‘Global Governance’ or the World Social Forum: Divergent analysis, strategy and tactics

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ABSTRACT
This chapter considers three different conceptualizations – three politico-ideological perspectives within civil society - on global-scale economics and geopolitics. The standpoints can be termed ‘global justice movements’, ‘Third World nationalism’ and the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’. These three perspectives stand in contrast to the fusion of neoliberal economics and neoconservative politics that dominates the contemporary world. The three approaches sometimes converge, but more often than not they are in conflict; as are the civil society institutions which cohere to the three different political ideologies. From different analyses flow different strategies, concrete campaigning tactics, and varying choices of allies. Much transnational social movement literature is bound up in the subjects’ norms, institutions, values, logistics and organizational development (as well as issues and advocacy - as in the case of Millennium Development Goal and anti-poverty campaigning), and very little takes ideology and analysis seriously. In contrast, the advent of the World Social Forum (WSF) – and sharp debates about its merits and capacities – gave rise to new literatures that put transnational networking at the centre of the analysis. However, since so many transnational networks have grown and prospered not through programmatic integration such as the WSF would suggest, but rather through sectoral processes, this means that ideological analysis is that much more complicated. While there is no grand WSF political programme to consider, nor is there likely ever to be one generated through consensus within the WSF, there are hints of a unifying approach within the global justice movements based upon the practical themes of ‘decommodification’ and ‘deglobalisation’ (of capital). However, because neoliberalism and imperialism are the two economic and political sides of the same coin, it is logical to analyse the nature of analysis (and then strategies, tactics and allies) that emanate from various oppositional forces, to assess whether by facing up to the ideological divergences, those in the global justice movement can anticipate opportunities for joint work with civil society (and occasional state) forces dedicated to Third World nationalism and the Post-Washington Consensus. It is in analysing the various sectoral and cross-sectoral analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances of WSF actors that researchers can perhaps best contribute to the broader project of global justice.
‘Global Governance’ or the World Social Forum: Divergent analysis, strategy and tactics

by Patrick Bond

When the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only the outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks... The massive structures of modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the ‘trenches’ and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position.
Antonio Gramsci

1. Introduction

In the same critical spirit as Gramsci, Ronnie Munck warns of ‘a slippery path for social movements that are being bamboozled by neoliberal globalisation into a controlled environment where even critical voices serve the overall purpose of stabilising the existing order’. That path, via official fortresses and earthworks such as the Bretton Woods Institutions and United Nations agencies, and now also international NGOs, is meant to reach a terrain termed ‘global governance’ in most conceptions of cosmopolitan democracy, such as David Held’s. It is here that the role of civil society lies ‘in the service of imperialism’, to quote a provocative analysis by James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer.

If in contrast, might we identify a ‘double movement’ at the global scale, in the way Karl Polanyi expected, namely a backlash when ‘the extension of the

1. The analysis that follows is extended from a paper presented to the International Society for Third-Sector Research in Bangkok and published in the Society’s journal Voluntas in December 2006. The arguments follow from prior statements carrying more detail on some of the issues, published in 2005-06 in Third World Quarterly (on problems with Millennium Development Goal campaigning), Policy Studies (on the need for decommodification and deglobalisation strategies), the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (on the promise and pitfalls of the World Social Forum), David Held’s Debating Globalisation (on the fruitless search for global governance reforms), and three books with specific details on South African and African resistance: Elite Transition (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), Talk Left Walk Right (UKZN Press, 2006) and Looting Africa (Zed Books and UKZN Press, 2006).
market organisation in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction’, by activists applying pressure against the sources of neoliberal pressure in Washington, Geneva and the world’s financial capitals, sometimes via the United Nations? 4 If this reading of the struggle over the very idea of ‘global civil society’ is pertinent, we may dispense with less useful theories in which society relates to national states first and foremost, as Rupert Taylor5 and Olaf Corry6 advise.

However, we would go further in cautioning, following James Ferguson, that ‘the current (often ahistorical and uncritical) use of the concept of “civil society” in the study of African politics obscures more than it reveals, and, indeed, often serves to help legitimate a profoundly anti-democratic transnational politics.’ To avoid getting locked into self-defeating semantics as to who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ (and see Chris Armstrong’s article in this volume for antidotes), Ferguson suggests a return to Gramscian class-analytic concerns, but in an internationalist manner that transcends the ‘old left’ view grounded in national settings:

‘Local’ people in ‘communities’ and their ‘authentic’ leaders and representatives who organize ‘at the grassroots’, in this view, are locked in struggle with a repressive state representing (in some complex combination) both imperial capitalism and the local dominant classes. The familiar themes here are those of resistance from below, and repression from above, always accompanied by the danger of cooptation, as the leaders of today’s struggle become the elites against whom one must struggle tomorrow.

I do not mean to imply that this conception of the world is entirely wrong, or entirely irrelevant. But if, as I have suggested, transnational relations of power are no longer routed so centrally through the state, and if forms of governmentality increasingly exist that bypass states altogether, then political resistance needs to be reconceptualised in a parallel fashion. Many of today’s most successful social movements have done just that… But academic theory, as so often, here lags behind the world it seeks to account for.

