SOUTH AFRICA AND THE BRICS: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS

POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT
TSHWANE (PRETORIA), SOUTH AFRICA
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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; Africa and the European Union (EU); the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014 on “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.

The first summit of the four-member BRIC bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009. South Africa’s inclusion transformed the grouping from BRIC to BRICS in April 2011, with the five-member bloc holding its sixth summit in the Brazilian cities of Fortaleza and Brasília in July 2014. Convened one month after the Fortaleza/Brasília summit, CCR’s August 2014 seminar reflected critically on the first complete hosting cycle of six BRICS summits (June 2009-July 2014). The Tshwane meeting brought together about 30 key South African, BRICS, and other policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to assess the potential for increasing the impact of the BRICS on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa’s continuing engagement with the bloc.

1. South Africa, Africa, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)

The BRICS countries played a pivotal role in enabling other developing and emerging economies to weather the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Participation in the BRICS grouping offers an opportunity for South Africa to deepen and broaden its bilateral engagement with Brazil, Russia, India, and China. In turn, South Africa’s accession has helped broaden the bloc’s focus from mainly economic cooperation to development cooperation. Efforts to strengthen intra-BRICS cooperation at the bloc’s fifth summit – held in Durban, South Africa, in March 2013 – included the establishment of the BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC) and the BRICS Business Council.

With an estimated annual gross domestic product (GDP) of $370 billion, South Africa is the second largest economy in Africa (after Nigeria) and the continent’s most industrialised country. Tshwane has sought to advance a broader African peacebuilding and development agenda within the BRICS. However, the extent to which the BRICS countries’ interests in Africa converge with the continent’s own interests is still uncertain. South Africa’s aspirations to act as an interlocutor between the BRICS and Africa also remains contested on the continent. A key challenge for Tshwane relates to how it can navigate tensions between its “African agenda” (promoting security and development on the continent and ensuring that Africa has a strong global role), its ambitions to play a leadership role on the continent, and its ability to wield influence within the BRICS, of which it is the smallest member, accounting for only about 2 percent of the bloc’s economic might.

2. South Africa’s Bilateral Relations: India and China

Bilateral trade between South Africa and India has grown rapidly since 2004, at an annual rate of 30 percent, and was worth 81 billion Rand in 2013. Meanwhile, China is South Africa’s single largest bilateral commercial partner, with total trade worth R270 billion in 2013. In turn, South Africa is China’s main trading partner in Africa, accounting for a 31 percent share of Beijing’s trade with the continent in 2013. Total Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in South Africa increased from $59 million in 2004 to $5 billion in 2012, making Tshwane the leading recipient of investment flows from China to the African continent.
However, South Africa’s pattern of trade with India and China is heavily weighted in favour of primary products from Tshwane and manufactured goods from New Delhi and Beijing. In addition, South Africa has run persistent trade deficits with both India and China. Leveraging Tshwane’s inclusion in the BRICS bloc to promote more equitable and mutually beneficial trade with New Delhi and Beijing, while obtaining access to key technologies and skills in support of South Africa’s own industrialisation, remains a critical concern for Tshwane.

Furthermore, greater security cooperation between South Africa and India – including through the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) – can help to deepen the strategic partnership between both countries, and is essential to meeting the threats of maritime piracy and terrorism. Peacekeeping is yet another often overlooked area of cooperation between Tshwane and New Delhi, as India is the third largest troop-contributing country to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, with 8,108 Indian personnel deployed to 12 operations worldwide in September 2014.

3. South Africa’s Bilateral Relations: Brazil and Russia

In Latin America, Brazil is South Africa’s largest trading partner. However, the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries – R21 billion in 2013 – has remained relatively low. While a number of Brazilian firms (including Brasil Foods, Indústrias Colombo, and Marcopolo) maintain offices in South Africa, these serve mainly as headquarters for their operations in other African countries. South African companies, in turn, have a similarly limited presence in Brazil, although the multinational company, Anglo-American, had investments worth $16 billion in Brazilian mining in 2013. Nuclear power and defence are emerging areas of cooperation between Tshwane and Brasília.

South Africa’s bilateral ties with Russia date back to the Soviet era, with Moscow an early and staunch supporter of the anti-apartheid struggle. However, post-Soviet Russia has lacked a clear Africa strategy. Russian business interests in South Africa are concentrated in mining, oil, gas, and petrochemicals. In addition, Tshwane and Moscow signed a $50 billion nuclear deal in September 2014. However, bilateral trade between South Africa and Russia was a mere R8 billion in 2013.

Notwithstanding their distinct dynamics, South Africa’s bilateral ties with both Brazil and Russia are characterised by a mutual lack of information that remains an obstacle to greater political, economic, and cultural cooperation. In addition, Brazilian companies often find it easier to conduct business in lusophone African countries, such as Angola and Mozambique, than in South Africa.

4. The BRICS Finance and Trade Agenda

Two key outcomes were achieved at the sixth BRICS summit in Fortaleza/Brasília in July 2014, signalling the bloc’s intention to consolidate its finance and trade agenda. These were: an agreement to establish the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB); and a treaty to create the BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA). The Shanghai-based New Development Bank – with an initial subscribed capital of $50 billion – could potentially provide an alternative to the World Bank for the funding of critical infrastructure projects. However, the infrastructure gap in developing and emerging countries is estimated to be about $1 trillion annually. The new bank will also need to ensure that it effectively manages different financing windows to meet clearly defined objectives, while addressing widely varying infrastructure needs equitably within the BRICS bloc. It is still far from certain that the New Development Bank will come into existence and become operational by 2016 as planned.
Modelled on Southeast Asia’s Chiang Mai Initiative, the $100 billion BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement is intended to strengthen the bloc’s capacity to withstand actual and potential short-term balance of payments pressures during global and regional financial crises. The individual commitments of the BRICS countries to the CRA vary by economic capacity, with China making the largest contribution of $41 billion. Brazil, Russia, and India have committed to providing $18 billion each, while South Africa has pledged $5 billion. Yet, the BRICS countries collectively have an estimated $52 trillion in foreign currency reserves, which indicates modesty in the CRA’s size and ambition.

5. Peace and Security: The BRICS and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

In 2011, South Africa, India, and Brazil all served on the UN Security Council, joining the two veto-wielding BRICS permanent members, Russia and China. However, during this year, the BRICS were unable to craft cohesive foreign policy positions to challenge the dominance of the Council by the United States (US), France, and Britain. For example, South Africa voted for Security Council Resolution 1973 in 2011, authorising Anglo-French-led intervention in Libya, while Brazil, Russia, India, and China all abstained.

South Africa has also been supportive of the concept of “responsibility to protect”, which is enshrined in the African Union’s (AU) Constitutive Act of 2000. China and India have been more reluctant to accept deviations from the principle of non-intervention, in particular R2P’s embrace of military intervention in situations in which governments fail to protect populations at risk. Russia has offered rhetorical support for R2P, invoking the principle whenever its vital interests are at stake, as in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Meanwhile, Brazil has proposed a new concept – “responsibility while protecting” (RwP) – that stresses the accountability of interveners to the UN Security Council and the need to monitor how Council resolutions are implemented.

6. The BRICS and the Reform of Institutions of Global Governance

A powerful desire to reform Western-dominated institutions of global governance such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and to create a more democratic and equitable world order lies at the heart of the collective endeavours of the BRICS countries. However, the five emerging powers of the BRICS bloc do not necessarily agree on how the architecture of global governance should be reshaped, which has led to a still unresolved debate about whether they are status quo powers, or revisionist actors with a transformative vision for an alternative world order. The bloc was unable to unite behind a common candidate to fill the top posts at the IMF and the World Bank in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The BRICS countries have also seemed divided on developing solutions to global challenges, in particular international financial instability and climate change.

There has further been no real progress made towards the reform of the UN Security Council. China and Russia’s permanent membership and veto power on the Council distances Beijing and Moscow from Tshwane, New Delhi, and Brasilia. Furthermore, South Africa, unlike India and Brazil, is also constrained by the AU’s 2005 Ezulwini Consensus in favour of two additional African permanent members with veto power. In addition, placing the BRICS in the vanguard could potentially complicate reform efforts, given questions about the extent to which India, Brazil, and South Africa can claim to have overwhelming support for their Security Council candidacies within their own regions.
7. BRICS and IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa)

Notwithstanding its regular summits, the BRICS bloc is still a relatively new grouping with an expanding, but still evolving, agenda for cooperation. Doubts persist about the bloc’s ability to coalesce into an agenda-setting actor with a harmonised approach to addressing global challenges. At the same time, the lack of cohesion among the BRICS countries makes it difficult to categorise them as being ‘for’ or ‘against’ the existing Western-dominated world order.

The IBSA Dialogue Forum – created in June 2003 – could provide an alternative focus for India, Brazil, and South Africa. The forum’s projects include the IBSA Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation, to which $3 million is pledged annually. The fund was established in 2004 for the implementation of replicable and scalable projects with the broad aim of poverty reduction and capacity-building.

