Local Politics of Conflict:
The transformation of a township in Durban/eThekwini 1

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Introduction

This paper builds on findings from a research project 2003-2006, ‘The Political Economy of Social Capital’, funded by the Norwegian-South African Research Programme. It complements household surveys and community surveys within a larger set-up, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey (KIDS). (See Braathen, Khandlhela & May, 2004). It may illuminate the political-historical context and improve the framework to interpret the data from these surveys.

It drafts the first part of a planned report. The report will depict the recent history of two violence-ridden and poor townships in Kwa-Zulu Natal. Lindelani is in the suburbs of metropolitan Durban and Ndaleni lies outside the rural town Richmond. Both townships experienced fierce clashes between IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) and ANC/UDF (United Democratic Front) supporters in the 1980ies. However, violence continued after 1994, in the post-apartheid democratic context, not only between the old enemies, but also between brothers-in-arms of the movements that came out as local rulers after 1994: Inkatha Freedom Party in Lindelani and ANC in Ndaleni. Commonalities and differences are identified in a comparative analysis. Emphasis is made on the role of independent community action (Christian grassroots initiatives), elected councillors and the local government in creating a more peaceful post-conflict environment conducive to improved welfare of the people.

This draft paper deals only with one of the two cases, namely the Lindelani case. Lindelani is a historical stronghold of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The paper depicts the developments in the 1980ies and 1990ies that undermined this stronghold. The major part analyses the development since ‘normal’ local democracy was established in 2000. It concludes by

1 A first draft if the paper was presented at the NFU Annual Conference, NORAGRIC/Ås, Norway 20-21 June, 2005.
suggesting the dilemma of a weak civil society, facing the threat of subordination to ‘competing clientelisms’.

**Zulu nationalism and IFP in the 1990ies**

Blauer (1995) sketches in detail the history of the Zulu nation tracing it from the formidable leader Shaka Zulu who built the nation by brutal force from 1816 to 1828, uniting tribes of Nguni-speaking people, forcing other tribes into an African diaspora, the last Zulu rebellions and the subsequent wars; the Zulu kingdom formation to how the apartheid era shaped the socio-cultural politics of the Zulu tribe, balkanization, etc. For this context, the political organization, in particular, the formation of the ANC and later on, the Inkatha Freedom party is of greater relevance. There is ample documentation (see Blauer, 1995; Goodenough 1995; Greenstein eds 2003, Graumans, 1999; Ntsebeza 2002). The most important of these chronicles has been how the Zulu communities were transformed from being a strong cultural heritage to a conflict riddled nation. Leadership struggles, the gross violations of human rights, destruction of family life, criminal elements were some of the features of such communities.

We sketch below some of the major political events in this community tracing it from the early eighties to how the community transformed post apartheid.

**The early post-apartheid period (1994-2000): The IFP leadership co-opted into government**

Buthelezi, the former minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan is the figure behind the debacle of resisting to join the first-ever universal democratic elections on April 27, 1994, unless more autonomy was granted to the bantustans and/or provinces. He joined the campaign only one week before the elections, and got much less than the polls indicated: only 10.5%.

(Approximately 20% of the SA population consider themselves Zulu, and nearly 25% speak Zulu). This means he could not speak with legitimacy on behalf of the Zulu nation. After 1994, he fell out against King Zwelithini. The king accepted the offer by President Mandela, to be paid by the national government, and disliked Buthelezi’s partisan exploitation of his Zulu institutions like the traditional authorities and the *imbizo*, a meeting at the highest level.

“Buthelezi has money to transport his people in thousands for mass rallies, but at home they have no running water, they have no electricity”, ANC propagandists argued. At the end of the day, Buthelezi accepted the post as Minister of Home Affairs in Mandela’s (and then Mbeki’s) government, and he seemed to enjoy his bargaining power – institutional power based on the KwaZulu-Natal province government, and non-institutional power based on fear for IFP’s violent rallies (Blauer, 1995).

