When does a University cease to exist?

The 40th Hoernle Memorial Lecture

South African Institute of Race Relations
Braamfontein, South Africa

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Introduction

My earliest memory of the South African Institute of Race Relations resides in my days as an undergraduate student traveling by four modes of transport (taxi, train, bus and thumb) to get to and from my (presumed) ethnically designated university in Bellville. I had to pass through Mowbray station, from my home in Retreat, to wait for the bus to the Afrikaans-dominant northern areas. Waiting for the “double-decker” one day, I saw a steady stream of black people enter an old, rickety house on the edge of the bus terminus in this white area. I was curious. I had time on my hands and decided to find out what was going on. I walked over to the house to find a number of white English women behind desks advising African men and women on various matters related to pass laws and domestic rights. I was enormously impressed and encouraged by these rare incidents (in my insular experience) of white-black co-operation against apartheid grievances. But I remember also being disappointed by the didactic and condescending tone of the white English women towards the overly humble, quiet and subdued spirits of the African men and women on the other side. We have come a long way since then; and yet—as Tony Leon’s behaviour so unintentionally reminds us--we have a long way to go. I nevertheless wish to pay tribute to the tremendous contribution of the South African Institute for Race Relations and its leadership—the Hoernle’s being superb examples—in serving as one of the many beacons of conscience and humanity through much of the previous century—before, during and after the long years of apartheid.
Is a Sign Enough?

I recently honoured a longstanding and generous invitation to speak at a rural university in South Africa. Shortly after I drove through the main gates of the institution, I literally tore-up my prepared speech and started to think about the content of a “talk from the heart” to deliver within one hour of arrival. As the crowd assembled, the chairperson for the event bent over and asked me for a title for the speech. He visibly panicked when I responded with: “The Case for Closing Down the University of X.” The chair sat down: “I cannot do this”, he pleaded, “there will be a riot.” “Tough”, I replied, “either you accept my title or I drive back to Pretoria.” The talk went ahead with the unhappy title.

The signage proclaiming the name of this University dangled precariously on one nut over the gates. The grass had not been cut for months if not years. The classrooms were dilapidated—in a worse state than I had seen in many township high schools around the country. The few good professors had left years ago. The management of the university, such as it was, did nothing else than try to keep student outrage down and manage constant threats of staffing action. The university vice chancellor did not enjoy credibility as a scholar or exhibit the basic competences of a manager; someone completely unknown outside this small town. There was constant uncertainty about meeting the payroll demands for each month. The library had not purchased any new books for years, and there was no periodical section to speak of; books were routinely stolen or destroyed. Scholarly publications by academics hardly existed; the few publications appeared in a little-known parochial and local titles posing as academic journals. Almost nothing was published in the competitive, peer-reviewed international journals. There was no intellectual life on this campus; no stirring debates about development; no lively seminars on current issues in economics or politics or education; no steady stream of international scholars to lend face and substance to the academic project; no leading scholarly figures on campus—so crucial to establishing the modern university; no idealism about the future or ideas about the complex problems of development The place, quite frankly, was dead.

As I pondered the pathetic state of this institution, a question came up in my mind that has been troubling me ever since: “when does a university cease to exist?”
My contention this evening is that a university’s existence is not determined by government decree: such as a gazetted declaration of some final date by which a university shuts down; or when a large institution engulfs and extinguishes the identity of a smaller one; or when new signage goes up declaring an imagined community.

As you travel from the University of Venda to what was formerly the Giyani College of Education, there is a bright new sign on the road that says: “University of Venda: Giyani Campus.” When you get to Giyani there is not a soul in sight and the decay of this once outstanding teacher education facility is obvious to the eye. This decaying facility was in fact transferred to the provincial department of education. The sign on the way there insists otherwise.

It would be easy to be fooled by the symbolic functions and routines of university life, and mistake this for a university. Even at this rural site, there were annual graduation ceremonies led by lecturers dressed in full academic regalia with solemn music accompanying the procession. Diplomas and degrees were handed out routinely. Each year there would be a new intake of students, albeit with lower and lower entrance requirements in order to keep the place solvent; the inflated matriculation results—which Umalusi recently conceded was based on examinations that it many key subjects had become “easier”—provided a temporary lifeline to this and other institutions. The financial squeeze had placed the ubiquitous “moratorium” on any new academic appointments. And lecturers would generally show up for classes to teach. At the end of the year there would be decisions about who passes and who fails. And then there is graduation, again.