The evolution of the BRICS agenda beyond trade and investment has raised questions about IBSA’s ability to retain a unique niche on the global stage. If managed well, both BRICS and IBSA could potentially play a critical and complementary role in advancing the interests of the “global South”.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the August 2014 Tshwane policy advisory group seminar:

1. The creation of a BRICS Business Travel Card should be considered to facilitate entry and exit for business travellers within the bloc’s five economies, following the example of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region. New Delhi, Tshwane, and Brasília must also prioritise the finalisation, ratification, and implementation of an envisaged trilateral trade area among India, the South Africa-led Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the Brazil-led Common Southern Market (MERCOSUR).

2. The BRICS should consider expanding and opening up the bloc’s engagement with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which has so far been the preserve of a few select bodies in the BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS Academic Forum. Civil society can be a source of creative solutions to global challenges that could help the five emerging powers move beyond a narrowly defined trade and finance agenda, and influence Western-dominated debates on development, climate change, and human rights.

3. South Africa, as vice-chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association in 2015–2017 (assuming the chair in 2017–2019), must build on the momentum generated under India’s leadership of the association (2011–2013) to expand and enhance cooperation in IORA’s priority areas. Security cooperation between Tshwane and New Delhi can also be strengthened through an increase in high-level exchanges between the South African and Indian armed forces, while more South African and African troops should participate in courses offered by the New Delhi-based Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK).

4. It is vital that South Africa and Brazil identify areas of trade complementarity in order to reduce their bilateral trade deficit. Brazil, with its highly developed agribusiness sector, can also help South Africa increase value-added exports in its trade profile through collaborative ventures, technology transfers, and knowledge-sharing, particularly in the citrus industry.
5. Greater educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation between South Africa and Russia urgently needs to be fostered for their bilateral economic engagement to reach its potential. In this regard, Moscow should consider re-establishing cultural centres to address the lack of knowledge about Russia in South Africa, while exploring ways to strengthen the impact of its Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa (AFROCOM).

6. Given the weak prospects of achieving comprehensive UN Security Council reform, developing and emerging countries should initially focus their efforts on expanding non-permanent membership of the body, while continuing to argue against permanent membership without veto power. The BRICS should also campaign for an enhanced role for the 193-member UN General Assembly, including on issues currently being dealt with by the Security Council.

7. The BRICS countries must make sure that the bloc’s agenda for the reform of key multilateral institutions – in particular the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, as well as the UN Security Council – is transparent and advances the interests of the “global South”, while complementing existing efforts by other groupings, such as the Group of 77 (G-77), to reshape the Western-dominated global order.

8. The BRICS bloc must tackle the challenge posed by uneven financial flows and support the development of more effective regulatory measures, including exchange controls, to mitigate the impact of international capital volatility on developing and emerging economies, including their own. The BRICS countries should also consider increasing their investments in green and sustainable technologies, while making a more concerted effort to ensure greater reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

9. BRICS-Africa development cooperation – as also highlighted by the BRICS Leaders–Africa Dialogue Forum of 2013 – should include an emphasis on funding models that promote more multi-country projects and augment integration efforts on the continent. In addition, the BRICS New Development Bank, in contrast to the Bretton Woods institutions, must retain its commitment to non-conditionality and non-interference in the policymaking space of borrowing countries.

10. The BRICS countries, notwithstanding the differences in their positions on the principle of R2P, must forge greater cohesion to prevent the abuse of the concept. The five emerging powers should create a coordinating mechanism at the United Nations, both to increase their influence in the UN Security Council and to move beyond crisis management towards agenda-setting on global peace and security issues.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at the Sheraton Hotel, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014 on “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.

The August 2014 meeting brought together about 30 key policymakers, academics, and civil society actors largely from the five BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries to reflect critically on the first hosting cycle of six BRICS summits (June 2009–July 2014) and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa’s continuing engagement with the BRICS bloc. This report is based on discussions at the meeting, as well as on the concept note and further research.

CCR has organised a series of major policy and research seminars on issues related to South Africa’s foreign policy since the advent of democracy in 1994, and worked closely with senior South African government officials and parliamentarians to support a positive leadership role for Tshwane in Africa and beyond. The Centre helped to generate policy options for South Africa’s Chair of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) security organ in 2004, and has conducted training and capacity-building workshops for senior officials of its Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). In May 2012, CCR worked closely with South Africa’s Department of Defence (DOD) to convene a policy advisory dialogue on a review of national defence policy. The Centre has also worked to strengthen the research and knowledge capacity of the South African Parliament’s foreign, defence, and trade portfolios, disseminating its findings and publications and engaging with parliamentarians on issues related to South Africa’s role in Southern Africa, Africa, and beyond.

The August 2014 Tshwane seminar built on this work, which also includes four key meetings held in 2011 and 2012 that focused on South Africa–Nigeria relations; South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa; and South Africa’s role on the United Nations (UN) Security Council between 2011 and 2012. In July 2013, CCR convened a policy meeting on “Post-Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Policy After Two Decades”, from which an edited book volume is being produced – building on the Centre’s 2007 volume South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era, which has been widely used by officials in Tshwane’s foreign, defence, and trade ministries, as well as by its diplomatic training academy. In February 2014, CCR collaborated with South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to host an important policy seminar on “South Africa, Africa, and International Investment Agreements”.

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1 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), “South Africa’s Role as Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security”, policy advisory group seminar, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, 30 November 2004.
The August 2014 Tshwane meeting also sought to develop the Centre’s previous work on Africa’s relations with China – the world’s second largest economy and Africa’s single largest bilateral trading partner, with a total trade volume of $210 billion in 2013. In 2008, CCR published an edited volume, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China*, based on a policy seminar in September 2007 that assessed Beijing’s expanding engagement with Africa. The Centre also convened a policy meeting in Tshwane in July 2009 to support African policymakers in crafting an effective multilateral response to Beijing, ahead of the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2009.

With an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of $370 billion in 2013, South Africa is the second largest economy in Africa (after Nigeria). As such, the country is a dominant economic force in the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and has twice served as a member of the United Nations Security Council, in 2007–2008 and 2011–2012. South Africa’s former foreign affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was controversially elected Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission in July 2012, amidst strong opposition from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda. Notably, South Africa is the only African member of the BRICS bloc.

Together, the five BRICS countries account for about 25 percent of global GDP and host more than 40 percent of the world’s population, spread across four continents. This “rise of the South” could thus potentially represent a historic shift in global economic power relations. Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, in particular, are expected to be the main engines of future economic growth in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. However, doubts persist about the BRICS’ ability to coalesce into an agenda-setting actor with a harmonised approach to addressing global challenges. Equally, it is still unclear whether the five BRICS countries are revisionist powers seeking to transform the international order in their own image, or status quo powers seeking co-optation into Western-dominated global institutions such as the UN Security Council, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Questions also persist about South Africa’s ability – as the grouping’s smallest member – to use its BRICS membership to promote Africa’s broader interests effectively.

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CCR’s August 2014 Tshwane seminar took place at the end of South Africa’s year-long chairing of the BRICS bloc in 2013–2014. The meeting followed Brazil’s assumption of the chair at the sixth BRICS summit, held in the Brazilian cities of Fortaleza and Brasilia from 14 to 16 July 2014 under the theme “BRICS – Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions”. The five key goals of CCR’s policy advisory group seminar in Tshwane in August 2014 were:

1. To analyse, and craft policy recommendations for strengthening, South Africa’s bilateral relations with Brazil, Russia, India, and China;

2. To consider the benefits and challenges of BRICS membership for South Africa, paying particular attention to the bloc dynamics that can help Tshwane to promote foreign policy goals consistent with respect for human rights, democratic governance, and international peacemaking;

3. To assist South Africa in leveraging its inclusion in the BRICS bloc to advance a wider African peacebuilding and development agenda;

4. To assess the implementation of the BRICS eThekwini (Durban) declaration and action plan of 2013, under Tshwane’s chair; and

5. To explore ways of strengthening the bloc’s impact on global politics, particularly in relation to the reform of key multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and the UN Security Council, with the aim of making these institutions more effective, democratic, and representative.
1. South Africa, Africa, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)  

The first summit of the four-member BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) bloc was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009. South Africa’s inclusion transformed the grouping from BRIC to BRICS in April 2011, and the South African port city of Durban hosted the fifth BRICS summit, under the theme “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration, and Industrialisation”, in March 2013.

Participation in the BRICS grouping offers an opportunity for South Africa to deepen and broaden its cooperation with Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Moreover, formal association with an elite cohort of emerging powers has increased South Africa’s international profile and potentially enhanced its role in global decision-making fora (including the UN Security Council and the Group of 20 [G-20]), while reinforcing its leadership claims on the continent. In turn, South Africa’s accession to the BRICS has helped broaden the bloc’s focus from mainly economic cooperation to development cooperation.

