Primitive accumulation, enclavity, rural marginalisation and articulation

By Patrick Bond

Last March in Durban, the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s Centre for Civil Society considered the legacies of two African political economists – Guy Mhone and José Negrão - along with two others whose work was based upon different versions of ‘primitive accumulation’: Rosa Luxemburg and South African sociologist Harold Wolpe. This was our ‘Colloquium on Economy, Society and Nature’, an attempt to reinvigorate long-standing concerns about political economy.

The analytical traditions are diverse but complementary. Together they capture many of the ways that primitive accumulation continues to structure and reproduce systems of inequality. For example, from Luxemburg – as reinterpreted by David Harvey – comes a sense of primitive accumulation as a permanent mode of imperial ‘accumulation by dispossession’ such that,

Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process. Bourgeois liberal theory takes into account only the former aspect: ‘the realm of peaceful competition’, the marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates it strictly from the other aspect: the realm of capital’s blustering violence which is regarded as more or less incidental to foreign policy and quite independent of the economic sphere of capital. In reality, political power is nothing but a vehicle for the economic process. The conditions for the reproduction of capital provide the organic link between these two aspects of the accumulation of capital. The historical career of capitalism can only be appreciated by taking them together.

‘Sweating blood and filth with every pore from head to toe’ characterizes not only the birth of capital but also its progress in the world at every step,
arid thus capitalism prepares its own downfall under ever more violent contortions and convulsions.¹

As an example of the wide-ranging Colloquium deliberations, Gillian Hart’s essay in this issue takes concern about articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist spheres of economy and society onto the terrains of politics, race and gender, in a conversation with Wolpe and Stuart Hall and through them with Althusser and Gramsci. Practical implications of the critique of primitive accumulation – of its ‘commodification’ of the social spheres like water and education - are related by Prishani Naidoo and Salim Vally. Other papers from the Colloquium offer a strong sense of revived Southern African and international political-economic reasoning that stretched from economic to social to environmental considerations.²

Consideration of how capitalism’s crises of sustainability and volatility drive the system towards superexploitative relations quickly leads to debates about resistance. Colloquium participants pondered how struggles against exploitation in production and reproduction, racism, sexism and ecological destruction contest the market itself, under circumstances of permanent primitive accumulation. Southern Africa is a central site for this discussion, since market forces have systematically ‘looted’ other modes of production, society (especially

². This was thanks to contributions from well-known progressive scholars Elmar Altvater, Dennis Brutus, Nicola Bullard, Massimo De Angelis, Ashwin Desai, Ulrich Duchrow, Bill Freund, Jeff Guy, David Hemson, Arndt Hopfmann, Joel Kovel, Martin Legassick, Margaret Legum, David Moore, Judica Maketha, Charles Meth, Vishnu Padayachee, Michael Perelman, Devan Pillay, Greg Ruiters, Lloyd Sachikonye, Ari Sitas and Ann-Marie Wolpe, as well as newer voices including Richard Ballard, Sthembiso Bhengu, Mark Butler, Horman Chitonge, Rehana Dada, Omano Edigheji, Isobel Frye, Lenny Gentle, Nina Hunter, Muna Lakhani, Thabo Madihlaba, David Masondo, Virginia Magwaza-Setshedi, Simon Mapadimeng, Ntawla Mwilima, Trevor Ngwane, Renato Palmi, Bobby Peek, Karen Read, Caroline Skinner, Riaz Tayob, Imraan Valodia, Ahmed Veriava, David Whitehouse, Horacio Zandamela and S’bu Zikode. From Maketha, from Guy Mhone’s widow Yvonne and brother Pat, and from former Wits P&DM student Tawanda Mutasah came many reminiscences, such as the latter’s remark that ‘every lecture Guy gave us invariably produced a standing ovation’. From Negrão’s widow Sabina Asselle and Mutasah we learned much more about the Mozambican economist’s extraordinary contributions to rural analysis and peasant organising. And in tribute to Brutus and his new book Poetry and Protest, fiery verses were provided by Vonani wa ka Bila, Mphutlane Bofelo and Pinky Magwaza.

