

South African Foreign Policy: An Alternative 20 Year Review

Patrick Bond

One of the most confusing aspects of the two-decade South African democracy is the new government's foreign policy, especially in view of African National Congress (ANC) traditions of hot rhetoric about the global realities of imperialism. At the same moment that the government released its own 20-year review of foreign policy, in March 2014, for instance, it was quite easy for a few ANC leaders to join the "Israeli Apartheid Week" events, condemning the oppression of the Palestinian people. No apparent costs were involved, and there was no immediate change to foreign policy, which is progressive yet cautious on this critical issue, far short of the overdue expulsion of Israeli diplomats that Latin American progressives agreed was necessary after Tel Aviv's murderous Operation Cast Lead against Gaza in late 2008.

As another example of "talk left" on foreign policy, just prior to the "Coalition of the Willing" invasion of Iraq in 2003, Nelson Mandela declared that George W. Bush, "who cannot think properly, is now wanting to plunge the world into a holocaust. If there is a country which has committed unspeakable atrocities, it is the United States of America." [1] Yet within weeks, three Iraq-bound US warships had docked and refuelled in Durban, and South Africa's state-owned weapons manufacturer, Denel, had sold \$160 million worth of artillery propellants and 326 handheld laser range-finders to the British army and 125 laser-guidance sights to the US Marines. Bush visited the South African capital Pretoria in July 2003, and left the impression, according to Johannesburg's *Business Day* newspaper, "of a growing, if not intimate trust between himself and Mbeki. The amount of public touching, hugging and backpatting they went through was well beyond the call of even friendly diplomatic duty." [2] By May 2004, Mandela had telephoned Bush in a cowed and conciliatory mood, for, as he put it, "The United States is the most powerful state in the world and it is not good to remain in tension with the most powerful state." [3]

In spite of the confusing signals from South Africa's leaders – occasionally talking left while mainly walking right – there can be no doubt that from the late 1990s the international political power centres showed increasing trust in Mandela, Mbeki, Manuel and Trade Minister Alec Erwin, giving them insider access to many elite forums. At the time, global-establishment institutions were coming under strong attack at sites like the Seattle and Cancun World Trade Organisation summits, the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, G8 meetings, a Gothenburg summit of the European Union, and the Davos World Economic Forum. Given the global elites' need for legitimacy, Pretoria's lead politicians were now to be allowed to preside over the UN Security Council, the board of governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Commonwealth, the World Commission on Dams, and many other important international and continental bodies. Simultaneously assuming Third World leadership, Pretoria also headed the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity, and the Southern African Development Community. [4]

In addition, during a frenetic two-year period beginning in September 2001, Mbeki and his colleagues hosted, led, or played instrumental roles at the following dozen major

international conferences or events: the World Conference against Racism (Durban, September 2001); the launch of the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development/NEPAD” (in Abuja, Nigeria, October 2001); the WTO ministerial summit in Doha, Qatar (November 2001); the UN Financing for Development conference in Monterrey, Mexico (March 2002); the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada (June 2002); the launch of the African Union (Durban, July 2002); the WSSD (Johannesburg, August–September 2002); the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (January 2003); the G8 summit in Evian, France (June 2003); George W. Bush’s first trip to Africa (July 2003); the WTO ministerial summit in Cancun, Mexico (September 2003); and the IMF/World Bank annual meeting (Dubai, September 2003).

In the event, Mbeki’s administration failed to capitalise on these opportunities:

- at the UN racism conference, Mbeki colluded with the European Union to reject the demand of NGOs and African leaders for slavery/colonialism/apartheid reparations;
- NEPAD provided merely a homegrown version of the Washington Consensus;
- at Doha, Erwin split the African delegation so as to prevent a repeat of the denial of consensus that had foiled the Seattle WTO summit in December 1999;
- Manuel was summit co-leader in Monterrey, where he legitimised ongoing IMF/World Bank strategies, including its lack of progress on debt;
- from G8 meetings, Mbeki departed with only rhetorical commitments, invariably to be violated in practice;
- the African Union supported both NEPAD and the Zimbabwean regime of President Robert Mugabe, suggesting that good governance would not be considered a component of Africa’s new partnerships;
- at the Johannesburg WSSD, Mbeki undermined UN democratic procedure, facilitated the privatisation of nature, and did nothing to address the plight of the world’s poor majority;
- in Davos, global elites ignored Africa;
- for hosting a leg of Bush’s Africa trip, Mbeki became the US “point man” on Zimbabwe, and avoided any argument as regards Iraq’s recolonisation;
- in Cancun, the collapse of WTO trade negotiations – again (like Seattle) catalysed by an African walkout – left Erwin “disappointed”;
- at Dubai, with Manuel leading the IMF/World Bank Development Committee, there was no Bretton Woods democratisation, new debt relief or post– Washington Consensus policy reform.[5]

