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Bankrupt Africa: Imperialism, Sub-Imperialism and the Politics of Finance

I. Introduction

Branwen Gruffwyd Jones argues: ‘Marx’s historical materialist method and theory of capital explains why capital is necessarily expansionary; why the plunder of Africa was an integral part of the primitive accumulation of western capital; why the reorganisation of Africa’s human and natural resources to meet the needs of Europe’s developing industries required colonial occupation and domination’. Calling forth such explanatory power

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1 The arguments were initially presented at a York University Department of Political Science Seminar on Empire in Toronto in November 2003. Special thanks are due Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin, Colin Leys, John Saul and Suzanne Soederberg, as well as participants at the Review of African Political Economy and Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa 30th Anniversary Conference in Sheffield, 27–9 May 2004. In other publications, crucial precursors to this argument are laid out. Bond 2002 includes analyses by numerous African intellectuals and progressive organisations highly critical of the sub-imperial New Partnership for Africa’s Development, a theme updated in Bond 2004a. In Bond 2003, I consider the way South Africa was affected by global financial markets in the immediate post-apartheid period. In Bond 2004b, I discuss the numerous ways Pretoria unsuccessfully attempted to reform ‘global governance’. In Bond 2004c, South Africa’s explicitly sub-imperial orientation is established within the context of shifting imperial designs on Africa. In Bond 2004d, I argue that reforms of the Bretton Woods Institutions have been ineffectual, particularly as conceptualised and promoted by South Africa. Bond 2004e and 2004f show the particular characteristics of post-apartheid South Africa that help explain the sub-imperial drive.

2 Jones 2003, p. 42. This position was, broadly speaking, the argument of a great organic twentieth-century tradition of anti-imperialist political economy and radical
is a tall order, but the argument makes most sense, perhaps, if we take a central aspect of these claims: namely, the financial component of capital’s uneven historical and contemporary expansion into Africa during periods of capitalist ‘crisis’; the role of financiers in the process of primitive accumulation, not just in the slave and colonial eras but as a permanent aspect of global capitalism; and the importance of financial power to the extraction of surpluses in both historical and contemporary times.

The specific South-African financial role in Africa was made clear in mid-2002, when Pretoria’s finance minister Trevor Manuel promised the Commonwealth Business Council he would ‘fast-track financial market integration through the establishment of an internationally competitive legislative and regulatory framework’ for the continent. But, without any Africa-wide progress to report two years later, Manuel’s director-general Lesetja Kganyago announced a new ‘Financial Centre for Africa’ project to amplify the financialisation tendencies already evident in Johannesburg’s exclusive new Sandton central business district: ‘Over the five years to 2002, the financial sector grew at a real rate of 7.7% per year, more than twice as fast as the economy as a whole’. Responsible for a full quarter of post-apartheid South African GDP growth, the sector required further room to expand. According to Kganyago:

What is needed is a financial hub especially focused on the needs and circumstances of the region, much in the same way that Singapore and Hong Kong cater for the capital needs of the Asian continent. . . . International financial centres tend to have a foundation in common. Elements include political stability, free markets, and what is best described as the rule of commercial law.

Pretoria’s specific aims included ‘opening South Africa’s markets to African and global issuers; global lowest trading costs and trading risk; global leadership in investor protection; and a global hub for financial business process outsourcing’. Concluded Kganyago,

Africa’s economies cannot wait the slow maturing of national financial markets to provide the necessary channel for large-scale foreign capital flows.
for development. Only a regional financial centre will be in a position to provide these services in the foreseeable future.3

The point of identifying the financial lever in the subordination of Africa is, ultimately, to remove the pressure, which is the subject of the conclusion to this article. Before that, I review theoretical considerations and historical evidence of the financial basis of imperialism, especially as applied to South-African sub-imperialism, dating to the 1870s (Section II); and consider the current international context for financial surplus extraction from Africa (Section III); including Pretoria’s collaboration (Section IV).

II. Theories and histories of financial imperialism and sub-imperialism

In his recent studies of the ‘new’ imperialism, David Harvey turns to the financial sphere:

The credit system and finance capital have, as Lenin, Hilferding and Luxemburg all remarked, been major levers of predation, fraud and thievery. Stock promotions Ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset stripping through mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt encumbrancy that reduce whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage, to say nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations – all of these are central features of what contemporary capitalism is about.4

In this context, international and domestic financial markets in Africa amplify traditional forms of primitive accumulation, establish new kinds of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (as Harvey puts it), and maintain other features of underdevelopment, particularly in recent years as commodification has spread more rapidly under neoliberalism. This process is co-ordinated by financial agencies, whose influence derives from Africa’s crippling debt, capital flight, import dependence and the compradorisation process. To establish how this happens requires a detour into debates over financial power

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4 Harvey 2003a, pp. 75–6. See also Harvey 2003b.
and vulnerability that can be traced back a century, and that are reflected in
durable questions of both an analytical and political nature still on the agenda
today. In particular, definitions of ‘finance capital’ are revealing, as they
identified the ‘unification’ and ‘merger’ of various fractions of capital, with
banking capital hegemonic. Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin thus emphasised
the institutional power-bloc characteristics of finance, at the expense of drawing
insufficient attention to the vulnerability implicit in financial relations and
their relationship to capitalist crisis.

After all, from around 1870 to 1920, it appeared that financiers had arranged
the concentration and centralisation of key industries, and were the motor
behind imperial tendencies. According to Lenin, the typical bank had ‘fuller
and more detailed information about the economic position of its clients’.
Specialisations within banks increased to accommodate the new control
functions, and financiers utilised interlocking directorates with firms and also
influenced crucial state decisions. Moreover, the new capitalism had a profound
geopolitical sensibility, for ‘Finance capital spreads its net over all countries
of the world. An important role in that is played by banks founded in the
colonies and by their branches’. Ultimately and most importantly, for Lenin,
finance was increasingly ‘separated’ from production:

> Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of
capitalism at which this separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy
of finance capital over all other forms of capital means the predominance
of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means the singling out of a
small number of financially ‘powerful’ states from among all the rest.