As the most industrialised economy in Africa, South Africa – led by its corporate sector – has sought to position itself as a key strategic access point to the rest of the continent. Within the BRICS, South Africa has clearly indicated its intention to leverage Africa’s voice; advance a continental development agenda; and promote global governance reform through greater South-South cooperation. Tshwane’s membership in the bloc also complements the country’s growth and development objectives as outlined in its National Development Plan (NDP) of 2012, as well as its goal of democratising global governance institutions. The BRICS countries played a pivotal role in enabling low-income countries in the “global South” to weather the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, stabilising global output and boosting growth in Africa. In March 2013, South African president Jacob Zuma hosted a BRICS Leaders–Africa Dialogue Forum retreat, on the theme “Unlocking Africa’s Potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure”, on the margins of the bloc’s fifth summit in Durban. This second meeting was attended by 15 African leaders representing Southern, Eastern, West, Central, and North Africa (though notably not Nigeria, South Africa’s leadership rival on the continent); the chairs of the African Union and the AU Commission; and representatives from the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The retreat agreed to develop cooperation between the BRICS and African countries to support the continent’s socio-economic development, with an emphasis on infrastructure development and industrialisation.

The extent to which the BRICS bloc will be able to promote an effective development agenda for Africa and the rest of the “global South” is a crucial issue, but is also one characterised by considerable uncertainty. At the Fortaleza/Brasília summit in July 2014, the five emerging powers of the BRICS bloc agreed to establish a New
Development Bank (NDB), “with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies”. The BRICS bank is a timely response to continental initiatives such as the AU Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) of 2011–2040 (adopted in July 2012), whose aggregate price tag will amount to about $368 billion, with 51 priority programmes and projects envisioned. However, it remains to be seen how the BRICS bank will fare as a provider of development finance, given that three of its members – Brazil, China, and India – together have outstanding World Bank loans worth $66 billion: not too far from the NDB’s entire initial subscribed capital of $50 billion. Still, the usefulness of the BRICS bank for African countries extends beyond the provision of capital and includes knowledge-sharing about innovative ways to meet the demands of development in the “global South”. In this respect, the New Development Bank could create space for BRICS and other developing and emerging economies to contribute more meaningfully to their own sustainable development.

The BRICS bloc is still an inchoate grouping, and the concrete benefits of membership, aside from enhanced prestige, are not yet fully evident for South Africa or the wider continent. Efforts to strengthen intra-BRICS cooperation at the 2013 Durban summit included the establishment of the BRICS Business Council – originally a Russian initiative – to promote engagement between the business communities of the five member countries; and the BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC), a forum for creative thinking that has been tasked with developing policy options and evaluating the bloc’s long-term strategies. In addition, the BRICS finance ministers met ahead of the 2013 Durban summit to discuss a proposal for the bloc to have its own credit-rating agency, an idea put forward by Indian academics in 2012. The BRICS bloc is seeking to democratise institutions of global governance and to reshape the post-1945 global economic architecture, in which there is an inherent bias against developing and emerging countries on the part of the two Bretton Woods institutions: the IMF and the World Bank. For example, weighted voting gives Western countries disproportionate influence, and since 1946, an American has always headed the World Bank and a European the IMF. Although efforts at collaboration within the BRICS bloc have been increasing, greater cohesion is needed among its five member countries. The group must also articulate a more concrete strategy aimed at strengthening its impact on global politics – one that clarifies the sum of all its initiatives, including the New Development Bank.

Furthermore, while the content of the 2013 Durban summit reflected South Africa’s prioritisation of its “African agenda” (promoting security and development on the continent and ensuring that Africa has a strong global role), the degree and nature of the individual interests of the five BRICS countries on the continent are largely driven by individual agendas that may not necessarily converge with Africa’s expectations, thus stoking fears among critics of a new “scramble for Africa”. There is genuine concern about use of large tracts of communal land (without proper consultation with local communities who are often displaced from their land) by the

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18 Sixth BRICS Summit, Fortaleza Declaration, para. 3.
BRICS countries (except Russia) in several African countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Sudan. In this regard, it is worth noting that post-apartheid South Africa’s own expanding corporate presence in Africa has also sometimes been controversial, with its companies facing widespread opposition in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania.

Moreover, in the absence of a unified continental approach to the BRIC emerging powers, and given the preference of these four countries, so far, to deal directly with individual African countries and sub-regions, South Africa’s role as a “gateway to Africa” remains contested. Both China and India have established alternative channels for their trade diplomacy with Africa—the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the India-Africa Summit—that bypass South Africa and the BRICS. Given South Africa’s apartheid history, development challenges, and weak economic growth, the extent to which Tshwane can claim to represent Africa, and to which it has been accepted by the rest of the continent as Africa’s interlocutor with the rest of the world, also remains contested.

A key challenge for South Africa relates to how it can navigate tensions between its “African agenda”, its ambitions to play a leadership role on the continent, and its ability to wield influence within the BRICS, of which it is the smallest member, accounting for only about 2 percent of the bloc’s economic might. In 2014, South Africa was overtaken as the continent’s largest economy by Nigeria, with a gross domestic product of $510 billion and a population (170 million) three times the size of South Africa’s (50 million). In order to advance an African agenda that stems from a collective African Union vision, Tshwane must seek to play the role of catalyst in international fora such as the BRICS, promoting complementarity rather than competition, and leading African efforts to support infrastructure development on the continent.

From left, Dr David Monyae, Section Manager, Policy Analysis, International Relations and Protocol Division, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town; Ms Joanmariae Fubbs, Chairperson, Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town; and Ms Nelia Barnard, Director of BRICS, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Tshwane

23 CCR, Post-Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Policy After Two Decades, p. 18.
2. South Africa’s Bilateral Relations: India and China

Although South Africa’s bilateral ties with India and China vary in historical depth, they pre-date South Africa’s formal accession to the BRICS bloc in April 2011.

The Indian/Asian diaspora in South Africa numbers about 1.3 million people, constituting 2.5 percent of the total population, and can be traced back to the import of indentured Indian labourers to Natal under British colonial rule from 1860 onwards. In June 1946, India – still under British dominion – became the first country to raise the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa in the UN General Assembly. During the apartheid era (1948–1990), New Delhi imposed a complete diplomatic, economic, cultural, and sports embargo against Pretoria. The contemporary South Africa–India “strategic partnership”, established in March 1997, has been defined by predictably strong political relations based on a foundation of mutual trust forged through New Delhi’s early and staunch support for the anti-apartheid struggle. This has since been buttressed by the two countries’ shared aspiration of creating a more just and equitable multilateral world order.

Trade and commerce between post-apartheid South Africa and India have grown steadily. However, this economic engagement is yet to reach its potential. Bilateral trade between South Africa and India has grown (albeit from a low base) at an annual rate of 30 percent since 2004 to reach R16 billion Rand in 2013, and is expected to exceed R116 billion in 2014. Tshwane and New Delhi must intensify their existing efforts to promote bilateral trade and investment, including the conclusion of a preferential trade agreement (PTA) between the Southern African Customs Union and India that has been under negotiation since 2002. Equally, there is a vital need to improve rail, road, and sea connectivity between the two countries for the more efficient movement of goods and services. It is also important that both South Africa and India prioritise achieving their national economic growth and development objectives, in order to sustain the upward growth trend in bilateral trade, and to benefit more fully from their expanding commercial ties.

Greater security cooperation between South Africa and India can further help to deepen their strategic partnership, and is essential to meeting the threats posed by maritime piracy and terrorism. In this regard, Tshwane and New Delhi need to move beyond rhetoric and low-level naval cooperation, and further escalate their engagement in the 20-member Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) – previously known as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) – to ensure the security of sea-lanes which are critical to trade. Both South Africa and India are founding members of this regional forum, which identified six priority areas in November 2011 to guide the scope of its work: maritime safety and security; trade and investment.

This section is partly based on presentations made by Shiv Shankar Mulderjee and Yang Yirui at the CCR policy advisory group seminar “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.

28 The IORA comprises Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen.
facilitation; fisheries management; disaster risk management; academic and science and technology cooperation; and tourism and cultural exchange. More institutionalised intelligence-sharing between Tshwane and New Delhi is also needed to combat the global threat of terrorism. Peacekeeping is yet another often overlooked area of cooperation between Tshwane and New Delhi, as India is the third largest troop-contributing country to United Nations peacekeeping missions, with 8,108 Indian personnel deployed to 12 operations worldwide in September 2014. South Africa, on the other hand, belongs to a generation of "new" contributors with a peacekeeping presence that is concentrated in Africa: 2,250 South African personnel were deployed in UN missions in the DRC, Sudan’s Darfur region, and South Sudan in September 2014, with Tshwane being the 14th largest troop-contributor to UN peacekeeping.

Meanwhile, China is South Africa’s single largest bilateral commercial partner, with total trade having increased exponentially from R5.6 billion in 1998 to R270 billion in 2013. In turn, South Africa is China’s largest trade partner in Africa, accounting for 31 percent of Beijing’s trade with the continent in 2013. In 2007, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) bought a 20 percent stake – the largest foreign purchase by a Chinese firm at the time – in Johannesburg-based Standard Bank, indicating the expanding scope of China’s presence in South Africa. The ICBC purchase contributed more than half of South Africa’s foreign direct investment (FDI) of $10 billion that year, and has been the biggest single investment in the country since the advent of democratic rule in 1994. Furthermore, between 2004 and 2012, total Chinese FDI stock in South Africa increased from $59 million to $5 billion, making South Africa the leading recipient of investment flows from China to Africa, ahead of Zambia, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, and Sudan. Similarly, tourism from China to South Africa more than doubled between 2010 and 2013, from 68,000 to 122,000, while four Confucius Institutes had been established in South Africa by 2014 to promote cultural and educational ties between the two countries. Political cooperation between Tshwane and Beijing has increased through a variety of mechanisms, including a comprehensive strategic partnership, a bi-national commission involving seven sector-specific sub-committees (diplomacy; economy and trade; science and technology; education; energy; minerals; and defence), and a joint working group.