After 2003, the pace slowed, with the focus shifting to three major hosting responsibilities: the 2010 World Cup, 2011 United Nations Climate Summit and 2013 Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa summit. In the meantime, problems in establishing NEPAD as an all- encompassing assertion of South Africa’s strength and values on the continent deserve more consideration for, by all accounts, this too petered out in disappointment. The origins of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism are revealing. Mbeki had embarked upon a late 1990s “African Renaissance” branding exercise, which he endowed with poignant poetics but not much else. The lack of content was somewhat remedied during 2000 in a power-point skeleton unveiled in

Mbeki's meetings with Clinton in May, at the Okinawa G8 meeting in July, at the UN Millennium Summit in September, and at a subsequent EU gathering in Portugal. The skeleton was fleshed out in November 2000 with the assistance of several economists and was immediately ratified during a special South African visit by World Bank president James Wolfensohn. By this stage, Mbeki had managed to sign on as partners two additional rulers from the crucial north and west of the continent: Abdeleziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria (both leaders of countries that suffered frequent mass protests and various civil, military, religious and ethnic disturbances). Later, he added Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade, who in 2012 had to be ousted from power by mass popular protest.

Addressing an international gathering in Davos, January 2001, Mbeki made clear whose interests NEPAD would serve: "It is significant that in a sense the first formal briefing on the progress in developing this programme is taking place at the World Economic Forum meeting. The success of its implementation would require the buy-in from members of this exciting and vibrant forum!" [6] And, of course, international capital would benefit: from large infrastructure construction opportunities, privatised state services, ongoing structural adjustment (which lowers the social wage and workers' real wages), intensified rule of international property law, and various of NEPAD's sectoral plans, all to be co-ordinated from a South African office at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, a World Bank-style institution staffed with neo-liberals and prone to economic and geopolitical gatekeeping. Once Mbeki's plan was merged with an infrastructure-project initiative offered by Wade, it won endorsement at the last meeting of the Organisation of African Unity, in June 2001. (In 2002, the OAU became the African Union, and NEPAD would long serve as its official development plan.) [7]

The actual NEPAD document was publicly launched in Abuja, Nigeria, by African heads of state on 23 October 2001. In February 2002, global elites celebrated NEPAD at venues ranging from the World Economic Forum meeting in New York to the summit of self-described "progressive" national leaders (but including Britain's Tony Blair) who gathered in Stockholm to forge a global "Third Way". Elite eyes were turning to the "scar on the world's conscience" (as Blair described Africa), hoping NEPAD would serve as a large enough band-aid, since G8 leaders at their June 2002 summit in Canada had already rejected Mbeki's plea for an annual \$64 billion in new aid, loans and investments for Africa.

For perhaps the main reason for international doubts about Mbeki's commitment to neoliberalism and the rule of law was his repeated defense of the continent's main violator of liberal norms, Mugabe. This loyalty was in spite of NEPAD promises that "Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, the core components of which include political pluralism, allowing for...fair, open and democratic elections periodically organised to enable people to choose their leaders freely." Yet Mbeki would term Zimbabwe's demonstrably unfree and unfair March 2002 presidential election to be "legitimate", and repeatedly opposed punishment of the Mugabe regime by the Commonwealth and the UN Human Rights Commission. In February 2003, South African foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma even stated, "We will never criticise Zimbabwe." It is not surprising then that NEPAD secretariat's Dave Malcomson, responsible for international liaison and co-ordination, once admitted to a reporter that "Wherever we go, Zimbabwe is thrown at us as the reason why NEPAD's a joke." [8] At

the June 2003 G8 meeting in Evian, France, world elites were well aware of NEPAD's lack of street credibility. They thus provided only paltry concessions to Mbeki, what the *Financial Times* termed "year-old pledges to provide an extra \$6 billion a year in aid to Africa" – a fraction of the amount spent on the Iraq War just weeks earlier.