This was also the period of Africa’s carve-up, with national borders decided
at an 1884–5 Berlin conference. In Southern and Central Africa, the consolidation
of settler colonialism was feasible in large part thanks to the 1880–90s
entrepreneurship and geopolitical leadership of Cecil Rhodes, a financier who
graduated from diamond merchant cartelisation in Kimberley, where the
DeBeers monopoly was born, to become governor of the Cape Colony. Rhodes
received permission from Queen Victoria to plunder what is now called
Gauteng Province (greater Johannesburg), once gold was discovered in 1886,
and then Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. His ambition was to paint the map
British imperial red, stretching along the route from the Cape to Cairo. Rhodes’s

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5 See discussions in Brewer 1980, pp. 103–9, Howard and King 1989, Chapter Five.
6 Lenin 1986, pp. 41–63.
two main vehicles were the British army – which invented the concentration camp and, in the process, killed 25,000 Afrikaner women and children and 14,000 black people during the 1899–1902 Anglo-Boer South-African War – and the British South Africa Company (BSAC), a for-profit firm which, in 1890, began its drive from Cape Town north of the Limpopo River by sponsoring the ‘Pioneer Column’. That settler initiative soon founded present-day Harare while massacring thousands of Shona and Ndebele people who had established pockets of resistance from 1893–6. London imperialists assumed that competition would continue beyond Berlin’s ‘Scramble for Africa’, and that only BSAC-style expansion, at relatively little cost to Britain’s taxpayers, would ensure geographical dominance over the interior of the continent in the face of hostile German, Portuguese, French, Belgian and Boer forces. Such a strategy was critical, they posited, to the protection of even the Nile Valley, which, in turn, represented the lifeline to the prize of India.7

As is the case today, however, a crucial economic dynamic was playing out in Europe, above and beyond the never-ending search for gold, which helped explain the resource flows behind Rhodes’s conquests: chronic over-accumulation of capital, especially in the London and Paris financial markets. Moreover, the push of capital was joined by the pull of white settlers from the colonising powers, as a result of growing social, ethnic and nascent class unrest across Southern Africa, itself a logical consequence of the establishment of systemic migrant labour systems. This dynamic fit the general thesis concerning financial control, capital-export, sub-imperial settler sites and the advanced capitalist countries’ ‘labour aristocracy’ advanced by, among others, Hobson, Hilferding and Lenin.8 Likewise, the easy availability of foreign portfolio funding for nascent Southern-African stock markets in Johannesburg and Bulawayo stemmed from a lengthy international economic depression, chronic excess financial liquidity (a symptom of general overaccumulation), and the global hegemony enjoyed by City of London financiers. Surplus capital was still concentrated in the London stock market in the early 1890s, and flowed easily not only to other European countries and the New World,

7 Loney 1975, pp. 31–2.
8 Lenin 1986, p. 87, illustrated *Imperialism* with a quote Rhodes uttered in 1895: ‘In order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists’. 
but also to the high-profile, well-tested initiatives of Rhodes, supported by the likes of the then journalist, Winston Churchill.

In sum, it was a period, Ian Phimister contends, of increasing geopolitical turbulence across Africa emanating from ‘capitalism’s uneven development during the last third of the nineteenth century, particularly the City of London’s crucial role in mediating the development of a world economic system’. As Britain faced industrial decline during the 1870s in both absolute and relative terms, manufacturers unable to compete in European markets joined ascendant London financial and commercial interests in promoting free-trade philosophy, in contrast to the protectionism of other Europeans and the United States.9

A central function of Rhodes’s role in the region was, in the course of searching for gold, to ameliorate the contradictions of global capitalism by channelling financial surpluses into new infrastructural investments, such as the telegraph, railroad and surveying that tamed and commodified the lands immediately north of South Africa. Even if these did not immediately pay off for the BSAC, they did succeed in extracting resources and assuring political allegiance to South-African corporate power, a power that was generally in harmonious unity with the evolving British-run states of the region. We return to this point shortly, because regional economic domination – through liberalism backed by the forces of colonial power then, and today, through neoliberalism with military capabilities not yet fully tested – has also become the objective of the contemporary South-African ruling class.

Before long, however, in both Southern Africa and the metropole, financial institutions suffered tremendous bankruptcies, culminating in system-wide crashes that left international payments in tatters from 1929–33.10 Marxist theories of imperialism based on finance capital were never fully reconciled to this development, and those who had established arguments over the prior quarter century and witnessed the Great Depression remained divided over the capacities of capital for reproduction under stress. Hilferding, for example, contended that the problem of rising overaccumulation in highly-concentrated branches and sectors of production could be perpetually displaced, thanks to the co-ordination functions of finance capital, into the more competitive, non-cartelised sectors of the economy. As a result, intensified uneven sectoral

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10 The excesses of financial speculation were more frequent and disruptive in Southern Africa, especially during the early 1920s. The South-African history of finance and uneven development is told in Bond 2003, Chapter 12; the Zimbabwean story is found in Bond 1998, Bond and Manyanya 2003, Phimister 1988.
development during crisis would not generate further destabilisation of the economy, but, rather, stabilisation through deepening cartelisation. The subsequent shake-out of the smaller producers would permit the finance capital cartel to increase the level of industrial concentration and survive the broader downturn.

Hilferding even expressed faith that the centralisation and concentration process would result in an ‘increasingly dense network of relations between the banks and industry . . . [which] would finally result in a single bank or a group of banks establishing control over the entire money capital. Such a “central bank” would then exercise control over social production as a whole’. Politically, this was extremely important, for it justified seeking a route to socialism that entailed the socialisation of capitalist relations via finance. As Hilferding concluded, ‘taking possession of six large Berlin banks would mean taking possession of the most important spheres of large scale industry, and would greatly facilitate the initial phases of socialist policy during the transition period, when capitalist accounting might still prove useful.’