To be sure, the world of academic theory is by now ready to see that the nation-state does not work the way conventional models of African politics suggested. And the idea that transnational networks of governmentality have taken a leading role in the de-facto governance of Africa is also likely

to be assented to on reflection. But are we ready to perform a similar shift in
the way we think about political resistance? Are we ready to jettison
received ideas of ‘local communities’ and ‘authentic leadership’? Critical
scholars today celebrate both local resistance to corporate globalization as
well as forms of grassroots international solidarity that some have termed
‘globalization from below’. But even as we do so, we seem to hang on
stubbornly to the very idea of a ‘below’ – the idea that politically
subordinate groups are somehow naturally local, rooted, and encompassed
by ‘higher level’ entities. For what is involved in the very idea and image of
‘grassroots’ politics, if not precisely the vertical topography of power that I
have suggested is the root of our conceptual ills? Can we learn to conceive,
theoretically and politically, of a ‘grassroots’ that would be not local,
communal, and authentic, but worldly, well-connected, and opportunistic?
Are we ready for social movements that fight not ‘from below’ but ‘across’,
using their ‘foreign policy’ to fight struggles not against ‘the state’ but
against that hydra-headed transnational apparatus of banks, international
agencies, and market institutions through which contemporary capitalist
domination functions? 7

If, then, we clamber onto the global-scale terrain a bit less encumbered by
national- and local-scale theoretical baggage associated with ‘civil society’, we
quickly encounter the trenches and apparently permanent fortifications of
multilateral institutions, international law and geopolitical alignments. These
appear at first blush to be overwhelmingly disadvantageous sites of struggle for
social-change activists. But Held and many large NGOs and networks insist that
on the global terrain, the battle to reform the institutions and rules of economy
and geopolitics can be won. I rejoin a debate with Held, below, on these matters.

In contrast, for Petras and Veltmeyer, the entire terrain has become a
swamp, especially for NGO cadre most concerned with global governance, who
allegedly import neoliberal precepts, dressing them up in the language of
participation and consultation:

The effects of structural adjustment programmes and other [global]
interventions have the potential of causing popular discontent. That is
where the NGO’s play an important function. They deflect popular
discontent away from the powerful [global] institutions towards local
micro-projects, apolitical ‘grass roots’ self-exploitation and ‘popular
education’ that avoids class analysis of imperialism and capitalism. On the
one hand they criticize dictatorships and human rights violations but on the
other they compete with radical socio-political movements in an attempt to
channel popular movements into collaborative relations with dominant

neoliberal elites. Contrary to the public image of themselves as innovative grass roots leaders, they are in reality grass roots reactionaries who complement the work of the IMF and other institutions by pushing privatization from below and demobilizing popular movements, thus undermining resistance.8

This represents the left pole, a ‘militant abstentionism’ in relation to global governance. But it is indisputable that, in Chris Armstrong’s words, ‘The danger of co-option is real, and the independence – and therefore critical import – of much of what goes under the heading of global civil society is highly dubious.’9

Hence some frank acknowledgement of difference is long overdue, for analytical reasons (Section 2) and also strategic purposes. After all, given the character of establishment political-economic dynamics and geopolitical power relations (Section 3), collaborative relations with dominant neoliberal elites in the multilateral agencies – e.g., the Bretton Woods Institutions and even the UN (Section 4) - have simply not paid off during at least a quarter-century of systematic reform attempts. If one takes merely the World Bank’s twists and turns on issues such as transparency, participation, environment, gender, corruption and post-Washington Consensus ideology, it is apparent that multilateral agencies can take a step forward and then several sideways and even backwards, leaving power relations and neoliberal development strategies largely intact. At the same time, half-hearted forms of consultation arranged by the multilateral institutions serve to keep larger questions of macroeconomics and the parameters of social policy out of bounds. This leads us to engage more forcefully with Held on global governance, to ask whether there is not a better approach: building a genuine citizenship from below, not joining an embryonic world-state regime on disadvantageous terms, from above (Section 5).

2. Politico-ideological alignments

As noted by Taylor, the conceptual baggage of civil society studies should be at least partially jettisoned to better negotiate the terrain ahead. In the transnational social movement literature, a great deal of work has gone into analysis of a Weberian, institutional character, in consideration of norms, institutions, values, logistics and organizational development. Gramscian and Polanyian insights into civil society legitimation and resistance to neoliberalism have not yet been adequately considered, although Hagai Katz has recently advocated

the forging of counter-hegemony in the ‘multiplicity of antagonisms’ evolving in and by way of the social relations of civil society. For a historic

bloc to be effective it needs to be a coalition of forces, that does not duplicate power disparities inherent in the existing world-system, that avoids localism or nationalism, and promotes global solidarity, through networking that links the local and the global – a unifying, non-homogenizing, and indigenizing strategy of resistance.¹⁰

Not only is our analysis of the counter-hegemonic bloc relatively immature. It has also become clear that the desired strategy will not easily emerge in the current context, in part because of strategic and tactical confusion and division. This occurs because of a deeper problem, ideological division in relation to the global governance debate relating to the emerging albeit embryonic global state.

Ideology is a difficult matter to pin down within all the different political currents. In what may be perhaps termed the movements for global justice (from where I write), many of the organisations and spokespeople are split between ‘autonomist’ and ‘socialist’ politics. Other forces in civil society have become the product – and ongoing generator – of Third World nationalist ideas. Moreover, a large share (probably the majority) of NGOs, trade unions, progressive religious organisations and academics aligned with civil society might best be considered ‘Post-Washington’ social democrats.

It is in the latter group that we often find leading civil society organisations joining global elite debates, including the Millennium Development Goals and ‘Make Poverty History’ campaigning. Moreover, since 2001 a global convergence of activists and strategists has appeared at the World Social Forum (WSF) meetings. Within and often beyond the WSF, a more robust mode of global justice and peace work is associated with sectoral processes of a transnational character. These different terrains of struggle make ideological analysis that much more complicated, given the shifting analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances associated with diverse transnational movements, especially when wide opportunities are presented to join existing (or emerging) political blocs.

There appear to have emerged at least five distinct and largely coherent ideological categories associated with, if not historic ‘bloc’ formation, at least increasingly universal political orientations (Table 1):

- Global justice movements (often combining traditions of socialism and anarchism/autonomism);
- Third World Nationalism (with varying political traditions);
- Post-Washington Consensus (often espousing a limited version of social democracy);
- Washington Consensus (neoliberalism); and
- Resurgent Rightwing (neoconservativism).