But despite these routines of ceremony and administration, this so-called university had long ceased to exist. Quite possibly, it might never have existed as a university in the first place—for the origins of most universities in South Africa is as much a function of apartheid engineering as it might have been a response to the social, intellectual and developmental needs of society. I do not wish to rehearse the social origins and identities of South African universities; that has been dealt with elsewhere.¹

Opportunities Lost

What is clear is that in the second term of the ANC-led government, South Africa had a unique opportunity to reverse the damage of apartheid higher education and give to the nation a few excellent universities that could address national and continental challenges of development and, at the same time, secure a position for African higher education among the best institutions in the world.

It is worth recalling two proposals that sought to achieve this repositioning of higher education. The first proposal of the task team of the Council on Higher Education was to create a tiered system that recognized and affirmed the diverse functions of the higher education system. This was a courageous proposal whose brilliance lay in the fact that it was also a recognition of the on-the-ground capacities of various kinds of institutions. The University of Cape Town was, quite simply, not the University of the North West or Natal Technikon or Giyani Teachers College. But this proposal was trumped by a mindless black nationalist politics that preferred to labour under the serious misconception that [a] the standing of institutions is simply a function of the divisiveness and underdevelopment of apartheid and [b] that with corrective action, all institutions (technikons included) could be like Stellenbosch or Wits. The racial pill was just too bitter to swallow: by conceding that there were only five or six serious universities in South Africa, all of them with white origins, would be to concede that black institutions were (again) at the bottom of the pile.

The second and less invasive opportunity was the original proposal for mergers. Under Minister Asmal, one way of regrouping institutions was to take on “the geopolitical imagination of apartheid planners” and replace this with what Terry Barnes memorably called “the geopolitical imagination of post-apartheid planners.” For Asmal this meant not creating research institutions (at the upper end) and bedrock institutions (at the lower end), but to merge weak and strong institutions, on the one hand (such as the incorporation of Vista Campuses into established universities), and to effectively close or scale down largely dysfunctional institutions (such as UNITRA) under new and more modest missions as training facilities. This radical plan for mergers was also reversed after intense and vociferous resistance from prominent black vice-chancellors organized under the banner of ‘disadvantaged institutions’, and making direct representations to the President of South Africa on what Itumeleng Mosala revealingly called
“the Native Question.” Once again, a historic opportunity was lost to at least create some semblance of the university in the higher education landscape.

What was missing in these debates was an honest assessment and open concession of the fact that South Africa did not (at the time) have 21 universities. At best, it had six serious institutions distinguished by its seriousness about the scholarship of discovery and teaching—in Ernest Boyer’s terms—and through its recognition by the international academy.

The restructuring of higher education provided a unique opportunity to make massive investments in these six universities as the leading centers of intellectual and scholarly life on the continent; as the primary producers of high-level skills for a global economy; and as the primary sites for the generation of new knowledge that could address and redress the serious challenges of development—such as poverty, HIV/AIDS and education. To be sure, the problem of racial identities of these institutions, the unequal production of scientists by race and gender, and the still unequal representation of black and women staff in these institutions remain serious concerns. But the way to redress these problems was not to keep “historically white” and “historically black” institutions as separate political entities. The governmental task, in my view, should have been to accelerate the deracialisation of these six institutions not to pretend that they would be white forever.

**Trapped in another’s discourse**

Here the dominant discourses in South African universities are completely out of touch with the demographic changes sweeping the former white universities and the demographic realities of this African country; we deploy language appropriate to the North American context where black persons are and will remain a demographic minority, to create defensive institutions (historically black) that simply do not merit distinction in what is effectively a black-majority country.

The University of Pretoria, for example, now has one of the largest populations of black students on its seven campuses, and the largest by far if the distance education students were added to the total registrations. At the same institution, the majority of students now prefer their instruction in English—not in Afrikaans—with dramatic implications for the future of the Afrikaans language. Among prospective undergraduate students for the 2005
intake, UP now has majority black applications in seven of its nine Faculties (excluding Education and Veterinary Science). And the number of black academic and administrative staff are increasing steadily—so that within a few years it will be very difficult to still describe these institutions in reference to their racial origins.

However, by pretending that all institutions could become the same thing, and that by shifting around smaller pools of governmental funding among 15 new institutions, equally strong universities could be created, is the kind of political miscalculation that now threatens the entire system of higher education in South Africa. One of the strangest and costliest mistakes made in this country was to declare technikons as universities (of technology)—this after decades in which this sub-sector made the case for institutional distinctiveness.

