Global Civil Society Strategies for Social Justice

by Patrick Bond
University of KwaZulu Natal Inaugural Professorial Lecture
10 October 2007, Howard College Theatre

Abstract

The global justice movements have explored various arguments about national states, political parties and linkage of issues across borders. These discussions have matured to the point where clearer distinctions can be made between ‘global governance’ approaches that are based to some extent on cosmopolitan democracy theory, on the one hand, and analysis/strategy/tactics based on ‘deglobalisation’ (of capital) and ‘decommodification’ on the other hand. Given sharp divergences (e.g. on ‘fixing’ versus ‘nixing’ multilateral agencies), the movements may not have the capacity or will to establish mutually reinforcing projects between those considered ‘tree shakers’ in the globalisation debates, with the insider-oriented ‘jam makers’. Nevertheless, some terrains and issue-areas lend themselves to a much more coherent approach than we have witnessed to date, since the 1980s IMF Riots gave way to more systematic organising of global justice campaigns, from Chiapas in 1994 to the late 1990s Jubilee movement to large-scale global events such as Seattle in 1999. Fusing these movements with anti-war movements is also a high priority. But doing so will require much more explicit attention to distinctions between ‘reformist’ and ‘non-reformist’ reforms, in the spirit of the late French social strategist Andre Gorz.

1. Director, University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society, http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs (bondp@ukzn.ac.za). Thanks are due staff/associates at UKZN CCS, and to collaborators in other institutions and justice movements who gave feedback on earlier versions of this paper: audiences at Gyeongsang, Korea and SungKongHoe Universities in May; attendees of the SA Netherlands Programme on Research Alternatives in Development Poverty Conference in June; the Centro Internacional Miranda in Caracas in July; the International Labour Research and Information Group in Cape Town in September; and the Research Centre for Cosmopolitan Civil Societies in Sydney in early October. Other papers with background arguments to this analysis appeared in the journal Voluntas (on civil society mobilisations), in Third World Quarterly (on problems with Millennium Development Goal campaigning), in Policy Studies (on the need for decommodification and deglobalization strategies), in the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research and Development Dialogue (on the promise and pitfalls of the World Social Forum as of early 2006 and mid-2007 respectively), in David Held’s Debating Globalization and the Dag Hammarsjold Foundation’s Critical Currents (on the fruitless search for global governance reforms as of 2005 and 2007 respectively), and in three books with specific details on South African and African interface with global political economy: Elite Transition (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), Talk Left Walk Right (UKZN Press, 2006) and Looting Africa (Zed Books and UKZN Press, 2006).
To fight for alternative solutions and for structural reforms (that is to say, for intermediate objectives) is not to fight for improvements in the capitalist system; it is rather to break it up, to restrict it, to create counter-powers which, instead of creating a new equilibrium, undermine its very foundations.

Andre Gorz, *Strategy for Labour*[^2]

Can we learn to conceive, theoretically and politically, of a ‘grassroots’ that would be not local, communal, and authentic, but worldly, well-connected, and opportunistic? Are we ready for social movements that fight not ‘from below’ but ‘across’, using their ‘foreign policy’ to fight struggles not against ‘the state’ but against that hydra-headed transnational apparatus of banks, international agencies, and market institutions through which contemporary capitalist domination functions?

James Ferguson, *Global Shadows*[^3]

### 1. Introduction

The Centre for Civil Society at this university was established in mid-2001 with a primarily national focus. But from the outset, that mandate changed. Global networks have become crucial to our Centre’s success, not only with my appointment as director three years ago, but mainly because progressive actors in South African civil society themselves began not just thinking globally and acting locally, but also acting globally.

Who can forget the protest at the end of August 2001, at the World Conference Against Racism here in Durban, where more than 10,000 people marched against the UN because of the conference’s shortcomings in relation to Zionism and the issue of reparations for slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, and apartheid. Exactly a year later there was the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, in which a vast number of South African civil society organisations again witnessed elite managerial shortcomings for addressing poverty and environmental crises, and again demonstrated – with 30,000 activists – by marching from Alexandra to Sandton. Tens of thousands of civil society protesters attacked the Bush and Blair governments in 2003 for their invasion of Iraq.

But even earlier, observers picked up the many ways that global injustices affect local processes, here and everywhere. Beyond the highest-profile 19th and 20th century internationalist campaigns – anti-slavery, the Spanish Civil War, anti-colonial solidarity (especially for Vietnam but also much of Southern Africa)

we began to understand how globalization compelled globally-coherent opposition, in the spirit of Karl Polanyi’s ‘double movement’.

So by the late 1990s, two decades of ‘IMF Riots’ – short, sharp reactions by oppressed people to international economic pressures – was transforming into mass opposition parties and movements. Many moved from, in Gramsci’s phrase, a war of position to a war of manuevre.

Most famously, on 1 January 1994, the Zapatista movement spoke from an obscure region of southeastern Mexico about the suffering of Third World people when ‘neoliberalism’ (free market economic policies) accompanies longstanding political repression. The Zapatista guerrillas, peasants, liberation theologians and intellectuals successfully melded indigenous people’s militancy and highly effective use of communication technologies.

The result was widespread international resonance with Zapatismo’s critique of the architectures of global power, making the people of Chiapas emblems of something much larger. At the end of 1999, the Seattle protest against the World Trade Organisation was another critical rupture, putting elites everywhere on notice that democracy’s global-scale deficits were no longer immune to society’s critical gaze.

Here in Durban, at the same moment, what initially appeared as a purely municipal matter exploded into national and global consciousness: service delivery demonstrations. Today, these mark South Africa as the world’s most protest-rich country, per capita. In 1999, investigations by the Concerned Citizens Forum – led by Fatima Meer – into Chatsworth community grievances led to sustained mobilisations, as captured by Ashwin Desai in his book We are the Poors. The problems were soon articulated by grassroots activists in not merely local, but also national and also international terms. The education of Chatsworth and Durban as a whole culminated in a series of physical and court battles between the community and the municipality in early 2000 over evictions and water/electricity disconnections.

In April 2000, the World Bank and International Monetary held their spring meetings in Washington and ‘two Trevors’ – Manuel chairing the Board of Governors and Ngwane teaching 30 000 people to toyi-toyi in protest – were filmed by SABC Special Assignment. The Jubilee SA movement that had begun a couple of years earlier moved to centre stage by bringing up the problem of apartheid debt, and the demand for reparations.

