

**PhD Thesis Research Proposal**  
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**1. Short descriptive title:**

**Civil Society and Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo:  
 A Study of Dam-Affected Communities resulting from the  
 Inga Hydropower Project**

**2. Background and outline of research problem:**

Megaprojects are often subject to ‘optimism bias’ (Mott MacDonald, 2002: 1), which in short means that policy-makers and the projects’ stakeholders overlook the costs and at the same time overestimate the benefits of the projects. These shortcomings often result in the following consequences. First, there is a particular kind of cost-benefit analysis that privileges the national economic interests and underplays the local impacts of at the vicinity of the megaprojects. Second, ‘optimism bias’ overlooks the public interests of the communities which will be affected by the projects. Thus, communities affected by the socio-environmental effects of the projects are awarded little or no compensation for their disrupted livelihoods. Macamo (2005: 7) agrees and stresses that ‘development itself, within the African context, is one of the major unacknowledged sources of unpredictability in the everyday life of Africans’. Third, ‘optimism bias’ reflects a particular way of thinking about development which often excludes the poor from benefiting from ‘conventional development models and paths to modernity’ (Wignaraja, 1993: 3). This of course does not preclude the political and economic elites enriching themselves through kickbacks and inflated invoicing during the project’s lifespan. Indeed, wealth accumulation of the elites is often accompanied by its notorious underside, the deeper impoverishment of ordinary citizens. Lastly, ‘optimum bias’ forces countries involved in the mega projects to continue spending money in both the maintenance of the infrastructures and debt repayment without getting expected revenues and consequently making most the mega projects ‘white elephants’<sup>1</sup>. Megaprojects are also sometimes characterised by corruption, cost overruns, schedule delays, benefit shortfalls. As a result, these projects remain controversial in terms of economic justification and socio-environmental costs.

This research will investigate the impact of the first two phases of the Inga Hydropower Project (IHP), which divided into two phases - Inga 1 - commissioned in 1972 with a capacity of 351 MW, and Inga 2 - completed in 1982 with a capacity of 1,424 MW - on the dam-affected communities<sup>2</sup> and the Congolese people in general. Furthermore, it will seek to explore the role civil society is (and is not) playing in the first two phases of this project in the Bas Congo Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Inga 1 and Inga 2 cost US\$34.5 million and US\$460.0 million respectively (Zimmer, 2007: 22, 24). Inga 3 is estimated to cost \$5 billion (Hathaway, 2005: 6) whereas Grand Inga or Inga 4 was estimated to cost US\$55 billion in 2005 (Hathaway, 2005: 6) or US\$80 billion in 2008 (Hathaway, 2008; Allo, 2008), depending on the source. Once completed, Inga 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the Congo River, at the Inga Falls Site, in the western part of the DRC, will together have a capacity of 44,275.0 MW, making the IHP the biggest hydropower installation in the world. Indeed, it is a massive project which will cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Therefore, the stakes are high, and the risks greater because of the possibility of the project draining away much needed financial resources to repayment of debts which benefit the elites. The IHP will also

<sup>1</sup> ‘White elephant’ in this context refers to any burdensome possession which costs more than it is worth (Atwood, 2005)

<sup>2</sup> Dam-affected communities refers to both six clans of *Ayant Droits Fonciers* – Mankunku, Mbenza, Namba, Gimbi, Zalu and Futila – which were forcibly removed from and resettled outside the Inga Site because of the IHP and their host communities.

destroy the ecosystems of the Inga Falls Site and flood land for agriculture, or cause earthquakes, landslides, water borne diseases and water pollution. These dangers will affect not only the dam-affected communities and but also all Congolese whilst distant end consumers outside the DRC are insulated.

Civil Society organisations in the DRC are divided around the IHP. On the one hand, there are those who endorse the IHP for various reasons including fear of harassment from the police and state officials, a pro-governmental orientation and/or funding by the state, or because they lack of the proper information on the real costs and benefits of megaprojects (e.g. megadams) on local communities. On the other hand, there are civil society organisations which are reluctant to endorse the project because the legacy of the first two phases - Inga 1 and Inga 2 - taught them that the local communities and the DRC population in general did not see the benefits of increased revenues and hydroelectricity supply. In fact, this study will verify the dam-affected communities' claims that there was no consultation or compensation to displaced communities. Despite these controversies, the IHP's further development continues under the auspices of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, the World Energy Council, and state owned utilities of different countries involved in the project including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) because for them

The ultimate objective of Grand Inga is to bring affordable and clean energy to the African continent to economic development and to improve the standards of living. It offers a unique opportunity to move the African continent closer to achieving its sustainable-development goals (World Energy Council, 2008:7).

The quote above highlights the shift of responsibility for the project from the DRC state to multinational corporations through internationalisation of responsibilities. This tension between two trade-off between economic accountability of the DRC government to external financial interests (a hallmark of a neoliberalised state) and its civic (domestic) accountability to its citizens. The quote also points to the tension and relationship between the two contracts, creating economic growth with the revenues from the project at one level and improving the standard of living of Congolese people at another. In support this statement, Abrahamsen (2000: xiv, 117) argues that newly elected [freely and fairly, or taking power through military coup] governments had [and still have] two irreconcilable constituencies to appease: external donors and creditors in order to receive development aid, on the one hand; and their poor majorities whom they need to get re-elected, on the other. The external constituencies impose neoliberal economic policies (economic liberalisation, privatisation of state enterprises, and the commodification of basic services and rights) in order to secure aid. This in turn gives rise to public discontent, unpopularity during elections, and the need to interrogate and challenge the *status quo* from below. On the other hand, if governments try to meet the demands of their internal constituencies at the expense of this economic contract, they will lose much needed development aid. They are caught between a rock and a hard place, so governments more often than not turn to dictatorial practices in order to contain public discontent, silence critical voices, so they can meet the demands of external constituencies. External pressure for political and economic reforms consequently leads paradoxically to 'highly fragile democracies or imperfect democracy' limited to political competition without substantially meeting the needs of the poor; and the perpetuation of socio-political unrests which remains a permanent threat to peace, development, and international trade. Several liberation wars which took place in the DRC are good examples of the tight rope that governments must walk on in order to satisfy conflicting demands of the two constituencies. Lastly, for the Western Corridor and the World Energy Council, the beneficiaries Inga 3 and Inga 4 respectively - as those who benefit from Inga 1 and Inga 2 - are African people. However, these benefits will exclude most Congolese because only 6 percent of DRC population has access to electricity (Hütz-Adams, 2007: 4; Zimmer, 2007: 34). Yet, the Congolese people will bear the risks and externalities of this massive project even though they are structurally excluded from the electricity supply. The role of civil society organisations in this context is to make the DRC state accountable to its citizens and consequently enforcing the social contract between

the state and its citizens. They also have a duty to force multinational corporations to adhere to international ethics and rules that govern funding of megaprojects, and also define and promote strategies which will bring the IHP, although internationally conceived, to deliver benefits to the very local communities in the immediate vicinity of the project.