Frankfurt-school economist Henryk Grossmann offered scathing comment: ‘Hilferding needed this construction of a “central bank” to ensure some painless, peaceful road to socialism, to his “regulated” economy’. As German Finance Minister under difficult circumstances in the late 1920s, Hilferding failed in any such mission, yet, as late as 1931, maintained the validity of his thesis.

Where did Hilferding go wrong in miscalculating the durability of finance capital power, and what are the implications for contemporary Africa? According to Suzanne de Brunhoff, Hilferding made a critical mistake that led him to dissociate money and the credit system, for ‘money as an instrument of hoarding’ was ignored, she complained: ‘This dissociation has probably

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11 Hilferding 1981, pp. 180, 298, 368. Hilferding posited that several factors ‘militating against a banking crisis’ would combine with finance capital’s increasing range to ensure that conditions of crisis could be ameliorated. Those factors included: first, the ability of finance capital to manage and share risk effectively; second, the belief that a strong gold reserve and other state regulatory policies could shore up the creditworthiness of the system; third, a decline in the volume and importance of speculative activity (at the powerful urging of key institutions of finance capital); and fourth, the ability of production by joint-stock companies during a downturn to continue since such production need not realise an immediate return. Hilferding concluded that it was ‘sheer dogmatism to oppose the banks’ penetration of industry . . . as a danger to the banks’, 1981, p. 291.


13 Sweezy 1968, p. 298.
been one of the reasons for the overestimation of the role of finance capital’.\textsuperscript{14}
That overestimation was based on at least five other causes, which Hilferding should have recognised within the logic of his argument. First, uneven sectoral development (disproportionalities) between capital goods and consumer goods, upon which Hilferding grounded his crisis theory, heightened with the rise of finance, notwithstanding short-run amelioration provided by credit. Second, the same problems in the productive sector that led to falling profit rates also forced banks to look further afield, geographically and sectorally, in order to maintain lending and a healthy deposit base, which brings added risk. Third, rather than declining in importance, financial speculation tended to increase dramatically prior to the climax of a crisis. Fourth, Hilferding’s argument that joint-stock companies were relatively immune from downturns was contradicted by his analysis of how vital credit was to the smooth operation of stock exchanges. Fifth, the combination of industry, commerce and banking increased temptations for insider lending and thus generated higher risk.

In sum, nearly all of Hilferding’s previous analysis led to the logical conclusion that, contrary to finance-capital hegemony during a crisis, banks do indeed lose self-control, as well as control of outside entities and processes. Paul Sweezy observed, ‘Hilferding mistakes a transitional phase of capitalist development for a lasting trend’. The transitional phase was one of recovery from the 1870s–90s financial crises; but the crises would emerge again during the early 1930s and from the 1970s until the present.\textsuperscript{15} As Grossmann concluded his 1929 book \textit{The Law of Accumulation}: ‘The historical tendency of capital is not the creation of a central bank which dominates the whole economy through a general cartel, but industrial concentration and growing accumulation of capital leading to the final breakdown due to overaccumulation’.\textsuperscript{16}

Why is this important today, especially in considering African underdevelopment? If classical theories of imperialism were based on the finance-capital thesis – adopted by Lenin, Kautsky, Bauer and Bukharin – and hence did not focus sufficiently on the vulnerability of financial circuits of capital, then they missed the intrinsic opportunities to combine these weaknesses of capital with the illegitimacy of the political form, colonialism. The anticolonial struggle was insufficiently linked to analysis of the dynamics of accumulation, particularly in Third-International politics. But there is an

\textsuperscript{14} De Brunhoff 1976, p. xiv.
\textsuperscript{15} Sweezy 1968, p. 267.
\textsuperscript{16} Grossmann 1992, p. 200.
additional problem with earlier theories, namely that they lined up imperial processes behind the metropole-colonial relationship, which missed what Harvey stresses are the features of primitive accumulation that were continually reproduced through the North-South relationship.

Rosa Luxemburg had a different approach. Notwithstanding flaws in her analysis, Luxemburg observed in her book *Accumulation of Capital* the core contradiction of capitalism, namely ‘the deep and fundamental antagonism between the capacity to consume and the capacity to produce in a capitalist society, a conflict resulting from the very accumulation of capital which periodically bursts out in crises and spurs capital on to a continual extension of the market’.\(^{17}\) Her thesis regarding the power relationships responsible for global uneven development was straightforward. ‘Capital cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist organizations, nor, on the other hand, can it tolerate their continued existence side by side with itself. Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of non-capitalist organizations makes accumulation of capital possible,’ she argued:

> The relations between capitalism and the non-capitalist modes of production start making their appearance on the international stage. Its predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system – a policy of spheres of interest – and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process.\(^{18}\)

This description immediately alerts us to similarities between early twentieth- and early twenty-first-century global unevenness. Today, the international stage offers views of a new colonial policy: ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ in the form of the World Bank/IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative and allegedly ‘participatory’ *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*; the homegrown neoliberalism of Thabo Mbeki’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development; the World Trade Organisation’s extraordinary reach of private property rights into traditional sites of state sovereignty and biopower; innovations in donor aid that link ‘good governance’ (better termed ‘low-intensity democracy’) with liberalisation; and all the other means Washington and its allies deploy

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\(^{17}\) Luxemburg 1968, p. 347.
\(^{18}\) Luxemburg 1968, pp. 396, 452–3.
to maintain control, including military might. Today, we can witness an international loan system that corresponds to spheres of interest writ large (not merely through banking relations along colonial-geographical lines, as before). Today, there are persistent, periodic wars, in Africa and around the world, that reflect the tensions associated with capitalist crisis, interimperialist rivalry, territorial defence against the devalorisation of capital, and various resulting forms of barbarism.

Drawing upon Luxemburg’s insights into the interactions between capitalism and non-capitalist aspects of production and social reproduction, Harvey provides a description of how the permanent process of primitive accumulation evolves into the system of accumulation by dispossession, that is, looting:

- commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neocolonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation (particularly of land); slave trade; and usury, the national debt and ultimately the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation.