However, on May 27, 1996, all parties signed an Electoral Code of Conduct condemning violence (repeated in May 1999). In the 1996 KwaZulu-Natal elections, IFP got 44.54% (42% in 1999 elections). ANC got 33.25% (rose to 39% in 1999 elections). ANC got more than 50% in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Richards Bay, and Newcastle and Ladysmith in the Northwest. IFP got between 75 and 90% in the Rural Councils in the North/West part of the province and about 65% in RC 5, 6 and 7 in the South. This contributed to stabilising the situation (Graumans, 1999).

The pattern of violence was resurrected in KwaZulu-Natal in 1998 ahead of the 1999 national elections. After these elections and the period up to the national and provincial elections of April 2004, IFP shared provincial power with the ANC. However, political violence and killings erupted now and then at the local level due to conflicts between ANC

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2 In the 2004 elections, IFP lost nearly 5% of the electorate to ANC, which became the biggest party in the province for the first time and formed provincial government alone.
and IFP strongmen. Actually, the national and provincial leaderships of ANC and IFP who were now in government, were challenged by local ‘ungovernable’ warlords. Extraordinary cases in this regard were Richmond in Ndaleni and Lindelani in Durban and All the mentioned national/provincial developments – of the IFP, of political violence, and of ANC’s increasing power and electoral support – can be observed in a peri-urban township in the outskirts of metropolitan Durban.

**Lindelani: a stronghold of IFP undermined by ANC and itself**

Lindelani is an area adjacent to KwaMashu in the north of Durban metropolitan area. KwaMashu was established as township in 1958 with many migrants from non-Zulu areas south of Durban. It became a stronghold for ANC and its allied movements.³ Lindelani, by contrast, emerged in the 1970ies as a squatter camp for residents from the more traditionalist Zululand north of Durban. It became a stronghold for IFP, with about 50 000 residents.

*1983-5 violent clashes with UDF.*

The ‘open space’ between the two townships was named Ntuzuma, and it was overflowed from the 1980ies by residents of KwaMashu. However, the IFP rulers of Lindelani felt their political control threatened by their new neighbours. Hence they imposed their rule on the Ntuzuma settlements, while supporters of ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF) which were politically on the offensive throughout the country in the first half of the 1980ies, resisted. As result, the 1980ies were marked by fierce violent clashes between the two sides – particularly in 1983-85.

During our visit to the Ntuzuma area, we passed by two ruin houses at the outskirts of the settlement. These houses belonging to some relatively better-off families linked to ANC/UDP were burnt down in 1983. The: “Township houses belonged to ANC people, the shack belonged to IFP people. The ‘township houses’ were extensions of the older KwaMashu/Ntuzuma townships”. ⁴ UDF/ANC responded to the burning of these houses by declaring war on IFP.

> My senior primary school was closed in 1985 due to political unrest. We were moved to a school in Newlands [5 km away]. The violence between IFP and UDF was particularly harsh from 1983 to 1985. All our parents were IFP, while the youth formed UDF groups. IFP wanted to thrash the youth – the youth responded with necklacing. Some IFP people were killed in front of me. A big number of people were killed – tens of people. ⁶

The last violent clashed between the two parties were in 1991 after the release of Mandela.⁷

*Social and political development of Lindelani: the IFP strongman.*

An observation was made in 1994 that Lindelani “boasts a tarred main road leading to smaller gravel roads, a creche, a lower and a senior primary school, electricity and plumbing, a building training centre, a crafts centre, a gardening course run by the Department of

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³ “The ANC people usually came from Transkei [a Xhosa-speaking Bantustan south of Durban] – one could establish their tribal origins from their surnames”. Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4.

⁴ Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4.

⁵ Councillor for ward 43, Mr. Mabizela (ANC).

⁶ Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4.