At the same moment, Thabo Mbeki declared himself a dissident/denialist on AIDS, and the Treatment Action Campaign arose above fierce stigmatisation and repression to humiliate Mbeki at the June 2000 international AIDS conference here in Durban. The next month in Johannesburg, an ‘Urban Futures’ conference allowed the newly-formed Anti-Privatisation Forum to flower. A Free Burma Campaign and Palestinian Support Committee gathered strength, with periodic protests at the Myanmar and Israeli embassies.
These are examples of how, dating back to the turn of the 21st century, a ‘foreign policy bottom-up’ was established by progressive South Africans. In turn, the World Social Forum – beginning in Porto Alegre in January 2001 – allowed many here and across the Third World to compare notes and develop strategy, sector-by-sector, as well as for the 15 February 2003 anti-war mobilisations.

In this lecture, and in the Centre’s work, we repeatedly ask whether those forces in global civil society striving for social justice have adopted the appropriate analysis, strategies, tactics and alliances. Often we answer in the negative, in what can only be considered ‘work in progress’ towards genuine ‘non-reformist reforms’, to quote the late Andre Gorz.

Analysis is crucial, so in order to provide the appropriate context for our considerations of global justice, we might first summarise the case against political society, especially the world elites who have entrusted themselves with the duty of global-scale reform, before considering the most recent round of failed reforms.

2. Global social injustice

In this section I have space only to offer a compressed account of key defining events since the early 1970s. The wider window provided in this analysis – and the 1/3 century longish view taken – is exemplified in studies by David Harvey (2007, 27), who explains the broad outline of the context we will investigate in the pages ahead:

Toward the end of the 1960s, global capitalism was falling into disarray. A significant recession occurred in early 1973—the first since the great slump of the 1930s. The oil embargo and oil price hike that followed later that year in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war exacerbated critical problems. The embedded capitalism of the postwar period, with its heavy emphasis on an uneasy compact between capital and labor brokered by an interventionist state that paid great attention to the social (i.e., welfare programs) and individual wage, was no longer working. The Bretton Woods accord set up to regulate international trade and finance was finally abandoned in favor of floating exchange rates in 1973. That system had delivered high rates of growth in the advanced capitalist countries and generated some spillover benefits—most obviously to Japan but also unevenly across South America and to some other countries of South East Asia—during the ‘golden age’ of capitalism in the 1950s and early 1960s. By the next decade, however, the preexisting arrangements were exhausted and a new alternative was urgently needed to restart the process of capital accumulation.

How and why neoliberalism emerged victorious as an answer to that quandary is a complex story. In retrospect, it may seem as if neoliberalism had been inevitable, but at the time no one really knew or understood with
any certainty what kind of response would work and how. The world stumbled toward neoliberalism through a series of gyrations and chaotic motions that eventually converged on the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s.

While the neoliberal project may have failed to meet its sponsors’ promises, nevertheless there is not yet a replacement conceptual framework strong enough to reshape the world. The forces in Washington that support economic neoliberalism (the World Bank, IMF, US Treasury, US Federal Reserve and associated thinktanks) and political neoconservatism (the White House, Pentagon, State Department and thinktanks) are both suffering major legitimacy problems. But their fusion in many multilateral agencies – notwithstanding some reform rhetorics – suggests a difficult period ahead for the two strongest potential alternatives: ‘Post-Washington’ or ‘Third World nationalist’ reformers.

It will be even more challenging – but possibly more fruitful – to insert into the equation a fifth framework promoted by social change activists within the ‘global justice movements’. Table 1 provides a snapshot (in October 2007) of the institutions, debates and personalities associated with these five ideological approaches.

However, before addressing their agendas, it is important to set out the three-decade long geopolitical process, as well as deeper political economic dynamics, and then provide some theoretically-informed explanation for these. A catalogue of geopolitical changes since the 1970s would emphasise at least four major developments:

- the 1975 US defeat by the Vietnamese guerrilla army, which reduced the US public’s willingness to use its own troops to maintain overseas interests;

- the demise of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s, as a result of economic paralysis, foreign debt, bureaucratic illegitimacy and burgeoning democracy movements;

- Middle East wars throughout the period, with Israel generally dominant as a regional power from the 1973 war with Egypt (notwithstanding its 2006 defeat in Lebanon); and

- the rise of China as a potent competitor to the West (in political as well as economic terms) during the 1990s-2000s.

These were merely the highest-profile of crucial political developments, leaving a sole superpower in their wake, yet one with much lower levels of legitimacy, dubious military and cultural dominance, slower economic growth, higher poverty and inequality, and vastly reduced financial stability over the past third of
a century. One critical aspect of the struggle between classes associated with these developments was the waning of the Third World nationalist project and a dramatic shift in class power, away from working-class movements that had peaked during the late 1960s, towards capital and the upper classes.

Chronologically, other crucial ‘moments’ that helped define the splintered, polarised political sphere since the 1970s included the following:

- formal democratization arrived in large parts of the world – Southern Europe during the mid-1970s, the Cone of Latin America during the 1980s and the rest of Latin America during the 1990s, and many areas of Eastern Europe, East Asia and Africa during the early 1990s – partly through human/civil rights and mass democratic struggles and partly through top-down reform - yet because this occurred against a backdrop of economic crisis in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Philippines and Indonesia, the subsequent period was often characterised by instability, in which ‘dictators passed debt to democrats’ (as the Jubilee South movement termed the problem) who were compelled to impose austerity on their subjects, leading to persistent unrest;

- the ebbing of Third World revolutionary movements - in the wake of transformations in Nicaragua, Iran and Zimbabwe in 1979-80 - was hastened by the US government’s explicit attacks during the 1980s on Granada, Nicaragua, Angola and Mozambique (sometimes directly but often by proxy), as well as on liberation movements in El Salvador, Palestine (via Israel) and Colombia, as well as former CIA client regimes in Panama and Iraq, hence sending signals to Third World governments and their citizenries not to stray from Washington’s mandates;

- after Vietnam, the US’s subsequent ground force losses in Lebanon during the early 1980s and in Somalia during the early 1990s (followed by Afghanistan and Iraq in the mid-late 2000s) shifted the tactical emphasis of the Pentagon and NATO to high-altitude bombing, which proved momentarily effective in situations such as the 1991 Gulf War (decisively won by the US in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait), the Balkans during the late 1990s, the overthrow of Afganistan’s Taliban regime in 2001 and the initial ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003;