We need continual reminding of earlier debates in the same spirit, prior to reviewing opportunities for resistance at the local, national, continental and global scales. For Luxemburg, as for many contemporary critics, capitalist crisis tendencies were translated into an aggressive, systematic geopolitical process, characterised by ‘oppressive taxation, war, or squandering and monopolization of the nation’s land, and thus belongs to the spheres of political power and criminal law no less than with economics’. But the laws of economics still unfold, according to the Marxist argument, as witnessed by historical evidence of financial ascendance during the accumulation cycle.

The existence of long waves of capital accumulation is securely established, with global ‘crises’ – defined, in Coxian terms, as problems in a system’s

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20 Harvey 2003a, p. 74.
21 Luxemburg 1968, p. 370. Updates of the theme that capitalism requires precapitalist ‘articulations’ are found in Seddon 1976 and Wolpe 1980; however, as Smith argues, these are best considered a symptom of uneven development, not the cause, Smith 1990, p. 156.
reproduction which cannot be self-corrected using the internal logic of the system, but, instead, require an external intervention—the cycles of accumulation—occurring roughly from 1825–45, 1872–92, 1929–48, and 1973–present, during which time large-scale devalorisation (shakeouts of economic deadwood) transpired. To be sure, precise measurement of these cycles of accumulation is difficult. But at least one variable stands out, for our purposes: national financial over-extension. In the 1820s, the 1870s and the 1930s, the periodic build-up of foreign sovereign debt ultimately required mass defaults, typically involving a third of all borrowing countries. Christian Suter explains the ‘global debt cycle’ by way of stages in the long wave, beginning with technological innovation and utilising international product cycle theory. At the global scale, a three-stage process unfolds comparable to Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, through which credit moves over time from largely ‘hedging’ functions, to ‘speculative’ activities, to a ‘Ponzi’-type (reverse pyramid) desperation stage in which borrowers contract new loans in order to cover repayment of interest on the old. At the global scale, this entails, as Suter puts it, ‘first, intense core capital exports and corresponding booms in credit raising activity of peripheries; second, the occurrence of debt service incapacity among peripheral countries; and third, the negotiation of debt settlement agreements between debtors and creditors’. Those settlements, even in the forms of default, are crucial to clearing away the deadwood so

22 Cox argues that ‘the economy must undergo some structural change in order to emerge from a crisis; in a cyclical downturn, the same structure contains the seeds of its own revival’, Cox 1987, p. 269.
24 Variables such as price series, profitability and production estimates are central to most studies, whereas, ideally, measures such as capital intensity (and the organic composition of capital), surplus-value rates, the velocity of circulation of capital, the geographical expansion of capitalist relations, capacity utilisation and inventory build-up would be preferable for Marxist analysis.
25 See, for example, Ferri and Minsky 1992.
26 Suter 1992, p. 41. At the upswing of a Kondratieff cycle, as basic technological innovations are introduced in a labour-intensive and unstandardised manner, both the demand for and supply of external financing are typically low, and, in any case, the residue of financial crisis in the previous long cycle does not permit rapid expansion of credit or other financial assets into high-risk investments. As innovations gradually spread, however, peripheral geographical areas become more tightly integrated into the world economy, supported by international financial networks. As the power of innovation-led growth subsides, and as the consumer markets of the advanced capitalist countries become saturated, profit rates decline in the core. This pushes waves of financial capital into peripheral areas, where instead of achieving balanced accumulation and growth, low returns on investment plus a variety of other political and economic constraints inexorably lead to sovereign default.
that accumulation can resume. As we see in Figure I, below, the cycle has repeated itself four times since the 1830s, but with divergent results in the contemporary experience.

This is not merely a problem of national accounts; the entire financial system becomes the basis for managing overaccumulation. Most important in the process of displacing (not resolving) overaccumulation crisis is a set of countervailing tendencies that, according to Harvey, transcend Marx’s absolute and relative surplus-value: ‘Absorption of capital (and labour) surpluses through temporal and geographic displacement played key roles in the history of crisis resolution’. For Harvey, credit serves a temporal displacement function – a so-called ‘temporal fix’ to overaccumulation – since finance not only speeds the turnover time of capital, as Marx observed, but also sends surplus capital into ‘the production of goods that have long term future uses in production or consumption’. This helps to displace crisis in the short-term, but exacerbates the overaccumulation problem down the road.27

There is also a ‘spatial fix’ to overaccumulation: in serving a geographical displacement function in the form of foreign lending, finance can send ‘surplus money to another country to buy up surplus commodities’. This amounts to a short-term solution to overaccumulation which comes back to haunt lenders in advanced capitalist countries: in order to pay off the debt, the borrower must cut imports from, and increase exports to, those very countries. In sum, the tensions and contradictions in value production and realisation can only be resolved, says Harvey, ‘at the price of internalizing the contradictions within itself. Massive concentration of financial power, accompanied by the machinations of finance capital, can as easily destabilize as stabilize capitalism’. Harvey thus highlights the constraints on the power of finance imposed by the full logic of the accumulation process, and finance capital is therefore seen not as a ‘merger’ of banking and other fractions of capital, but far more usefully in terms of ‘the countervailing forces that simultaneously create and undermine the formation of coherent power blocs within the bourgeoisie’.28

How have those power blocs formed in response to capitalist crisis in the contemporary world, and how do they affect Africa?