⁷ Councillor for ward 43, Mr. Mabizela (ANC). Interview 29/04/04. Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4. Mandela’s and ANC’s active stand for peace were the main factors attributed by these informants.
Manpower, two soccer fields, a stadium, several playgrounds, and many vegetable stalls and shack shops. This is far more than many informal areas, and even many formal townships” (Xaba, 1994). It has been noted that IFP loyalists were instrumental in the building of a training centre for the unemployed, and in the upbringing of purified water and tarred roads to the shacks (Goodenough, 1993).

Asking why the squatter area (Lindelani) had more infrastructural development than a formal township (KwaMashu), Thokozani Xaba found the answer in differences in types of authority, and in particular in relationships to the KwaZulu (Bantustan) administration. Both Lindelani and KwaMashu were transferred to KwaZulu in 1975. In KwaMashu the councillors had little democratic legitimacy and were generally condemned as ‘corrupt money-grabbers’. By the 1990ies, civic leaders (UDF) had created a de facto dual power structure. But the turn-out also for the civic organisations were poor. Services as well as public order deteriorated (Xaba, 1994).

Also Lindelani was marred by crime and lawlessness until the residents conferred power on a committee of men. It used brutal methods, but successfully lowered the crime level. Over time one man, Thomas Mandla Shabalala, emerged as the big chief (or warlord). He selected leaders who in turn had their messengers and ‘community police’, divided into units. ‘Arrested’ persons would be taken to the leader’s house, tried and sentenced. The sentence was normally a warning or a number of lashes, depending on the crime. Mr. Shabalala was a member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and member of Inkatha’s Central Committee. It is undeniable that favouritism on the part of the KwaZulu administration played a part in funding and procuring development projects for Lindelani (Xaba, 1994). In other words, there was law, order and development in Lindelani. However, the long term development effects of Lindelani’s autocracy (or tyranny) was questioned by Xaba: “development tended to be geared to addressing the concerns of the leaders rather than those of the people”. For those who lived in Ntuzuma in the outskirts of Lindelani, there was ‘not much’ of development. Nonetheless, the community is still nostalgic and lamenting the death of their local hero, Mr. Shabalala.

1998-99: Violent IFP in-fighting
Four years later, one could see that the ‘law, order and development’ in Lindelani had degenerated into gangsterism. An outside observer was not impressed by its social development, describing Lindelani as ‘a shack settlement of 50 000 on the northern outskirts of Durban’ (Goodenough, 1998).

In the 1994 national election only IFP contested in Lindelani, and this happened also in the local elections in 1996. Lindelani was a ‘no-go-area’ for ANC. However, Mr. Shabalala was expelled from IFP in 1995 after leading a march through Durban that ended with a shoot-out with police. The march was a protest against the set-up of a transitional council for the metropolitan area, meaning that Shabalala’s fiefdom would be controlled by ANC. He was challenged by his former protégée, Michael Zulu, who had the provincial and local IFP structures behind him.

A right-out gang war broke out in 1998. The conflict started with the killing on May 13, 1998, of two brothers who went to church instead of an IFP meeting. 25 people were killed the next four months. Mr. Zulu was arrested for attempting to murder a man and his girlfriend: Mr. Shabalala was prosecuted for an attack on the home of a fellow IFP member in 1996, Richard Mgenge. (Goodenough, 1998). Violence continued with gun killings, petrol bombs etcetera. The violence reached a climax when Mr. Zulu was released from jail. He was shot dead end of 1998.