- the 1989-90 demise of the Soviet Union had major consequences for global power relations and North-South processes, as Western aid payments to Africa, for example, quickly dropped by 40 percent given the evaporation of formerly Cold War patronage competition (until the resurgence of Chinese interest in Latin America and Africa during the 2000s);
the consolidation of European political unity followed corporate centralization within the European Economic Community, as the 1992 Maastricht treaty ensured a common currency (excepting the British pound which was battered by speculators prior to joining the euro zone), and as subsequent agreements established stronger political interrelationships, at a time most European social democratic parties turned neoliberal in orientation and voters swung between conservative and centre-right rule, in the context of slow growth, high unemployment and rising reflections of citizen dissatisfaction;

persistent 1990s conflicts in ‘Fourth World’ failed states gave rise to Western ‘humanitarian interventions’ with varying degrees of success, in Somalia (early 1990s), the Balkans (1990s), Haiti (1994), Sierra Leone (2000), Cote d’Ivoire (2002) and Liberia (2003), although other sites in central Africa - Rwanda in 1994 and since then Burundi, northern Uganda, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Sudan’s Darfur region - have witnessed several million deaths, with only (rather ineffectual) regional not Western interventions;

the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington (followed by attacks in Indonesia, Madrid and London) signalled an increase in conflict between Western powers and Islamic extremists, and followed earlier bombings of US targets in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen which in turn received US reprisals against Islamic targets in Sudan (actually, a medicines factory) and Afghanistan in 1998 and Yemen in 2002; and

the early-mid 2000s rise of left political parties in Latin America included major swings in Venezuela (1999), Bolivia (2004) and Ecuador (2006), as well as turns away from pure neoliberal economic policies in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, and were joined during the mid-2000s in Europe by left coalitions in Norway and Italy.

This list of seminal political moments should not obscure other important trends that seem to have accompanied them:

- social and cultural change, including postmodernism, the ‘network society’, demographic polarizations and family restructurings;

- new technologies brought about by the transport, communication and computing revolutions;

- major environmental stresses including climate change, natural disasters,
depletion of fisheries and worsening water scarcity; and

- health epidemics, such as AIDS, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, anthrax, drug-resistant tuberculosis and malaria, severe acute respiratory syndrome and avian flu.

Although these are topics beyond the scope of the current lecture, in the realm of ideology the importance of these polarising events and processes cannot be overstated. Moreover, given the rise of neoliberal and neoconservative philosophies (formerly ‘modernization’ and colonialism), there have been sometimes spectacular counterreactions ranging from Islamic fundamentalism and resurgent Third World Nationalism, to Post-Washington Consensus and ‘global governance’ reform proposals, to global justice movement protests.

Meanwhile, in the sphere of economics, a variety of key moments mark the rise and then decline of neoliberal policy influences across the world:

- in 1973, the Bretton Woods agreement on Western countries’ fixed exchange rates - by which from 1944-71, an ounce of gold was valued at US$35 and served to anchor other major currencies – disintegrated when the US unilaterally ended its payment obligations, representing a default of approximately $80 billion, leading the price of gold to rise to $850/ounce within a decade;

- also in 1973, several Arab countries led the formation of the Oil Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, which raised the price of petroleum dramatically and in the process transferred and centralized inflows from world oil consumers to their New York bank accounts (‘petrodollars’);

- from 1973, ‘los Chicago Boys’ of Milton Friedman – the young Chilean bureaucrats with doctorates in economics from the University of Chicago - began to reshape Chile in the wake of Augusto Pinochet’s coup against the democratically-elected Salvador Allende, representing the birth pangs of neoliberalism;

- in 1976, the International Monetary Fund signalled its growing power by forcing austerity on Britain at a point where the ruling Labour Party was desperate for a loan, even prior to Margaret Thatcher’s ascent to power in 1979;

- in 1979 the US Federal Reserve addressed the dollar’s decline and US inflation by dramatically raising interest rates, in turn catalyzing a severe recession and the Third World debt crisis, especially in Mexico and Poland in 1982, Argentina in 1984, South Africa in 1985 and Brazil in 1987 (in the latter
case leading to a default that lasted only six months due to intense pressure on the Sarnoy government to repay);

• at the same time, the World Bank shifted from project funding to the imposition of structural adjustment and sectoral adjustment (supported by the IMF and the ‘Paris Club’ cartel of donors), in order to assure surpluses would be drawn for the purpose of debt repayment, and in the name of making countries more competitive and efficient;

• the overvaluation of the US dollar associated with the Fed’s high real interest rates was addressed by formal agreements between five leading governments that devalued the dollar in 1985 (Louvre Accord), but with a 51 percent fall against the yen, required a revaluation in 1987 (Plaza Accord);

• once the Japanese economy overheated during the late 1980s, a stock market crash of 40 percent and a serious real estate downturn followed from 1990, and indeed not even negative real interest rates could shake Japan from a long-term series of recessions;

• during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Washington adopted a series of financial crisis-management techniques - such as the US Treasury’s Baker and Brady Plans – so as to write off (with tax breaks) part of the $1.3 trillion in potentially dangerous Third World debt due to the New York, London, Frankfurt, Zurich and Tokyo banks which were exposed in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe (although notwithstanding the socialization of the banks’ losses, debt relief was denied the borrowers);

• in late 1987, crashes in the New York and Chicago financial markets (unprecedented since 1929) were immediately averted with a promise of unlimited liquidity by Alan Greenspan’s Federal Reserve, a philosophy which in turn allowed the bailout of the Savings and Loan industry and various large commercial banks (including Citibank) in the late 1980s notwithstanding a recession and serious real estate crash during the early 1990s;

• likewise in 1998, when a New York hedge fund - Long Term Capital Management (founded by Nobel Prize-winning financial economists) – was losing billions in bad investments in Russia, the New York Fed arranged a bailout, on grounds the world’s financial system was potentially at high risk;

• starting with Mexico in late 1994, the US Treasury’s management of the mid- and late 1990s ‘emerging markets’ crises again imposed austerity on the Third World while offering further bailouts for investment bankers exposed

• in addition to a vastly overinflated US economy (with record trade, capital and budget deficits) whose various excesses have occasionally unravelled – as with the dot.com stock market (2000) and real estate (2007) bubbles – the two largest Asian societies, China and India, picked up the slack in global materials and consumer demand during the 2000s, but not without extreme stresses and contradictions that in coming years threaten world finances, geopolitical arrangements and environmental sustainability.