The United States of America is an excellent example of how a differentiated system of higher education meets both community and development needs, on the one hand, and demands for high-level scientific production and scholarship on the other hand. But in this context De Anza Community College does not pretend to be Loyola University which in turn does not pretend to be the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

**Can all universities be re-created equal?**

Central to this pretense that all universities could be re-created equal is the perceived leverage that resides in the new funding formula for higher education. Since all other policy instruments (such as employment equity and qualifications reforms) appear to have had, at best, muted effects on institutions, the one device with most potential for change—whether disruptive or constructive—appears to be financial instruments. The one reality is that there will not be more money from Treasury to capacitate disadvantaged institutions and in the process to redress past inequalities; about this fact there is little disagreement. What government is therefore left with is to find means for redistributing the small pool of available resources from the white, privileged institutions (as the case is put) to the black, disadvantaged institutions. At a political level, I have no problem with redistribution. At a strategic level, this is extremely dangerous, for the following reasons.
First, the historically white institutions remain—for the moment at least—the most viable option for creating world class African universities that can compete with leading universities elsewhere and that could deploy its significant resource base to resolve urgent problems of development. To systematically erode this capacity in favour of a racially motivated policy of redistribution is shortsighted in the extreme and will, for sure, drag all institutions down to the lowest common denominator—a situation in which we all lose. Where, I often muse, will Cabinet Ministers send their children for higher education in 20 years time? At the rate we’re going, the answer is: outside of South Africa.

Second, the historically black institutions have been so devastated by a combination of apartheid underdevelopment and post-apartheid corruption, that any simplistic notion that these entities could be salvaged to become universities is naive at best and pernicious at worst. I have studied, taught and led in historically black universities and the one thing that is clear is that massive injections of sustained, multi-year funding would be necessary to build adequate libraries, recruit and retain world class professors, attract outstanding graduate students, and develop the kind of intellectual life that distinguishes universities from other kinds of institutions—like prisons, hospitals and mental asylums. By which I mean: we hold students against their will when they feel they are entitled as post-apartheid beneficiaries to pass, we entertain all manner of social illnesses under the guise of promoting the academic project, and the madness of managerialism has displaced the power of intellectual community as the distinctive feature of university life.

The levels of recurrent funding required for bringing all universities to the same or similar levels will simply not materialize; in the same way that all the rhetorical excesses about FET colleges will remain just that—since the macroeconomic commitments of government have ruled out any possibility of the transformation of this sector.

The crisis and credibility of institutional leadership

It is timely at this juncture to reflect on the disturbingly poor quality and credibility of higher education leadership after apartheid, and how this has additionally contributed to the demise of the South African university.
In the historically white universities we have a leadership which, with few exceptions, has yet to find ways of *acting credibly* by building a strong and diverse academic and intellectual community of scholars. It is such perceived inaction that exposes these institutions to the political claim of stalling transformation and to the punitive effects of the more coercive instruments of state. Worse, when such institutions begin to bleed their few visible black scholars, their capacity to thrive intellectually and socially begin to suffer. For at least one of the leading and former white universities of the 1970s and 1980s, it may already be too late to revive their fortunes since the combination of poor political and financial management have placed this institution permanently on the defensive and unable to sustain its formidable intellectual prowess of past decades.

In the historically Afrikaans universities there remains a serious contestation about the ownership of these institutions. Make no mistake, the disgraceful behaviour of reactionary academics on and around the University of Stellenbosch campus has very little to do with the late Braam Fischer and his communist affiliations. It has everything to do with what Jakes Gerwel insightfully called *besitterskap* i.e., who owns this public university called Stellenbosch. The reactionaries are careful to frame this debate as Stellenbosch Afrikaners versus the black nationalist state—which then enables them to label the *proposers* of the honorary doctorate as guilt-ridden white Afrikaners sacrificing themselves on the altar of African nationalism. But by framing the debate in such terms, they also betray their own political motives: to draw the laager around Stellenbosch as the one of the last institutions of Afrikaner power in which to publicly assert Afrikaner power and privilege. It is the Stellenbosch Afrikaner who must, at all costs, assert the right to retain Afrikaans as dominant language policy at the university, to determine who enjoys rights of access to this Afrikaner institution, and to decide to whom rites of privilege—such as the honorary doctorate—might be awarded. It is a battle for ethnic-dominant if not ethnic-exclusive ownership of a public institution—nothing more, and nothing less. In the process, the broader mission of the university—as the one place that accommodates and is tolerant of the diversity of ideas—is seriously eroded because of the small-mindedness of a collective band of conservative leadership on and around the campus. It should stand to the credit of the Stellenbosch Vice Chancellor that he recognizes the dangers of retreat for the very survival of the idea of the university.
Having lost power within the state, the public institutions (as opposed to the family) in which conservative Afrikaners now seek to project their power are sport, the school, the church and the university. The only secure institution for purposes of racial balkanization in this context is the church, sport having lost face a while ago to an aggressive and, in my view, misguided politics of quotas. For the next decade, schools and universities will be the primary sites of contestation for the assertion of racial privilege and power in the conservative Afrikaans community—and language will serve as the most potent flag-bearer of such contestation.