Why did South Africa's rulers consistently support Mugabe? In mid-2001, Mbeki told the British television show *Hard Talk* that he had tried persuading Mugabe to reform, but that the Zimbabwean ruler "didn't listen to me." By November, Mbeki publicly attributed Zimbabwe's problems to "twenty years of economic policies" (with no details—e.g., was Mugabe's failed 1990s IMF-blessed Economic Structural Adjustment Program included?). Mugabe's was often blamed for "socialist" policies, yet his social spending spree was, in reality, a brief two-year period of rising education and health expenditures until 1984, followed by systematic cutbacks and deprivation under IMF and World Bank guidance. It is more likely that Pretoria backed Harare because of a common trajectory, for as Zimbabwe began to implode during the late 1990s, and as Mugabe appeared to have squandered both political popularity and the legitimacy to govern, the ANC leadership must have looked north and observed the following as if in a mirror:

- a liberation movement which won resounding electoral victories against a terribly weak opposition, but under circumstances of worsening abstentionism by, and depoliticization of, the masses;
- concomitantly, that movement's undeniable failure to deliver a better life for most of the country's low-income people, while material inequality soared;
- rising popular alienation from, and cynicism about, nationalist politicians, as the gulf between rulers and the ruled widened inexorably and as numerous cases of corruption and malgovernance were brought to public attention;
- growing economic misery as neoliberal policies were tried and failed; and
- the sudden rise of an opposition movement based in the trade unions, quickly backed by most of civil society, the liberal petit-bourgeoisie and the independent media – potentially leading to the election of a new, post-nationalist government.[9]

There were also material economic reasons for letting Zimbabwe's economy suffer, insofar as South African business was the primary beneficiary of deindustrialization just across the Limpopo River. As for other cases within what became known as South Africa's "subimperialist" drive up continent, Johannesburg businesses were assertive especially in banking, breweries, construction, mining, services and tourism. The largest South African corporations benefited from NEPAD's lubrication of capital flows out of African countries – though the money did not stop in Johannesburg. For a financial flight was taking place, mainly to London, where the Anglo American Corporation, DeBeers, Old Mutual insurance, South African Breweries, Liberty Life insurance and other huge South African firms had relisted. Moreover, the regional acquisitions by South African corporations were in any case mainly takeovers, not "greenfield projects" involving new fixed investments. Thus, on the one hand, in spite of a high-profile mid-2002 endorsement of NEPAD by 187 business leaders and firms, led by Anglo American, BHP Billiton and the Absa banking group, there had been no investments made in twenty key infrastructure projects to be reported two years later, though there were plenty of vocal corporate complaints that NEPAD's peer review mechanism had insufficient teeth to

discipline errant politicians. According to the chief reporter of (pro-Nepad) *Business Day* in mid-2004, “The private sector’s reluctance to get involved threatens to derail NEPAD’s ambitions.”[10]

On the other hand, the prospect that Johannesburg-based corporations were becoming “new imperialists” was of “great concern”, according to Pretoria’s then public enterprises minister, Jeff Radebe, speaking in early 2004: “There are strong perceptions that many South African companies working elsewhere in Africa come across as arrogant, disrespectful, aloof and careless in their attitude towards local business communities, work-seekers and even governments.”[11] But Radebe could also have been describing his Cabinet colleague Mbeki. The *Sunday Times* reported from the July 2003 African Union meeting in Maputo that Mbeki was viewed by other African leaders as “too powerful, and they privately accuse him of wanting to impose his will on others. In the corridors they call him the George Bush of Africa, leading the most powerful nation in the neighbourhood and using his financial and military muscle to further his own agenda.”[12]

That agenda continued after Mbeki, becoming evident in March 2013 when tragically, 15 corpses of SA National Defense Force soldiers were recovered in Bangui after apparently trying to guard Johannesburg businesses – some linked to ANC’s Chancellor House and other ANC leaders – in the Central African Republic’s capital against the Chad-backed Seleka rebel movement. A few weeks later, another 1350 SANDF troops were deployed in the resource-rich eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of a peace-keeping force (not far from where Zuma’s nephew Khulubuse had bought into a major oil exploration project).