Even so, critical issues have remained unaddressed, including, in particular, a pattern of trade that is heavily weighted in favour of primary products from South Africa and manufactured goods from China, which is unsustainable in the long-term. The trade relationship between Tshwane and New Delhi is skewed in a similar way. Furthermore, South Africa has run persistent trade deficits with both India and China. Tshwane’s trade imbalance with New Delhi grew in the Asian country’s favour from about R4 billion in 2011 to R23 billion in 2013. South Africa’s trade deficit with China stood at about R39 billion in 2013. A key challenge for

35 Based on data from South Africa’s DTI, “SA Import Value HS8 (Yearly)” and “SA Export Value HS8 (Yearly)”. 
South Africa relates to how the country can leverage its inclusion in the BRICS bloc to promote more equitable and mutually beneficial bilateral trade with the grouping’s two Asian members; and to access technologies and skills that can support Tshwane’s own industrialisation efforts. Prior to the 2014 Fortaleza/Brasília BRICS summit, the Contact Group for Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI) presented recommendations to the bloc’s trade ministers on increasing value-added exports in intra-BRICS trade. These were based on a joint study conducted under South Africa’s 2013–2014 chair of the BRICS bloc, underscoring Tshwane’s continuing concerns about this thorny and politically sensitive issue. The joint communiqué of the meeting of BRICS trade ministers in July 2014 – endorsed at the Fortaleza/Brasília summit in the same month – welcomed the study, but “instructed the CGETI to continue working on its recommendations”.  

36 Joint communiqué of the meeting of BRICS trade ministers, Fortaleza, Brazil, 14 July 2014 (accessed on 2 October 2014 at http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140714-trade.html).
3. South Africa’s Bilateral Relations: Brazil and Russia

Five years after the BRICS bloc was formally established in June 2009, bilateral relations between its five member states have remained their primary method for consolidating these relationships.

Even as South Africa’s diplomatic cooperation with Brazil and Russia has grown rapidly over the past decade, several obstacles remain in Tshwane’s bilateral ties with Moscow and Brasília, each with its own dynamics. For reasons related to history and geography, South Africa and Brazil remained largely unknown to each other during the apartheid era (1948–1990), though Brasília hosted the first of a series of international seminars on apartheid in 1966, and gradually, from the 1970s onwards, adopted “an anti-colonial and anti-apartheid stance”. Brazilian engagement with Africa was reinvigorated under the leadership of President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (2003–2011), who also played a key role with South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki in helping to found the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, and South Africa) in June 2003, and in advancing the interests of other developing and emerging economies within this framework.

In September 2009, Tshwane and Brasília signed a strategic partnership agreement and a memorandum of understanding on consultation and cooperation in the area of inter-governmental relations. In Latin America, Brazil is South Africa’s largest trading partner. However, the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries – R21 billion in 2013 – has remained low. In June 2012, Brasília initiated a dispute at the World Trade Organisation – its first against any African country – following the imposition of anti-dumping duties by South Africa on imports of Brazilian poultry. Following high-level bilateral talks between the two countries, the dispute was resolved within the framework of the WTO, with South Africa withdrawing the anti-dumping duties in January 2013 and opting instead for general import duties on all poultry originating from countries with which it did not have a preferential trade agreement. As in the area of trade, Brazilian foreign direct investment in South Africa is modest, with outward FDI stock from Brazil to South Africa amounting to a paltry $51 million in 2011. While a number of Brazilian firms (including Brasil Foods, Indústrias Colombo, and Marcopolo) maintain offices in South Africa, these serve mainly as headquarters for their operations in other African countries. South African companies, in turn, have a similarly limited presence in Brazil, although the multinational company, Anglo-American, has investments worth $16 billion in Brazilian mining through its subsidiary, Anglo-American Brasil Limited. That said, there are emerging areas of cooperation between South Africa and Brazil, with the two

37 This section is partly based on presentations made by Pedro Carneiro De Mendonca and Vladimir Shubin at the CCR policy advisory group seminar “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.
39 Data from South Africa’s DTI, “SA Import Value HS8 (Yearly)” and “SA Export Value HS8 (Yearly)”.
countries negotiating an agreement—still unsigned in November 2014—on nuclear technology. The development of the A-Darter air-to-air missile by South Africa’s Denel, in collaboration with Brazil, is a more concrete and notable example of defence cooperation between the two emerging powers.

Beyond the realm of official government policies, South Africa’s private sector—business as well as academia—has maintained a focus on developing external relations with partners in Europe and the United States (US), despite Tshwane’s turn towards the BRICS and other developing and emerging economies. From a Brazilian point of view, there is an obvious lack of interest and understanding about the individual BRICS countries—except China to a certain extent—on the part of South Africa’s mainstream media, business, and academic circles. In the case of lusophone Brazil, language has posed an additional obstacle to increasing investment, with Brazilian companies finding it comparatively easier to conduct business in Portuguese-speaking countries such as Angola and Mozambique, which host significant Brazilian populations, than in anglophone South Africa.

South Africa’s bilateral ties with Russia date back to the Soviet era, with Moscow an early and staunch supporter of the anti-apartheid struggle. Since the end of apartheid in South Africa by 1994, Tshwane and Moscow have signed a number of agreements, the most important of which has been the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of April 2013, outlining the terms for bilateral cooperation in areas including trade, investment, and humanitarian intervention. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were strengthened through bilateral talks between Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, and South Africa’s Jacob Zuma, at the fifth BRICS summit in Durban in March 2013, as well as by an official state visit to Moscow by president Zuma in August 2014. The state visit was followed in September 2014 by the signing, on the sidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference in Vienna, Austria, of a $50 billion nuclear deal between South Africa and Russia, which will increase Tshwane’s nuclear power-generating capacity. Russian business interests in South Africa are concentrated in the mining, oil and gas, and petrochemical sectors.

However, commercial and cultural ties between South Africa and Russia are weak compared to those in the political sphere. Bilateral trade between Tshwane and Moscow also amounted to a mere R7.5 billion in 2013. Mutual lack of information about the realities of life in South Africa and Russia remains a key obstacle to developing and strengthening economic, cultural, and educational cooperation between the two countries. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia was economically weak and initially disengaged from Africa, closing diplomatic posts and cultural centres across the continent. From 1996 onwards, with Yevgeny Primakov as Russian foreign minister, a more confident foreign policy began to emerge. This took concrete shape from 2001 onwards, with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin (2000–2008), seeking to establish closer ties with the West after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., in September 2001. However, concern about continued eastward expansion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led to a “re-set” in Moscow’s relations with Washington. This contributed to Russia turning towards emerging powers in the “global South”, which was reflected in Moscow’s participation in the BRICS bloc. However, Moscow has continued to lack a wider African strategy—sub-Saharan Africa is mentioned in only one paragraph (out of 104) in the Russian Foreign

46 Data from South Africa’s DTI, “SA Import Value HS8 (Yearly)” and “SA Export Value HS8 (Yearly)”.

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Policy Concept of 2013, outlining Moscow’s diplomatic priorities and objectives. Domestically, Russia is fragmented by social divisions and characterised by a weak civil society; a parliament with limited powers; and a proliferation of political parties, only a handful of which have any contact with Africa. The introduction of direct flights between South Africa and Russia, as well as the easing of entry requirements and visa restrictions by the two countries, could help improve both commercial and cultural interaction.

In this respect, notwithstanding their distinct dynamics, South Africa’s bilateral ties with Brazil and Russia are characterised by a lack of mutual communication, both in the Brazilian and Russian media, about Africa, and also in the South African media about Moscow and Brasilia. In the case of Brazil, there is very little reporting on Africa, while in Russia many elites have a view of Africa that reinforces negative stereotypes about a continent of conflicts, disease, famine, and safaris.

4. The BRICS Finance and Trade Agenda

Two key outcomes were achieved at the July 2014 Fortaleza/Brasília BRICS summit that signalled the grouping’s concrete intention to consolidate its finance and trade agenda.

These were: an agreement to establish the New Development Bank, and a treaty to create the BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA). The idea of a BRICS bank was first mooted at the fourth BRICS summit, held in New Delhi in March 2012. The bloc declared its intention to assess the feasibility and viability of this proposal. A year later, the 2013 Durban summit outcome document included a specific commitment to establish a new bank to finance infrastructure and development projects in the BRICS and other developing and emerging economies.49 Launched in July 2014, the New Development Bank will have an initial authorised capital of $100 billion, with the initial subscription set at $50 billion, to be contributed equally by the five founding countries. Membership in the bank will be open to other countries in the future, but with the BRICS retaining a majority stake (no less than 55 percent). The bank will be headquartered in Shanghai, China, and have its first regional office in Johannesburg, South Africa. Its first president will be from India, the first chair of its board of governors from Russia, and the first chair of its board of directors from Brazil. Although the modalities for the bank’s operationalisation have not yet been mapped out in detail, the BRICS countries have indicated that they will eschew policy conditionality in favour of evaluating projects on sustainability and content, in addition to financial criteria.