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28 Harvey 1982, pp. vi, 283.
III. Contemporary imperial financial relations

In sometimes contested, but broadly consistent, surveys of global political economy, a half-dozen leading Marxist political economists have provided conceptual underpinnings and updated empirical accounts of sustained crisis tendencies in global capitalism’s core regions.\textsuperscript{29} In spite of the Bush régime’s hubris over an apparent economic recovery (and profitability surge), Robert Brenner, for example, warned in early 2004:

Should the dollar continue to fall, US equity and bond values will come directly under stress and inflation will increase . . . . Indeed, given that the rest of the world owns $7.61 trillion worth of US assets – 40% of the US government’s tradeable debt, 26% of US corporate bonds, and 13% of US equities – a significant decline of the dollar has the potential to set off a rush to offload these, unleashing a violent downward spiral of currency and asset prices. Can an economy move forward by way of the expansion of service and financial sectors catering to consumption, when key goods-producing sectors remain weighed down by over-capacity and reduced profitability, when overseas producers are grabbing ever-greater shares of the US goods market, when exports are falling ever further behind imports with no hope of closing the gap at current exchange rates, and when the US depends upon the largesse of East Asian governments to cover its international obligations?\textsuperscript{30}

This balancing act is not just a mid-2000s conjuncture, but follows logically from three decades of lower GDP growth (indeed, negative per capita GDP if we factor in pollution and exhaustion of non-renewable resources), untenable financialisation and periodic financial collapses, frantic outsourcing of production across the world and hyperactive trade, the emergence of system-threatening ecological problems, soaring inequality, and the near-universal lowering of both labour’s remuneration and the social wage, all associated with the neoliberal project during a period of persistent capitalist overaccumulation.

What have been the implications of global overaccumulation crisis for Africa? Much of the damage since the 1980s can be traced to the liberalisation


of trade and finance that, in turn, cheapened the continent’s products for northern consumption. Giovanni Arrighi criticises African élites’ self-destructive hedonism:

[N]ot just in fostering conspicuous consumption but also, and especially, in assuming levels of foreign indebtedness that magnified the region’s vulnerability to the change of systemic weather. In this respect, the [1980] Lagos Plan of Action’s call for collective self-reliance was right on target. Unfortunately it came too late and, worse still, led to no action at all... it would probably have been less damaging to default on the foreign debt than to reschedule it under the conditions dictated by the World Bank. In the short-run, the collapse would have been more severe; but the negative long-term effects of the ‘good policies’ imposed by the agencies of the Washington Consensus would have been avoided.31

The negative effects of neoliberal policies such as trade liberalisation were indeed debilitating. John Saul and Colin Leys show how Africa’s ‘takeoff into manufacturing for internal consumption is blocked by an inability to compete with imports and by tiny domestic markets; meanwhile collapsing infrastructures, political risk, and poorly trained workforces tend to make manufacturing for export uncompetitive, even at very low wages’.32 Sub-Saharan African manufactured products fell steadily from 18 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 15 per cent by 2000, while gross capital formation crashed from a peak of 25 per cent of GDP in 1980 to just 15–18 per cent during the subsequent two decades (compared to China’s steady 35–40 per cent over the same period). Michael Barrett Brown identifies several structural factors that hamper African exporters: ‘The value added in making up manufactured goods has been greatly increased compared with the raw material required; synthetics continue to replace natural products in textiles, shoes and rubber goods; and the elasticity of demand for agricultural products (the proportion of extra incomes spent on food and beverages) has been steadily falling’. While some prices have risen in recent years – oil, rubber and copper, thanks to Chinese demand – exports that many countries rely upon continue to stagnate or fall. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) confirms that, from 1980 to 2000, cotton prices fell by 47 per cent, coffee by 64 per cent, cocoa by 71 per cent and sugar by 77 per cent. Africa’s agricultural

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exports were down from US$15 billion in 1987 to US$13 billion in 2000, although oil exports rose from US$18 billion to US$28 billion over the same period (benefitting only the mainly corrupt élites of Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria).\footnote{Barrett-Brown 2004.} In historical terms, the prices of primary commodities (other than fuels) have risen and fallen according to the deeper long-wave rhythm identified above. Exporters of primary commodities have fared particularly badly when financiers have been most powerful. The cycle typically includes falling commodity prices, rising foreign debt, dramatic increases in interest rates, a desperate intensification of exports which lowers prices yet further, and bankruptcy. From around 1973, this process impoverished the non-industrialised Third World, especially Africa, albeit with occasional, erratic exceptions in oil-producing regions.

Finally, the other source of financial account outflows from Africa that must be reversed is illegitimate capital flight, ranging from liquid flows to transfer pricing. James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana argue that a core group of sub-Saharan African countries whose foreign debt was US$178 billion lost more than US$285 billion (including imputed interest earnings) because of élite repatriation of assets.\footnote{Boyce and Ndikumana 2000.} By 2004, an estimated 37 per cent of African citizen’s investments (cash and assets) were located offshore, according to the World Bank.\footnote{Zambian Post, 24 June 2004.} Outflows via multinational corporate investment also remain a major problem, though statistics are hard to come by. Foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa during the neoliberal era has mainly been channelled into extractive minerals and oil, with Nigeria and Angola predominating (thus unveiling the negative relationship between ‘good government’ and foreign investors, contrary to neoliberal rhetoric).\footnote{The only other substantive foreign investment flows were to South Africa for the partial privatisation of telecommunications in 1997, and for the 1994–2001 expansion of automotive-sector branch plant activity within global assembly lines (capital-intensive investments which led to substantial auto sector job losses). Even these marginal foreign stakes were by far offset by South Africa’s own outflows of direct investment, in the forms of relocation of the largest corporations’ financial headquarters to London, not to mention the repatriation of dividends/profits and payments of patent/royalty fees to multinational corporations.} Transfer pricing via these investments occurs when companies cheat Third-World countries on tax revenues, by artificially inflating their imported input prices so as to claim lower net income. It is only possible to guess the vast scale of the problem on the basis of case studies. For instance, the Oxford Institute of Energy
Studies estimated that, in 1994, fourteen per cent of the total value of exported oil ‘was not accounted for in national trade figures as a result of various forms of transfer pricing and smuggling’. And, in a 1999 UNCTAD survey, 84 per cent of Third-World countries ‘estimated that the affiliates they hosted shifted income to their parent companies to avoid tax liabilities and 61 per cent thought that their own TNCs were engaging in income shifting’. Probably the most persistent African applied intellectual critic of these processes of corporate accumulation by dispossession, Yash Tandon of the Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Networking Initiative in Harare, provides a longer list of surplus extraction processes that are not well understood by UNCTAD and other mainstream researchers. They include patent and copyright fees on technology agreements which are, according to Tandon:

[O]ften arbitrarily determined in terms of intra-enterprise agreements between affiliates of TNCs operating in developing countries... management and consultancy fees [through ‘aid’ contracts];... loss of export revenue on account of protectionism in industrialized countries amounting to $35 billion for the developing countries annually ($24 billion due to the Multifibre Agreement, $5 billion due to primary goods and $6 billion due to other goods)... loss of revenue on account of blockage on the free movement of people [which Tandon and the UNDP estimate at $25 billion annually during the 1980s]... and loss of capital through biopiracy.... According to Vandana Shiva, wild seed varieties have contributed some $66 billion annually to the US economy.