**Table 1: Five international ideological currents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political current:</th>
<th>Global Justice Movements</th>
<th>Third World Nationalism</th>
<th>Post-Wash. Consensus</th>
<th>Washington Consensus</th>
<th>Resurgent Rightwing</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tradition</strong></td>
<td>socialism, anarchism</td>
<td><em>national</em> capitalism</td>
<td>(lite) social democracy</td>
<td>neoliberalism</td>
<td>neoconservatism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main agenda</strong></td>
<td>‘deglobalisation’ of capital (not of people); ‘globalisation-from-below’ and international solidarity; anti-war; anti-racism; indigenous rights; women’s liberation; ecology; ‘decommodified’ state services; radical participatory democracy</td>
<td>increased (but fairer) global integration via reform of interstate system, based on debt relief and expanded market access; reformed global governance; regionalism; rhetorical anti-imperialism; and Third World unity</td>
<td>fix ‘imperfect markets,’ add ‘sustainable development’ to existing capitalist framework via UN and similar global state-building; promote a degree of global Keynesianism; oppose US unilateralism and militarism</td>
<td>rename neoliberalism (PRSPs, HIPC, PPPs) with provisions for ‘transparency’, self-regulation and bail-out mechanisms; coopt potential emerging-market resistance; offer financial support for US-led Empire</td>
<td>unilateral petro-military imperialism; crony deals, corporate subsidies, protectionism and tariffs; reverse globalization of people via racism and xenophobia; religious extremism; patriarchy and bio-social power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading institutions</strong></td>
<td>social movements; environmental justice activists; indigenous people; autonomists; radical activist networks; leftist labour mmts; liberation theology; radical think-tanks (e.g., Focus on the Global South, Global Exchange, IBASE, IFG, IPS, Nader centres, TNI); radical media (GreenLeft Weekly, Indymedia Pacifica, Pambazuka, zmag.org); semi-liberated zones (Bolivarian projects, Kerala); sector-based or local coalitions in the World Social Forum</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement, G77 and South Centre; self-selecting regimes (often authoritarian): Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Zimbabwe with a few – Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela – that lean left; AlJazeera; supportive NGOs (e.g., Seatini, Third World Network)</td>
<td>some UN agencies (e.g., Unicef, Unifem, Unrisd, Wider); some INGOs (e.g., Care, Civics, IUCN, Oxfam, TI); large enviro. groups (e.g., Sierra and WWF); big labour (e.g., ICFTU and AFL-CIO); liberal foundations (Carnegie, Ford, MacArthur, Mott, Open Society, Rockefeller); Columbia U. economics department; the Socialist International; Norway</td>
<td>US state (Fed, Treasury, USAid); corporate media, IT and financiers; World Bank, IMF, WTO; elite clubs (Bilderburgers, Trilateral Commission, World Economic Forum); some UN agencies (UNDP, Unctad, Global Compact); universities and think-tanks (U. of Chicago economics, Cato, Council on Foreign Relations, Adam Smith Inst., Inst. of International Economics, Brookings); BBC, CNN and Sky; most of G8</td>
<td>Republican Party populist and libertarian wings; Project for a New American Century; right wing think-tanks (AEI, CSIS, Heritage, Manhattan); Christian Right institutions and media; petro-military complex and industrial firms; the Pentagon; rightwing media (Fox, National Interest, Weekly Standard, Washington Times); proto-fascist European parties - but also Zionism and Islamic extremism</td>
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### Political current: Global Justice Movements

- Internal disputes: role of state; party politics; fix-it vs nix-it for int’l agencies; gender and racial power relations; divergent interests (e.g., Northern labour or environment vs Southern sovereignty and indigenous rights); tactics (e.g., merits of symbolic property destruction)

- Exemplary proponents:
  - **Political Society**: R.Alarcon F.Castro H.Chavez R.Correa E.Morales

### ThirdWorld Nationalism

- Degree of militancy versus the North; divergent regional interests; religion; large vs small countries; internecine rivalries;

### Post-Wash. Consensus

- Some look left (for alliances) while others look right to the Wash. Consensus (in search of resources, legitimacy and deals); which reforms are optimal

### Washington Consensus

- Differing reactions to US empire due to divergent national-capitalist interests and domestic political dynamics

### Resurgent Rightwing

- Disputes over US imperial reach, religious influence, and how to best protect culture, patriarchy, and state sovereignty

### Exemplary proponents:

- **Political Society**: J.Aristide M.Bachelet G.Brundtland S.Byers J.Fischer W.Maathai T.Mkandawire M.Robinson G.Verhofstadt K.Watkins

- **Civil Society**: Y.Akyuz Y.Graham M.Khor Y.Tandon


- **Civil Society**: B.Clinton T.Friedman W.Gates H.Kissinger K.Rogoff M.Yunus


- **Civil Society**: O.Bin Laden Z.Brzezinski P.Buchanan A.Colter J.Falwell W.Kristol R.Limbaugh R.Murdoch G.Norquist M.Peretz R.Scaife
The five currents are recognisable by the political traditions from which they have evolved, their political-economic agenda, leading institutions, internal disputes and noted public proponents. Semantics need not detain us at this stage, but it is critical to recognize that these are fluid categories. Across the world, many individuals have moved, not merely rhetorically, but also substantively, from one camp to another. For example, economist Joseph Stiglitz has rapidly shifted left since the late 1990s, while Brazilian president Luis Ignacio da Silva has repositioned himself from a socialist metalworker to a statesman far to the right of his Workers Party base. Some, like South African president Thabo Mbeki, can stand rhetorically in more than one camp at once (Mbeki popularized the term ‘global apartheid’ though has had an important role in its implementation). For many individuals, their outlook depends partly upon the political scale which they are contesting: global, continental, national or local.