The aim of this study is to explore the logics and dynamics of the economic contract/ social contract trade-off confronted by the DRC government as represented in the Inga Hydropower Project (IHP), and to assess the ability of civil society organisations to impress civil accountability on the state. In that respect, there is a need to re-think the whole concept of civil society – as a means of interrogating power and development projects (Howell and Pearse, 2001) - in the light of investigations of the real socio-political forces at work in the DRC and at the IHP in particular.

The study will be carried out in 13 villages of the dam-affected communities representing the ancestral homeland of the six clans of *Ayant Droits Fonciers*<sup>3</sup>. The main reason for this focus is: firstly, the aim of development projects should be to improve the lives of dam-affected communities and the country at large, through direct benefits such as job creation, access to adequate social and economic opportunities, and infrastructural investment (i.e. running water, electricity, roads, etc.). In addition, development projects should empower the surrounding communities through capacity building, technology and skills transfer.

Secondly, development projects should not be trapping the ‘beneficiaries’ into poverty-production (Øyen, 2002: 5–8) by burdening them with vast financial obligations (debt servicing) incurred from the projects in the first place, which in some cases do not benefit the communities or the country as a whole. This is the potential paradox of megaprojects. They are conceived as antipoverty initiatives; but they are a major cause of producing poverty. Why and how does this happen? Is it happening in the IHP? If so, what are the dynamics? How does this illuminate the development process?

This study will examine the operational legal/policy framework of the IHP, and then correlate that to stakeholders’ transactions with dam-affected communities, to investigate whether discrepancies exist between official policies and their implementation. First, the study will examine the strategic priorities of the World Commission on Dams (2000: 213). This commission was established by the World Bank after construction of Inga 1 and Inga 2. Its recommendations will shed light on what the responsibilities of stakeholders were in the 1960s (Inga 1) and the 1980s (Inga 2), and this will inform the framework from which to understand the current rehabilitation of the existing phases, and the further development of the Inga Site for the Inga 3 and 4. Secondly, the study will explore the guidelines of the World Bank and African Development Bank on mega-development projects. Thirdly, the study will explore environmental laws of different countries involved in the IHP.

### 3. Preliminary literature review and reasons for choosing topic

This preliminary literature review is articulated into three interlinked themes: development aid or aid, megadam projects, and community struggles for socio-economic and environmental justice.

Aid is important for economic growth and poverty alleviation (Radelet, 2006: 6). In fact, economic growth could not happen in some countries without aid (MacGillivray, 2004: 4). Botswana and Korea, and the international campaigns against river blindness, small pox and polio are good examples of positive contributions of aid. Critics, however, point to some weaknesses inherent in aid. Firstly, aid increases government bureaucracies, sustains bad bloated governments, and benefits the political and economic elites at the expense of the poor majority (Lam and Wantchekon, 2003: 8). Secondly, aid is subject to diminishing

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<sup>3</sup> People whose ancestors were the first to occupy the Inga Falls site and who consequently ‘owned’ it [this is a traditional view of land ownership because in the DRC constitution, soil and everything it contains, belongs to the state].

returns, which occur when recipient countries reach their aid absorption capacities (McGillivray, 2004: 6). Thirdly, aid may cause the Dutch disease in recipient countries when it creates a shift from ‘traded goods sector to non-traded goods sector’ (Verbeke, 2007: 11). Fourthly, aid can be a vehicle for the corrupt acquisition of assets or hard currency, particularly from mega-development projects, which are then siphoned abroad into Swiss bank accounts (Collier, Hoefler, and Pattillo, 2004: 4). Therefore, this research project intends to contribute to critical and nuanced views on aid.

Aid, coupled with geopolitical and economic interests, is often directed to megaprojects with little or no economic justification. Politically motivated megaprojects are habitually subjects to social discontents and mobilisation from below which gives rise to a wide range of civil society activisms - ironically recommended by donor agencies to promote community ownership, good governance and public accountability - against both several development projects and neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s. Similarly, Petras (1997) argues that some [neoliberal] donor funding institutions began to finance and promote parallel strategies in the same manner in order to interrogate the role of the state and provide spontaneous assistance. Consequently, there is an inherent (or at least potential) tension in aid strategies between the disempowerment of citizens through the design and constitution of aid/ debt protocol, on the one hand, and the empowerment of citizens through effacement of state powers and strengthening of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), on the other hand. How does this tension play out in the IHP is the central concern of this research.

This section on megadam projects briefly reviews the Akosombo Dam in Ghana, the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the Three Gorges Dam Project in China, and the Narmada Dam Project in India, to highlight and discuss gaps in literature. These dams were selected because of their geographic dispersion across the world, the number of people displaced for the dams to come to fruition, and their total capacity, which more or less equals the size of the Inga 1 and Inga 2 of the IHP.

The construction of the Akosombo Dam between 1961 and 1964 and subsequent creation of the 8,480 km<sup>2</sup> Lake Volta – the world largest man-made lake in terms of surface area (Afari-Sefa, and Rodgers, 2007) – represent two major infrastructural investments of contemporary Ghana.

The Akosombo Dam was part of the ‘Ten Great Years 1951-1960’ national development plan designed to modernise and transform an agrarian economy to industrial-based economy in order to abolish poverty, ignorance, and disease in modern Ghana within a generation (BBC2, 1994; GIS, 1960; cited in Alhassan, 2009: 151)... This is because the welfare of our people is our chief pride, and it is by this that my government will be asked to be judged (Dzorgbo, 2001: 148; cited in Alhassan, 2009: 151)

Indeed, the overall positive socio-economic contribution of the Akosombo Dam is obvious. The dam provides electricity to 60 percent of the Ghanaian economy which is strongly dependent on the mining, manufacturing and commercial sectors. Secondly, electricity has made Ghana one of the most industrialised Western African countries, with a coverage of 50 percent (Alhassan, 2009: 153). The financial performance of the dam is considered to be successful because the operating profit was positively maintained from the 1985 to 1999. Thirdly, fish yield and fisheries-related activities increased in the dam reservoir representing 90 percent of all fish harvested in 2003 (Sarpong *et al.*, 2005). Lastly, Pittaluga *et al.* (2003; cited in Alhassan, 2009: 152) points to a ‘general state of well-being insofar as employment related aspects of poverty are concerned’.

However, some members of the communities displaced by the dam disagree. They argue that this economic contribution of the Akosombo Dam resulted in socio-economic and environmental costs to the communities living upstream and downstream. In fact, 740 villages were submerged by Lake Volta; 80,000 people were

forcibly displaced of whom 70,000 were resettled into 52 locations in standardised houses regardless of family size, traditions or livelihood activities. The remaining 10,000 people received inadequate compensation. There was also an increase in malaria, intestinal and urinary bilharzias cases (Peter and Baumgrtel, 2005: 6–10). Secondly, there were unequal share of benefits from the dam. Electricity generation as distribution focused mainly on the cities and industrial zones at the expenses of the rural areas where the displaced communities live as they try to rebuild their shattered lives. The dam-affected communities were finally provided with electricity only in 2000/2001 (Alhassan, 2009: 153).