This, then, is a list of major events that reflect tensions and occasional eruptions, but never genuine resolutions to the growing overall problems of volatility that have wracked world politics and economics. What must be demonstrated next, is that the volatility documented above is simply not being – and given the adverse balance forces cannot be - addressed by global elites.

3. The failure of reformist reforms

The last few years have not been ripe for global reforms, as witnessed by some telling intra-elite battles decided mainly by the arrogance of the United States (US) and European Union (EU):

• in relation to geopolitical tension, the lack of peace settlements (or indeed prospects) in the Middle East, Gulf, central Asia, central Africa and the Horn of Africa, with a looming war involving the US, Iran and probably Israel and oft-predicted long-term interimperial conflicts between the US and China;

• on United Nations democratization, the inability to expand the Security Council in recent heads-of-state summits, notwithstanding pressure from aspirant members Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa;

• on trade, the apparently permanent breakdown of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations;

• in international finance, ongoing contagion of turbulence (including bursting market bubbles, bankruptcies and volatile currencies), extremely high – and growing - current account deficits in the US and other countries (including South Africa), World Bank legitimacy crisis,
worsening IMF financial deficits, and US/EU resistance to Bretton Woods reform as witnessed by the leadership appointments in 2007 of two men from the neoconservative/neoliberal power structure, Robert Zoellick (World Bank) and Dominique Strauss-Kahn (IMF);

- environmentally, the failure of the EU and supportive Third World states to defend, much less expand the Kyoto Protocol, in part due to the ‘carbon trading’ distraction and in part due to the alternative alignment promoted by the US and Australian regimes, with Canada, China, India and South Africa joining, as large CO2/per capita emitters lacking commitment to change production structures (with respect to other global ecological management problems arising in freshwater, maritime resources, trade in toxics, species extinction and the like, there has been very little or no progress); and

- an overall ‘global apartheid’ economic, political, public health and social services structure in which most measures of global inequality continue worsening, making mockery of the (already relatively unambitious) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

According to South African president Thabo Mbeki, speaking at the UN heads of state summit last month,

The cold reality is that it will be difficult for the UN in its present form fully to implement its own decisions and therefore help the poor achieve urgently the MDGs. Indeed, until the ideals of freedom, justice and equality characterise this premier world body, the dominant will forever dictate to the dominated and the interests of the dominated, which are those of the majority of humanity, would be deferred in perpetuity. Thus, noble statements would continue to be uttered on all matters facing the majority of the people of the world such as the need to successfully conclude the Doha Development Round, while little is done to implement this and the many critical agreements necessary to pull the poor out of the morass of poverty and underdevelopment.4

The WTO Doha round launched in 2001 is in fact premised on the dubious idea that liberalised trade will be good for poor people, a matter of intense debate, especially in relation to Africa.5 But Mbeki’s pessimism is a tangible reflection of the lowered expectations the world elite really has for ‘global governance’ and

world-scale reforms. Already in 2004, regretted cosmopolitan democracy champion David Held, ‘The value of the UN system has been called into question, the legitimacy of the Security Council has been challenged, and the working practices of multilateral institutions have been eroded.’6

These latter three points of Held are, indeed, celebrated by critics of imperialism, and after the UN General Assembly endorsed the US occupation of Iraq in May 2003, Tariq Ali suggested, simply, ‘let it go the way of the League of Nations’.7 But there are many thousands of Post-Washington Consensus NGOs which disagree.

James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer have attacked the cadre based mainly in NGOs who fail to properly address global power, because they import neoliberal precepts into social movements, dressing them up in the language of participation and consultation:

The effects of structural adjustment programmes and other [global] interventions have the potential of causing popular discontent. That is where the NGO’s play an important function. They deflect popular discontent away from the powerful [global] institutions towards local micro-projects, apolitical ‘grass roots’ self-exploitation and ‘popular education’ that avoids class analysis of imperialism and capitalism. On the one hand they criticize dictatorships and human rights violations but on the other they compete with radical socio-political movements in an attempt to channel popular movements into collaborative relations with dominant neoliberal elites.8

Mike Davis has amplified the critique and applied it especially to urban NGOs in Third World cities.9 A similar danger – cooption - exists for those forces which too rapidly jump scale to the global, in search of reforms. It should be clear, after nearly three decades of systematic NGO advocacy within and around the multilateral agencies – the Bretton Woods Institutions, WTO and even the United Nations – that collaboration has mainly not paid off. UN researcher Kleber Ghimire registers pessimism based on his survey of movements (albeit sometimes ‘spontaneous and informal’) which address debt, trade barriers, the Tobin tax on financial corruption, anticorruption and fair trade:

Although governments, bilateral bodies and international development institutions are beginning to pay more attention to such reformist transnational movements, this has not resulted in significant policy impacts... There are major ideological limitations of the system to readily accommodate such demands... There are few signs of stable interactions between formal political bodies and social movements. Internal divisions persist between reformist and radical forces within the movements themselves...10

The Post-Washington ideology often finds expression in campaigns such as the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, ‘Make Poverty History’ and the ‘Global Call to Action against Poverty’ (GCAP), which essentially rely for credibility upon minor advances within multilateral elite institutions. Activists associated with Post-Washington strategies are sometimes accused of promoting ‘reformist reforms’ which legitimize existing power structures, accumulation dynamics, and political processes, and which might also have the effect of demobilizing their own constituents by virtue of gaining a modicum of change on issues such as debt relief or aid promises.11 ‘Non-reformist reforms, in contrast, would open wide the doors for further contestation, would empower the movements not the system, and would identify areas of structural contradiction for more intense struggles ahead. (The distinction here, which formally dates to Andre Gorz’s 1964 Strategy for Labour, is probably more useful than the traditional revolutionary approach to reforms in the form of ‘transitional demands’, although the radical spirit is similar.)