Civil society forces are located in each camp, of course, but the crucial question is where fusion or at least critical mass may emerge to direct social resources. Whereas global justice ideologies are nearly exclusively forged by non-state actors, notwithstanding a recent state-based leadership revival from Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales in Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia, there are important NGO links to progressive Third World nationalism, especially the Malaysian-based Third World Network, and agencies such as the South Centre sometimes linking the two sides. Most large transnational civil society agencies, trade unions and environmental groups can be found in the ‘Post-Washington’ ideological camp.

The rest of the argument concerns itself exclusively with the various analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances associated with civil society within the global justice movements, Third World nationalism and the Post-Washington Consensus, since these are the main voices contending for counter-hegemonic respect. To be sure, there is a complementary set of overlapping typologies, consisting – in David Sogge’s formulation (Table 2) – of ‘mainstream’ and ‘alternative’ lineages of civil society.
Table 2: Mainstream and alternative lineages of civil society (David Sogge) 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership of civil society</th>
<th>Mainstream lineage</th>
<th>Alternative lineage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local and intermediary NGOs, anti-government media, nonprofit service bodies such as missions, charities, professional and business associations</td>
<td>Social movements, non-establishment political parties, trade unions, activist community-based organisations, knowledge-based NGOs, independent media</td>
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| Main problems for civil society to tackle | Imperatives of markets, competition and modern life break natural social bonds. Tensions increase, threatening political instability. Lack of trustful relations in society sets limits to exchange and to security of private property – thus setting limits to economic growth. The state ‘crowds out’ private economic actors. Bad governance stems from oversised state apparatuses and from behaviour of government elites. | Domination by national and foreign state and private actors (often in collusion) generates socio-economic exclusion and insecurity. These set limits to equitable development and growth, weaken tax-based redistributive measures, frustrate democratic politics and generate dangerous social polarisation. Bad governance is a cumulative outcome of national and global politico-economic and military forces. |

| Wider roles of civil society | Civil society fosters bonds of trust, thus lowers business transaction costs and widens market relations. It compensates for loss of traditional social bonds, strengthening social consensus and consent to rules, thus helping prevent conflict. | Civil society promotes the ethic and practice of solidarity and emancipation, animating and inspiring action toward state and toward private business interests. (Nonviolent) conflict seen as a necessary motor of social change. |

| Organisations’ positioning and tasks | Organisations together form a ‘third sector’ complementing the state and business sectors, though they are separate from the state in political terms. Via ‘advocacy and lobbying’ they hold the government to account. They promote decentralisation and reduction of central state powers. Via public-private ‘partnerships’ some NGOs provide social services, conflict mediation &c. as alternatives to state providers. | Organisations distinct from state and from business interests. Social movements may however crystallize into parties contesting for state power. Otherwise, primary tasks are to aggregate countervailing power through mobilising and forging alliances among groups of the poor and excluded via routine and non-routine political, judicial and media channels. |

| Level and scope | Mainly local and national | Local, national and international |

| Political premises | Approach is premised on notions of ‘weak publics’ where opinions are formed but no active political leverage is pursued. | Approach premised on notions of ‘strong publics’ where opinions develop and political leverage actively pursued. |


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Sogge also divides organisations more broadly divided into ‘liberatory’, ‘reactionary’ and ‘status quo’ groups, according to their normative values:

- **An emancipatory camp.** A diverse category populated by those pursuing aims consistent with covenants of social, economic, cultural and civil rights. Having been vigorously discouraged for decades by outside powers and their local clients, it is a minority, often a besieged minority.
- **A supremacist category.** Also in a minority, these groups routinely pursue domination over others, denying or subverting emancipatory aims, as agents of economic or violent crime, promoters of xenophobia, ethnic hatred, denial of rights to women and girls, etc. However, in some settings they can be well-positioned and enjoy the protection or outright support of those holding state and corporate power.
- **The self-regarding or inward-looking.** The bulk of voluntary associations and nonprofits may best be categorised as instrumental, as vehicles for service delivery, political self-advancement, etc., or merely inward-looking, as with the most religious and cultural associations, clubs providing services to members and so forth.

There are crucial political differences within the emancipatory camp that must be recorded. Popular and intellectual texts on the global justice movements are already overwhelming, and it is difficult to pin down the ideological orientations and strategic trajectories.  

12 Alex Callinicos breaks up the movements into ‘localist,’ ‘reformist,’ ‘autonomist’ and ‘socialist’ ideologies. Christophe Aguiton cites three currents: ‘radical internationalist,’ ‘nationalist,’ and ‘neo-reformist.’ Peter Waterman argues against these categories, by ‘surpassing’ traditional left internationalism. “Emancipation” might seem a more appropriate term than “left”

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when discussing the transformation of society, nature, culture, work and psychology, and that increasingly important but nether-place, cyberspace.’

Whichever way the global justice movements are cut and pasted, greater ideological and strategic clarity for the purpose of ‘forging counter-hegemony’, to borrow from Katz’s argument, probably entails avoiding a futile strategy of fusing mainstream and alternative civil society lineages. Instead, the ‘multiplicity of antagonisms’ evolving as self-declared emancipatory forces – from within the global justice tendency but perhaps also encompassing civil society forces within Third World nationalist and Post-Washington ideologies - are those we are concerned with, although ‘self-regarding’ civil society agencies are certainly thick on the ground in global governance fora.