In a separate study, Scudder (2003: 2) investigated the impact of the Aswan High Dam built between 1959 and 1970 in Egypt to provide water for sustainable irrigation, hydropower generation, flood control, navigation improvement, and domestic and industrial water provision. The dam reservoir created the 5,250 km<sup>2</sup> Nasser Lake and displaced at least 100,000 Egyptians and Sudanese Nubian nomads. Strzepek *et al.* (2006: 2-4) agree. They stressed that the dam intended ‘to convert a variable and uncertain flow of river water into a predictable and controllable flow’, to increase production of rice and cotton through irrigation, to facilitate navigation up and down the Nile for tourism and transportation of goods and people, and to generate electricity for all towns and villages in Egypt. Tortajada (2007: 7) and Biswas (2002) argued that the dam successfully protected Egypt from 9 years of droughts, from 1979 to 1988, and the high flood of 1988. In addition, the investment in agriculture and transport increased by 50 percent and 120 percent, respectively (Hasan, 1991; cited in Strzepek *et al.* (2006: 7). Furthermore, the construction of the dam has changed the hydraulic regime of the river downstream. In fact, the canalisation of the river was controlled by a series of dams and barrages that has reduced its length. Likewise, the number of islands in the river has declined from 150 before the Dam to 36 at present. Yet, the ‘New Pyramid’ (Biswas, 2002) caused serious erosion because of the flow of silt-free water (silt is now deposited behind the dam). This reduced soil fertility downstream because of the loss of the nitrogenous component need for crop production that silt possesses. As a result, thousands of tonnes of commercial fertilizers were needed to replace what the silt had naturally provided (Scudder, 2003: 2). Secondly, there is the annual deposit of 134 million tons of sediment in the High Aswan Dam reservoir (known as Lake Nasser) decreasing its storage capacity and life time each year (Shalsh, 1982: 623). Thirdly, the dam increased schistosomiasis (Biswas, 2002) and malaria cases in the surrounding areas. Fourthly, there was an unequal allocation of compensation as the Egyptian government gave more compensation and arable land to Nubians than any other communities in the resettlement process (Scudder, 2003: 17).

Scudder (2006: 41) argues that the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)’s objectives include providing water to South Africa, electricity to Lesotho, and improving the living standards of the dam-affected communities through access to clinics, electricity and roads. The LHWP background points to a combination of repressive regimes in both South Africa and Lesotho. In fact, the agreement between the two countries was signed in 1986 under the auspices of the Apartheid government in South Africa and a military dictatorship in Lesotho which came to power through a military coup that year. The World Bank played a catalyst role between the two countries and financial institutions because of economic sanctions imposed on South Africa at the time. In addition, the World Bank established a trust in the United Kingdom with the aim of addressing political sensitivities linked to the project. It is clear that there was neither consultation with nor compensation to the dam-affected-communities (Horta and Pottinger, 2006: 23). As a result, LHWP-induced resettlements exacerbated the precarious living standards of the impoverished majority of displaced people in several ways. Firstly, the LHWP-induced resettlement destroyed social capital of the displaced representing 36 percent of credit opportunities from relatives and friends. This in turn reduced community bonds and resilience against shock and vulnerability. Only 27.1 percent of households surveyed indicated that they benefited from a skills empowerment training of which 77.6 percent said that the training was inadequate. The participants indicated that they lost 50 percent of their sources of income (Sets’abi and Mashinini, 2006: 115-120). Secondly, there was a lack of transparency in the planning

process, a lack of environmental impact assessment studies, and widespread corruption since its inception. Thirdly, forced resettlement caused conflicts between the host communities which were not included in compensation plans and the resettlers. In addition, there was competition over natural resources including land for agriculture and burial, grazing space, and other natural resources (Horta and Pottinger (2006: 23–30). Thus, resettlers are poorer now than they were before the project despite all the promises.

The Chinese Three Gorges Dam Project - the world largest hydropower project - was built to control flooding in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River which killed 240,000 in 1870; 142,000 in 1935; 30,000 in 1954; and 3,000 in 1991; provides enough energy to the region as the country embarked on market oriented economic policies; and improve the Yangtze River navigability (Ponseti and Lopez-Pujol, 2006: 151-165). In contrast, sceptical dam opponents argue that the project is not economically justified because of (1) a lack of electricity demand in the region due to the closure of several state-owned industries; (2) sediment accumulation will reduce the general capacity after decades of operation; (3) navigation will be obstructed by the sedimentation process after construction of the dam; (4) the dam reservoir will modify the scenery of the area and destroy distinctive archaeological features of the area thus undermining tourism; and (5) the project will forcibly remove 1,200,000 people with little or no compensation (Ponseti and Lopez-Pujol, 2006: 166-178). In support of this view, Jing (1997: 65-68) argues that the Three Gorges has been an economic, political, and environmental disaster since its inception because of the lack of consultation with and insufficient compensation to the affected communities, lack of transparency in compensation, cost overruns, destruction of peoples livelihoods, and displacement of a large number of people. Allin (2004: 3-4, 18-28, 38) agrees with the previous author and concluded that although the project brought considerable economic benefits such as reducing flood, increasing trade, and producing energy; (1) the project was planned as a top-down and non-participatory; (2) the project was motivated by politics rather than socio-economic considerations; (3) the project violated the seven strategic priorities and the five key decision points of the World Commission on Dams. As a result, the costs of the project are borne by the poorest and most marginalised communities.

In India, the Narmada Project will irrigate 1.8 million ha of land, provide drinking water to 8,000 villages, and produce 145 megawatts of electricity (Mazumdar, Sarkar, and Sathe; 2000). It will consist of 2 megadams, 30 large dams, 135 medium dams and 3000 small reservoirs (Baviskar, 2001: 5; Metha, 2005: 12; Mazumdar, Sarkar, and Sathe; 2000) and will displace 4 million people from 245 villages (Mazumdar, Sarkar, and Sathe; 2000). For local communities, the Narmada project means forced displacement, land dispossession, homelessness, traumatic resettlement; in short the process of *poverty-production* (Oyen, 2002: 5). Meth's (2001: 2-4) 'analysis of gender, [forced] displacement and [resettlement] policies in India' supports this argument and stresses that women are often caught in a double bind. On one hand, male bias in society helps reinforce gender discrimination in terms of unequal distribution and access to resources and also validates "the silencing of women's interests in forced displacement processes". On the other hand, "biases within state institutions, structures and policies" dealing with resettlement and rehabilitation perpetuates and worsens these differences. Hemadri *et al.* (2000: iii-xx) agree and point to several problems including (1) the absence of comprehensive planning for rehabilitation, (2) undervaluation of compensation, (3) inability of rural communities to handle the compensation in cash, failure to acquire alternate fertile lands, (4) inhospitable sites, (5) multiples displacements, (6) state failure to provide alternative livelihoods, and (7) unwillingness of some host communities to welcome the displaced as well as a cultural clashes between the resettled and indigenous communities. As a result, the victims of development-induced displacement and resettlement have resisted development projects from their inception until today. Earlier resistance was erratic, localised, disorganised, and reflecting the sporadic discontent of those to be displaced. Nowadays, resistance is organised, constant, and has been successful in networking and building strong alliances both at the national and international. That is why, current struggles have significant influence on challenging the purpose of development projects (Hemadri *et al.*, 2000: xxv)

In summary, development projects, and megaprojects in particular, have mixed outcomes in the African context. Development projects also lead to a tension between technical solutions and democratic solutions to poverty alleviation through fair redistribution of resources, community empowerment, and subsequent development. Megaprojects could be seen as tools for sustainable development if there was a fair share of the costs and the benefits among people involved. However, this is not often the case. The selected literatures highlight instead the impoverishment of the ordinary citizens through dispossession of land and water, destruction of the livelihoods and social capital, a lack of consultation with and compensation to the affected communities, repayment of debts, and the inability of ordinary people to pay the services generated by development projects.