How is this system reproduced? A tight web of interrelated, overlapping economic, political, cultural and even military forces exists to permit and promote such high levels of accumulation by dispossession from Africa. I will focus on only two elements: neoconservative Washington’s attempt to establish military capabilities in the main hot-spots where risk-based profitability is of concern; and neoliberal Washington’s use of contemporary compradorism, especially through South African elites who play a sub-imperial role, to lubricate the commodification of life, particularly through the financial markets.
For guidance, Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin have conducted rigorous studies of the power and centrality of Washington to contemporary neoliberal imperialism, in the form of either/both the neoconservative military-industrial complex in the Bush White House and Pentagon, or/and the Washington Consensus nexus of the US Treasury, Bretton Woods Institutions and Wall Street. Panitch and Gindin simultaneously reject crisis-based theorisations of imperialism (as well as those that hark back to early twentieth-century debates), leading Greg Albo to observe a fundamental ‘opposition between these alternative interpretations . . . . The persistent underlying contradictions of the world capitalist economy, and the US role in these contradictions, continue to be taken as signs of either the terminal decline of US power, or its opposite’. It appears very much an update of the Hilferding/Grossmann dichotomy.

What do conditions in Africa tell us about this debate, particularly looking from the vantage-point of sub-imperial South Africa? Nelson Mandela offered one justification for our contemplation of the imperial trajectory of yesteryear, during an August 2003 talk to business and social élites at Rhodes House in Cape Town, where he launched the Mandela-Rhodes Trust: ‘I am sure that Cecil John Rhodes would have given his approval to this effort to make the South African economy of the early 21st century appropriate and fit for its time’. Rhodes’s approval would have recognised the explicitly financial stranglehold that Northern governments, multilateral agencies, international banks and corporations maintain on Africa, during a period which combined global financial volatility and geopolitical arrogance, both emanating from London. However, there are also hints of resistance here, which add a dimension to the debate over financial power and vulnerability not often considered in political economy.

IV. African challenges to financial imperialism and sub-imperialism

The most important recent challenge to a classical-Marxist reading of finance, imperialism and sub-imperialism – as I have sought to provide above – comes
from Panitch and Gindin, who argue that the current conjuncture cannot be compared to the earlier period:

Although traditional Marxist theories of crises provide some valid insights into the nature of these discontinuities, they are ultimately limited in what they explain. Their inadequacy stems from a tendency to fetishize crises in the sense of abstracting them from history, seeing markets and market-related institutions in static terms, and ignoring or inadequately integrating the role of classes and states into their analysis. The particular salience of crises cannot be understood apart from their historical specificity.43

Certainly, the present conjuncture is different from earlier epochs of imperial expansion insofar as the hegemon is not presently exporting its overaccumulated capital, but, on the contrary, is drawing in US$2 billion per day of global savings in order to cover balance of payments and state budget deficits. However, this does not appear tenable over the medium term, as the imminent threat of a run on the dollar begins to force interest rates higher (possibly bursting the real-estate bubble) and makes ever more difficult the unprecedented debt servicing obligations of the US state, firms and consumers. Still, Panitch and Gindin insist that Washington now boasts highly capable managers of financial panics who can control ‘the depth, duration and contagion’ of crises within national boundaries, hence reconciling the ‘combination of capitalist volatility and capitalist durability’:

The global spread of capitalism could not be sustained without new mechanisms to manage risk. The development of markets that commodify risk was a response to this. It is clear enough that such markets include morally-repulsive speculation, appalling waste, and conspicuous inequalities, and that they have also added new risks, but that doesn’t erase their importance to capitalist development (their very necessity within capitalism is a reason to question the rationality of capitalism as a social system). The development of financial structures increases volatility while it contributes to capitalist dynamism (which often works its way through crises) and supports the durability of the system . . . . The deepening of financial markets plays a directly imperial role. It has made it possible for the American economy to attract global savings that would otherwise be inaccessible without global markets.44

It is worth stressing, however, that as in the earlier epoch described by theorists of imperialism, the West’s imperial capacity is reproduced through sub-imperial processes, including the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and a variety of other mechanisms that promote accumulation by dispossession, not least through financial surplus extraction. Mbeki’s finance minister Trevor Manuel, for example, has been a stalwart of Washington in legitimating the most important mechanism for risk abatement under renewed financial imperialism: the redefinition of the Bretton Woods institutions’ functions. It is here too that we can identify important moments of resistance.

Most importantly, the taxpayer-financed Bretton Woods institutions socialised commercial bank losses and privatised profits through an unending series of bank bailouts beginning with Mexico in 1982, following the Volcker 1979–80 interest rate shock that catalysed the Third-World debt crisis. Instead of merely providing balance of payments support (the IMF) or longer-term project investments (the World Bank), as was the case from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, both institutions converged in their lending strategies in order to simultaneously restructure unmanageable debt loads and restructure socio-economic relations through the imposition of Washington Consensus policies. As noted above, these institutions’ financial and ideological grips are crucial to the ‘directly imperial role’ that the West plays in Africa, in a manner that did not exist in the earlier period, which was characterised by financial loosening during crisis, including defaults by a third of the debtor countries (Figure 1).