3. Establishment power and vulnerability

We can contrast these divergent intra-emancipatory civil society tendencies with an impressive coherence of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies within the world ruling elites, over the last few years. These are emblematized by recent leaders of multilateral institutions:

- the European Union chose Spanish neoconservative Rodrigo Rato as International Monetary Fund managing director in mid-2004;
- the new head of UNICEF, chosen in January 2005, was Bush’s agriculture minister Ann Veneman, although the USA and Somalia are the only two out of 191 countries which refused to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child;
- for another key UN post in February 2005, the outgoing neoliberal head of the World Trade Organisation, Supachai Panitchpakdi from Thailand (who served US and EU interests from 2003-05), was chosen to lead the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development;
- Paul Wolfowitz – the architect of the illegal US/UK/Coalition of the Willing war against Iraq – was appointed by Bush to head the World Bank in March 2005;
- the European Union’s hardline trade negotiator Pascal Lamy won the directorship of the World Trade Organisation a few weeks after that;
- to ensure that Washington’s directives to the United Nations continued to be as explicit as possible, Bush appointed John Bolton as US Ambassador in mid-2005, and although he departed in December 2006, his replacement will have the same bullying mandate.14

From the State Department, Bolton’s main function was to disempower the UN, as witnessed in these remarks: ‘Americanists find themselves surrounded by small armies of globalists, each tightly clutching a favourite new treaty or multilateralist proposal… If I were redoing the Security Council today, I’d have one permanent member because that’s the real reflection of the distribution of power in the world.’ Bolton engineered Washington’s withdrawal from or weakening of the anti-ballistic missile treaty, a biological weapons convention protocol, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the nuclear test ban treaty, the UN conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and the International Criminal Court.

According to Phyllis Bennis of the Institute for Policy Studies, Bush’s appointment of such an official was not unpredicted, since

many of the secretary-general’s top staff were replaced over the last two years or so with active supporters of the US agenda for the United Nations. That effort includes the US-orchestrated replacement of Kofi Annan’s longstanding chief of staff Iqbal Riza with Mark Malloch-Brown (who called Bolton ‘very effective’), and the appointment of Bush loyalist and right-wing American State Department official Christopher Burnham as undersecretary-general for management.16

This is not to say that the fusion of neoliberalism and neoconservatism so apparent is permanently hegemonic and crisis free. Walden Bello recounts three problems in the maintenance of empire, starting with ‘a crisis of overextension, or the growing gap between imperial reach and imperial grasp.’ For Bello, ‘Hugo Chavez’s scintillating defiance of American power would not be possible without the Iraqi resistance’s successfully pinning down US interventionist forces in a war without end.’

Second, the overaccumulation of capital continues, based upon generalised overproduction but under the new circumstances of rising Chinese and Indian output. According to Bello, ‘Efforts by global capital to regain profitability by more intensively exploiting labor in the North or moving out to take advantage of significantly lower wages elsewhere have merely exacerbated the crisis’ because the long neoliberal austerity lowered the rates of increase in global demand to levels lower than in earlier decades.

Third, ‘the crisis of legitimacy of US hegemony’ is reflected in ‘the US no longer wanting to act as a primus inter pares, or first among equals, in the WTO, World Bank, and the IMF, and wishing to unilaterally pursue its interests through these mechanisms, thus seriously impairing their credibility, legitimacy, and functioning as global institutions.’ The US undermines its own internal credibility through its illiberal Patriot Act, new systems of repressing dissent, ‘the massive hijacking of elections by corporate financing that has corrupted both the Republican and Democratic parties and the systematic disenfranchisement of poor people’. Bush was comfortable ‘doing the bidding of US industry in torpedoing the Kyoto Protocol, awarding his vice president’s corporate allies such as Halliburton with no-bid contracts, going to war for his oil cronies, and creating a free-market paradise for US corporations in Iraq.’

But these three crises, in turn, intensify Washington’s desperation to control all relevant multilateral fora. It is in this context of an adverse balance of forces that we can understand not only the recent debacles of global governance: the inability to expand the UN Security Council in September 2005; the breakdown of the Doha Round of World Trade Organisation negotiations in July 2006; and the shrinkage of Africa’s voting power within the IMF board of governors from 4.1% to 2.4% planned for September 2006. The question, under the circumstances, is whether global governance reforms are indeed possible.

4. Top-down reformism foiled

We are now witnessing and also foreseeing the futility of reform proposals while the neoliberal/neoconservative fusion prevails as the dominant bloc. This approach is personified by Paul Wolfowitz, close ally of the Indonesian dictator Suharto during the 1980s before his central role in imperial theft and corporate patronage associated with the illegal Iraq War. Under Wolfowitz’s leadership, the Bank’s main self-declared internal reform is against rampant project corruption whose historical costs to the institution were conservatively estimated at $100 billion. But Patricia Adams from Probe International condemns Wolfowitz’s disclosure plus amnesty strategy because it ‘immunises bribers from debarment, allows the Bank to cover-up its own negligence or complicity, and undermines the administration of justice in countries where it is a criminal offence to bribe a foreign official.’

The Bank strategy recalls other recent reform failures. In the case of the ill-fated 1998-2001 World Commission on Dams (WCD) cohosted by the World Bank, for example, its chairperson, Kader Asmal, despaired at the 2003 findings of the World Panel on Financing Infrastructure (mainly implemented by the Bank), which was led by former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus.

18. Odious Debts Online (2006), ‘Wolfowitz to Push Anti-Corruption Program at World Bank Meeting, 15 September.’
According to Asmal, ‘For an esteemed panel to effectively write off the WCD, whose core recommendations have been endorsed by many of its member organisations, is quite remarkable and raises concerns about the value of the report. Failing to address this point effectively takes us back many years.’

Moreover, as Patrick McCully of International Rivers Network remarked, ‘The World Bank’s singularly negative and non-committal response to the WCD Report means that the Bank will no longer be accepted as an honest broker in any further multi-stakeholder dialogues.’

