Great Powers in the Changing International Order

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post-World War II optimism that it was possible quickly and permanently to solve problems in poorer parts of the world. This accounting of the origin and evolution of the agency is done with a view to understanding that these events shaped the organisation. To this end, major formative events such as the emergence out of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the ongoing battles with the FAO for legitimacy, and the ongoing efforts to secure core and project funding from various donor sources are described and analysed. In this recounting of the agency’s history, readers may labour through the legal and bureaucratic detail, but, as a counterbalance, the inclusion of key personalities and their influence on the WFP makes for an interesting read. There are, for instance, sections on the impact that executive directors James Ingram and Catherine Bertini had on the agency.

Chapters 5 and 6 assess the WFP within a framework of ‘legitimacy’. Legitimacy is seen as a useful evaluative concept for an agency such as the WFP because it is global in its operations, multilateral in nature and required to satisfy the accountability needs of stakeholders—donor states, recipient states and the final recipients of the food aid itself. Moreover, the WFP’s performance in non-core tasks such as advocacy and fund-raising is also assessable through a legitimacy framework. The author’s assessment against the legitimacy framework provides important lessons that are applicable both to the WFP and to the food aid regime and transnational governance more broadly. The negative impacts of relief food aid on recipient countries and the WFP’s complicity in a broader system which produces global hunger are among the important issues discussed here.

All in all, the book provides a useful and illuminating assessment of the place, role and performance of the WFP in ways that may be of some use to comparable transnational actors. Moreover, the study not only highlights lessons for global governance, but is also an intriguing account of the WFP as an organisation. The impact of personalities, competition for resources and then legitimacy with the FAO, and the diplomacy required to keep its stakeholders happy—this all provides a thoroughly readable narrative background. The book is recommended not only to those interested in the current state of the WFP and international food aid, but also to those with a broader interest in transnational governance and effective international response to challenges of a transnational nature.

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The theme of this book is that the dreams of Western liberal institutionalism have not been fulfilled (11). Correspondingly, the contemporary world is too networked—and armed with nuclear weapons—to be functionally controlled by great power managerialism (12–13). In addition (and for me the most interesting premise—Chapter 7), these dreams are being undermined by a dispersal of power, and the non-Western world is not willing to carry the Western standard into the globalised twenty-first century (by way of the provision of global public goods). Professor Bisley argues that these facts are manifested, most obviously, by the lack of a moral mission for the international system, which should be an international society.

The text builds its approach primarily from the English school of Bull and Wight. In doing so, it challenges a great lump of history from outside of Europe, from the ‘people without history’ (see Eric Wolf’s text of 1982), which less analytically—and less formally—may yet still describe an alternative answer. The substitute answer may be formed by the disjointed struggle for power by Western and non-Western states.
We are presented with an analysis of the past—from the Concert of Europe onwards—that builds an alternative understanding of the present, under the notion that the founders of the United Nations misread history. This, in turn, gives rise to a ‘wholesale rethinking of how international order can be fostered under conditions of globalization’ (184). The book’s proposition is the restructuring of the United Nations Security Council. This would comprise additional representation (145) and, argued as thus, a more functional multilateral institutionalism.

Professorship is evident in the intellectual prowess and cognitive skill that clearly emerge, while the work is lighter than a PhD thesis on references and facts. A few more statistics (as employed on page 153), names and dates would have rendered this a masterpiece for all time rather than one for our time. Professor Bisley is, however, correctly carrying a flag of knowledge into the intellectual arena (the job of full professors), and thus his normative assertions and ‘clearing house’ of mind are apposite.

Lesser scholars may find a place for their concentrations in the slips and slights that often require a doffed hat be granted to intellectual giants. The text argues that there is no clear definition of great power (173), and yet refutes this (159) by providing a useful one. The definition is deployed to argue that there is an absence of new great powers (160), contending that China (and India, as most often joined in the book as if a single rising estate) will fail to accept the role of ‘aristocratic’ managerial great power, and thus not be a great power.

This is a problematic interpretation (or dismissal) of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) legitimate concepts of power, and of its relationship to the sovereign states system and the history of Western intervention into others’ political economies. PRC statespersons may determine that the PRC and the others must simply conclude that the Western ways are redundant (and, arguably, soon to be powerless, in relative productivity terms). Then will they be gone from the systems of old Europe? This point is actually made and yet de-emphasised (148).