8 Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4.
9 Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04
Mr. Zulu was killed by unknown people – four men stepped out of a black Mercedes. Afterwards, in the funeral, seven of Zulu’s mourners were killed and three houses were burnt down ... Many people tried to promote peace. We held inter-church ecumenic prayers at a football stadium.\textsuperscript{10}

Mr. Shabalala, however, survived. Not as a chief warlord, but as a businessman. He won in court and got back his seat in the provincial parliament, but lost it in the 2000 elections when he was expelled from the IFP. His wife continued as an IFP councillor for some time. “He continued his business, but much of his empire collapsed – the taxis, the butchery etc. He has recently opened a private mortuary and undertaker business.” \textsuperscript{11}

Mr Shabalala was brutally killed at his home in early 2005. The reasons for the murder remains unclear but there are strong suspicions raised around his business links.\textsuperscript{12}

**Lindelani under ‘normal’ democracy (2000-)**

The local government in New South Africa was subject to a long transformation process. The fully democratic and unitary system did not come into effect after the local elections in December 2000. In this system, the number of municipalities were drastically reduced to 284 from 843 in the “interim phase” (1996-2000). The new system has given the citizens formal democratic rights – political, social and economic rights. These rights and the functions of local government are enshrined in the Constitution (Cameron 2003).

*Municipal reform I: ‘demarcation’, or divide and rule*

The task of changing boundaries – the demarcation process - of the local municipalities started once the ANC government was in place in 1994. As pointed out by many students of local government, “[b]oundary changes are often associated with a redistribution of political power and resources, with some institutions and parties benefitting, and others being disadvantaged” (Maharaj, 2002). In South Africa, the issue was to ‘amalgame’ areas with high tax base (e.g. with predominantly white population) and areas with low tax base (black population). The point was also to include land under ‘tribal authority’ (traditional chiefs) into democratic local self-government. At the micro-level, one could also see ambitions to extend the authority boundaries of ANC-supported population centres. Hence, the process was quite contested and did not end before late 2000 (Maharaj, 2002).

The newly demarcated boundary increased the Durban metropolitan area by 68% although increasing the population by only 9%. The greater Durban city administration was renamed eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. Today eThekwini has 100 wards. Lindelani was, as a result of the demarcation process before the 2001 elections, split up and shared by two wards: Ward 38 and Ward 43. Ward 38 was won by IFP: one of the 7 wards won by IFP in eThekwini. Lindelani was after the 2000 elections “the only stronghold of IFP in Durban”\textsuperscript{13} Ward 43 was won by ANC. The IFP stronghold has been contained even during the 2006 local elections.

*Municipal reform II: new managerialism.*

\textsuperscript{10} Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4  
\textsuperscript{11} Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4  
\textsuperscript{12} See news comments in Daily News, January 26 and 27, and The Mercury, January 31, 2005  
\textsuperscript{13} Confirmed in separate interviews with the two councillors, Mr. Maphalala (IFP, ward 38) and Mr. Mabizela (ANC, ward 43).
The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32, 2000) defined the most important functions of the municipalities to include the provision of water, sanitation (and sewerage disposal systems), roads, storm water drainage (including solid waste disposal), electricity distribution and municipal health services. Education and social welfare are not local government functions. However, the role of local government is supposed to shift from the traditional role of local service delivery towards the promotion of economic and social development (Cameron 2003).

As part of the local municipal transformation, the huge informal settlements in the outskirts of Durban received EU-funding for social development. The most well-known of these ‘development associations’ was in Cato Manor. The development associations relaxed their ‘community-driven’ pretensions when they were transformed into Area Based Management areas (ABM). They take part in the huge planning machinery of the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. ABM is a national president-led programme to coordinate and align local, provincial and development efforts; ‘technical and political champions to push cooperation’. They operate with 5 year development plans, annual business plans, and align with the city priorities and the IDP process. The ‘Integrated Development Plan’ (IDP) is a major policy instrument in the new South African local government system. According to the Municipal Systems Act, the IDPs have to reflect the priorities of poor communities and promote social and economic development. (Cameron, 2003)

One of the six ABM areas is called INK – acronym for Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu - and includes Lindelani. It covers 15 wards, 9400 ha, 500 000 people or 18 % of Durban’s population – ‘youthful, highly unemployed’.