The Bank/IMF renaming of structural adjustment programmes - Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (1999-present) – entailed increased citizen participation, but also proved to be a dead end in all the cases civil society researchers have carefully considered. Other foiled Bretton Woods Institution reform initiatives include the 1999-2003 Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (Sapri), which failed when Bank staff walked out of the process. Commented Richard Peet, ‘the President of the World Bank did not listen to Sapri,

because he could not. For he would hear, and he even might learn, that his finest, most splendid ideas had produced the worst, most harmful effects."²²

The crucial 2002-04 Extractive Industries Review was similarly constructed as a multi-stakeholder project but the Bank’s seriousness about the mineral/petroleum/timber industries’ problems was thrown into question during the process. According to several major environmental NGOs, ‘One of the Bank’s most important environmental reforms of the 1990s was its more cautious approach to high-risk infrastructure and forestry projects. This policy is now being reversed. The World Bank recently announced that it would re-engage in contentious water projects such as large dams in what it refers to as a “high risk/high reward” strategy. In 2002, the Bank dismissed its “risk-averse” approach to the forest sector when it approved a new forest policy. The World Bank is also considering support for new oil, mining, and gas projects in unstable and poorly governed countries, against the recommendations of its own evaluation unit.’²³ When the EIR surprisingly recommended a phasing out of all Bank fossil fuel investments, the Bank not surprisingly rejected that option.

Ultimately, nearly all civil society initiatives with the World Bank and IMF have been disasters, with Civicus withdrawing from its controversial 2003-05 initiative to rebuild relations. The institutions’ 2006 annual meetings, normally a site of intense collaboration with mainstream civil society groups, were marred by police repression and unprecedented denial of visas and immigration rights at the host site, Singapore. A successful boycott call made by social and environmental groups – including Jubilee South and Jubilee USA, Focus on the Global South, Solidarity Africa Network, the World Development Movement, the European Network on Debt and Development, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth International and Oil Watch International – was an emblematic indictment of contemporary political power relations:

The IMF and World Bank cannot escape responsibility for recent developments. Knowing full well the authoritarian character of the Singaporean Government, they appear to have picked Singapore as the site of their Annual Meetings because they wanted to avoid the legitimate and peaceful street protests that have been staged at earlier World Bank-IMF and World Trade Organization meetings. The choice of Singapore as a venue for the annual meetings has been consistently criticised by civil society organizations, yet the World Bank and IMF went on with their plans. We condemn the Singapore Government’s repressive actions, and we also condemn the World Bank and the IMF for being complicit in these actions.²⁴

²⁴. INFID Indonesia, Freedom from Debt Coalition Philippines, Jubilee South, Focus on the
This record raises the larger question posed by cosmopolitan democracy theorists, of how institutions of such power and scope can be managed. Amongst leading strategists, the late Iris Marion Young argued for the closure of the Fund and Bank (which ‘do not even pretend to be inclusive and democratic’) so as to pursue a ‘reasonable goal’: reform of the United Nations, ‘the best existing starting point for building global democratic institutions... As members of the General Assembly, nearly all the world’s peoples today are represented at the UN.’ Moreover, the UN is a site where imperial powers ‘seek legitimacy for some of their international actions’ and where states ‘at least appear to be cooperative and interested in justice.’ Likewise, civil society organisations have mobilized around UN events and issues.25

Yet futile global governance reforms have recently been waged to improve United Nations Security Council reform, handling of governance/democracy implementation (especially at local levels)26 and Millennium Development Goal advocacy. None have had satisfactory results. For example, the MDGs are, in David Held’s view, ‘the moral consciousness of the international community’,27 yet in reality they were generated nontransparently by the elite United Nations, itself simultaneously moving to embrace the Washington Consensus with its pro-corporate Global Compact, endorsement of ‘Type 2’ Public-Private Partnership privatisation strategies, and collaboration with the World Bank. Held concedes that ‘there may have been no point in setting these targets at all, so far are we from attaining them in many parts of the world’ – but global justice activists worry that their main flaw is that the institutions which set the goals are so far from the people who need to own the struggles and their victories. They are, as Peggy Antrobus of the feminist economics network DAWN renames them, ‘maximum distraction gimmicks’.28 Likewise, for the most important global-scale problem, climate change, it is timely to query whether UN processes are providing, as Held desires, a ‘sustainable framework for the management of


global warming’? Kyoto definitely wasn’t the answer, as Carbon Trade Watch, CornerHouse and the TransNational Institute demonstrate. 29

5. Bottom-up strategies for deglobalisation and decommodification

In contrast, the strategic formula which, amongst other movements, the South African independent left has broadly adopted is to build durable and relatively democratic mass movements 30 informed by internationalism, combined with demands upon the national state to ‘lock capital down’. 31 The spirit entails what Walden Bello has called ‘deglocalisation’ (of capital). 32 This has entailed three bouts of important mass internationalist protest activity, with more than 10 000 people marching against the UN’s World Conference Against Racism (in Durban, September 2001) for failing to put reparations and Zionism on the agenda; more than 25 000 demonstrating against the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, August 2002) for embracing neoliberal environmental and social strategies; and more tens of thousands protesting the war against Iraq (countrywide, 2003-04).

South African activists like Dennis Brutus, Trevor Ngwane and Virginia Magwaza-Setshedhi have also been instrumental in trying to remove the boot of the Bretton Woods Institutions from Third World necks, harking back to anti-apartheid analysis, strategy and tactics. As a revival of ‘divestment’ to fight apartheid, the World Bank Bonds Boycott has had remarkable success in defunding the institution that is most often at the coalface of neoliberal repression across the Third World. In addition, South Africans and other activists have won dramatic victories in deglobalising the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights regime, by demanding generic anti-retroviral medicines instead of branded, monopoly-patented drugs. Similar struggles are underway to deglobalise food, especially given the Genetically Modified Organisms threat from transnational corporations, to halt biopiracy, and to kick out the water and energy privatisers. These are typically ‘nonreformist reforms’ insofar as they achieve concrete goals and simultaneously link movements, enhance consciousness, develop the issues, and build democratic organisational forms and momentum.