The Shanghai-based NDB could potentially provide an alternative to the World Bank for the funding of critical infrastructure projects. The infrastructure gap (the difference between demand for infrastructure and investment levels) is estimated to be about $1 trillion a year in developing and emerging countries ($35 billion in Africa), with demand continuing to grow and industrialised countries unwilling, or unable, to increase financing commitments after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. However, it is still far from certain that the BRICS bank will come into existence and become operational by 2016 as planned. Questions also persist about whether the bank will have a concrete impact in transforming development cooperation. Although the NDB is intended to supplement, rather than replace, existing international financial institutions, its initial subscribed capital of $50 billion is nonetheless insubstantial compared to the capital of the World Bank and other multilateral and regional development banks. The African Development Bank (AfDB), for example, was capitalised at $100 billion: twice the proposed BRICS bank’s finance. Furthermore, the NDB’s initial $50 billion capital base will be accumulated over seven years, with each BRICS member paying 20 percent of its contribution ($2 billion) in pre-agreed instalments during this period, while the remaining 80 percent ($8 billion) is to be callable capital (pledged funds that will only have to be provided, if needed).

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48 This section is partly based on presentations made by José Alfredo Graça Lima and Charles Okeahalam at the CCR policy advisory group seminar “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects.”
For the New Development Bank, once operationalised, to be effective in helping to reduce the infrastructure gap in the developing world, the BRICS countries will need to ensure that the bank effectively manages different financing windows to meet clearly defined objectives. Infrastructure needs within the BRICS bloc vary enormously across a range of sectors including rail and road densities, electricity supply, and port infrastructure quality. For example, while India has 143 kilometres of road for every 100 square kilometres of its land area, Russia – with about five times the land area – has only about six kilometres of road per the same unit of land area. Addressing these divergent needs adequately and fairly will be a key challenge. Furthermore, the governance of the New Development Bank will be critical to ensuring that it can occupy a unique niche in an otherwise crowded field of development banks. The five BRICS countries were unable to unite behind a common candidate to fill the top posts at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2011 and 2012 respectively.

The bloc must forge greater internal cohesion and develop, as well as articulate, a more concrete alternative strategy to challenge the dominance of the World Bank’s approach to development issues. The US has actively opposed China’s efforts to establish a new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the region, and questioned the Chinese initiative’s potential economic benefits, while raising doubts about its environmental and social safeguards.50 This is despite the inability of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to provide adequate financing to meet the demands of economic growth in the region. According to the Manila-based ADB – led by a Japanese since its creation in 1966 – Asian countries need to invest an estimated $8 trillion in infrastructure by 2020. Concerned about Chinese competition for influence in the region, Washington has lobbied key Asian economies – in particular, South Korea and Australia – against Beijing’s proposal.

The BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement, finalised at the 2014 Fortaleza/Brasilia summit, will create a pooled currency reserve of $100 billion. Comparable to the Chiang Mai Initiative51 in its design, the CRA is intended to strengthen the bloc’s capacity to withstand actual and potential short-term balance of payments pressures during financial crises. The BRICS countries’ individual commitments to the CRA – unlike their commitments to the NDB – vary by economic capacity, with China making the largest contribution of $41 billion. Brazil, Russia, and India have committed to providing $18 billion each, while South Africa has pledged $5 billion. Yet the BRICS collectively have an estimated $5.2 trillion in foreign currency reserves, which indicates modesty in the CRA’s size and ambition.52 The IMF held $806 billion in reserves in October 2014.53 Furthermore, the larger Chiang Mai Initiative, valued at $240 billion, upon which the BRICS arrangement is modelled, remained unused in November 2014.

The expansion of intra-BRICS trade is an agreed aim of the bloc.54 Intra-BRICS trade grew more than ten-fold between 2002 and 2013, from $75 billion to $851 billion, with China emerging as the second largest trade partner for its fellow BRICS members after the European Union (EU). Trade ministers from the five BRICS countries have met regularly since April 2011. Other initiatives aimed at strengthening economic relations among the

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51 The Chiang Mai Initiative, originally established as a set of bilateral arrangements in 2000 and replaced by the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Agreement in 2010, involves the ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – and China (including Hong Kong), Japan, and South Korea.
The bloc’s members include the BRICS Competition Forum, launched in September 2009; the Business Forum, created in April 2010; and the Business Council, established in March 2013.\(^5\) The BRICS bloc is not the only platform for economic cooperation between South Africa and the other four emerging economies. In 2009, Tshwane signed a preferential trade agreement with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, which includes Brazil),\(^6\) while negotiations are ongoing for a similar trade deal with India. Furthermore, these talks pre-date South Africa’s membership in the BRICS in 2011, which does not automatically include any preferential trade agreement, leaving unclear the nature and extent of the concrete economic benefits that accrue to the country from its formal association with the bloc. Since 2008, intra-BRICS cooperation has expanded to include more than 30 issue areas ranging from health and education to science and technology. Even so, the bloc’s finance and trade agenda has remained its main calling card.


\(^6\) The other full members are Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
5. Peace and Security: The BRICS and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

In 2011, South Africa, India, and Brazil all served on the United Nations Security Council, joining the two veto-wielding BRICS permanent members, Russia and China.

The presence of all five BRICS countries on the Security Council for the first time since the bloc’s inception in 2009 created an opportunity for them to collaborate on issues of common concern in pursuit of greater influence over the international security agenda and to challenge the dominance of the Council by the US, France, and Britain. However, the responses of the BRICS countries to the crises that the UN Security Council faced in 2011 – particularly over Libya – raised serious questions about the bloc’s ability to craft cohesive foreign policy positions, given the diverse national interests and diplomatic priorities of its members. South Africa voted for UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorising Anglo-French-led intervention in Libya, while Brazil, Russia, India, and China all abstained.

There are deeper tensions within the BRICS bloc on the issue of the “responsibility to protect”, which urges action by the international community to protect populations at risk from egregious human rights abuses. The African Union was the first international organisation to enshrine the R2P principle into its founding document, the AU Constitutive Act of 2000. South Africa has historically been more prepared to support the concept of R2P, while China and India have been reluctant to accept deviations from the principle of non-intervention. Beijing and New Delhi have particularly objected to R2P’s embrace of external military intervention to protect populations at risk. Russia has offered rhetorical support for R2P, invoking the principle whenever its vital interests are at stake (for example, in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea in 2014). Brazil has proposed a new concept – “responsibility while protecting” (RwP) – that emphasises the need for the accountability of interveners to the UN Security Council and to monitor how Council resolutions are being implemented.

The five BRICS countries were united in their opposition to “mission creep” in Libya in 2011, and to what they regarded as NATO members’ abuse of the authority of the Security Council as well as their misuse of the R2P principle to pursue a “regime change” agenda against Muammar Qaddafi. While condemning the violations of human rights in Syria, the emerging powers of the BRICS bloc have firmly held to the view that there can be no military solution to the conflict in the country. The BRICS countries also opposed the introduction of sanctions on Russia in the aftermath of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine in 2014. In March 2014, China abstained on a draft UN Security Council resolution that urged countries not to recognise the results of the Crimean referendum on union with Russia. New Delhi, Brasília, and Tshwane similarly refrained from

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57 This section is partly based on presentations made by Monica Herz and Kudrat Virk at the CCR policy advisory group seminar “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.
60 This paragraph is drawn from CCR, Post-Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Policy After Two Decades, pp. 42-43.
criticising Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. They abstained on a similar resolution in the UN General Assembly, indicating an ability to forge cohesion in resistance to Western hostility towards one of their own members. Still, it would be incorrect to assume that an obstructionist, reactive, and anti-Western stance is all that can be expected from the BRICS countries in their efforts to redesign institutions of global governance. The July 2014 Fortaleza Declaration acknowledged the role of the UN in seeking to maintain international peace and security, while noting “the necessity to promote, protect and fulfil human rights in a non-selective, non-politicised and constructive manner, and without double standards”. In order to contribute effectively to the settlement of international conflicts, the BRICS bloc should invest greater political and economic resources to make non-interventionist approaches work.

The BRICS bloc can help to refine - even re-define - the debate on R2P through interrogating the principle in greater depth. The five emerging powers must look beyond the immediacy of crises in Syria, Gaza, and Libya, and consider the diversity of state and non-state actors that can help shape policy discussions on the issues raised, building bridges across any North-South divide. Differences in perspectives on sovereignty among the BRICS’ five members, as well as in their individual national security demands, limit the contributions that the BRICS countries can make collectively to norm-building at the intersection of security and human rights issues. Even so, the BRICS bloc shares a sense of caution about the use of force in the context of “humanitarian intervention”. BRICS members can help to disaggregate the ideas contained within the emerging norm of R2P, in particular by drawing attention to a need to differentiate R2P from the concept and practice of the protection of civilians (PoC).