South African critics of Mbeki were joined by African intellectuals who demanded better from their leaders as well, and many such critics seemed to understand clearly Pretoria’s continental ambitions. To illustrate, at a joint conference in April 2002 in Accra, Ghana, the Council for Development and Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and Third World Network Africa identified the “most fundamental flaws of NEPAD” as follows:

- the neo-liberal economic policy framework at the heart of the plan ... which repeats the structural adjustment policy packages of the preceding two decades and overlooks the disastrous effects of those policies;
- the fact that in spite of its proclaimed recognition of the central role of the African people to the plan, the African people have not played any part in the conception, design and formulation of the NEPAD;
- notwithstanding its stated concerns for social and gender equity, it adopts the social and economic measures that have contributed to the marginalisation of women;
- that in spite of claims of African origins, its main targets are foreign donors, particularly in the G8;
- its vision of democracy is defined by the needs of creating a functional market.[13]

Nor did not take long for the pessimists’ predictions to come true, as even on its own terms NEPAD was fundamentally flawed. As Senegalese President Wade stated in

October 2004: “I am disappointed. I have great difficulties explaining what we have achieved when people at home and elsewhere ask me... We’re spending a lot of money and, above all, losing time with repetition and conferences that end and you’re not quite sure what they’ve achieved.”[14] In June 2007, at the World Economic Forum meeting in Cape Town, Wade acknowledged that NEPAD “had done nothing to help the lives of the continent’s poor”.[15] Later that year, Wade was even more frank: “The redirection of the project has become inevitable, because nobody has yet understood anything from NEPAD and nobody implemented NEPAD.”[16] As Mbeki himself confessed a few weeks after his ouster from power, in December 2008, “I am afraid that we have not made the progress we had hoped for. Indeed, and regrettably, I believe that we have lost some of the momentum which attended the launch and detailed elaboration of the NEPAD programmes.”[17]

Mbeki’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) itself was conceived so that African regimes – including South Africa’s (to great internal consternation) – would essentially review themselves with kid gloves, and, when civil society’s own critique emerged, this was merely repressed.[18] According to Bronwen Manby from AfriMAP (a pro APRM NGO)

Although each country that has undergone the APRM process is supposed to report back to the APR Forum on its progress, there is no serious monitoring exercise of how effectively this is done. Nor any sanctions for failure to act. Nor, apparently, is there any real system to ensure that the commitments the government makes address the most important problems highlighted in the APRM review...The implementation of the APRM programme of action is also left entirely to the executive, with no formalised role for parliamentarians or civil society to hold the government’s feet to the fire should it fail to perform... Even the continental APRM secretariat failed to engage in any serious way with national institutions...Without this sort of integration into other national planning systems, debates and oversight mechanisms, the APRM process seems doomed to become little more than a cosmetic exercise without effect in the real world of policy and decision making.[19]

In sum, the imposition of NEPAD’s neo-liberal logic soon amplified uneven development in Africa, including South Africa. Added to the invasion by Chinese firms specializing in neo-colonial infrastructure and extractive industries, as well as cheap (but deindustrializing) manufactured goods, and to the West’s preparations for military interventions from the oil-filled Gulf of Guinea in the west to the Horn of Africa in the east, it was apparent that Africa was now to be squeezed even harder. Patents, marketing restrictions and inadequate state-financed research made life-saving medicines unreasonably scarce; genetically modified food threatened peasant farming; and trade was also increasingly exploitative because of the “Singapore issues” advanced in their own interests by the G8 countries as regards investment, competition, trade facilitation and government procurement. Indeed, the new conditionalities merely amplified the grievances of developing nations as regards the negative impact upon them of the G8’s vast agricultural subsidies, unfair industrial tariffs, incessant services privatisation and intellectual property monopolies. Together, these prompted African–Caribbean–Pacific withdrawal from the ministerial summit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Cancun in September 2003, leading to its collapse, with no

subsequent improvements in the following years.