Of course, this is a matter for nuanced scale politics: determining whether local community, subnational, national or regional strategies can best mitigate and reverse global economic tyranny for particular issues. But the main reason to deglobalise is to gain space to fight neoliberal commodification. To illustrate, the

30. Many of these are surveyed in Richard Ballard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valoodia (2006), Voices of Protest, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
South African decommodification agenda entails struggles to turn basic needs into genuine human rights including: free anti-retroviral medicines to fight AIDS (hence disempowering Big Pharma); 50 litres of free water per person per day (hence ridding Africa of Suez and other water privatisers); 1 kiloWatt hour of free electricity for each individual every day (hence reorienting energy resources from export-oriented mining and smelting, to basic-needs consumption); extensive land reform (hence de-emphasising cash cropping and export-oriented plantations); prohibitions on service disconnections and evictions; free education (hence halting the General Agreement on Trade in Services); and the like. A free ‘Basic Income Grant’ allowance of $15/month is even advocated by churches, NGOs and trade unions. All such services should be universal (open to all, no matter income levels), and to the extent feasible, financed through higher prices that penalise luxury consumption. This potentially unifying agenda could serve as a basis for widescale social change, in the manner that Gosta Esping-Andersen has discussed with respect to Scandinavian social policy.33

6. The WSF as a programmatic site

To arrive at such an agenda will require a formal programme, something that the global justice movements have not found easy to establish given the divergent tendencies between socialism and autonomism. For example, in early 2005 at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre, 19 well-known movement intellectuals and activists gathered to produce a draft of ‘Twelve proposals for another possible world’ (abridged as follows):

1. Cancel the external debt of southern countries;
2. Implement international taxes on financial transactions (most notably the Tobin tax on speculative capital), on direct foreign investments, on consolidated profit from multinationals, on weapon trade and on activities accompanied by large greenhouse effect gas emissions;
3. Progressively dismantle all forms of fiscal, juridical and banking paradises;
4. All inhabitants of this planet must have the right to be employed, to social protection and retirement/pension, respecting equal rights between men and women;
5. Promote all forms of equitable trade, reject all free-trade agreements and laws proposed by the World Trade Organization, and putting in motion mechanisms allowing a progressive upward equalization of social and environmental norms;
6. Guarantee the right to for all countries to alimentary sovereignty and security by promoting peasant, rural agriculture;

7. Forbid all type of patenting of knowledge on living beings (human, animal or vegetal) as well as any privatization of common goods for humanity, particularly water;
8. Fight by means of public policies against all kinds of discrimination, sexism, xenophobia, antisemitism and racism. Fully recognize the political, cultural and economic rights (including the access to natural resources) of indigenous populations.
9. Take urgent steps to end the destruction of the environment and the threat of severe climate changes due to the greenhouse effect, resulting from the proliferation of individual transportation and the excessive use of non-renewable energy sources;
10. Demand the dismantling of all foreign military bases and the removal of troops on all countries, except when operating under explicit mandate of the United Nations, especially for Iraq and Palestine;
11. Guarantee the right to access information and the right to inform, for/by all citizens;
12. Reform and deeply democratize international institutions by making sure human, economic, social and cultural rights prevail.34

It can well be argued that these efforts risk the ‘top-down’ danger of imposing programmatic ideas upon fluid movements and campaigns.35 Reflecting the

34. The signatories – regrettably 18 men and just one woman - were Aminata Traoré, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Eduardo Galeano, José Saramago, François Houtart, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Armand Mattelart, Roberto Savio, Riccardo Petrella, Ignacio Ramonet, Bernard Cassen, Samir Amin, Atilio Boron, Samuel Ruiz García, Tariq Ali, Frei Betto, Emir Sader, Walden Bello and Immanuel Wallerstein.

1) This first position is weakened by not specifying that cancellation should extend to middle-income countries. Yes, it’s implicit in ‘southern countries,’ but given the awful role of some Jubilee chapters in the North, in dividing the South into HIPC and non-HIPC, it really does require explicit argument - endorsing the Jubilee South platform - so as to ensure that Brazilians, Argentines, Nigerians, Indonesians, South Africans, etc, are included as beneficiaries of total Third World debt cancellation. The statement is also weakened by its failure to endorse the growing demand not only for return of wealth stolen by elites and lodged in Swiss (and other) banks, where a victory was won against Nigeria’s late dictator Sani Abacha this week, but also the demand for reparations. That demand, applied to South Africa for instance, would entail the recovery of interest paid over many decades by apartheid’s rulers, drawn out of social surpluses taken from oppressed black South Africans. The reparations demand against Citibank and its ilk, made by Jubilee South Africa and the Khulumani apartheid-victims advocacy group, recently went before a New York judge, who denied it last November because of pressure from South Africa’s comprador government, notwithstanding favourable precedents and the Alien Tort Claims Act (which the Bush administration has been trying unsuccessfully to gut). But the reparations demand will continue to be made (including on appeal in that case), and should have been noted and
supported not only in terms of apartheid financing, but more generally in cases of Odious Debts and debts already repaid many times over. The authors should also have noted the ecological debt owed by the North to the South, for the illegitimate abuse of the global commons (again, a Jubilee South movement along these lines is already working hard to make it an international campaign).

2. The sentiments cannot be disputed. However, there is a very healthy debate on whether a Tobin Tax is appropriate, in contrast to national capital controls. A global Tobin Tax could easily be avoided by financiers (using ‘securitisation’ instruments which work on derivative movements of asset prices), and given the power relations we currently face at global scale, the proceeds might well be diverted - as then IMF acting director Stanley Fischer suggested in 2000 - back into the Bretton Woods Institutions.

3. This is a fine statement, and a long-overdue demand. The post-911 hunt for Al Qaeda finances shows that these offshort money centres aren’t immune to pressure. However, have the authors done the necessary work with the residents (especially low-income) of Switzerland, Panama, the Cayman Islands, Jersey, etc etc, so that the full implications are explored, and alternative modes of livelihood promoted?

4. This is an excellent sentiment, but what sort of international state arrangements would be required to enforce compliance? Does the global progressive movement want to move in this direction, given the adverse power relations?