In support to this, Scott (1998: 88-90) argues that the most disastrous of state development in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries began with a concoction of three ingredients. The first ingredient is the administrative ordering of nature and society i.e. high-modernist ideology<sup>4</sup>. The second ingredient is an uncontrolled use of power of state as a tool for achieving these plans. The third ingredient is a weakened civil society that lacks the ability to refuse to accept these plans. In other words, the state-sponsored disasters are a result of rulers with extravagant and utopian plans for their societies [regardless of the outcomes of these designs. Ordinary people develop informal networks and activities in order to survive. These livelihoods substitute the short comings and failures of development projects]. In the same vein, Ferguson (1990: 252) contends that development projects produce unacknowledged effects in the world and African countries in particular. In fact, development projects may expand state bureaucratic power through ‘provision of services which serve to govern and politically control the country’. In addition, there is a shift in search for and understanding of political realities of poverty into technical problems which need appropriate and technical solutions from development agencies and experts rather than a political will from the state as it is often the case across the world.

Previous studies on the megaprojects and megadams in particular focus on the socio-economic and environmental consequences of these projects. Thus, the contribution of this research to this body of knowledge will be to (1) document the impact of the IHP on local communities and DRC, (2) reveal the responsibilities of people and institutions involved, and – given that resettlers are often worse off after the move – show the unequal share of costs and benefits between rural and urban areas, the poor and the rich, residential areas and industrial zones, as it is often difficult for dam-affected communities to successfully resist large dam projects. And finally, (3) explore the strategies that the dam-affected communities and civil society at large could use to break the cycle of the ‘resource curse’ and the subsequent poverty.

I have chosen this topic for practical and theoretical reasons. The practical reasons consist of the following. First, no major study of this important development project has been undertaken before, and no questions have been posed or answered about the actual or potential role development aid, the DRC government, and civil society in Inga 1 and Inga 2 play. Second, neoliberal literature on dam and development paradigm, how development should occur, and the assumptions of hydroelectricity as clean and cheap energy need to be interrogated to shed light on both costs and benefits of megadam projects to the rich and the poor, as well as urban and rural areas. Third, it is assumed that the burden of servicing the debt by the DRC from the initial phases and the additional debt to be incurred for the final phases of the IHP is hampering the funding of other state projects, such as welfare and education, which are vital to the development of this war-torn country. Theoretically, this study intends to contribute to the body of knowledge on civil society as a means of interrogating power and the purpose of development, and on strategies that local civil society

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<sup>4</sup> High-modernist ideology refers to ‘a strong version of the self-confidence about scientific and technological progress in order to satisfy human needs, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, mastery of nature, and rational design of social order commensurate with scientific understanding of natural laws’ (Scott, 1998: 4)

organisations could use in order to move from failed/unsuccessful opposition of megaprojects such as Inga 1 and Inga 2 to community involvement and ownership of these projects and fair (re)distribution of revenue.

#### 4. Research problems and questions

As mentioned above, this thesis intends to document (1) the impact of Inga 1 and Inga 2 on the dam-affected communities and (2) the role played by civil society in the first two phases of the IHP and current development of the project. Thus the key research questions are as follows:

1. *What can we learn from the history of IHP?* To answer this question it requires exploring the role of development aid and development agencies in the 1960s-80s, as well as more recently in the rehabilitation of the first two phases. For example what kinds of alliances existed that supported or challenged the IHP, and whether they were between which state and business stakeholders? What international and national laws were applied in the DRC regarding environmental impact assessments, regulations controlling the construction of large dams, safety regulations for the protection of communities living close to dams, communal property rights that may accrue to these communities by reason of ownership through traditional leaders, and the need to compensate people displaced or deprived of their livelihoods by IHP projects?
2. *What has been the role of civil society in the DRC before, during, and after the construction of Inga 1 and 2, and what is it likely to be in the development of Inga 3 and Inga 4?* What does the IHP mean to local civil society groups? What challenges do local civil society groups have so that IHP relations break - not amplify - the cycle of 'resource curse' and poverty? What are the attitudes of the dam-affected communities and Congolese civil society in general, given their earlier experiences of Inga 1 and Inga 2, to new hydropower projects?

#### 5. Research objectives

In order to fully answer the research questions above, this dissertation seeks to achieve the following objectives:

*What can we learn from the history of IHP?*

1. To investigate the role of international financial institutions, transnational corporations and development agencies, as well as the local Congolese state, their policy guidelines and possible alliances in megaprojects, especially with regards to the IHP.
2. To understand impoverishment risks faced due to forced-displacement and post-resettlement situation.
3. To document the achievements and limitations of dam-induced displacement and resettlement plans and policies if any, especially relating to livelihood restoration.

*What has been the role of civil society in the DRC before, during, and after the construction of Inga 1 and 2, and what is it likely to be in the development of Inga 3 and Inga 4?*

4. To examine the socio-economic and environmental impacts of Inga 1 and Inga 2 on the dam-affected communities and vulnerable groups (women, the elderly, people with disabilities, and unaccompanied minors), and Congolese people in general.

5. To explore the degree and nature of responses from the local communities to the IHP in the 1960s and 1980s, and presently; and the reasons for these specific attitudes to this massive project.
6. To explore the possibilities for the dam-affected communities, and DRC civil society in general, to benefit from the IHP.

## **6. Principal theories upon which the research project will be constructed (research design)**

This research project will contrast various approaches to development that have emerged from modernisation theories, the theory of class and modes of production, and theories of social movements.

### **6.1. Modernisation theories**

The IHP is a modernisation project inspired from modernisation theory. It therefore needs to be explored and understood within the context of various modernisation theories relevant to this research project because the IHP intends to integrate the DRC into the global system of production and exchange. In addition, the IHP will allow the DRC to move its economy and technology from traditional socio-economic models to a condition of modernity requisite for economic development (Henshaw, 2005: 2–4). Lastly, the IHP is seen as a technical solution to poverty and underdevelopment. This approach to poverty alleviation overlooks ‘the complex and deeply embedded political and economic factors structure and shape poverty and inequalities’ (Moodley, 2005: iv). It also undermines the human ability to search for ‘appropriate alternative paths to development’ (Moodley, 2005: 64). In support to this, Ferguson (1990: 87, 256) contends that the net result of depoliticisation of poverty is the translation political problems - a lack of political will to efficiently to alleviate poverty - into technical problems which need technical solutions from development aid.