Throughout this period, there was a larger Washington geopolitical agenda for Africa, which Bush's first Secretary of State, Colin Powell, described in a document, *Rising US Stakes in Africa*: political stabilisation of Sudan (whose oil was craved by Washington); support for Africa's decrepit capital markets, which could allegedly "jump start" the Millennium Challenge Accounts (a new aid regime); more attention to energy, especially the "massive future earnings by Nigeria and Angola, among other key West African oil producers"; promotion of wildlife conservation; increased "counter-terrorism" efforts, which included "a Muslim outreach initiative"; expanded peace operations, transferred to tens of thousands of African troops thanks to new G8 funding; and more attention to AIDS. On all but Sudan, South African co-operation was crucial to the US imperial agenda. In late 2006, for example, when Bush wanted to invade Somalia to rid the country of its nascent Islamic Courts government, he called in Mbeki to assist with legitimating the idea, though it was ultimately carried out by Meles Zenawi's Ethiopian army three weeks later.[20] When in 2011, Obama wanted to invade Libya to rid the country of Muammar Gaddafi, South Africa voted affirmatively in the UN Security Council, even though Zuma had tried to intervene to save him via an African Union peace-keeping plan.[21]

And on occasions such as the 2009 and 2012 recapitalisation of the International Monetary Fund, especially to generate larger bailout financing options for Europe, South Africa's finance ministers could be relied upon. Manuel consistently promoted the kind of debt relief that resulted in low-income African countries actually paying a much *higher* percentage of export income on debt relief – because, while the unrepayable capital was written down, the ongoing repayment obligations actually increased.[22] As for South Africa's financial role in Africa, mid-2002 witnessed Manuel promising the Commonwealth Business Council he would "fast-track financial market integration through the establishment of an internationally competitive legislative and regulatory framework" for the continent.[23]

But without any Africa-wide progress to report two years later, Manuel's director-general Lesetja Kganyago announced a new "Financial Centre for Africa" project to amplify the financialization tendencies already evident in Johannesburg's exclusive new Sandton central business district: "Over the five years to 2002, the financial sector grew at a real rate of 7.7 percent per year, more than twice as fast as the economy as a whole." [24] Responsible for a full quarter of post-apartheid South African GDP growth, the sector required further room to expand. According to Kganyago:

What is needed is a financial hub especially focused on the needs and circumstances of the region, much in the same way that Singapore and Hong Kong cater for the capital needs of the Asian continent... International financial centres tend to have a foundation in common. Elements include political stability, free markets, and what is best described as the rule of commercial law.

Pretoria's specific aims included "opening South Africa's markets to African and global issuers; global lowest trading costs and trading risk; global leadership in investor protection; and a global hub for financial business process outsourcing". Concluded Kganyago, "Africa's economies cannot wait the slow maturing of national financial

markets to provide the necessary channel for large-scale foreign capital flows for development. Only a regional financial centre will be in a position to provide these services in the foreseeable future.”

In the same spirit, Reserve Bank deputy governor Daniel Mminele acknowledged in November 2012 that Pretoria stood alongside Washington in *opposing global regulation* such as the “Robin Hood tax” on financial transactions that was supported by more enlightened countries, including those from Europe being roiled by global financiers. Moreover, Mminele conceded, “South Africa is aligned with advanced economies on the issue of climate finance” and against those of the South, especially when it came to the matter of paying “ecological debt” to increasingly desperate countries already losing 400,000 people per year to climate-caused deaths. South Africa, in other words, stood out in the world as an extremist advocate of neoliberal global financial governance.[25] Yet ironically, by 2012 Mbeki was reinventing himself as a leading critic of illicit capital flight from Africa.[26]

A telling incident in mid-2002 illustrated the responsibility that the South African government had taken on to police such world financial mechanisms. A Cabinet meeting in Pretoria concluded with this statement: “The meeting noted the provision by South Africa of a bridge loan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 75 million. This will help clear the DRC’s overdue obligations with the IMF and allow that country to draw resources under the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.”[27] In ensuring the rollover of the debt, Pretoria thus sanitized the earlier generation of IMF loans made to Mobutu Sese Seko, riven with corruption and capital flight to European banks.