Some of the other Colloquium contributions are being published in a Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung/CCS volume, The Accumulation of Capital in Southern Africa: Rosa Luxemburg’s Contemporary Relevance, and other publications from the conference are in press. We had sponsorship from several donor agencies, including the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust, the National Research Foundation of SA and Norwegian Research Council, the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung and the SA-Netherlands Programme for Research Alternatives in Development. The papers are available at http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs
women’s unpaid labour, via racist colonialism) and the natural environment. The South African government has recently taken to explaining that this legacy as based upon a divison of ‘first and second economies’, and Thabo Mbeki claims a ‘developmental state’ is being built to fix matters. Naturally many of the contributions criticised both the analysis and practice of neoliberal states in the region.

Consider excerpts from Adebayo Olukoshi’s keynote contribution,\(^3\) which surveys Mhone’s work amongst other major theorists of the ‘enclave economy’ in post-colonial Africa:

First of all, an enclave sector was finally triggered by foreign capital, whether it be merchant, industrial, service or financial. Often it was a conglomerate combining all. So you had Unilever and others which dabbled in everything from commodity trading to the provision of military financial services and the establishment of import substitution industries in the context of post-independence tariff policies.

Secondly, the enclave sector displayed a high level of capital intensity which was ironic in the context of massive labour surplus, and which basically sucked in the most skilled strata of the labour force, whether it was a racialised labour market or not.

Thirdly, the enclave sector was structured to facilitate large-scale production, and key players in the sector also exercised a host of monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages. Guy Mhone’s contribution often stressed not just the use of market mechanisms to establish control, but also the use of extra-economic means, including political intervention and coercion, in order to secure advantages in the market to exercise monopoly or to exercise oligopolistic advantages. And of course, needless to say, transnational corporations had a privileged role in the enclave economy.

Fourthly, as a terrain dominated by foreign capital, the enclave sector was also distinct by being the arena of the expatriates, and all kinds of political economy associated with the fact that the enclave was the upper arena for an expatriate investing or managerial elite. In the context of Southern Africa, the arena was distinctly racial capitalist. In almost all cases, the role

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of local entrepreneurs or indigenous economic actors were either absent completely or were subordinate to the foreign investor.

Fifthly, the enclave sector was the central factor in the external orientation of the African economies, of what many political economists of the period referred to as the ‘extroverted nature’ of the African economies. And that extroversion in turn meant that the enclave played a central role in this vulnerability of African economies in the 1960s and 1970s. One of the most interesting approaches undertaken by Mhone, connecting his 1982 study of the Zambian copper industry to the most recent work he did on Botswana and Namibia as vector economies, essentially characterized this as a Dutch Disease syndrome, repeatedly precisely because of the enclave, extroverted nature of the economies. Because of export orientation, the core developmental project was not driven by an internal logic, but by external logic which meant that attention was not paid to the development of the home market, to create effective demand, but rather to the capture of opportunities in the external markets. But these were characterized by many degrees of instability, ranging from cyclical crises such as in Zambia during the collapse of the copper economy, to the kinds of crises that the apartheid economy experienced on account of the enclave nature of the accumulation process.

The sixth characteristic is that the state itself assumed the key role in the development of the enclave sector. There has been no case of an enclave economy, anywhere on the continent, in which the state has not been the foremost guarantor of enclavity. The profitability of the enclave sector is assured through security, tax holidays and the government’s liberal grants to foreign investors active in the enclave sector through tariff walls erected to give them protection against external competition as import substitution. And in general, the policy orientation and incentives created were decisively in favour of the enclave sector, in contradiction to policy in the informal sector and what Mhone was talking about as the ‘communal sector,’ particularly in South Africa.