A starting point would be problematising Walter Rostow’s theory of the stages of economic growth that says the growth follows the path from traditional society, to the pre-condition for take-off or transitional stage, to the take off, the drive to maturity; and lastly the age of mass consumption (Todaro, 1994: 70, 73). Also problematising Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of innovations, which involves: production of new types of goods, or change of properties of existing goods; introduction of new methods of production, that may be based on new scientific discoveries; opening of a new markets; use of new sources of raw materials and intermediate goods; and new organisation in production point to the move from traditional settings and technologies to modernity necessary for economic growth and development (Freeman, 2007: 7). The study will also look at Bernard Kabatu-Suila’s theory (2004a: 7, 16, 20–23) of five priority conditions for development – political will; the average level of education of the indigenous population; economic infrastructures; the industrialisation of countries; and the contribution of the agriculture sector in the economy (or control by the indigenous population of the management of the agricultural sector) – developed from the ineffectiveness of Rostow’s theory and Schumpeter’s theory in the context of Third-World countries. He argued that these earlier modernisation theories, although relevant for North America and Western Europe, were not applicable to developing countries, for several reasons which were not included in Rostow’s and Schumpeter’s studies. Looking at Kabatu-Suila’s theory (2004a: 7, 16, 20–23), incidentally a Congolese scholar, it would be doubtful to expect positive outcomes from the IHP because only one out of five priority conditions is met, namely the level of education. The remaining four are less likely to be met in a near future for various reasons including poor political leadership and the negative impacts of foreign involvement in the day-to-day politics of the DRC. This situation is illustrated by the fact that only 64.6 percent of revenue from the Inga 1 and Inga 2 electricity sold inside and outside the DRC is collected by the *SNEL* (World Bank, 2007: 26-27, 34, 95, and 97). Poor recovery mechanisms is a result of bad governance and a lack of political will to engage competent people, fairly share resource, and develop

the country. The World Bank (1989: 60; cited in Abrahamsen, 2000: 60) agrees. It consequently advises that 'African tradition based on the strong family and ethnic ties', inefficient and unaccountable administrations, should not have any place in central [, provincial and local] governments where individuals need to be selected on merit because officials should not confuse public funds with private monies as it is always the case..

## 6.2. Marx's theory of social class and modes of production

Marx's theory will help the researcher to understand the ways in which megaprojects produce unequal shares of costs and benefits between (1) city and rural areas, (2) 'insider' and 'outsider' citizen groups (structural exclusion), (3) the process and practice of accumulation by dispossession of other people's assets or rights (Harvey, 2003: 137), and (4) the capacity of citizen groups to struggle for citizenship rights. In addition, Marxist notions of uneven and combined development explain the backwardness of rural areas - where most of energy is produced - to the benefit of the cities where most consumers live. Lastly, Marx's theory argues that the accumulation of wealth by one class - the bourgeoisie - is coupled with dispossession, exploitation and impoverishment of another class - the proletariat (Bond and Desai, 2006: 230). This in turn leads to class conflict and the struggle.

Marx's theory on social class contends that 'the owners of the means of production exploit those who produce goods and services, while the working class becomes alienated consumers' (Gingrich, 2008). Wright (1999: 1-3) argues that any system of production needs a variety of resources whose use can be described as 'production function or social relation' in which individuals involved have different kinds of rights and powers. Social class and subsequent inequality between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are shaped by the social relations and materialised through exploitation and domination. Exploitation takes the form of interdependence of material interests of individual actors. It makes sure that the material well-being of exploiters casually depends upon the material deprivation of the exploited. Second, the inverse interdependence of the well-being of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat depends upon the exclusion of the proletariat from having access to certain productive functions. Thirdly, the exclusion of the proletariat produces material gain for the bourgeoisie because it allows this class to appropriate the labour power of the proletariat. Domination, on the other hand, refers to the position given to some people by virtue of rights and powers over the productive function, to control other people's activities, to direct them, to hire and fire them (Wright, 1999: 12-13). As three important branches of Marxism that replied to modernisation theory's notion of development, this thesis will consider dependency theory (Ferraro, 1999; Vernengo, 2004: 1-12), World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 1974; Goldfrank, 2000; Ridener, 1976; Skocpol, 1977: 1075; Zhu, 2008), and the theory of uneven and combined development (Trotsky, 1906; Novack, 2002; Bond and Desai, 2006) as alternative to main development thinking. They challenged Marxist' conflict within a single states stressing the international nature of capital and labour flows and subsequent repercussions for economic and political processes at the societal as well as for the reproduction of the inequalities (Moghadam, 2000: 721).

The reasons that such theories will have relevance to the IHP are the following: Dependency theory emphasises a strong influence of external forces / core states on policy development of peripheral countries [such as the DRC] through national elites (Ferraro, 1999; Vernengo, 2004: 1-12). In the same vein, the world system theory points to the domination and control of a vast region by "a single political system"; but also to a situation where "a single political system does exist over all, or virtually all, of the space (Kardulias, 1996). Domination occurs through dispossession of land and other resources. In support to this thinking, the theory of uneven and combined development (Trotsky, 1906; Novack, 2002; Bond and Desai, 2006: 230) contends that the development of historically backward societies [like the DRC] leads necessarily to a mixture of - pre-capitalist and capitalist development, [and accumulation of wealth by the

elites and acute impoverishment of the majority<sup>5</sup>] – different phases in the historical process (Novack, 2002). Competition over conflicting interests and the role of the state as ‘an instrument of economic exploitation and political control’ (Held, 1996: 134) lay the foundation for various forms of class struggle, including social movements.

### 6.3. Theories of social movements

Finally, theories of agency ‘from below’ – based on social movement mobilisation – are important, even if quiescence and concessions have characterised IHP victims so far. These theories are important for this research because

... as the poor and vulnerable groups in the South deepen their understanding of their reality, they also, through greater conscious-raising and awareness, action and organisation, can bring about changes both in their lives and in the society that will lead to human development and participatory democracy (Wignaraja, 1993: 4).

The attempts to bring changes can occur through individuals’ involvement by means of direct actions, lobbying the international community and advocating for the affected communities with less or opportunities to voice their concern at local, international and transnational levels. The changes will also need the contributions of a wide range of activists (NGOs and transnational advocacy networks - TANs), the private sector, policy makers, incumbent politicians in power, the opposition both inside and outside the country.