5. By promoting ‘all forms’ of equitable trade, aren’t the authors ignoring the ways in which trade and transport operate inefficiently and irrationally? Aren’t the authors buying into the export-led growth fetish of neoliberalism? Wouldn’t it be better to consider John Maynard Keynes’ advice (in 1933): ‘Let goods be homespun where reasonably and conveniently possible’? And why do the authors ignore the vast campaign by water activists to remove water from GATS?

6. This is excellent, and hopefully works against the pro-trade bias of point #5. Yet here was an opportunity, apparently lost, to talk not only about food sovereignty, but about the need to establish nutritional priorities, to assess the full cost (e.g. virtual water) associated with food production, and to help movements engaged in food decommodification.

7. This is also an excellent sentiment, however it does not go far enough. One of the very most severe threats we face - which on February 16 the Kyoto Protocol has formally brought into force (just a fortnight after the authors’ statement) - is the privatisation of the air. This technique is being established by companies and agencies (especially the World Bank) addicted to C02 emissions, and allows them to enhance their carbon-emitting rights (a bogus property right established through Kyoto) by buying into Third World carbon-reduction scams such as monocultural timber plantations (Brazil’s Planter) and toxic dumps in low-income/black neighbourhoods (South Africa’s Bisaser Road). Given that the commodification of the commons now entails the privatisation of the air (as endorsed even by some coopted environmentalists), the authors should be alerting their audiences to this danger.

8. No objection.

9. To blame global warming first of all on ‘individual transportation’ - without a self-ironic nod to the flights the authors themselves took to Porto Alegre - is missing the point, when so much more C02-generating transport is associated with unnecessary trade in commodities, which the authors have unfortunately already endorsed in #5.

10. This sounds like a necessary but entirely insufficient demand to deal with the kinds of military threats faced by countries like Iran, which is facing US bombing runs in the very near future. It also fails to get at the proxy mechanisms by which imperialism continues to operate, with venal local elites serving US and EU interests so that ‘foreign military bases’ are hardly the first line of attack by anti-imperialists. The global arms trade, for instance, should have been mentioned here.
same tendency, a much longer effort along these lines was made by Samir Amin and Francois Houtart in January 2006 – the ‘Bamako Appeal’ - at the polycentric WSF.

The concern is that the WSF has been an unprecedented space for these sorts of debates. Personally, I would be thrilled if the WSF and its affiliates developed programmatic points of convergence. My own feeling is that the programmes will emerge from struggle, as they always have, and that probably the ideological diversity of the WSF will not permit sufficient clarity on matters of the sort I raise above (especially over whether we should ‘fix’ or ‘nix’ embryonic global-state institutions). Instead, I think real progress in these directions will be found in transnational sectoral forums, of which there are roughly three dozen examples, some of which are already generating the global-scale analysis, demands, strategies, tactics and alliances which the Porto Alegre and Bamako Appeal authors should have made reference to. We can divide these into three types: political movements (a very broad category); traditional and cross-sectoral civil society movements; and issue-based civil society movements:

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
1) Political movements/parties representing values/ideas of social democracy, nationalism, socialism, autonomism, anarchism

TRADITIONAL AND CROSS-SECTORAL CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENTS
2) Labour mvts (including unemployed movements, migration and workplace health/safety)
3) Women’s mvts (including a variety of gender issues)
4) Youth mvts (including children)
5) Anti-war mvts (including arms sales, nuclear weapons, landmines)
6) Anti-racism mvts (dating to abolition)
7) Minority rights and ethnic mvts

11. This is excellent, but should be augmented with some brief discussion about reform of state media, which in many Third World settings is also a severe barrier to progress.
12. This position is quite destructive for the growing campaigns - such as IFIs-Out! (http://www.ifi-out.org), hosted by Jubilee South - which are not supportive of incorporating the Bretton Woods Institutions and other neoliberal agencies into the already mainly neoliberal UN. Given the global-scale power relations that will prevail for the immediate future, probably into our children’s and grandchildren’s generation, does it make sense to empower global-scale institutions? What about the danger that a UN process will give legitimacy to the ongoing malevolent roles of global-scale actors, as occurred with the UN’s recognition of the US occupation and of the puppet Iraqi regime?

In sum, did the 18 men and 1 women who authored these points think them through as thoroughly as possible? Should critiques of their process - namely, launching a major manifesto into the WSF without proper consultation and without explicit references to actual campaigns by activists across the world - be joined by concern that, for whatever reason, they are perhaps not sufficiently close enough to the issues to have solved some of the problems noted above?
8) Civil rights mvts
9) Democracy mvts (including transparency/corruption)
10) Consumer mvts
11) Indigenous rights mvts
12) Human rights mvts
13) Sexual identity mvts
14) Disability rights mvts
15) Cultural mvts (art/music/literature/crafts/video)
16) Religious mvts
17) Solidarity mvts
18) Elder rights mvts

ISSUE-BASED CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENTS
19) Finance/debt/aid/investment
20) Trade
21) Economic subsectors (including recuperated factories)
22) Corporate disempowerment and anti-consumerism
23) Land/agriculture/forestry/fisheries
24) Housing/urban access rights
25) Water (including irrigation, groundwater, dams and rivers, household access, sanitation)
26) Energy (including global warming, pollution, household access)
27) Health (including treatment)
28) Food/nutrition
29) Social security
30) Education
31) Other environmental (including toxics, nuclear, mining, marine)
32) Media
33) Policing/prisons
34) Information/ICT

In my opinion, the heavy lifting required to analyse the movement of movements - and their analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances - has not even properly begun. If intellectuals are six months or more behind the times, perhaps we must await the increasing coherence of these transatlantic movements at sites such as the 2006 World Social Forum in Nairobi, to drive the research forward in a manner that tells us more about the world than any other method, namely praxis.