Reformist reformers include Make Poverty History strategists, unveiled in the British press as under the influence of Gordon Brown’s office via the Oxfam/Treasury/World Bank revolving door.12 At the end of 2005, writers like Stuart Hodkinson, Noreena Hertz and Maxine Frith analyzed the fatal flaws of Make Poverty History. According to Frith, the problem was that celebrities ‘hijacked’ the campaign.13 For Hertz, ‘We achieved next to nothing’ because ‘the campaign’s design allowed it to accept inappropriate markers for success that were never real proxies for justice, empowerment or accountability. And also because its demands were never in fact audacious enough.’14 Hodkinson was even more critical:

By being too dependent on lobbying, celebrities and the media, by failing to give ownership of the campaign to southern hemisphere social movements, by watering down the demands agreed by grassroots movements at the World Social Forum, and by legitimizing the G8 summit, the campaign was doomed from the start. Ten out of 10 on aid, eight out of 10 on debt? [This is a reference to Bob Geldof’s claim after Gleneagles.] More like G8, Africa nil.

The Johannesburg-based GCAP, known primarily for advocating white headband fashion, issued an initial newsletter in mid-2005, entailing 3600 words of report-backs on poverty campaigns. There was not a word about organic anti-poverty activism in the Global South: labor strikes, popular mobilizations for AIDS-treatment and other health services, reconnections of water/electricity, land and housing occupations, anti-GMO and pro-food security campaigns, women’s organizing, municipal budget campaigns, student and youth movements, community resistance to displacements caused by dam construction and the like, anti-debt and reparations movements, environmental justice struggles, immigrants’ rights campaigns, political movements to take state power, etc. Two decades of unrest went unnoticed: 1980s-90s IMF Riots, high-profile indigenous people’s protests since Zapatismo in 1994, global justice activism since Seattle in 1999, the Social Forum movement since 2001, anti-war demos since 2001, autonomist protests and the Latin American left’s revival. Instead, GCAP and similar efforts dedicated their efforts to UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) advocacy.

And what of the MDGs? September 2005 was a telling moment: the heads-of-state UN summit meant to celebrate progress on the MDGs. According to an apparently surprised Vicente García-Delgado, the UN representative for the NGO then hosting GCAP in Johannesburg, Civicus,

What took place at the UN during the few weeks leading to the Summit was a disgrace - an ugly diplomatic spectacle where a large majority of Member States saw their carefully drafted outcome document blown up before their eyes, and where the entire process of delicate inter-governmental negotiations was held hostage to a small minority pulling in opposite directions.

4. Bottom-up global justice strategy

In contrast, for ‘non-reformist reformers’ who advocate global justice, the period since 2001 witnessed two kinds of constructive activities, one in building the World Social Forum and its constituent movements, and the other linking social movements across borders usually sector-by-sector – albeit with insufficient linkages between the sectors. In his important politico-anthropological book on Africa, Global Shadows, James Ferguson offers this confession:

Traditional leftist conceptions of progressive politics in the third world (to which many anthropologists, including myself, have long subscribed) have almost always rested on one or another version of the vertical topography of power that I have described. ‘Local’ people in ‘communities’ and their ‘authentic’ leaders and representatives who organize ‘at the grassroots’, in this view, are locked in struggle with a repressive state representing (in some complex combination) both imperial capitalism and the local dominant classes. The familiar themes here are those of resistance from below, and repression from above, always accompanied by the danger of cooptation, as the leaders of today’s struggle become the elites against whom one must struggle tomorrow.

I do not mean to imply that this conception of the world is entirely wrong, or entirely irrelevant. But if, as I have suggested, transnational relations of power are no longer routed so centrally through the state, and if forms of governmentality increasingly exist that bypass states altogether, then political resistance needs to be reconceptualized in a parallel fashion.  

Hence we begin such a reconceptualization – a vast task which can only be done through myriad debates and struggles, and with activists from the ‘grassroots’ as our most serious guides – by checking the progress of the World Social Forum. From disputes between the various camps within the WSF we might reconstruct a map of ideological currents that span Third World Nationalism, the Post-Washington Consensus reformers and the disturbing fusion of neoliberalism and neoconservatives to be found in most multilateral agencies. Those with any lingering hope for global governance as a route to global eco-social justice under prevailing power relations should, after this reality check, perhaps instead refocus on those cross-border, cross-sectoral and cross-cutting alliances that can rearticulate how to best fight global-scale repression in all its manifestations.

We learnt a great deal about the divergent ways forward for global justice movement political strategy at the 2007 World Social Forum in Nairobi. One of the most influential commentators and activists, Walden Bello, found the Nairobi WSF to be:

18. Ferguson, Global Shadows, p.108.
disappointing, since its politics was so diluted and big business interests linked to the Kenyan ruling elite were so brazen in commercializing it... There was a strong sense of going backward rather than forward in Nairobi. The WSF is at a crossroads. Hugo Chavez captured the essence of the conjuncture when he warned delegates in January 2006 about the danger of the WSF becoming simply a forum of ideas with no agenda for action. He told participants that they had no choice but to address the question of power: “We must have a strategy of ‘counter-power.’ We, the social movements and political movements, must be able to move into spaces of power at the local, national, and regional level.”

Developing a strategy of counter-power or counter-hegemony need not mean lapsing back into the old hierarchical and centralized modes of organizing characteristic of the old left. Such a strategy can, in fact, be best advanced through the multilevel and horizontal networking that the movements and organizations represented in the WSF have excelled in advancing their particular struggles. Articulating their struggles in action will mean forging a common strategy while drawing strength from and respecting diversity. After the disappointment that was Nairobi, many long-standing participants in the Forum are asking themselves: Is the WSF still the most appropriate vehicle for the new stage in the struggle of the global justice and peace movement? Or, having fulfilled its historic function of aggregating and linking the diverse counter-movements spawned by global capitalism, is it time for the WSF to fold up its tent and give way to new modes of global organization of resistance and transformation?19

From my own experience, a mixed message - combining celebration and autocritique - is in order, in the wake of the Nairobi WSF. From January 20-25 2007, the 60,000 registered participants heard triumphalist radical rhetoric and yet, too, witnessed persistent defeats for social justice causes - especially within the WSF’s own processes. According to a statement made by the Social Movements Assembly at a January 24 rally of more than 2000 people:

We denounce tendencies towards commercialization, privatization and militarization of the WSF space. Hundreds of our sisters and brothers who welcomed us to Nairobi have been excluded because of high costs of participation. We are also deeply concerned about the presence of organizations working against the rights of women, marginalized people, and against sexual rights and diversity, in contradiction to the WSF Charter of Principles.20

Conflicts included arrests of a dozen low-income people who wanted to get into the event; protests to forcibly open the gates; and the destruction of the notoriously repressive Kenyan interior minister’s makeshift restaurant which had monopolized key space within the Kasarani stadium’s grounds.