**Municipal reform III: ‘councillorism’**

The eThekwini council has 200 councillors. One hundred of them are elected in wards and the other hundred candidates are elected to represent political parties on the basis of proportional representation. With about 3 million citizens, the 100 wards have in average 30 000 inhabitants. Of course, that is too many people for a ward councillor to keep daily contact with.

To assist him, each ward is supposed to have a Ward Committee of maximum 10 members, each representing one subward. The Ward Committee usually has one part-time secretary. The Ward Committee deals with broader community issues: crime, policing, poverty relief. In addition, there are Ward Development Committees to assist the councillor and the provincial authorities in bringing in services: housing improvement schemes, water, roads, storm water drainage, and sewerage. In one of the wards they had also a Ward Development Forum. All the NGOs/CBOs were represented there: women’s organisations, churches, taxi association, health worker union, youth and sports organisations etc. The Forum gathers 2-3 persons from each organisation.

The municipal reform required comprehensive formal community involvement in budgets and IDPs with effect from the 2002/2003 budget. (Cameron, 2003). We could not identify any records of such ‘comprehensive formal community involvement’ in any of the wards visited during field work in 2004. Not even the mentioned bodies – the Ward Committee, the Ward Development Committee, and the Ward Development Forum seemed to be satisfied by their involvement in IDP. And more important, these bodies were not well known by ordinary people. If elected by the community, the meetings electing them had not

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15 ABM INK, April 2004: “ABM INK presentation” (power point file).
16 Ibid. The Ward Development Committee in ward 42 had 3 meetings to discuss priorities for the ward. “Then, what happened next to these priorities? – Nothing. This was only rhetoric. We are running out of patience”.
been widely convoked. Many of our informants hinted that the members of these bodies were handpicked by the councillor himself.

One aspect undermining motivations for community participation, is the fact that the wards do not receive any block grants or other fixed annual amounts of money. The wards do not collect any own revenues. “Money go through the councillor, and is not sufficient”. Hence, with the absence of rules for downward public accountability, and with non-transparent regulations of the ward committees, the councillors may operate as they want. In good cases it means they are benevolent despots, in bad cases they are just despots. The local despotism inherent in the colonial and apartheid systems for ‘native’ administration may survive modern democracy, as claimed by Mamdani (1996).

Two different councillor styles?
As to the IFP councillor in Ward 38, the women’s focus group agreed that he did help people in the community, but that assistance largely depended on political affiliation. “When you go to him in the office he asks for the IFP card”. Others claimed that the problem was that he was never in his office, “he does nothing but driving his Mercedes”. The councillor himself claimed that he organised regular meetings: “The ward and development committee meet once a month, and I rotate meetings in all sub-wards and it takes 8 days to do all the meetings”. The focus group agreed that he organised many meetings, but they were not public. “He last called a meeting for men only. They discuss IFP support and how to discipline those people who are criticising the party”.22

The ANC councillor in Ward 43 held lesser meetings, according to the focus group. However, these meetings were public, attracting a lot of people from the community, because he always dealt with issues of development. “He does not mix development with politics”.23 The ANC councillor himself thought that ANC had the advantage of an open approach policy, in that they talk to and listen to people, “The IFP rules the Amakhosi [chieftain] style and do not want to talk about issues openly”.24

Nevertheless, none of the focus group members had heard about the IDP. When explained about IDP, none of them could recall that there ever had been a community meeting to discuss priorities and long term Integrated Development Plans.

Two housing projects
In Ward 38, with the IFP councillor, the project started in 1996. It was a project initiated by the IFP provincial government that took its seat that year. “It has been a province project all the time, not a municipality one which has a very bad housing department. The municipality tried many times to stop my project”. In 1999 the province got an ANC minister, and the progress halted. In 2001 a pro-IFP minister took over, and there was a quick further funding for other units. So far 3700 housing units in approved sites have been built, more 3000 units are underway. The application criteria is means-based, but it does not take time to approve the applications”.25