The seventh characteristic is the strong linkage between the enclave and the international market, through the web of transactions established during the structural period of imperialism. Transactions between the enclave and the rest of the world were structured as that of the periphery to the centre, with very few backward connections to the rest of the economy. So technological intensity was not refracted, in an organic manner, with what was going on in the informal economy.
Finally, the enclave functioned as a hierarchy, but not a hierarchy in the sense that it was completely self-contained, as it were, but because it responded primarily to an external logic. And I think this difference is important because if you go back again to the debates of dualism and to whether African economies were structured into self-contained elements, it is important to note that for many radical political economists, for Guy Mhone himself, the enclave was an enclave, primarily to the extent to which it was structured to respond to an external logic and not a domestic logic as such.

In some of my own collegial debates with Mhone (over six years of teaching at the Wits Graduate School of Public and Development Management), these features invariably generated comparisons of enclavity as an ‘outcome’ of capital on the African semi-periphery and periphery with uneven development as a ‘process’. As we combined these insights, e.g. in a comparative study of Botswana and Zimbabwe, I came to realise how Mhone’s approach forced open the doors to new intellectual problems of a relatively unique sort.4

As interpreted by Olukoshi, these problems related to contradictions during accumulation crisis which in turn affected the character of subsequent industrialisation: ‘It was difficult to capture the moments when qualitative shifts were possible within the enclave itself’ especially under circumstances Mhone regularly pointed out, when ‘in South Africa and Zimbabwe and to some extent Namibia and Botswana [there was] dysfunctionality within the enclave itself.’ This dysfunctionality proved an important basis for semi-peripheral industrialization in other parts of Africa, according to Olukoshi, such as Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and to some extent, Nigeria. Yet such truncated accumulation requires from analysts far greater attention to ‘the economic nationalism associated with the settler population [which] meant the process of accumulation was not easily captured in analysis, in spite of very interesting debates brought to many of us outside of South Africa by the Review of African Political Economy.’

Indeed it was partly because of a 1970s Poulantzian fascination with, as Olukoshi reminds, ‘understanding which fraction of capital had an upper hand at what point in time, without connecting this simultaneously to either the national question or to issues of race’, that by the 1990s radical political economy began to lose many of its South African adherents. Likewise, he continues,

Very little attention was paid to the important role of the work of women and the modes in which the relationship between men and women particularly in the labour reserves was central to the sustenance of the enclave economy. It was left to our feminist colleagues, people in gender studies in the 80s and 90s, particularly in the emergence of studies on the economy of care and other aspects of our understanding of livelihoods on the continent, to draw attention to the definite silence in the debates around enclavity on the issue of gender.

Olukoshi concluded by reminding of the need to incorporate agency of both labour and smallholder rural populations who resisted enclavity, and to transcend the classic studies within a defined national territorial boundary: ‘At best what we would get was the connection between the local, national territorial and global. But at the intermediate scale, the impact of enclavity in Southern Africa was relatively underdeveloped in the literature, and this is one area in which Guy Mhone’s contribution was thought to be quite outstanding.’

Pointing to Mhone’s last great work, a soon to be published study for CODESRIA ‘in our quest for an alternative framework for African development beyond structural adjustment’, Olukoshi reports that

He, perhaps more than any other person, contributed substantially to rescue the notion of enclavity from its treatment as simply a geographical matter. In many respects, even in the writings of some of the most radical political economists there always was a tension in the treatment of the enclave as simply a spatial expression, an island, which, when you read the writings closely, was not an island in the sense of being self-contained. It was an externally-oriented island, not connected therefore to local social and economic dynamics in ways that would produce what Mhone called ‘virtuous cycle’ in his writings. The enclave’s island character tended to weaken the foundations of accumulation and to exacerbate vulnerability to external shocks.

There are formidable policy challenges arising from Olukoshi’s reading of Mhone, such as regional labour migration:

In the post-colonial era, enclavity has also played itself out as a result of anomalies and contradictions in ways that have fueled xenophobia and ethnicity. Consider the post-apartheid immigration policy, which attempts to maintain rigid boundaries in the context that was preceded by the sucking of labour from other parts of Southern Africa without regard to boundary and without regard to the kinds of rules that were supposed to be concerned about loss of jobs to immigrants populations, particularly in
South Africa. This policy flows out of the unemployment-underemployment nexus that characterizes primary discrimination, in Mhone’s analysis of the centrality of race to enclavity in Southern Africa. The notion of primary discrimination is basically the discrimination built into the political economy of the enclave in a way that permanently dampens wages for the working class. It is one which is shared across the board in all the enclave economies.