In the context of this study, social movement refers to ‘a series of demands or challenges to power-holders in the name of social category that lacks an established political [, social and economic] position’ (Tilly, 1985: 735-6, cited in Strutt, 1987:39)

The resource mobilisation (RM) theory pays particular attention on how groups organize themselves to follow their goals by ‘mobilising and managing resources’ (Canel, 1997). It tries to explain how material and non-material resources and the structure of political opportunities give rise to collective action. It also explores ‘how movements and their institutions are organized’ (Swain, 2001: 10). The RM theory argues that social movements emerge as a result of two factors. Firstly, there are internal factors – leadership, extent of available resources, group strength and degree of internal organisation – and external factors – the degree of societal repression, extent of the third party involvement, and strength of pressure group (Domokos-Bays, 1997: 8; Canel, 1997). Secondly, there are social, political, and economic inequalities, and conflict over the misuse of existing resources and the formation of new ones. Struggles for material and non-material resources represent the main feature of social movements, (Domokos-Bays, 1997: 8; Canel, 1997). Canel (1997) and Strutt (1987: 39) contend that there are two orientations dealing with factors that influence success or failure of social movement within the RM theory. The first model, ‘political-interactive’, explores the processes that initiate social movements. Its focal point consists of changes in the structure of political opportunities for group action, pre-existing networks, shared grievances within the group through political power and resources, interests and group solidarity. The second model, ‘organisational-entrepreneurial, looks at organisational dynamics, leadership and resource management’. It utilises economic and organizational theories to analyse social movements (Canel, 1997). In other words, ‘social movements arise not out of goals and grievance [which have always been there] but from change in resources, organisation, and opportunities for collective actions’ (Strutt, 1987: 38). Thus, prosperous societies are breeding grounds for social movement entrepreneurs. Rich societies also promote ‘conscience

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<sup>5</sup> Bond, P. and Desai, A. 2006. “Explaining uneven and combined development in South Africa”. In B. Dunn (Ed.), *Permanent Revolution: Results and Prospects 100 Years On*. London: Press: 230–244.

constituents' who donate various resources to social movement industry. Furthermore, the increase of the welfare state is a source of increased collective activity (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; McAdam et al., 1988: 702–3; cited in Canel, 1997).

The new social movement (NSM) theory is a reaction to the resource mobilisation theory and the Marxist approaches to collective action. It originated in Europe and is facilitated by the emerging of new values and subsequently includes a wide range of social movements (Swain, 2001: 5). Canel (1997) argues that the new social movement theory intended to redress two economic and class reductionisms which prevented the Marxists from understanding the dynamic of collective action and contemporary social movements. The economic reductionism is the 'assumption that economic logic justifies the unity of collective action and underlies its political and ideological processes'. As a result, economic reductionism contends that economic factors are more important in theorising collective actions than politics and ideological conflicts. Class reductionism, on the other hand, argues that 'the assumption that the identity of social agents is given to them overwhelmingly by their class position'. All social actors are, ultimately and fundamentally, class actors; their identity reflects individuals with common economic interests (Mouffe, 1979: 169; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 76; cited in Canel, 1997). The new social movement theory then 'interrogates modernity both as a reality and as an ideal'.

According to the SNM, the social field contested by social movement is neither the market nor the state. It is civil society: the domain of struggles, public spaces, and political processes; it comprises the realm in which the creation of norms, identities, and social relations of domination and resistance are located (Cohen, 1985: 700; cited in Strutt, 1987: 41).

The NSMs consist of a wide range of movements of which the most important include the green, peace movement, religious, spiritual movements (Domokos-Bays, 1997: 8), and the movements sponsored by the states to sustain and strengthen state power (Swain, 2001: 2) in order to create a buffer between the *status quo* dominated by the state, and revolutionary vision of some social movements. In short, the NSM theory identifies long-term changes that generate new structural, political and cultural conditions which become the breeding grounds for the emergence of various forms of social movements. The NSM theory does not, however, 'explain how strategies, decisions, resources, opportunities and other factors converge to give rise to social movement'. In addition, 'it excludes the dynamics of mobilization, political action, the relationship between SMs, and other important factors' (Canel, 1997).

The political opportunity theory holds that variations in political openness differently affect the degree of social mobilisations within cities and countries. Repressive cities and those which constantly discouraged communities from organising independently, prevented protests more easily than those with political 'openings and participation' (Eisinger, 1973; cited in Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 1460). Activists are therefore constantly watching for structural changes in policy, signals from particular institutional actors, political alignment, development and deployment of a particular identity, and several other opportunities to move into a favourable context for mobilisation to voice their claims (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 1459–1463). Yet, the structure of political opportunities/ constraints represents a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence and development of social movements/ revolutions. In fact, the combination of political opportunities, and the perception of 'high costs for inactivity and a strong feeling of threat' are good ingredients for the formation of collective actions. McAdam *et al.* (1996: 1–11) agrees and emphasises that social movements/ revolutions emerge [at both national and transnational levels] as a result of three equally important conceptual elements. First, there is a broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national and international contexts in which they are embedded. Second, there are mobilising structures – religious and lay organisations, professional associations, informal and formal friendship networks through which individuals actively organise and engage in collective action – represent the cornerstones of social movements and successful or aborted revolutions. Third and lastly, framing processes

or political processes which consists of shared grievance, optimistic vision of their ability to redress the problem, and constructed ideas in collective actions.

The transnational social movement theory (TNSM) draws on political opportunities/ constraints [, mobilising structures, and shared grievances] at the international level which may translate into similar factors at certain times and in certain countries (Kolb, 2003: 2, 9-10). Giugni (2002: 15-27) agrees with the previous author and draws attention to three basic concepts that explain remarkable similarities of contemporary social movements across various countries. First, ‘the globalisation model’ emphasizes the way the interconnectedness of the world motivates transnational structures and processes which may have comparable effects in diverse countries. Globalisation provides an opportunity for an increased consciousness around common issues such as pollution, global warming, terrorism... and the negative impacts of the IHP on local people and their ecosystems. Second, ‘the structural affinities model’ argues that similar structures in different countries lead to convergent pattern of movements. However, similar political opportunity/ constraints among countries do not necessarily create similar social movements. Thirdly, ‘the diffusion model’ that describes the resemblance among collective behaviour through ‘direct (networks) or indirect (media)’ might spread the information of protest across countries (Giugni, 2002: 15-27). Regardless of their motives and outcomes, transnational social movements should meet the following similar features throughout the world: (1) issues, themes, and goals; (2) levels of mobilisation; (3) strategies, tactics, and forms of action; (4) organisational structural; (5) cultural frames, ideas, and discourses; and (6) timing of protest Giugni, 2002: 27). However, modern transnational advocacy networks echo past international campaigns including the abolition of slavery in the US in 1833-65; woman suffrage between 1888 and 1928; and eradication of foot-binding in China in between 1874 and 1911, and female circumcision among the Kikuyu in Kenya in 1920-31. Critics point out to two main weaknesses of past international campaigns. In fact, the antislavery movement overlooked wage slavery whereas the woman suffrage movement ignored subordination of women in society and at homes (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 39-40). The TNSM explains the emergence, rise and proliferation of the Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) which bring hope to unnoticed local struggles against socio-economic and environmental injustice, ‘unresponsive or repressive states through cross-border activity around shared values, common discourse, and dense exchange of information (Bob, 2005: 3).

The above mentioned theories are relevant to the present research on the IHP because, in the first place, the poor and ordinary citizens are often excluded from redistribution of revenue from mega projects including the IHP. Secondly, the poor in both rural and urban areas are also structurally excluded from these projects through their inability to afford electricity and water because of the high prices of these services. Thirdly, social movements “are unlikely to have any stable character, and they bear varying relationships to other political and social institutions and practices (Thomas, 1996; cited in Swain, 2001: 5) because different people get involved for various ideas and agendas. Fourthly, these theories shed light on the absence of vibrant and competent social movements in some countries including the DRC that I am going to elaborate in the following paragraph.