In Ward 43, the implementation of a housing scheme did not start before end of 2000, after the ANC councillor was elected. It was a municipality project. 666 units were built by mid-2002. 80 % of these units are electrified and have sewer; only about 65 % have water (in July 2004). Phase 1 of additional 500 units have been completed in 2004 and are to be

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19 Ibid.
20 Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04
21 Councillor for ward 38. Mr. Maphalala (IFP) interview 08/07/04.
22 Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04
23 Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04
24 Councillor for ward 43. Mr. Mabizela (ANC), interview 29/04/04
25 Councillor for ward 38. Mr. Maphalala (IFP) interview 08/07/04.
allocated as soon as sewer services are completed. “We get them for free. We receive the land title from the eThekwini municipality, and it can be sold after 5 years. Every owner can extend his house as he wishes.” 8 building contractors and about 40 people were involved in bricklaying building the foundations of the houses. Phase 2, also of 500 houses, will commence in 2005. There are 3500 applications for the houses. 26

A recent check (March 2006) on the progress of the housing project was that the project is not yet fully finished because new houses would block existing roads. This is clearly stemming from poor or lack of proper physical planning. About 15 of the 666 houses, have not been completed due to some problems with infrastructures. In following up progress from 2004, the current situation is that most units have been constructed, but about 10% of the units lack connection to water and sewerage pipes. Metered water posts have been erected. About 20% of the houses also lack direct access to a road. People are also not too happy about the houses and the major complaint is that the units are too small. “It is a one bedroom only, fit for bachelors not families.” 27

Although the community has some critical remarks about the housing provided, both projects have to a greater extent boosted the reputation of the Councillors in both Lindelani thus the reelection of the very same Councillors. It is emphasised that the ANC councillor in ward 43 has been particularly “…lucky, because he just took over the housing plans that IFPs Mr. Shabalala had made ready before him”. The IFP councillor in ward 38, on the other hand, deserved to cash in on ‘his’ housing scheme since “it was more complete than ours; every house was plummeted and connected to water and sewerage pipes. This is why IFP still has a good grip on that ward.” 28

Social change I: service improvements acknowledged
When discussing service delivery, housing provision is one of the service delivery developments first mentioned. “Most social development in this settlement has taken place the last years. The junction road road was constructed in the early 1990ies. A community assembly hall was reconstructed in 1998/99. A clinic has just opened. Five-six new primary schools have been built in this ward [43] alone. The access road to our community was rehabilitated and tarred in 2003. And 1166 new houses have been built so far in our community. “We get them for free.” 29

The women’s focus group was not fully satisfied with water, electricity supply, health services – the hospital was too far away -, and public transport. However, primary schools had improved a lot, and so had agricultural extension and road maintenance. The construction of community hall, sport ground and local markets were also positive surprises. 30

Social change II: increased crime
“Political violence has been replaced by criminal violence. Crime is very high and a serious social issue in the area. I have been a victim many times of robbery, mugging and hijacking. Other crimes include drug dealing. Crime is still above the officially reported number because victims are reluctant to report to the local police, whom they also see as a perpetrator of crime. Lack of trust in the local police station has brought the crime-fighting-spirit down”. 31

The IFP councillor thought that there was an escalating rate of crime. “The contractors doing the service delivery jobs are directly affected – their cars are hijacked, instruments are

26 Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/04.
27 Community liaison officer, interview 17/03/06
28 Community liaison officer, interview 17/03/06
29 Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/04.
30 Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04
31 Father Michelson, parish priest in Ntuzuma/Lindelani, interview 07/07/04.
stolen and sold.” He thought the perpetrators are “young people from the KwaMashu K.” Crime is due to massive unemployment among young people – after matriculating, the young people have no money to further education. Staying at home push them to criminal activities”. 32

The focus group agreed that crime levels in the areas are alarming. Five years ago there was much less crime. ‘Now, you are robbed and raped by the kids and some that you don’t know... They take these drugs and come back and do crime ... A police forum was created to address the problem but the structure was disbanded within a month because the police are also involved in these crimes”. 33