For Mhone, the enclave was a rich metaphor that told us a coherent story of the linkages – and lack thereof – between capitalism and non-capitalist terrains of life via distorted labour markets, racial discrimination, and the ‘double jeopardy’ that – in Olukoshi’s words – meant the region’s accumulation was shaped by ‘being former colonies of Britain or Portugal’ firstly, and secondly,

By being subordinated to South Africa, to the logic of South African capital within Southern Africa. So it was domination at the global level, but also at what one may call the subimperial level, which played itself out almost in a zero-sum logic in which the development of accumulation and of infrastructure in South Africa was at the expense of the rest of the countries of Southern Africa.

The policy analysis Mhone has left critics of neoliberalism is exceptionally rich, because structural adjustment ‘further re-enforced enclavity’ leaving Africa deindustrialized and facing ‘the massive expansion of the boundaries of the informal’, remarked Olukoshi: ‘It is ironic that people like Hernando de Soto are now profiting from this condition, while seeking to introduce private titling in the informal political economy.’

But for the adverse balance of forces, it would have been Mhone (not simplistic market theorists like DeSoto and Michael Porter) who could have held genuine influence in South and Southern African policy over the past quarter century. Mhone’s books included The Political Economy of a Dual Labour Market in Africa (1982); Malawi at the Crossroads (edited, 1992); The Case for Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe (coauthored, 1992); and The Informal Sector in Southern Africa (1997). He published dozens of articles and chapters in major journals and academic books, on structural adjustment, labour markets, agriculture, industrialisation, the informal sector, women workers, HIV/AIDS, and other facets of socio-economic policy. He worked in and wrote about every country in the region.

Throughout, Mhone’s gentle temperament, quiet dignity, extensive experience, courage and powerful intellectual contributions - especially his theory of Africa’s dysfunctional ‘enclave’ economies - inspired colleagues and students. He explored the limits of neo-classical economics applied to African conditions and
in the process questioned dogmas associated with labour and capital market theory.

Mhone’s last major address to his professional colleagues was as a concluding plenary speaker at a December 2004 Addis Ababa conference of the Ethiopian Economics Association, the Dakar-based Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, and the New Delhi-based International Development Economics Associates. With characteristic humility and patience, he carefully balanced social-justice instincts and rigorous economic analysis, fusing conference themes on rural development with his own long-standing inquiries into linkages between workers and peasants; capitalism and non-capitalist spheres; the capital-intensive sectors and the mass of underutilised labour; and inputs and outputs. In the process, Mhone revived the best of the 1950s-era development economics subdiscipline, and merged into it highly sophisticated critiques of mainstream economic theory established during the 1960s-70s, and policy lessons of neoliberal failures from the 1980s-90s. His contributions will be valued for generations to come.

As Olukoshi concluded, ‘Perhaps a theoretical dialogue between the cumulative works of Guy Mhone with some of the contributions of people like Samir Amin, the earlier Samir Amin, in particular the Africa of labour reserves and small holder, and of the plantation economies might be a useful theoretical undertaking for an ambitious post-graduate student.’ Amin’s global-justice work has been so stimulating to the Centre for Civil Society – including his July 2006 debate with radical youth over the ‘Bamako Appeal’ he helped to initiate a few months earlier at the World Social Forum in Mali – that it deserves full treatment, in a subsequent RoAPE Briefing.