All of this raises, for activists, the question of whether global justice strategies should be more firmly articulated through the WSF. Can the WSF’s current ‘openspace’ concept be upgraded into something more coherent, either for mobilizing around special events (for instance, G8 summits or coordinated anti-war demonstrations) or establishing a bigger, universalist left-internationalist political project? Bello puts the argument for upgrading in these terms:

The idea of an ‘open space’ should be interpreted in a partisan fashion, as explicitly promoting some views over others and as openly taking sides in key global struggles. In this view, the WSF is under an illusion that it can stand above the fray, and this will lead to its becoming some sort of neutral forum, where discussion will increasingly be isolated from action. The energy of civil society networks derives from their being engaged in political struggles, say proponents of this perspective. The reason that the WSF was so exciting in its early years was because of its affective impact: it provided an opportunity to recreate and reaffirm solidarity against injustice, against war, and for a world that was not subjected to the rule of empire and capital. The WSF’s not taking a stand on the Iraq War, on the Palestine issue, and on the WTO is said to be making it less relevant and less inspiring to many of the networks it had brought together.

In South Africa, CCS has hosted several debates on this question, with at least four varying points of view emerging. In July 2006, for example, leading African political economist Samir Amin presented the ‘Bamako Appeal’, a January 2006 manifesto which originated at the prior WSF polycentric event, and which combined, as Amin put it, the traditions of socialism, anti-racism/colonialism, and (national) development. In support was the leader of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, Hassan Sunmonu (also a WSF International Council member). Complaining that ‘billions of ideas have been generated since 2001 up till the last Forum’, Sunmonu found ‘a lot of merit in that Bamako Appeal that we can use to transform the lives of ourselves, our organizations and our peoples.’

But reacting strongly against the Bamako Appeal, CCS student (and Johannesburg anti-privatization activist) Prishani Naidoo and three of her comrades criticized its ‘last century’ tone and content, which mirrored ‘the mutation of the WSF from an arena of encounter for local social movements into

an organized network of experts, academics and NGO practitioners.’

For Naidoo, ‘It reassures us that documents like the Bamako Appeal will eventually prove totally irrelevant and inessential to struggles of communities in South Africa as elsewhere. Indeed, the WSF elite’s cold institutional and technicist soup, occasionally warmed up by some hints of tired poeticism, can provide little nourishment for local subjectivities whose daily responses to neoliberalism face more urgent needs to turn everyday survival into sustained confrontations with an increasingly repressive state.’ In contrast, Naidoo and the others praise the ‘powerful undercurrent of informality in the WSF’s proceedings [which] reveals the persistence of horizontal communication between movements, which is not based on mystical views of the revolutionary subject, or in the official discourse of the leaders, but in the life strategies of their participants.’

A third position on WSF politics is the classical socialist, party-building approach favoured by Ngwane and other revolutionary organizers. Replying to both Amin and the autonomist critique at the July workshop, Ngwane fretted, on the one hand, about reformist projects that ‘make us blind to recognize the struggles of ordinary people.’ On the other hand, though, ‘I think militancy alone at the local level and community level will not in itself answer questions of class and questions of power.’ For that a self-conscious socialist cadre is needed, and the WSF is a critical site to transcend localist political upsurges.

A fourth position seeks the 21st century’s anti-capitalist ‘manifesto’ in the existing social, labor and environmental movements that are already engaged in excellent transnational social justice struggle. The WSF’s greatest potential - so far unrealized - is the possibility of linking dozens of radical movements in various sectors. Instead, at each WSF the activists seem to disappear into their own workshops: silos with few or no interconnections. Before a Bamako Appeal or any other manifesto is parachuted into the WSF, we owe it to those activists to compile their existing grievances, analyses, strategies and tactics. Sometimes these are simple demands, but often they are also articulated as sectoral manifestos, like the very strong African Water Network of anti-privatization militants formed in Nairobi.

These four positions are reflected in a book released at the Nairobi WSF by the New Delhi-based Institute for Critical Action: Centre in Movement (CACIM) and CCS: *A Political Programme for the World Social Forum?* It contains some older attempts at left internationalism, such as the Communist Manifesto (1848) and the Bandung Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference (1955), as well as the ‘Call of Social Movements’ at the second and third Porto Alegre WSF, the 2005 Porto Alegre Manifesto by the male-heavy Group of Nineteen, and the Bamako Appeal with sixteen critical replies. There are also selections on global political party formations by Amin, analysis of the global labor movement by

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Peter Waterman, the Women’s Global Charter for Humanity, and some old and newer Zapatista declarations.

Lest too much energy is paid to these political scuffles at the expense of ongoing struggle, consider the spirit articulated by Ngwane, in a Nairobi debate with WSF founder Chico Whitaker: ‘Ordinary working class and poor people need and create and have a movement of resistance and struggle. They also need and create and have spaces for that movement to breathe and develop. The real question is what place will the WSF have in that reality. What space will there be for ordinary working class and poor people? Who will shape and drive and control the movement? Will it be a movement of NGO’s and individual luminaries creating space for themselves to speak of their concern for the poor? Will it be undermined by collaboration with capitalist forces? I think what some of us saw happening in Nairobi posed some of these questions sharply and challenged some of the answers coming from many (but not all) of the prominent NGO’s and luminaries in the WSF.’

To date, the WSF’s primary achievements have been in gathering the multiplicity of movements fighting neoliberal capitalism and imperialism, and maintaining the open space to keep alive mutual education and networking. But aside from the kinds of adverse power relations that were critiqued by grassroots activists in Nairobi, the WSF’s main disappointment remains our inability to converge on strategy, generate agreed joint actions, and forge cross-sectoral ties.

In past decades, ‘international’ were forged from labor, socialist, women, youth, anti-racism/colonialism, anti-war, and other such movements, actively seeking commonalities across borders. In addition to these movements, future international initiatives will more tightly link organizations devoted to minority rights, civil rights, democracy, indigenous people, cultural freedom, human rights, sexual identity, disability rights, and elder and youth rights. There are, in addition, many other issue-based movements that already coordinate advocacy and protest, in many cases taking leadership from the South where movements are more militant and the stakes higher: finance/debt/aid/investment, trade, recuperated factories/coops, corporate disempowerment and anti-consumerism, land/agriculture/forestry/fisheries, housing/urban access rights, water, energy, health, food/nutrition, social security, education, other environmental struggles, media, policing/prisons, and information and communication technology, to name a few.