One worrying case was that a mob, allegedly belonging to vigilante groups that officially help police to combat crime, had set three community members alight in July 2003 after accusing them of being criminals. The focus group did not think it was a crime related action but political – rather related to IFP threatening families who might have voted for the ANC. 34

With the death of Shabalala, there are perceptions that crime is certainly going to increase drastically. “Under him there was very little crime. If any burglary, people reported to him, not to the police. The culprits were usually taken within a few days” 35

By way of a conclusion

Social change III: towards competing clientelisms?
The aftermath of the 1996-99 IFP violence is that people have pulled out of IFP. There is very little trust in that party in the Ntuzuma community (Ward 43). However, “in Ward 38 people still vote for IFP because of the councillor, Mr. Maphalala. He serves his people well – a cool guy, with a sense of humour. While, in this ward, people vote ANC because they see something is done by the ANC councillor”. In other words, political trust is personalised and conditional. Thus, in both camps we find political clientelism – classically defined as ‘political support in exchange for material benefits’ (Clapham, 1982). The main material benefits have been houses, exploited politically by the two councillors mentioned. However, this clientelism has so far been a very competitive one. People have a certain freedom to choose their patrons.

In the April 2004 national and provincial elections IFP saw its majority very reduced in Ward 38 – down to 1381 votes, with 1100 for ANC. In Ward 43 there were 7000 for ANC and only 2700 for IFP in 2004. 36 “At our voting station, the difference was about 1200 votes. ANC got about 2000 votes, IFP 800”.37

This electoral swing towards ANC does not mean that people have embraced the party actively. While the IFP branch is dying, there is still no ANC branch in the community. The community liaison officer hinted that this has something to do with lack of ‘powerful leaders of ANC in this area’. 38 “People are not interested in politics anymore”.

However, people are very concerned with development, which might be conducive to ANC ‘open approach’ clientelism. And they are also very concerned with public law and order, which might be a winning stick for IFPs more authoritarian clientelism. Some women in the focus group spoke nostalgically well of the former IFP warlord Shabalala because “he

32 Councillor for ward 38. Mr. Maphalala (IFP) interview 08/07/04.
33 Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04.
34 Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04
35 Community liaison officer, interview 17/03/06
36 Councillor for ward 43, Mr. Mabizela (ANC). Interview 29/04/04.
37 Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4
38 Examples of powerful local ANC leaders were Mr. Ian Mlasi and John Dube, but they have both died. The latter was one of the founders of ANC. Community liaison officer, interview 09/07/4
did not tolerate drugs and dealt with crime effectively”.\textsuperscript{39} The IFP councillor tries to be responsive by taking active part in a Community Policing Forum and go to a meeting later that day to “discuss strategies to deal with crime in the area of Ntuzuma and KwaMashu”\textsuperscript{40}, e.g. crime outside his own ward.

To end on a normative note, the problem in Lindelani seems to be that there are no ‘association of associations’ – no independent civic networks that could provide a countervailing force to the mentioned clientelisms. There are no churches in the focus group members’ communities. There are four burial societies (stokvels) that are ‘corrupt and heartless’, four soccer clubs, three community gardens.\textsuperscript{41} However, there are no organisations apart from the political parties and the catholic church that could unite concerned citizens across the communities. There have been no exercises of local truth and reconciliation committee. Political violence in the past and the criminal violence at present seems to hamper cross-community trust and action. Much depends on enlightened initiatives by the political leaders to curb crime and promote social movements and voluntary cooperation between people – particularly between the young and unemployed men and women.

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\textsuperscript{39} Focus group from ward 38 and 43, interview 09/07/04
\textsuperscript{40} Councillor for ward 38, Mr. Maphalala (IFP) interview 08/07/04
\textsuperscript{41} Father Michelson, parish priest in Ntuzuma/Lindelani, interview 07/07/04