African elite legitimation of the Bretton Woods institutions continues today, even where countries as diverse as Nigeria and Zimbabwe (not to mention numerous ‘failed states’) have recently defaulted on major debt repayment obligations. Keeping these countries ‘in line’ on debt is important within the context of Mbeki’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development, which promises to ‘support existing poverty reduction initiatives at the multilateral level, such as the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) approach linked to the HIPC debt relief

45 Other ‘risk management mechanisms’ such as securitisation systems and hedge funds, as Panitch and Gindin refer to, came later, were themselves in periodic need of bailout (most spectacularly, Long Term Capital Management in 1998), and contributed to the sense that imperialist financial-crisis displacement is merely a system of legalised ‘moral hazard’. 
initiative.\textsuperscript{46} (Not for nothing was the Partnership document labelled ‘philosophically spot on’ by the Bush régime’s leading Africa official in 2003.\textsuperscript{47})

In contrast, African chapters of the Jubilee debt-cancellation movement have unequivocally opposed these. Jubilee South’s May 2001 ‘Pan-African Declaration on Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes’ criticised ‘structural adjustment programmes in their various guises, particularly as based on the feminisation of adjustment to the further detriment of women and children’. Given that ‘the World Bank and IMF are facing a deepening crisis of legitimacy’, the two institutions ‘introduced PRSPs mainly as a public relations exercise to demonstrate a supposedly new-found concern for the poverty in the poorest countries of the South, and to prove that they have a genuine desire to see the people of these countries “participating” in finding solutions to their poverty’.\textsuperscript{48}

A telling incident in mid-2002 illustrated the responsibility that the South-African government has taken on, via the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, to police the financial mechanisms of imperialism. A Cabinet meeting in Pretoria concluded with this statement: ‘The meeting noted the provision by South Africa of a bridge loan to the Democratic Republic of the

\textsuperscript{46} New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2001, paragraph 118.

\textsuperscript{47} Walter Kansteiner, cited in Gopinath 2003.

\textsuperscript{48} \url{http://www.jubileesouth.net}. 
Congo of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 75 million. This will help clear the DRC’s overdue obligations with the IMF and allow that country to draw resources under the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.50 Consistent with imperialism’s need to renew accumulation by dispossession, Pretoria thus codified the earlier generation of IMF loans made to Mobuto Sese Seko, riven with corruption and capital flight to European banks. Continuities with an earlier sub-imperial project were obvious, for the people of the DRC were previously victims of South Africa’s apartheid-era allegiance with Mobuto, an arrangement that especially suited the ecology-destroying mineral extraction corporations headquartered in Johannesburg. The people’s struggle against oppression had initially spawned another ruler in 1996, Laurent Kabila, who unfortunately refused democracy and later fell to an assassin’s bullet. Thanks to his unelected son Joseph’s connections in Pretoria’s Union Buildings and finance ministry, the old ‘odious’ Mobuto loans would not be repudiated but instead be honoured, and serviced with the new credits. In addition, IMF staff would be allowed back into Kinshasa with their own new loans, and with neoliberal conditionalities again applied to the old victims of Mobuto’s fierce rule.50 These elite linkages, the protective Washington gear and Mbeki’s capacity for reproducing neoliberalism in such hostile conditions were, together, at least temporarily effective.

Similarly, South Africa’s black victims of apartheid were repeatedly attacked by Pretoria during their ongoing pursuit of reparations for an earlier generation of odious bank loans and corporate investments. The call for reparations harks back to the campaign for financial sanctions against apartheid-era South Africa, spearheaded by the African National Congress but promoted strongly in the US during the mid-1960s by Martin Luther King and Students for a Democratic Society, the 1970s by community activists, and early 1980s by Ralph Nader and a new generation of anti-apartheid campaigners. In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution against loans destined for the minority rulers of South Africa. The World Bank replied that

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50 The same day’s Cabinet announcement from Pretoria also revealed that South Africans would generously fund the World Bank’s main lending subsidiary for impoverished African countries, on behalf of a special constituency: ‘Cabinet approved South Africa’s contribution to the replenishment of the resources of the [Bank-subsidiary] International Development Association, to the tune of R83 million. This amount, which would be drawn down over a nine-year period, would benefit our private sector, which would be eligible to bid for contracts financed from these resources’. South African Government Communications and Information Service 2002, p. 1.
‘the Bank’s articles provide that the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member and that they shall not be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned’. The following apolitical activity was observed during apartheid:

- the Bank’s US$100 million in loans to the parastatal electricity company Eskom from 1951–67 that gave only white people electric power, but for which all South Africans paid the bill, as well as US$100 million more for railways;
- IMF apartheid-supporting loans of more than US$2 billion between the Soweto uprising in 1976 and 1983, when the US Congress finally prohibited lending to Pretoria;
- a Bank loan for Lesotho dams which were widely acknowledged to ‘sanctions-bust’ apartheid South Africa in 1986, via a secret London trust fund; and
- IMF advice to Pretoria in 1991 to impose the regressive Value Added Tax, in opposition to which 3.5 million people went on a two-day stayaway stay away.

Reparations from apartheid’s financiers were surely in order. Activists from Jubilee South Africa and other church and apartheid-victims groups were frustrated by the failure of the September 2001 World Conference Against Racism – the single most appropriate international forum – to advance their agenda. The conference was so tightly controlled by Mbeki that a reparations endorsement, supported by the rulers of Nigeria and Zambia, amongst others, was simply not permitted in the final resolution. The activists turned to the US and Swiss courts, following the model set against Swiss and German bankers and corporations which violated human (and property) rights during the Nazi era. Civil cases for billions of dollars in damages were filed on behalf of apartheid victims against large multinational corporations which profited from South-African investments and loans. The fear engendered was so great that the Bush régime and corporate lobbies pleaded with US courts, initially unsuccessfully, to nullify an interpretation of the Alien Tort Claims Act that made the apartheid-reparations suits possible.