At the 2005 World Summit, South Africa actively encouraged other countries to support the inclusion of R2P in the outcome document. India, on the other hand, only began to support the principle once it became clear that New Delhi was isolated in its opposition. Overall, India has adopted a more cautious approach to R2P, and faced frequent criticism for failing to do more for the protection of human rights. New Delhi’s reluctance to embrace R2P fully stems in large part from its deep discomfort with the interventionist pillar of the R2P framework. An activist international approach to the protection of human rights, especially the use of force, does not fit with India’s cumulative national experience and the dominant overall narrative of its foreign policy. New Delhi’s record of intervention is mixed (for example, its annexation of Goa in 1961). But, in a number of cases in which it has undertaken military action, India has drawn the lesson that force is not always an appropriate tool for achieving its foreign policy objectives. For example, its peacekeeping effort in Sri Lanka in 1987–1989 failed when it became a party to the conflict and more than 1,000 Indian soldiers were killed before the remaining 45,000 Indian peacekeepers were withdrawn from the country.

Brazil has been similarly sceptical about the use of force on the basis of R2P, favouring political solutions to regional and international crises. Historically, Brazilian foreign policy has stressed the inviolability of borders, and placed a strong emphasis on the sanctity of sovereignty. However, over the past two decades, the promotion of human rights and democracy has emerged as a key theme in Brazil’s diplomacy. Under Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva – particularly, during his second term in office (2007–2011) – Brasília also sought greater political influence in global affairs, seeking actively to participate in international forums; to push forward its case for a permanent seat on an expanded United Nations Security Council; and

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62 Sixth BRICS Summit, Fortaleza Declaration, para. 28.
63 This paragraph draws from Monica Herz, “Brazil and R2P: Responsibility while Protecting”, in Weiss and Serrano (eds.), The International Politics of Human Rights, pp. 107-128.
to intensify its relations with other emerging powers. In the debate on R2P, Brazil has stressed the concept of “non-indifference”, while seeking to limit the use of force. In September 2011, Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, first put forward the concept of “responsibility while protecting”, which sought to highlight the harmful consequences of using force without proper authorisation, clear objectives, and accountability to the UN Security Council, and attempted to limit its use. While India and South Africa supported the Brazilian proposal, it was opposed by several countries, including the US and Britain.

Following the controversial intervention in Libya, South Africa faced considerable criticism for failing to anticipate the NATO powers’ abuse of R2P, and subsequently opposed any Western-led move that did not clearly exclude the possibility of armed intervention in Syria’s civil war. In October 2011, South Africa (alongside Brazil and India) abstained on a draft resolution – vetoed by Russia and China – on Syria, based on concern that it might be another prelude to “regime change”. Earlier in August in the same year, the three IBSA countries sent a joint delegation to facilitate a political solution to the Syrian crisis, but with little impact. While South Africa has not retreated from its support for the principle of R2P, the country has sought to address the problems of abuse and selectivity in its implementation. Since 2013, South African president Jacob Zuma has advocated the creation of a temporary rapid response force – the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) – as an interim measure for the protection of civilians on the continent, until the establishment of the 15,000-strong African Standby Force (ASF) envisaged by the AU by 2015. Despite criticisms of R2P – including the view that it is a dangerous breach of sovereign rights – the principle cannot be dismissed entirely, particularly in Africa, where it is enshrined in the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000. Rather, the BRICS should consider engaging more closely with African countries on the challenges of implementation, in particular on the need to guard against the selective use and misuse of the principle in practice.

For more on South Africa’s position on R2P, see Adekeye Adebajo, “Nigeria and South Africa: On the Concept ‘Every African Is His Brother’s Keeper’”, in Weiss and Serrano (eds.), The International Politics of Human Rights, pp. 171-191.

6. The BRICS and the Reform of Institutions of Global Governance

A powerful desire to reform Western-dominated institutions of global governance, and to create a more democratic and equitable world order, lies at the heart of the collective endeavours of the BRICS countries.

At the same time, the grouping’s pursuit of its fundamental objectives should not be perceived as an anti-Western exercise. The five emerging powers also do not necessarily agree on how the architecture of global governance should be reshaped. The bloc has seemed divided on developing solutions to global challenges - in particular, international financial instability and climate change, which were identified as the top two global threats in a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2013. In this respect, BRICS members’ reform efforts, or lack thereof, have generated different perceptions, reflected in a still unresolved debate as to whether these emerging countries are status quo powers, or revisionist actors with a transformative vision for an alternative world order. However, a third and far more critical view regards the BRICS countries as a group of “sub-imperialist” collaborators within the Western-dominated system, and part-and-parcel of a broader global failure to address major political, economic, social, and environmental issues.

International Financial and Trade Institutions

Both the World Bank and the IMF have long been criticised for having undermined the role of governments in developing and emerging countries through their one-size-fits-all structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) from the 1980s onwards, particularly in Africa. Powerful Western actors maintain a strong grip on these bodies, with voting weighted according to each country’s contributions. Since 1946, an American has headed the World Bank in exchange for a European heading the IMF. In 2011, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa openly called for a transparent and competitive selection process to fill the top post at the IMF, following the resignation of France’s Dominique Strauss-Kahn as the Fund’s managing director. Yet, the bloc was unable to unite behind a contender of its own, with China, Russia, and Brazil giving their support to the European candidate, France’s Christine Lagarde (subsequently elected), rather than to Mexico’s Agustín Carstens, governor of his country’s central bank. A year later, in 2012, despite lofty rhetoric, the five emerging powers again failed collectively to challenge Western dominance at the World Bank in the bid for its presidency. Russia openly...
lent its support to the American nominee – the winning candidate - Jim Yong Kim; China and India more discreetly backed him in the closed deliberations. South Africa and Brazil supported Nigeria’s finance minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. However, the BRICS have enjoyed more success at the World Trade Organisation. In 2013, Brazil secured the election of its own ambassador to the WTO, Roberto Azevêdo, as the organisation’s director-general, making him the first person from a BRICS country to head the institution.

The BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank are widely seen as reflecting a desire by the five emerging powers to reduce their dependence on the World Bank and the IMF. Yet, there is concern that the new CRA will amplify, rather than provide a genuine alternative to, the damaging role played by the International Monetary Fund. The $100 billion CRA is too small, in that it allows member countries to borrow only 30 percent of their quota – $3 billion in the case of South Africa at the lower end, and $6.2 billion in the case of China at the higher end – before they must turn to the IMF. In 1985, when South Africa faced its last major debt crisis and was forced to call a halt on repayments, it would have needed a bailout of $13 billion. With South Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio standing at 38 percent in September 2013, the amount now required for a bailout for a similar crisis would be much larger.

Furthermore, the extent to which the BRICS’ planned initiatives go beyond symbolising their frustration with the Bretton Woods status quo is questionable. The New Development Bank’s entire initial paid-in capital of $10 billion is to be contributed in US dollars. China’s purchase of US Treasury Bills (T-Bills) is similarly continuing to help sustain Washington’s dominance of the international financial architecture. Rather, in the absence of reform, as liberalisation has progressed, BRICS economies have remained vulnerable to actions by the dominant Western economies. For example, in 2013, a small increase in US interest rates by the American Federal Reserve led to an outflow of capital from emerging markets, damaging interest rates in the five BRICS countries and exposing the fragility of their economies.

Meanwhile, the opening up of global commodity and capital markets has enabled the economic rise of the BRICS, as well as a modern-day “scramble for Africa”, with the five countries – including South Africa – seen to be engaged in use of large tracts of communal land (without proper consultation with local communities who are often displaced from their land) and resource exploitation on the continent. In real terms, once resource depletion is accounted for, African economies are shrinking, rather than rising. Similarly, the BRICS countries, driven by their domestic demands for energy and fossil fuels, have sometimes aligned with industrialised economies on climate change, and in 2009, brokered a deal that set non-binding commitments on emissions, which – if left unchecked – could lead to a devastating temperature rise in Africa. In this regard, BRICS members have sought, at times, to work within the existing global system – all five countries have benefited from globalisation – while seeking, at other times, to challenge the status quo and pursue a more transformative agenda. In November 2014, China, however, set a target for CO₂ emissions to peak around 2030.

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72 Steil, “The Brics Bank Is a Feeble Strike Against Dollar Hegemony”. 
The United Nations Security Council

The 15-member United Nations Security Council is the most powerful diplomatic body in the international peace and security architecture, but it is also the most unrepresentative and undemocratic of the UN’s principal organs, with both Africa and Latin America lacking permanent representation on the Council. There has been no real progress made towards the reform of the Security Council in five decades, with its five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5) – the United States, China, Russia, Britain, and France – especially reluctant to share their power, in particular the right to veto. The Council’s structure has remained unchanged since 1965, when its membership was expanded from 11 to 15 with the addition of four non-permanent seats. Meanwhile, decision-making within the Council has become the near-exclusive preserve of its five permanent members, with free deliberations rarely occurring, and with most of the body’s meetings, in effect, scripted by the P-5. In 2014, Washington, Paris, and London drafted all the resolutions in 27 out of 40 issues on the Council’s agenda.73 It is worth noting, though, that the P-5 cannot act without the support of the 10 non-permanent members on the Council, the latter of whom – if they acted together – possess a “hidden veto” with the power to compel action by the permanent members.