Continuities with an earlier subimperial project were obvious, for the people of the DRC were previously victims of South Africa’s apartheid-era allegiance with Mobutu, an arrangement that especially suited the ecology-destroying mineral extraction corporations headquartered in Johannesburg. The people’s struggle against oppression had initially spawned another ruler in 1996, Laurent Kabila, who unfortunately refused democracy and later fell to an assassin’s bullet. Thanks to his son Joseph’s connections in Union Buildings and finance ministry, however, the old “odious” Mobutu loans were honoured and serviced with Pretoria’s new credits. They should have been repudiated. In addition, IMF staff would be allowed back into Kinshasa with their own new loans, and with neoliberal conditionalities again applied to the old victims of Mobutu’s fierce rule. A similar process was offered to regimes such as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and King Mswati’s Swaziland for the purpose of repaying the IMF first and foremost, although Pretoria’s conditionalities were just as tough as the IMF’s so these did not materialise. For these reasons, and others, the 2000s was a period that could be considered South Africa’s “subimperialist” era.[28]

The big question raised by Zuma’s presidency was whether the momentum from Mbeki’s years would continue, given the former’s pre-occupations with domestic matters. Only in 2012 was the answer decisively affirmative: Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s election as African Union Commission chairperson was engineered, and Pretoria secured entry into the Brazil-Russia-India-China bloc (BRICS). The next question was whether these interventions would generate a return, because BRICS’ attempts to adjust global governance in the large emerging economies’ interests were revealed as hapless

when three BRICS lined up publicly in support of three different candidates for World Bank President in 2012 (South Africa favoured a neoliberal Nigerian finance minister; Brazil promoted a progressive Keynesian economist from Colombia; and Russia backed Washington's inevitably-victorious choice of US citizen Jim Yong Kim.) Also in 2012, BRICS committed to support the IMF's recapitalization with \$75 billion, of which South Africa gave \$2 billion[29] – in spite of simultaneously arguing the need for a “BRICS Development Bank” because the Bretton Woods Institutions were unresponsive. Meanwhile, the “Bank of the South” project advocated for many years by the Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez did not get South Africa's support. In sum, the critique of Mbeki – that in the cases of NEPAD and so many other global-governance strategies he was *only polishing the chains of global apartheid, not breaking them* – applied equally to Zuma.

Notes

[1] Independent Online, 30 January 2003.

[2] Business Day, 11 July 2003.

[3] Mail & Guardian, 24 May 2004.

[4] Patrick Bond, *Against Global Apartheid*, (London: Zed Books, 2003).

[5] Patrick Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006).

[6] Business Day, 5 February 2001.

[7] Patrick Bond (Ed.), *Fanon's Warning* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005).

[8] Financial Times, “G8 Vows to ‘Fully Commit’ to Developing African Nations,” 2 June 2003.

[9] Patrick Bond and Simba Manyanya, *Zimbabwe's Plunge*, London, Merlin Press, 2003.

[10] Rob Rose, “Companies ‘Shirking’ their Nepad Obligations”, Business Day, 24 May 2004.

[11] SAPA, “SA's ‘Imperialist’ Image in Africa”, 30 March 2004.

[12] Ranjeni Munusamy, “The George Dubya of Africa,” Sunday Times, 13 July 2003.

[13] Council for Development and Social Science Research in Africa, Dakar and Third World Network-Africa, “Declaration on Africa's Development Challenges,” Resolution adopted at the Joint Conference on Africa's Development Challenges in the Millennium, Accra, 23-26 April 2002, p.4.

[14] BBC, “Africa's big plan ‘disappointing’”, London, 22 October 2004.

[15] L Ensor, “South Africa: Get Down to Brass Tacks – Mbeki”, Business Day, 18 June

2007.

[16] Daily Observer, "Wade: Nepad has failed," 4 October 2007.

[17] Sapa, "Nepad losing momentum: Mbeki", 12 December 2008.

[18] Patrick Bond, "Removing Neocolonialism's APRM Mask: A Critique of the African Peer Review Mechanism", *Review of African Political Economy*, 36: 122, 2009, pp.595-603.