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51 Cited in Darrow 2003, p. 151.
52 Bond 2003, Chapter Three.
53 Business Day, 17 June 2003. In June 2004, the Supreme Court confirmed the applicability of the Act to such cases, although it also warned courts to bear in mind US foreign policy objectives.
Mbeki had first responded to the reparations campaign with ‘neither support nor condemnation’. However, in April 2003, in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report, recommending a reparations payment by businesses which benefited from apartheid, he changed tack. It was suddenly ‘completely unacceptable that matters that are central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts which bear no responsibility for the well-being of our country and the observance of the perspective contained in our constitution of the promotion of national reconciliation’. The President expressed ‘the desire to involve all South Africans, including corporate citizens, in a cooperative and voluntary partnership’ – simply ignoring the numerous attempts by Jubilee SA, the Apartheid Reparations Task Force and Cape Town’s Anglican archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane for several years prior to filing the lawsuits.54 In July 2003, Mbeki and Justice Minister Penuel Maduna then explicitly defended international lenders and corporations against two major reparations proceedings in the US courts, arguing in a nine-page brief that by ‘permitting the litigation’, the New York judge would discourage ‘much-needed foreign investment and delay the achievement of the government’s goals. Indeed, the litigation could have a destabilising effect on the South-African economy as investment is not only a driver of growth, but also of unemployment’.55 Former Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Columbia University economist Joseph Stiglitz filed friend of the court briefs with the activists, but Mandela also took the opportunity provided by the Mandela-Rhodes Trust launch in August 2003 to publicly criticise the reparations struggle.56

The lesson from the experience was simple: it would be impossible to seek allies in the fight for global justice amongst the nationalist leadership of South Africa, no matter the Pretoria politicians’ occasional anti-imperialist rhetoric. Instead, alliances against financial power would have to be forged amongst Third-World social movements themselves, unhindered by distractions from those Northern-hemisphere (especially Washington/London) NGOs and labour movements which typically sought mere reform, not abolition, of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In April 2004, a new network of

54 For coverage, see Financial Times, 19 May 2003.
56 Sowetan, 26 August.
impressive mass-based social movements\(^\text{57}\) and radical NGOs\(^\text{58}\) called ‘IFIs Out!’ emerged, with exemplary ‘unifying principles’ that included the following:

- We believe in dismantling the IFIs, since we believe them to be fundamentally incapable of transforming into just institutions.
- We believe in decommodification, in opposition to the neoliberal trend of privatising all common property.
- We believe that IFIs reinforce patriarchy and the oppression of women.
- We believe that IFIs reinforce a racist system of global apartheid, including the oppression of indigenous communities.
- We believe in the free global movement of people.
- We believe in the globalisation of capital.
- We believe in cross-territorial work, crossing national, regional, and continental boundaries, and boundaries between issues (such as women, agriculture, indigenous peoples, public health, etc.).
- We believe in global South leadership.
- We believe in strengthening popular social movements.
- We believe in linking global struggles against IFIs with local struggles around land, food, water, etc. (‘global-local linkage’).

Are there concrete ways to take these principles into battle against the IFIs? One anti-imperialist financial tactic based on the strategy of defunding the World Bank was introduced four years earlier: the World Bank Bonds Boycott. Catalysed by Jubilee South Africa, Brazil’s Movement of Landless Workers, and numerous other Third-World activist groups, Bonds Boycott activists posed this simple question that harked back to anti-apartheid disinvestment campaigning: is it ethical for socially conscious people to invest in the Bank by buying its bonds, responsible for eighty per cent of the institution’s resources, hence drawing out dividends which represent the fruits of enormous suffering?

\(^{57}\) Social-movement attendees at the founding conference (25–6 April 2004) included Association of Communities Organizing for Reform Now, US; CEIBA, Guatemala; Citizens Network for Essential Services, US; CODDEFFAGOLF, Honduras; COPINH, Honduras; Council of Canadians; Freedom from Debt Coalition, Philippines; Jubilee South, Philippines; Jubilee South Africa; MPNKP, Haiti; Narmada Bachao Andolan, India; Halifax Initiative Coalition, Canada; and Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, South Africa.

\(^{58}\) These included Center for Economic and Policy Research, US; Center for Economic Justice, US; CEJ Southern Africa, South Africa; CIEPAC, Mexico; Development Gap/SAPRIN, US; Focus on the Global South, Thailand/India; Institute for Global Networking, Information and Studies, Norway; Public Citizen, US; and Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, US.
Within a few years, the world’s largest pension fund, TIAA-CREF, had sold its bonds under activist pressure, and an impressive array of investment funds committed never to buy another Bank bond again.\(^5\) In addition, IFIs Out! committed to campaigning against the recapitalisation of the IFIs. Another front was neoliberal knowledge reproduction via the IFIs, especially the World Bank’s ‘Knowledge Bank’ role, which IFIs Out! began to address in 2004 through intellectual de-legitimation.

In these and many other ways, African activists are contributing to resistance against financial imperialism, South-African sub-imperialism, and the compradorisation process. Their simultaneous, overlapping, interlinking efforts are bringing together some of the most advanced leftist mass movements across the world. What I believe they are doing, through praxis, is updating the classical theories of imperialism, but not based upon the finance-capital thesis of overwhelming power. They have, instead, begun to focus systematically upon the vulnerability of financial circuits of capital, and are taking advantage of opportunities to combine their attacks against these weaknesses of capital with critiques of the illegitimacy of the political form, US-led empire.

How far they go in part depends upon how far comrades in the advanced capitalist financial centres recognise the merits of their analysis, strategy and tactics – and offer the solidarity that African and other Third-World activists can repay many times over, once the financial boot is lifted from their countries’ necks and they gain the space to win their lasting, emancipatory objectives.

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\(^5\) \(<http://www.worldbankboycott.org>\). Organisations that have endorsed the boycott included major religious orders (the Conference of Major Superiors of Men, Pax Christi USA, the Unitarian Universalist General Assembly, and dozens of others); the most important social responsibility funds (Calvert Group, Global Greengrants Fund, Ben and Jerry’s Foundation, and Trillium Assets Management); the University of New Mexico endowment fund; US cities (including San Francisco, Milwaukee, Boulder and Cambridge); and major trade-union pension/investment funds (e.g. Teamsters, Postal Workers, Service Employees Int’l, American Federation of Government Employees, Longshoremen, Communication Workers of America, United Electrical Workers).


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