But indeed it is the cause of the great rural analyst José Negrão that inspires just as much inspiration in struggles for social justice. As noted below by Sabina Asselle and Joe Hanlon, Negrão was no armchair academic, he was responsible for what might be considered unprecedented post-independence praxis, by helping develop a formidable peasant land rights campaign. In his major study of ‘How to induce development in Africa? The case of Mozambique’, Negrão was concerned with four major challenges to conventional dualistic wisdom:

(i) as rural - urban migratory flows exceeded the supply of jobs the subsistence economy became less and less able to perform its social

reproduction function, and the demand for modern sector output tended to fall;

(ii) despite a rising per capita GDP, as wealth was concentrated in an insignificant fringe of society in real terms this meant declining annual per capita income;

(iii) the assumption that there was surplus time that could be applied in mechanised farming did not materialise, because the agricultural calendar and gender relations within the family production unit meant that periods of so-called free time did not coincide with periods of peak agricultural activity;

(iv) women were increasingly marginalised and relegated to maintaining the subsistence economy, while men sought employment in the modern sector in towns.

The Mozambican case was tragic insofar as the post-independence reaction to market failure, rural protectionism, was not carried out in the late 1970s as promised: ‘Despite the rhetoric about cooperativism, the government support it received was minimal compared to that given to the state sector. The terms of trade between the urban industrial product and the rural agricultural product were clearly unfavourable to the latter.’ This mirrored at the local level some of the problems with import-substitution industrialisation that were evident in North-South relations, according to Negrão:

Contrary to predictions, the gap between the poor and the rich got wider, the middle class was eliminated and there was a flight of capital. The various limitations identified include:

(i) import controls tended to inflate costs;

(ii) protectionism only benefited some and was rarely translated into local investments;

(iii) protection for industry tended to lower the purchase price of goods produced by rural families; and

(iv) the prices of the protected agro-industrial products of countries in the South were unable to compete with the subsidised prices of conventional crops controlled by the North.

But trying to cure these diseases – intrinsic to semi-peripheral enclave economies - with neoliberal medicine would only kill the patient, Negrão and others in his group Cruzeiro do Sul found. With financial liberalisation a major strategy by post-Marxist Frelimo, ‘the profits from capital flows from the traditional to the modern sector are channelled to offshore financial markets and secondly, derived from the first, the tendency for interest rates to rise produces a fall in effective demand and thus in output.’ For Negrão, true to economic training, the core strategic problems stemmed from limitations of bourgeois theory:
contrary to the theoretical assumption, in the real world markets are
imperfect, incipient or pure and simply do not exist;
the ‘invisible hand of the market’ itself causes externalities, particularly
for women (due to the opportunity cost of their work time) and the
environment (due to diseconomies of scale);
there is a tendency for savings to be transformed into market capital
and internationalised, rather than into productive investment within
the country; and
rural families do not have access to sufficient savings to enable them
to choose options based on the economic rationality of market
signals.

Negrão thus sought a way out of the empiricist box, in which neoclassical
thinking imposes ‘theoretical limitations with regard to strategy’, ranging from
markets to political governance:

The epistemological rupture in the production of knowledge on
development has created a theoretical vacuum that has led international
agencies, donors and governments to an excessive empiricism in their
activities. The manifestations of this empiricism include:
(i) the cost of money in the country is systematically ignored on the
unverifiable assumption that the market will take care of it;
(ii) the presumptuous application of logical frameworks, problem trees
and participatory diagnoses takes precedence over absolutist
positivism – as only deduction is considered valid the role of
induction and theory are disregarded and results are measured by
output rather than by prevailing dynamics;
(iii) the insistence that in order to reduce poverty rural units must
increase supply because it is assumed that demand is perfectly
elastic;
(iv) instead of being considered flexible mechanisms open to change,
institutions are equated with the legal framework approved by
national parliaments, where a sector approach focusing almost
exclusively on ministries demonstrates an ostrich-like naivety;
(v) the western model of representative democracy is imposed as being
qualitatively superior, without taking into account endogenous
practices of participatory democracy that exist to some extent
throughout the country.

Drawing from two decades of research, Negrão came to question four common
features of orthodox thinking: the end of the peasantry in Africa due to urbanisation
is infeasible given limitations on job creation; the technical ignorance of rural
families ‘does not fit the facts’ given ‘local experience and understanding that should not only be esteemed but should also be stimulated in order to enrich the individual and social formation of knowledge’; the lack of endogenous organisational capacity is false given ‘time-honoured mechanisms and forms of organisation in rural societies that should be put to good use’; as is the assumption about the lack of market information.