In fact, Nzongal-Ntalaja (2003: 61-93; 121-212) explores specifically the reactions of civil society organisations to the expansion of capitalism in the DRC from colonial to post-colonial epochs. He concluded that there has been a well documented resistance to different forms of capitalist expansion in the DRC. In fact, there was a series of liberation wars from 1895 to 1908, the politico-religious movements since the 1920s, and peasants’ and workers’ revolts from 1900 to 1945. This resistance laid a foundation for modern mass nationalism which led to struggles for several forms of struggles for independence. Indeed, there were struggles for the first independence from the Belgian imperialist bourgeoisie from 1920 to 1960, the second independence from Congolese political and economic petty bourgeoisie or *new whites* between 1964 and 1977, and the third independence against Mobutu regime and his western allies between 1992 and 1996. In support to this, Rento, Seddon and Zeilig (2007: 33) contend that Congolese vehemently resisted

to the western capitalism of accumulation by dispossession and looting of the natural resources since the Belgian invasion of the DRC. In fact, from King Msiri's defeat in 1891, Batetela's revolt in 1895, to several rebellions within between 1890 and 1895 and the Mai-Mai traditional fighters since 1996; Congolese had resisted and continue to do so against various forms of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. How does this historical legacy of resistance translates itself to the Inga Hydropower Project and income generated by the project, and the dam-affected communities' struggles for socio-economic and environmental justice? This is what this research project will investigate.

In the meantime, L'Ecuyer (2004: 85-90) points to some of the weaknesses of Congolese civil society organisations which may negatively influence the struggle for social and economic justice around the IHP. Indeed, he argues, that there are many internal divisions in the eastern part of DRC - South and North Kivu, Katanga, and Kasai - which remain the breeding grounds for insurgency, armed conflicts and regional and foreign invasions that led to social upheaval, mayhem, rape and murder. This region has ironically the highest number of civil society organisations in the DRC. Yet, the fragmentation of the DRC into 'spheres of interests' has existed since Mobutu's dictatorship. What is currently new is the scale of fragmentation, violence and the scale of carnage. The Congolese are so demoralised that the anti-dictatorship political and social movements have become mere spectators rather than agents for social change. They watch helplessly the fragmentation of their country without the capacity to influence the main political actors at both local and national levels, the power to mobilise people on a massive scale or the ability to influence/ lobby the political opposition to adopt a clear united position. The social movements take the form of associations for human rights - rather than as catalyst for radical changes - actively involved in regular 'reports on human rights violations, accounts of thefts and looting of natural resources committed by different armed groups'. (L'Ecuyer, 2004: 85-90). Petras (1997)'s research finding on 'Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America' shed light on L'Ecuyer (2004: 85-90)'s research finding on division and ineffective civil society organisations and states

As opposition to neoliberalism grew [in the developing countries in Africa and Latin America] in the early 1980s, the U.S. and European governments and the World Bank increased their funding of NGOs. There is a direct relation between the growth of social movements challenging the neoliberal model and the effort to subvert them by creating alternative forms of social action through the NGOs. The basic point of convergence between the NGOs and the World Bank was their common opposition to "statism". On the surface the NGOs criticized the state from a "left" perspective defending civil society, while the right did so in the name of the market. In reality, however, the World Bank, the neoliberal regimes, and western foundations co-opted and encouraged the NGOs to undermine the national welfare state by providing social services to compensate the victims of the MNCs (Petras, *ibid*).

In support to this, Petras and Vermeyer (2005: 220-240) argue in their research finding on 'social movements and state power' in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador that foreign funding to local NGOs divert people's demands and expectations from the state to localised and small interventions. As a result, the 'local development provides micro-solutions to micro problems, designed as a means of eluding confrontation with power structure and substantive change'. Similarly, in the DRC there was a rise of two opposition movements to challenge the peak of Mobutu's dictatorship in the 1980s brought substantial funding from western non-governmental organisations (NGOs). First, there was the internal opposition (the student movement, the Group of 13 Member of Parliament, the *Union pour Democratie et le Progres Social* and the Sacred Union, a coalition of opposition movements to Mobutu government). Second, the externally based opposition consisted of *Movement d'Action pour la Resurrection du Congo* (MARC) and the *Front de Liberation Nationale Congolaise* (FLNC) (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 61, 95 and 171). The funding in turn became incentives for the mushrooming of new multiple civil society organisations commonly known as NGOs which began in the eastern part of the country through the church

organisations. The ‘tendency’ then moved to the western part of the DRC before spreading to the rest of the country. However, the increase of number of civil society organisations against Mobutu’s dictatorship paradoxically and surprisingly reinforced the *status quo*. The funding small interventions diverted the expectations and struggles for better life of the Congolese poor from the state towards the NGOs which could never replace the state. In addition, the mix of acute poverty, chronic unemployment, poor and incompetent leadership within several NGOs and political opportunism resulted in substituting these organisations to income generation activities for their members. Some also used them as stepping stones for political positions in the government. Mobutu became stronger with the emergence of civil society organisations.

This research project will investigate whether or not there is any change in the vision and positive impacts of the DRC civil society organisation in the lives ordinary Congolese, and the reasons for radical change or the absence of radical change.

## **7. Research methodology and methods**

### **7.1. Data collection**

#### *Qualitative research*

##### **7.1.1. In-depth interviews (structured and semi-structured): with closed and opened-ended questions**

I will use in-depth interviews, both structured and non-structured, with open-ended and closed-ended questions, in order to collect life histories for qualitative analysis from the dam-affected communities, civil society organisations involved in socio-economic and environmental justice, illegitimate debts cancellation, indigenous people’s rights and development-induced displacement. I will also interview the collaborators of these civil society organisations, DRC government officials, and ordinary Congolese citizens in Matadi and Kinshasa. In-depth interviews will also be used for officials at the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and other institutions involved in the projects.

I will interview 120 people from the following backgrounds: (1) 26 people from the dam-affected communities, (2) 6 *Ayant Droits* or clans’ representatives, (3) 15 representatives from local civil society organisations (from Boma and Inga Site, Matadi, and Kinshasa), (4) 5 representatives from transnational civil society organisations (based outside the DRC), (5) 10 DRC officials (National Company of Electricity, Environmental Study Group, National Energy Council, Ministry of Energy, and the Office of Management of Public Debt), (6) 6 representatives from the financial institutions and development agencies (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, European Investment Bank, ESKOM-South Africa, and the World Energy Council), (7) 8 ordinary Congolese citizens, and (8) 8 ordinary citizens from Southern African Development Community countries, excluding the DRC, involved in further development of the Inga Hydropower Project (Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, and Angola), and 24 from four focus group discussions.