The issue of UN Security Council reform was crowded out by the events of the “Afro-Arab Spring” in 2011, during which all five BRICS countries were represented around the decision-making table, and a potential opportunity was thus lost.74 There are important tensions among the emerging powers of the BRICS bloc on this vital issue. While China and Russia’s permanent membership and veto power on the Security Council should be central to the influence of the BRICS countries on the body, this elevated status also distances Beijing and Moscow from Tshwane, New Delhi, and Brasília. Although China is rhetorically in favour of “necessary and reasonable reform” of the UN Security Council and greater representation for developing and emerging countries (especially African countries),75 Beijing has not been keen on expansion of the Council’s veto-wielding permanent membership, due largely to a desire to keep Japan off the Council.76 Russia has also not shown much enthusiasm for Council reform. Though Moscow acknowledges the importance of creating a more representative body and emphasises the need for proposals that enjoy maximum support in the 193-member UN General Assembly, it supports leaving intact the present veto-wielding powers of the P-5.77 Furthermore, placing the BRICS in the vanguard could potentially complicate reform efforts, given continuing questions about the extent to which India, Brazil, and South Africa can claim to have overwhelming support for their Security Council candidacies within their own regions.

India and Brazil, along with Germany and Japan, have formed the Group of Four (G-4) in mutual support of their candidacies for permanent membership on the Security Council and to campaign for its reform. South Africa – constrained by the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus in favour of two additional African permanent members

with veto power – is not a member of this group and, along with Nigeria, favours dropping the African insistence on the veto. In this regard, African countries may arguably have become hostage to their own all-or-nothing common position, and should consider revisiting the Ezulwini Consensus. The continent’s efforts are further complicated by the divide between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and the former’s insistence that one of two additional African permanent seats be held by an Arab state. About 60 percent of the Security Council’s deliberations are focused on Africa, while 85 percent of its peacekeepers were deployed on the continent in November 2014. Yet, rotating African membership of varying capacity has inhibited the continent’s ability to engage more robustly on the UN Security Council in African cases.
7. BRICS and IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa)  

A proliferation of inter-state groupings is one of the most striking features of the still evolving contemporary world order. Several of the groupings, such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), a coalition in climate change negotiations, are issue-specific; while others, such as the Group of 20 major economies, cut across the traditional North-South divide in international politics.

The emergence of BRICS, in particular, has also inspired an alphabet soup of acronyms that might identify the next group of economies powering up in the “global South”, such as MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey). It has been suggested that once intra-BRICS cooperation has deepened, the bloc should consider expanding to include new members from among MINT and other emerging economies, which could help increase the influence of BRICS in the international system. In 2001, Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill coined the acronym “BRIC” to describe four countries with potential global economic clout – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – but did not envisage the grouping to constitute a formal bloc. Moreover, for some, the genesis of the BRICS grouping dates further back, to December 1998, when Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, during a visit to India, envisioned the creation of a “strategic triangle”, comprising Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi, to ensure regional peace and security.

Notwithstanding its regular summity, the BRICS bloc is still a relatively new grouping with an expanding, but still evolving, agenda for cooperation. Doubts remain over whether the bloc can develop from a loose, informal alliance pursuing often disparate – even competing – interests, into “a ‘go-to’ institution for setting regional and global agendas”. Bilateral relations within the BRICS grouping are fraught with rivalry. For example, China and India have a disputed shared border, and are competing for influence in the Indian Ocean. In addition, for Beijing and New Delhi, as well as Moscow, ties with Washington continue to retain considerable importance, thus limiting the BRICS bloc’s ability to give more concrete weight to its calls for the reform of American-dominated institutions of global governance. This overall lack of cohesion among the five BRICS countries also makes it difficult to categorise them as being “for” or “against” the existing liberal world order.

The IBSA configuration – comprising India, Brazil, and South Africa – could provide an alternative focus for the three BRICS countries who often stress their common democratic credentials. Although overshadowed by the presence of China in the BRICS bloc, IBSA is an older dialogue forum – created in June 2003 – that provides a framework for cooperation among its three members in a range of sectors, from health and education to defence, as well as on global governance issues at multilateral fora such as the UN. From its inception, IBSA has displayed innovation in its activities at the multilateral and trilateral levels, as well as in the work of its 15 sector-specific

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78 This section is partly based on presentations made by Harithara S Viswanathan and Chris Landsberg at the CCR policy advisory group seminar “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.


working groups, 8 although its six people-to-people fora 8 remain fledgling. The forum’s projects include the IBSA Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund), established in 2004 for the implementation of replicable and scalable projects with the broad aim of poverty reduction and capacity-building in critical sectors such as infrastructure, health, water, agriculture, and rural services. Each IBSA country contributes $1 million to the Fund annually, and increasing this amount could strengthen the facility further. While the BRICS countries are still in the process of defining a common agenda and forging the unity to speak with one voice on key global issues, IBSA is arguably already a more cohesive grouping than BRICS and could potentially offer an easier platform for strengthening cooperation among its members.

However, in recent years, the three IBSA countries have vacillated on their commitment to the forum, in view of the greater attention that the BRICS grouping has commanded. The evolution of the BRICS agenda beyond trade and investment has also increased the overlap with the interests and activities of the older IBSA grouping. This can be seen in the efforts of the five BRICS countries to institutionalise their bloc; craft a sustainable development agenda that includes climate change, food security, and water; and focus on inclusive growth, not to mention the bloc’s decision to establish the New Development Bank. This expansion of BRICS cooperation, at the very least, raises questions about a duplication of effort by the two groupings and increases doubts about IBSA’s ability to retain a unique niche on the global stage, particularly given the latter’s lack of inclusion of China and Russia. Notably, IBSA’s tenth anniversary commemorations – to be held in New Delhi in June 2013 – were postponed. The frequency of the body’s meetings has also been changed from once every 12 months to once every 18 months, leading some observers to wonder whether this could result in the demise of the forum.
Yet, fear of Chinese domination and perceptions that Beijing and Moscow are seeking a greater global role, have renewed interest in IBSA. For China, the BRICS bloc is a tool to achieve its economic objectives, whereas for Russia the bloc is a means to challenge Western political hegemony. Brazil, India, and South Africa, in contrast, follow a predominantly economic agenda within the BRICS. In this respect, the different expectations of the five BRICS countries could weaken their collective endeavour. Another challenge for the BRICS relates to the bloc’s over-dependence on summits at the level of heads of state. This summitry allows easier access to the bloc for private and corporate actors, while often denying the same access to civil society organisations – critical stakeholders that can contribute to debates on the continued evolution of BRICS.

To a significant extent, “BRICS vs. IBSA” is a false debate. BRICS and IBSA have distinct mechanisms and focus areas, and do not exist in opposition to each other. Instead, they are complementary coalitions, with both bodies still under institutional construction. Both BRICS and IBSA can play a critical role in promoting cooperation among their members and in making progress towards the reform of institutions of global governance. While sustained economic growth is important for the membership of both groupings, it is more critical for BRICS, given the latter’s focus on reforming the international economic architecture. The reform of the UN Security Council, meanwhile, is a crucial issue for the IBSA grouping. In order to strengthen IBSA, its three members must identify new initiatives to increase the forum’s profile; develop new mechanisms for cooperation, while increasing efficiency by dismantling its non-performing working groups; and enhance people-to-people interaction through a more liberalised visa regime. The IBSAMAR initiative, which seeks to improve interoperability between the Indian, Brazilian, and South African navies to combat the threat of piracy, should also be strengthened. Above all, the sixth IBSA summit – postponed from June 2013 – should be held as soon as possible, alongside sustained regular summitry among the group’s three members.

However, both BRICS and IBSA are state-centric in nature. Both seek to alter and transform the global order, and all five countries who belong to these two groupings have concrete interests in Africa. African countries should therefore articulate what kind of engagement they seek with these emerging powers in BRICS and IBSA.
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the August 2014 Tshwane policy advisory group seminar:

1. The creation of a BRICS Business Travel Card should be considered to facilitate entry and exit for business travellers within the bloc’s five economies, following the example of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region. New Delhi, Tshwane, and Brasília must also prioritise the finalisation, ratification, and implementation of an envisaged trilateral trade area among India, the South Africa-led Southern African Customs Union, and the Brazil-led Common Southern Market.

2. The BRICS should consider expanding and opening up the bloc’s engagement with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which has so far been the preserve of a few select bodies in the BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS Academic Forum. Civil society can be a source of creative solutions to global challenges that could help the five emerging powers move beyond a narrowly defined trade and finance agenda, and influence Western-dominated debates on development, climate change, and human rights.

3. South Africa, as vice-chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association in 2015–2017 (assuming the chair in 2017–2019), must build on the momentum generated under India’s leadership of the association (2011–2013) to expand and enhance cooperation in IORA’s priority areas. Security cooperation between Tshwane and New Delhi can also be strengthened through an increase in high-level exchanges between the South African and Indian armed forces, while more South African and African troops should participate in courses offered by the New Delhi–based Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK).