What is equally disturbing is the behaviour of the leadership of historically black institutions. It is worth reminding ourselves that some of these institutions were—resources apart—thriving sites of intellectual production during the anti-apartheid years. It is also worth recalling that several HBUs had attractive financial reserves during the 1980s and even the early 1990s. But what happened in the years leading to and since 1994 is a testimony to corrupt and inept leadership—something amply documented in the series of special investigations commissioned by government and easily accessible on the Internet. My contention is that several promising HBUs, which at various historical moments stood on the brink of defying their origins to become strong academic entities with strong developmental agendas, were slowly stripped by their leaders of both their material and intellectual assets to become, well, non-universities.

We need to move beyond the understandable disgust that I hope every citizen of this country felt when the Mail and Guardian last week published the salaries of the heads of our universities. There are other questions that need to be addressed. First, what does this say about the leadership represented in university councils who hire and pay vice chancellors? This has governance implications. Second, how does a vice chancellor earning R2-3 million turn away indigent students who cannot afford to study at his institution? This has ethical implications. Third, what damage does such behaviour do to the argument for greater autonomy of institutions when corrupt behaviour is allowed to fester within the public sector? This has political implications.

The role of leadership in the demise of institutions of course has its correlates in the business world. At a recent national conference on Black Economic Empowerment I made the point that the small but highly visible group of BEE millionaires were the worst possible advertisement for those
of us who seek to tap into the idealism of our youth and reinvigorate them for public service and for work in the helping professions. The notion that success means outrageous financial enrichment of the individual stands in the way of building strong universities founded historically on idealism and service. I spend much of my time these days in schools to convey the message that success is not purpose, and that career should not be confused with calling.

But the future existence of the university is not only threatened by the lack of resources or the credibility of leadership; it also undermined by the growing corporatisation of the university. I made this point at the 2004 TB Davie Memorial Lecture at the University of Cape Town:

You may recognize another university in which the entire place has been transformed into a commercial center, the departments called ‘cost-centres’ and the students called ‘clients’; in which every “management” meeting is consumed with balancing the budget in the light of impending subsidy cuts; in which the response to external intervention is one of compliance and consent; in which the accumulation of larger and larger numbers of accredited publications is pursued with relentless vigour; in which teaching is equated with technology; and the mechanics of research confused with the elegance of scholarship. Just about everyone in such a place is in the business of (ac)counting. Here, too, the university has long ceased to exist.

I continued by arguing that a university ceases to exist when the intellectual project no longer defines its identity, infuses its curriculum, energizes its scholars, and inspires its students. It ceases to exist when state control and interference closes down the space within which academic discourse can flourish without constraint. The university ceases to exist when it imposes on itself narrowing views of the future based on ethnic or linguistic chauvinism, and denies the multiplicity of voices and visions that grant institutions their distinctive character. And the university ceases to exist when it represents nothing other than an empty shell of racial representivity at the cost of academic substance and intellectual imagination.
Capability is not enough

Whether South Africa has any universities (in the ways imagined) in the next 30 years will depend crucially on the decisions made today. The most critical and realistic scenario is to create a two-tier university system consisting of [a] a small group of high-powered research universities targeted to enjoy a substantially increased investment in research infrastructure and postgraduate education; and [b] a larger group of high-quality teaching universities targeted to create opportunities for a broad base of students within a programme that has strong academic development thinking infused into the undergraduate curriculum.

The first group should have an unambiguous mission of creating world-class research and scholarship focused on and deriving from the pressing problems of African development; the second group having an equally unambiguous mission of offering high caliber teaching to large masses of undergraduate students.

The second group should provide clear and well-funded channels of progression for the best students in these teaching universities to proceed to postgraduate studies and research in the first group i.e., the research universities. It could be argued of course that such differentiation is already taking place—this is correct; the problem is, that without policy directive and planning impetus, such “natural differentiation” comes at enormous cost, socially and materially, with inestimable levels of wastage for a third world country.

But new institutional configurations are not enough. What will also be required is a new generation of higher education leaders selected not because of political expediency and racial preference but on the basis of leadership credibility; in the 21st century, capability is simply not enough—as George Bush is busy finding out.

The greatest challenge facing the post-apartheid university is that second-generation South Africans fail to find a compelling moral purpose in higher education beyond crass materialism and individual self-enrichment. It will require credible leadership to sustain the idea of the university through a restored idealism among students and teachers, an idealism that places our common humanity at the center of institutional endeavour in a very dangerous world.
Failing such leadership endeavour, it is not only universities that will cease to exist.