Within my population of interest - individuals affected by the IHP and ordinary people inside and outside the DRC - which is already diverse and heterogeneous my exploration will focus on gender (male versus female), marital status (single versus married) and age differential (youth versus old age). The aim of this approach is to ensure that my sampling is inclusive and the result is representative according to the focus of the study because different people in different settings face specific challenges.

##### **7.1.2. Participant observation**

Participatory observation will consist of observing and participating in the study communities' daily activities. My observations at the Inga Falls Site will focus on the dam-affected communities, workers on the dam, community leaders, church leaders and a few individuals, including women and other persons whose status is precarious (the elderly, orphans and the disabled). I shall try to determine what day-to-day challenges they have faced since the building of the first two phases of the IHP. At the Head Office in Kinshasa of the *Société Nationale d'Electricité* (SNEL)<sup>6</sup>, I will focus on the management of the project to in order to understand it better.

### **7.1.3. Focus group discussion**

I will organise four focus groups of six people each of similar backgrounds in the Inga Falls Site, Boma, Matadi, and Kinshasa, in order to obtain in-depth information on their perceptions of the IHP. Participants will be asked how the project has affected their lives and what possibilities they see for a better future for themselves and their children's children.

### **7.1.4. Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model**

The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model contends that forced displacement can cause impoverishment among the displaced through landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources, increased morbidity and mortality and community disarticulation, unless it is particularly addressed by targeted policies. To counteract these effects, the model suggests that reconstructing and improving the livelihoods of forcibly displaced communities needs 'risk-reversal' through specific strategies supported by adequate funding (Cernea, 1997: 1–2; Scudder, 2005: 44).

### ***Quantitative research***

#### **7.1.5. Descriptive research**

The descriptive research will describe the data and the characteristics of the sample. It will also answer the questions *who*, *what*, *where*, *when* and *how*, concerning the participants, the timeframe and the nature of their answers.

#### **7.1.6. Policy document survey**

I shall conduct a survey of policy documents, legislation, reports, official records and statistics from the relevant departments of the DRC government, related to water rights, and this will include energy-related issues, property rights, land ownership, indigenous communities' rights, and legal provisions in case of land dispossession for projects of national interest. The study will also look at the international treaties and regulations to which the DRC is signatory, as well as the policies of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank on megaprojects, in order to identify gaps in information that this study is going to fill.

#### **7.1.7. Situational mapping**

'Right is not a standard granted by a charity from above' (Shivji, 198: 3; cited in Mander, 2005: 143). The notion of social justice belongs within the power relations between the oppressor and the oppressed, the dominant and the oppressed, humans and non-humans. Accordingly,

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<sup>6</sup> SNEL stands for *Société Nationale d'Electricité*, the state utility concerned with the production, transportation, distribution and sale of electricity.

three situational maps and analyses will be used: (1) situational maps. They refer to strategies for articulation the elements in the situation and examining their relationship among them; (2) social world/arena maps as cartographies of collective commitments, relations and sites of action; and (3) positional maps as simplification strategies for plotting positions articulated and not articulated in discourses. (Clarke, 2005: 86, 109, 125)

## **7.2. Data analysis**

This research will use a multi-method approach to data collection. It is therefore important to use more than one method for data analysis, matching the constraints and opportunities presented by each data collection method. The Hermeneutical Approach and NVIVO Qualitative Software will be used to analyse data.

### **7.2.1. The Hermeneutical Approach**

Human rights, power struggles over citizenship, social and environmental justice, and service delivery have been variously interpreted. Indeed, Ricoeur (1981, cited in Atkins, 2006) argues that ‘language belongs to, and is expressive of, extra-linguistic reality’ because words have different meanings when used outside the dominant paradigm. It is therefore important to use the hermeneutical approach to unpack the meanings of these concepts from two major viewpoints, that of the socio-economic and political elites who may already be profiting from IHP, and the majority, who may be prevented from accessing the windfalls that these meanings may entail.

### **7.2.2. NVIVO Qualitative Software**

NVIVO software is relevant for this research because of the volume and complexity of responses that the researcher expects to obtain from participants. It has the advantage of speeding up the process of locating coded themes, grouping data together in categories, and comparing passages in transcripts or incidents from the notes (DeNardo and Levers, 2002: 3). However, it is unable to fully present the themes and categories.

## **8. Structure of dissertation**

### **Chapter One: Introduction**

- 1.1. Background of the study
- 1.2. Objectives of the study
- 1.3. Rationale of the study
- 1.4. Broader impact of the study
- 1.5. Limitations of the study
- 1.6. Conclusion

### **Chapter Two: Literature review, research questions, and methodology**

- 2.1. General introduction
- 2.2. Literature review
  - 2.2.1. Development theories and development industry
  - 2.2.2. Development industry, megaprojects, and policies
  - 2.2.3. Theories of civil society and social movements
  - 2.2.4. Civil society, megaprojects, and the World Commission on Dams
  - 2.2.5. Civil society, resource curse, and socio-economic and environmental justice
- 2.3. Research questions
- 2.4. Methodology, research setting, and limitations

## 2.5. Conclusion

### **Chapter Three: Impacts of Inga 1 and Inga 2**

- 3.1. General introduction
- 3.2. Socio-economic and environmental impacts
  - 3.2.1. Capital accumulation by dispossession
  - 3.2.1. Dam-affected communities
  - 3.2.2. Peace and wars
  - 3.2.3. Other programmes for reconstruction and development
- 3.4. People's view of future development of the Inga Hydropower Project
- 3.3. Conclusion

### **Chapter Four: Civil society's role in the Inga Hydropower Project and distribution of resources**

- 4.1. General introduction
- 4.2. Civil society and Inga 1 and Inga 2
  - 4.2.1. DRC citizens in Inga, Boma, Matadi, and Kinshasa
  - 4.2.2. Local civil society and politics in the 1960s and 1980s
  - 4.2.3. Transnational advocacy networks
- 4.3. Civil society and further development of Inga Hydropower Project
- 4.4. Conclusion

### **Chapter Five: Civil society, DRC people and Inga Hydropower Project's benefit sharing**

- 5.1. General introduction
- 5.2. Experiences from other countries
- 5.3. Constraints and opportunities of the DRC context
- 5.4. From rhetoric to actions
- 5.5. Conclusion

### **Chapter Six: Conclusion**

- 6.1. Answering to research questions
- 6.2. Theoretical reflections on the findings
  - 6.2. Key contributions of the study
- 6.3. Methodological lessons from the study
- 6.4. Topics for future studies

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### 12. Research schedule (work plan/time-frame)

Date	Activity	Output
2009		
January – March	Completion of PhD proposal Submission to doctoral board	Acceptance at the School of Development Studies; Permission to undertake research
May – June	Trip to the Inga Falls site Refinement of research methodology	First hand experience of the legacies of Inga 1 and 2 Preliminary contact with subjects
July – December	Literature Review Refinement of methodology	Ongoing and updated chapter that reviews the available and current literature
2010		
January – June	Fieldwork 6 workshops with trainers of dam affected communities	Collection and organisation of Data Awareness around community struggles over dam related issues Awareness around the WCD
July - December	Data Analysis	Research findings
2011		
January – December	Writing up of research findings	Final documentation and submission