4. It is vital that South Africa and Brazil identify areas of trade complementarity in order to reduce their bilateral trade deficit. Brazil, with its highly developed agribusiness sector, can also help South Africa increase value-added exports in its trade profile through collaborative ventures, technology transfers, and knowledge-sharing, particularly in the citrus industry.

5. Greater educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation between South Africa and Russia urgently needs to be fostered for their bilateral economic engagement to reach its potential. In this regard, Moscow should consider re-establishing cultural centres to address the lack of knowledge about Russia in South Africa, while exploring ways to strengthen the impact of its Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa (AFROCOM).

6. Given the weak prospects of achieving comprehensive UN Security Council reform, developing and emerging countries should initially focus their efforts on expanding non-permanent membership of the body, while continuing to argue against permanent membership without veto power. The BRICS should also campaign for an enhanced role for the 193-member UN General Assembly, including on issues currently being dealt with by the Security Council.
7. The BRICS countries must make sure that the bloc’s agenda for the reform of key multilateral institutions – in particular the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, as well as the UN Security Council – is transparent and advances the interests of the “global South”, while complementing existing efforts by other groupings, such as the Group of 77 (G-77), to reshape the Western-dominated global order.

8. The BRICS bloc must tackle the challenge posed by uneven financial flows and support the development of more effective regulatory measures, including exchange controls, to mitigate the impact of international capital volatility on developing and emerging economies, including their own. The BRICS countries should also consider increasing their investments in green and sustainable technologies, while making a more concerted effort to ensure greater reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

9. BRICS-Africa development cooperation – as also highlighted by the BRICS Leaders-Africa Dialogue Forum of 2013 – should include an emphasis on funding models that promote more multi-country projects and augment integration efforts on the continent. In addition, the BRICS New Development Bank, in contrast to the Bretton Woods institutions, must retain its commitment to non-conditionality and non-interference in the policymaking space of borrowing countries.

10. The BRICS countries, notwithstanding the differences in their positions on the principle of R2P, must forge greater cohesion to prevent the abuse of the concept. The five emerging powers should create a coordinating mechanism at the United Nations, both to increase their influence in the UN Security Council and to move beyond crisis management towards agenda-setting on global peace and security issues.
Annex I

Agenda

Friday, 29 August 2014

17:00 – 19:00 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Public Dialogue and Report Launches: “South Africa’s Foreign and Economic Policy After Two Decades”

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

Speakers: Mr Xavier Carim, Deputy Director-General, International Trade and Economic Development, South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Tshwane (Pretoria)

Professor Chris Landsberg, South Africa Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

Day One: Saturday, 30 August 2014

09:00 – 09:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Chair: Ms Felleng Sekha, Managing Partner, IQS Strategic Public Affairs Consulting, Johannesburg

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Mr Fadl Nacerodien, Chief Director, Policy, Research, and Analysis Unit (PRAU), South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Tshwane
09:45 – 11:15 Session I: South Africa, Africa, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)

Chair: Ms Joanmariae Fubbs, Chairperson, Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town

Speaker: Ms Nelia Barnard, Director of BRICS, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Tshwane

Discussant: Dr David Monyae, Section Manager, Policy Analysis, International Relations and Protocol Division, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town

11:15 – 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 – 13:00 Session II: South Africa’s Bilateral Relations: India and China

Chair: Professor Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Lusaka, Zambia

Speakers: Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee, Former High Commissioner of India to South Africa

Mr Yang Yirui, Minister Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of China to South Africa, Tshwane

13:00 – 14:15 Lunch

14:15 – 15:45 Session III: South Africa’s Bilateral Relations: Brazil and Russia

Chair: Dr Funmi Olonisakin, Founding Director, African Leadership Centre (ALC), King’s College London (KCL), England; and Research Associate, Department of Political Science, University of Pretoria, Tshwane

Speakers: Ambassador Pedro Carneiro De Mendonça, Ambassador of Brazil to South Africa, Tshwane

Professor Vladimir Shubin, Principal Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Moscow, Russia

15:45 – 16:00 Coffee Break
16:00 – 17:30  Session IV: The BRICS Finance and Trade Agenda

Chair: Dr Bhekinkosi Moyo, Executive Director, Southern Africa Trust, Midrand, South Africa

Speakers: Ambassador José Alfredo Graça Lima, Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs II, Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia; and Brazil’s Sherpa to the BRICS

Dr Charles Okeahalam, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer, Africa Growth Holdings (AGH) Group; and Former Professor of Financial Economics and Banking, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Day Two: Sunday, 31 August 2014

09:30 – 11:00  Session V: Peace and Security: The BRICS and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speakers: Professor Monica Herz, Associate Professor, Institute for International Relations; and Coordinator, International Policy and Multilateral Agenda, BRICS Policy Centre, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Brazil

Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

11:00 – 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45  Session VI: The BRICS and the Reform of Institutions of Global Governance

Chair: Mr Doctor Mashabane, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations (UN), New York, United States (US)

Speakers: Professor Patrick Bond, Director, Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Durban, South Africa

Ambassador James Jonah, Former United Nations Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs
12:45 – 13:45  Lunch

13:45 – 15:15  Session VII: BRICS and IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa)

Chair: Ambassador José Alfredo Graça Lima, Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs II, Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia; and Brazil’s Sherpa to the BRICS

Speakers: Ambassador Harihara S. Viswanathan, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi; and Head of India’s Delegation to the BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC)

Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research Chairs Initiative Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg

15:15 – 15:45  Coffee Break

15:45 – 16:45  Session VIII: Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
## Annex II

### List of Participants

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2. Professor Said Adejumobi  
   Director, Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa  
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   Second Secretary  
   Embassy of Russia  
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   Second Secretary  
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   Director of BRICS  
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   Chief Executive Officer  
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9. Ambassador Pedro Carneiro De Mendonça  
   Ambassador of Brazil to South Africa  
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    Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs II  
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   Associate Professor, Institute for International Relations; and
   Coordinator, Global South Unit for Mediation, BRICS Policy Centre
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   Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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18. Ambassador James Jonah
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   South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
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   Beijing, China

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   Cape Town, South Africa

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   Midrand, South Africa

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   New Delhi, India

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   Founding Director  
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   King’s College London (KCL)  
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   Delegation of the European Union (EU)  
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   Principal Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies  
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   Moscow, Russia

36. Mr Eric Sogocio  
   First Secretary  
   Embassy of Brazil  
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   Assistant Director of BRICS  
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   Cape Town, South Africa

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   Distinguished Fellow  
   Observer Research Foundation (ORF)  
   New Delhi, India

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   Cape Town, South Africa

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   Cape Town, South Africa
Annex III

List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFROCOM</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa (Russia)</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Brazil, South Africa, India, and China</td>
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<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, and China</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</td>
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<td>BTTC</td>
<td>BRICS Think Tanks Council</td>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>CGETI</td>
<td>Contact Group for Economic and Trade Issues (BRICS)</td>
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<td>CRA</td>
<td>Contingency Reserve Arrangement (BRICS)</td>
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<td>CUNPK</td>
<td>Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (India)</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence (South Africa)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>G-4</td>
<td>Group of Four</td>
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<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of 20</td>
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<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India, Brazil, and South Africa</td>
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<td>ICBC</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Bank of China</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>IORA</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)</td>
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<td>MINT</td>
<td>Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NDB</td>
<td>New Development Bank (BRICS)</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan (South Africa)</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>OSF-SA</td>
<td>Open Society Foundation for South Africa</td>
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<td>P-5</td>
<td>five permanent members of the UN Security Council</td>
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<td>PIDA</td>
<td>Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (AU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>preferential trade agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>responsibility to protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>regional economic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RwP</td>
<td>responsibility while protecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>structural adjustment programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Other Publications in this series
(Available at www.ccr.org.za)

VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S SECURITY
THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA
THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE
The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA’S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA
The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY
AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA
The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY
This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of democratic practice, sustainable development, and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN
This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA
This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE
The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.

VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA
PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY
This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

VOLUME 19
AFRICA’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.

VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN AFRICA
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

VOLUME 21
AFRICA’S EVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE
The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA
The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of ‘prosecution versus amnesty’ for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
This report is based on a seminar, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.
This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity.

This seminar, held from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This policy seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

This meeting, held on 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006), Cairo, Egypt (September 2007), and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition - the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to “reset” the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa's performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements (IIAs), including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014 considered the challenges and potential of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region-building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.
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In August 2014, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, brought together about 30 key policymakers, academics, and civil society actors from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) to reflect critically on the first hosting cycle of six BRICS summits (June 2009–July 2014) and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa’s continuing engagement with the BRICS bloc. The meeting focused on how to strengthen South Africa’s bilateral relations with Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and considered the benefits and challenges of BRICS membership for South Africa, including how to assist Tshwane (Pretoria) to advance a wider African peacebuilding and development agenda within the bloc, as well as how to strengthen the bloc’s impact on global politics, particularly in relation to the reform of key multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the United Nations (UN) Security Council, with the aim of making them more effective, democratic, and representative.