[19] Bronwyn Manby, "African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from Kenya", *Pambazuka News*, 362, 15 April 2008.

[20] White House Press Office, "Press Release: Remarks by President Bush and President Mbeki of South Africa in Photo Opportunity," Washington, 8 December 2006. Specifically, Mbeki referred to: "the difficult situation in Somalia" – ("Yes, sir," Bush intervened). and Mbeki continued, "and the President, together, we are very keen that, indeed, something must move there. This was a failed state. It's necessary to support the transitional government, to restoring a government and to reunify the country, and so on. It's an important thing because the problem, one of the big problems is that as it is, it provides a base for terrorists, find safe haven there and then can spread out to the rest of the continent. It's something that is of shared concern." Within three weeks, at Washington's behest, Ethiopia invaded Somalia. (See *Sudan Tribune*, 10 December 2010, reporting on WikiLeaks cables: <http://www.sudantribune.com/US-behind-Ethiopia-invasion-in,37189>).

[21] An opponent of Mbeki in contesting continental politics, Gaddafi's own links to Zuma were potentially important prior to the 2011 uprising; the "Browse Mole" report by veteran journalist Ivor Powell – who was then working for the Scorpions special police unit dedicated to corruption – named Zuma as a beneficiary of largesse from both Libya and Angola, an allegation the *Mail & Guardian* considered "credible". See Sam Sole, "Browsed and Beaten," *Mail & Guardian*, 1 May 2009 and Ivor Powell, "Smoke and Mirrors," *Mail & Guardian*, 1 May 2009.

[22] Lynley Donnelly, "Throwing Good Money at EU Troubles," *Mail&Guardian*, 22 June 2012.

[23] Trevor Manuel, "Mobilizing International Investment Flows: The New Global Outlook," Speech to the Commonwealth Business Council, Johannesburg, 24 September 2002.

[24] Lesetja Kganyago, "South Africa as a Financial Centre for Africa," Speech to the Reuters Economist of the Year Award Ceremony, Johannesburg, 11 August 2004.

[25] Daniel Mminele, "South Africa and the G-20 – challenges and opportunities," Presentation to the SA Institute of International Affairs and the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 31 October 2012.

[26] Thabo Mbeki, "Tackling Illicit Capital Flows for Economic Transformation," Thabo

Mbeki Foundation, Johannesburg, 2012,
<http://www.thabombekifoundation.org.za/Pages/Tackling-Illicit-Capital-Flows-for-Economic-Transformation.aspx>

[27] South Africa Government Communications and Information Service, "Statement on Cabinet Meeting", Pretoria, 26 June 2002.

[28] For more on the role that South Africa has come to play vis-à-vis its neighbours in southern Africa, see D. Miller, O. Oloyede, R. Saunders (eds.). entitled South Africa in Africa – African perceptions, African realities, special issue of the African Sociological Review, 12, 1, 2008.

[29] Explaining the SA contribution – initially he said it would be only one tenth as large – Gordhan told Moneyweb that it was on condition that the IMF became more "nasty" (sic). to desperate European borrowers, as if the Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and Irish poor and working people were not suffering enough. The result of this BRICS intervention was that China gained dramatically more IMF voting power, while Africa actually lost a substantial fraction of its share. Gordhan then admitted at the September 2012 Tokyo meeting of the IMF and Bank that it was likely "the vast majority of emerging and developing countries will lose quota shares – an outcome that will perpetuate the democratic deficit." And given "the crisis of legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the IMF," it "is simply untenable" that Africa only has two seats for its 45 member countries. Yet Gordhan's role in promoting the BRICS' expanded capital commitment to the IMF was the proximate cause of perpetuating the crisis of legitimacy. (Moneyweb, "Special report podcast: Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Finance", 29 September 2011, <http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-special-report/special-report-podcast-pravin-gordhan--minister-of?sn=2009+Detail> and Pravin Gordhan, "IMFC Statement by Pravin J. Gordhan, Minister of Finance, South Africa," Washington, IMF, 13 October 2012, <http://www.imf.org/external/am/2012/imfc/statement/eng/zaf.pdf>.