In addition to better targeting of common enemies (such as the Bretton Woods twins, the WTO, the White House, the EU, etc), the challenge, I think, is to gain more coherence not only for networking among these movements, but also in finding sites of interlock where their own political programs can be drawn on for the sake of a larger – and firmly grounded – manifesto that would inspire a new generation of coordinated global/national/local activism.

One national-scale example of an all-encompassing political project – which perhaps would emerge from greater linkages across and between these
movements, and much closer attention to their traditions of struggle - comes from South Africa: the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme. That document attempted to fuse the historical struggles of the Mass Democratic Movement’s component parts, drawing upon the analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances built in some cases over decades. Though the neoliberal African National Congress did a subsequent U-Turn on the vast majority of progressive mandates in the RDP, it remains a crucial statement of South African social justice aspirations.

As a result of their disappointments locally, one strategic formula which, amongst other movements, the South African independent left has broadly adopted is to build durable and relatively democratic mass movements informed by internationalism, combined with demands upon the national state to ‘lock capital down’. The spirit entails what Walden Bello has called ‘deglobalization’ (of capital), to which should be added ‘decommodification’ as a central objective. South African activists like Dennis Brutus, Trevor Ngwane and Virginia Magwaza-Setshedi have also been instrumental in trying to remove the boot of the Bretton Woods Institutions from Third World necks, harking back to anti-apartheid analysis, strategy and tactics. As a revival of ‘divestment’ to fight apartheid, the World Bank Bonds Boycott has had remarkable success in defunding the institution that is most often at the coalface of neoliberal repression across the Third World. In addition, South Africans and other activists have won dramatic victories in deglobalizing the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights regime, by demanding generic anti-retroviral medicines instead of branded, monopoly-patented drugs. Similar struggles are underway to deglobalize food, especially given the Genetically Modified Organisms threat from transnational corporations, to halt biopiracy, and to kick out the water and energy privatizers. These are typically nonreformist reforms insofar as they achieve concrete goals and simultaneously link movements, enhance consciousness, develop the issues, and build democratic organizational forms and momentum.

Of course, this is a matter for nuanced scale politics: determining whether local community, subnational, national or regional strategies can best mitigate and reverse global economic tyranny for particular issues. But the main reason to deglobalize is to gain space to fight neoliberal commodification, in the process establishing proto-socialist consumption strategies that would accompany the kinds of radical initiatives at the point of production required to move to the next mode of production.

27. Many of these are surveyed in Ballard, R., A.Habib and I.Valodia (2006), Voices of Protest, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
To illustrate, the South African decommodification agenda entails struggles to turn basic needs into genuine human rights including: free anti-retroviral medicines to fight AIDS (hence disempowering Big Pharma); 50 litres of free water per person per day (hence ridding Africa of Suez and other water privatizers); 1 kiloWatt hour of free electricity for each individual every day (hence reorienting energy resources from export-oriented mining and smelting, to basic-needs consumption); extensive land reform (hence de-emphasizing cash cropping and export-oriented plantations); prohibitions on service disconnections and evictions; free education (hence halting the General Agreement on Trade in Services); and the like. A free ‘Basic Income Grant’ allowance of $15/month is even advocated by churches, NGOs and trade unions. All such services should be universal (open to all, no matter income levels), and to the extent feasible, financed through higher prices that penalize luxury consumption. This potentially unifying agenda could serve as a basis for widescale social change, in the manner that Gosta Esping-Andersen has discussed with respect to Scandinavian social policy.  

As for global-scale justice, this must await stronger bottom-up connections, as Ferguson suggests, in a manner that entails movements working across borders, and linking what are sometimes single issues in the process. In many parts of the world, Karl Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ – popular resistance through which ‘the extension of the market organization in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction’ is already reasserting itself, both through the rejection of market power in many areas of life and nature, and in the reduction of the scope and scale – globalization – through which capital exerts itself. But it is especially in the middle-income, semi-peripheral countries that commodification and economic globalization are most fiercely experienced, and most actively resisted.

To reiterate though, these are not purely scenes that occur outside the realm of state politics, for in many Latin American sites (especially Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador), mass-popular initiatives have changed governments through votes and protests. Overall, the last thirty years since the onset of neoliberalism, and especially the last decade, witnessed a formidable upsurge of unrest: 1980s-90s IMF Riots, high-profile indigenous people’s protests since Zapatismo in 1994, global justice activism since Seattle in 1999, the Social Forum movement since 2001, globally coordinated anti-war demos since 2001, autonomist protests and the Latin American left’s revival. In the process, the most serious activists are crossing borders, races, classes and political traditions in sector after sector: land (Via Campesino), healthcare (International Peoples Health Movement), free schooling (Global Campaign for Education), water (the People’s World Water Forum), energy/climate change (the Durban Declaration), debt (Jubilee South),

democratic development finance (IFIs-Out! and World Bank Bonds Boycott), trade (Our World is Not for Sale) and others. For these movements, what strategies are most appropriate given the circumstances and this array of forces? As noted in the discussion about the WSF, some in the Global Justice Movements insist that autonomist independence is the objective, while others consider these as seed-bed struggles for socialism, starting locally but building to national, regional and international scales when the power relations are less adverse. Although this is not the optimal site for such a debate, it is fairly obvious that in Chiapas, Zapatismo has ended its localist project and moved to a national agenda, in alliance with other indigenous and progressive movements. Argentine factory occupations appear to have hit their maximum autonomist strength at the stage of roughly 200 sites and 15,000 participants. Brazilian landless activists are reformulating critiques of the national state, in the wake of the betrayal by the Workers Party, but making yet more militant demands for state services such as interventions against major landowners and grid connections to water and electricity services for their occupied lands. Johannesburg’s Anti-Privatization Forum and its affiliates – sometimes identified as autonomist because of their illegal reconnection of water and electricity – have recently debated the adoption of an explicitly socialist manifesto. Autonomism may, hence, be at the point of exhaustion as a scale politics, potentially to be renewed by national-scale political initiatives, as we see in Latin America – yet which work across borders and link issues, as Chavez and his movements appear to clearly comprehend.