The book argues that a consensus about the purpose of international society is required in order to have a stable and functional international society. However, given the significant differences between domestic political structures globally (as acknowledged by Bisley), it may be more likely that powerful states like the PRC use great power on their own terms and in their own ways. Is that not a consequence of great power, that others must define themselves in relation to that great power? The angle taken by the book thus presents as somewhat insular of Western thought.

In addition, Western scholars, realist and mercantilist, may decry the findings. The USA, a historically revolutionary and violent state, may maintain the unipolar moment, for example, by investing in military technology so that drones outnumber peopled vehicles. Scholars from the other end of the diverse spectrum may also disagree. Post-Shock and Awed Iraq has the capacity to climb through the mess of invasion to become the ‘MacArthured Japan’ of the Middle East, and grow the seeds of US exceptionalism into the ever expanding free market. Finally, beyond Western thought, the USA does have the option to join in a new Asian system of rivalrous great-powermanship through confrontation in the littoral of Pacific Asia. Are they ready to leave Europe’s history and Western liberal dreams in the past? Thus, refuting the book’s premise that the globalised world is ungovernable is simply a matter of having other standards, picking other examples of the contemporary state of world affairs and applying an alternative theoretical lens.

This book offers a wealth of interest and knowledge that will enlighten readers and broaden their thinking. An interesting project, it presents a pessimistic view of the present, evidenced by the failure of the international system to deal with the most important issues. These are listed as: climate change, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, regulated agricultural trade, World Bank and financial institutions’ governance, overused Western principles and the structure of the United Nations Security Council (145), among others. These crucial issues substantiate the main argument of the book: ‘that great power approaches to the management of order are unsuited to circumstances of world politics in the twenty-first
century’ (181). We shall see. The states and, more fundamentally, the peoples of the USA and PRC may prove otherwise.

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Reference


The world’s spotlight has focused on the Arab Awakening in the Middle East and the withdrawal or impending withdrawal of US and other international troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet these momentous changes overshadow the next potential conflagration in the Middle East and Central Asian arena—the future of Pakistan. Bruce Reidel reminds us that ‘no country is more important to the future of America’s relationship with the Muslim world’ (vii) and ‘no country is more important in respect to nuclear arms control, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear war’ (viii). Referred to, variously, as the ‘most dangerous [state] in the world’ or ‘the ally from hell’ (Goldberg and Ambinder 2011), Pakistan presents itself as a complex and deeply disturbed nation that is seemingly about to implode internally and spread chaos externally.

Stephen Cohen and his fellow contributors have added to a growing literature on Pakistan (see Lieven 2011; Lodhi 2011; Synnott 2009). Maleeha Lodhi’s edited volume *Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’* (2011) sits as a comparative volume to *The Future of Pakistan*; both seek to analyse Pakistan’s present situation in order to consider the future that Pakistan will take, positing the question: Whither Pakistan? While Lodhi’s volume is wholly made up of Pakistani contributors who share a largely optimistic vision and a policy-recommending objective, Cohen’s volume has an international flavour, with a generally pessimistic outlook and more of a predictive objective.

*The Future of Pakistan* utilises a number of perspectives, setting forth the variables or issues that will influence the future for Pakistan while projecting potential outcomes. It focuses on the medium term—the next 5–7 years (2011–7). In the first section, Stephen Cohen reflects on past predictions on the future of Pakistan. The second section is a compilation of 14 essays presented by both Pakistani and international scholars who participated in a workshop at the Rockefeller Center in Bellagio, Italy in 2010, as well as two specially commissioned essays contributed by Indian scholars. The last section is a final essay on Pakistan’s future by Stephen Cohen.

The collective wisdom is that Pakistan is likely to continue to ‘muddle along’ in a trajectory similar to the present, with a strong military overseeing both internal and external security issues, and functioning as the ‘power behind the throne’, which is represented by a struggling civilian-run government attempting to manage the country. The factors regarding possible future outcomes include both internal and external dynamics and actors: from demographics to education; from a deteriorating economy to the problematic ethnolinguistic divisions of the country; from the growing influence of radical Islamist and militant groups to the place of the military, including its conflicting involvement in supporting and fighting insurrections within and outside Pakistan; from the role and failure of the state to effectively govern the