It is impossible to say where and how far these initiatives and movements will proceed before they either accomplish their goals or are defeated. But because the commodification of everything is still underway, this could provide the basis for a widescale movement for fundamental social change, if linked to the demand to ‘rescale’ many political-economic responsibilities that are now handled by embryonic world-state institutions under the influence of neoconservative (or after 2009 probably neoliberal) US administrations. To make any progress, delinking from the most destructive circuits of global capital will also be necessary, combining local decommodification strategies and tactics with the call to defund and then close the World Bank, IMF and WTO (the earlier General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade plus North-South concessions like Lome were far preferable for Third World interests). Beyond that, the challenge for progressive forces, as ever, is to establish the difference between ‘reformist reforms’ and reforms that advance a ‘non-reformist’ agenda. The latter would include generous social policies stressing decommodification, and capital controls and more inward-oriented industrial strategies allowing democratic control of finance and ultimately of production itself.

But the work required to analyse the movement of movements - and their analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances - has not even properly begun. Perhaps we must await the increasing coherence of these cross-border and potentially
cross-sectoral movements at the next local, national and regional social forums, that will build towards the 2009 World Social Forum. Meantime the activists are driving the research forward in a manner that tells us more about the world than any other method, namely praxis, and it behooves us to learn from their victories and failures, if we want the most strongly rooted global justice programme possible.
## Five international ideological currents

*(Patrick Bond, bondp@ukzn.ac.za, October 2007)*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political current:</th>
<th>Global Justice Movements</th>
<th>Third World Nationalism</th>
<th>Post-Wash. Consensus</th>
<th>Washington Consensus</th>
<th>Resurgent Rightwing</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tradition</strong></td>
<td>socialism, anarchism</td>
<td>national capitalism</td>
<td>(lite) social democracy</td>
<td>neoliberalism</td>
<td>neoconservatism</td>
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<td><strong>Main agenda</strong></td>
<td>‘deglobalisation’ of capital (not people); ‘globalisation-from-below’ and international solidarity; anti-war; anti-racism; indigenous rights; women’s liberation; ecology; ‘decommodified’ state services; radical participatory democracy</td>
<td>increased (but fairer) global integration via reform of interstate system, based on debt relief and expanded market access; reformed global governance; regionalism; rhetorical anti-imperialism; and Third World unity</td>
<td>fix ‘imperfect markets’; add ‘sustainable development’ to existing capitalist framework via UN and similar global state-building; promote a degree of global Keynesianism; oppose US unilateralism and militarism</td>
<td>rename neoliberalism (PRSPs, HIPC, PPPs) with provisions for ‘transparency’, self-regulation and bail-out mechanisms; coopt potential emerging-market resistance; offer financial support for US-led Empire</td>
<td>unilateral petro-military imperialism; crony deals, corporate subsidies, protectionism and tariffs; reverse globalization of people via racism and xenophobia; religious extremism; patriarchy and bio-social power</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leading institutions</strong></td>
<td>social movements; environmental justice activists; indigenous people; autonomists; radical activist networks; leftist labour movements; liberation theology; radical think-tanks (e.g., CCS, Focus on the Global South, Global Exchange, IBASE, IFG, IPS, Nader centres, TNi); radical media (Democracy Now! GreenLeft, Indymedia, Pacifica, Pambazuka, zmag.org); semi-liberated zones (Bolivarian projects, Kerala); sector-based or local coalitions in the World Social Forum</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement, G77 and South Centre; self-selecting regimes (often authoritarian): Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Zimbabwe with a few – Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela – that lean left; AlJazeera, supportive NGOs (e.g., Seatini, Third World Network)</td>
<td>some UN agencies (e.g., Unicef, Unifem, Wider); some INGOs (e.g., Care, Civicus, IUCN, Oxfam, TI); large enviro. groups (e.g., Sierra and WWF); big labour (e.g., ICFTU and AFL-CIO); liberal foundations (Carnegie, Ford, MacArthur, Mott, Open Society, Rockefeller); Columbia U. economics department; the Socialist International; Norway</td>
<td>US state (Fed, Treasury, USAid); corporate media, IT and financiers; World Bank, IMF, WTO; elite clubs (Bilderburgers, Trilateral Commission, World Economic Forum); some UN agencies (UNDP, Unctad, Global Compact); universities and think-tanks (U. of Chicago economics, Cato, Council on Foreign Relations, Adam Smith Inst., Inst. of International Economics, Brookings); BBC, CNN and Sky; most of G8</td>
<td>White House and Pentagon; Republican Party populist and libertarian wings; Project for a New American Century; right-wing think-tanks (AEI, CSIS, Heritage, Manhattan); Christian Right institutions and media; petro-military complex and industrial firms; rightwing media (Fox, <em>National Interest</em>, <em>Weekly Standard</em>, <em>Washington Times</em>); proto-fascist European parties - but also Zionism and Islamic extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal disputes</td>
<td>role of state; party politics; fix-it vs nix-it for int’l agencies; gender and racial power relations; divergent interests (e.g., Northern labor or environment vs Southern sovereignty and indigenous rights); tactics (e.g., merits of symbolic property destruction)</td>
<td>degree of militancy versus the North; divergent regional interests; religion; large vs small countries; internecine rivalries</td>
<td>some look left (for alliances) while others look right to the Wash. Consensus (in search of resources, legitimacy and deals); which reforms are optimal</td>
<td>Differing reactions to US empire due to divergent national-capitalist interests and domestic political dynamics</td>
<td>Disputes over US imperial reach, religious influence, and how to best protect culture, patriarchy, and state sovereignty</td>
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**Exemplary proponents**

**POLITICAL SOCIETY:**
F.Castro H.Chavez R.Correa E.Morales

**CIVIL SOCIETY:**

**POLITICAL SOCIETY:**
J.Aristide M.Gaddafi Huj. N.Kirchner R.Mugabe D.Ortega V.Putin

**CIVIL SOCIETY:**
Y.Akyuz Y.Graham M.Khor Y.Tandon

**POLITICAL SOCIETY:**
M.Bachelet W.Maathai G.Verhofstadt K.Watkins

**CIVIL SOCIETY:**

**POLITICAL SOCIETY:**

**CIVIL SOCIETY:**

**POLITICAL SOCIETY:**

**CIVIL SOCIETY:**