As a result, for Negrão, the challenge of reversing rural marginalisation required a bottom-up challenge to power, but one drawing from chaos theory and entailing acute sensitivity to the circumstances of rural producers. He called for two fundamental correctives:

The first is the adoption of a holistic approach where the set of economic (productivity and growth), environmental (eco-systems and bio-diversity) and social (identities, power, access etc.) aspects are more than just the summation of the sectoral components of the national accounts. The second is the need to understand the historical roots of African rurality, where decision-making processes governing the allocation of labour, land and capital involve economic units where production, consumption and distribution are inseparable functions, and thus cannot be contemplated separately for analytical purposes.

To move in this direction would necessarily entail a break from orthodox political practice:

The limitations of representative democracy on the ground are evident - the capital is too far away, power elites reproduce themselves and the rhetoric of party politics frequently becomes a fixture in the futile discourse of local civil servants. Studies have shown that social and political stability requires much more than just delegating power through a vote; it requires effective participation in decision-making processes, from the family up to the national level – it requires the exercise of participatory democracy.

Hence, ‘The fewer obstacles to the delegation of power created by public institutions, the faster fundamental rights are materialised and the higher the national savings.’ But this was by no means either a conservative libertarian or anarcho-syndicalist position, for Negrão insisted on a linkage of local and national strategies that also, like Mhone, revived sophisticated post-Keynesian insights.

His policy prescriptions would be relatively simple to implement by a genuinely developmentalist state, were such to arise: ‘making available cheap money to the national business sector with the aim of increasing demand in
the family sector through agro-industry’, and in the process linking natural resources of the family sector with the ‘technology, management know-how and market access’ of capital; ensuring ‘basic education, better quality potable water and general sanitation’ as central prerequisites to peasant well-being and productive capacity and likewise ‘reducing relative distances to services, markets and resources by building infrastructure, providing low-cost transport and gradually replacing wood fuel by electricity’; and ‘rebuilding the institutional fabric based on principles of participation in decision-making processes at all levels, gender balanced relations and the inclusion of endogenous and crosscutting institutions in governance.’

As was evident in the peasant movement that Negrão himself helped to construct, an agenda with these sorts of features will continue to be pursued by progressives in Mozambican civil society, and indeed these are some of the core strategies that are to be found more generally in African economic justice advocacy. Whether they can be generalised will depend upon the success of vehicles like the African Social Forum and the myriad economic justice networks springing up as structural adjustment ideology wanes.

The broader strategy of attacking neoliberal capitalism in Africa will require these kinds of approaches to rural marginalisation simultaneous with concern about macroeconomic enclavity. It is here that we turn, finally, to Wolpe’s insights into the ‘articulation of modes of production’. His work was based upon demystifying the construction of South Africa’s 20th century system of social and economic control (‘apartheid’ after 1948 but essentially the same migrancy-based approach to ‘cheap labour power’ beforehand). Although there have been fruitful debates about Wolpe’s chronology and methodology, there can be no question that the capitalist mode of production relied upon earlier modes of production for an additional ‘superexploitative’ subsidy. This happened via a reduction in the cost of labour power’s ‘reproduction’: i.e., workers came to the labour market very inexpensively because of the multiple oppressions involved across the society. Colonial-era arrangements for compulsory work included slavery and other forms of forced labour, taxes and fees, indebtedness, and wholesale expropriation of land. One of the most advanced of these systems was South Africa’s apartheid, where superexploitation was based upon simultaneous class/race/gender/ecological power, and led to an initial labour inflow from Bantustan reserve areas to the cities, mines and plantations where workers earned a pittance – certainly not enough to support the reproduction of an urban family.

This was Wolpe’s seminal insight from a 1972 *Economy and Society* article:

> The supply of African migrant labour-power, at a wage below its cost of reproduction, is a function of the existence of the pre-capitalist mode. The
dominant capitalist mode of production tends to dissolve the pre-capitalist mode thus threatening the conditions of reproduction of cheap migrant labour-power and thereby generating intense conflict against the system of Segregation.⁶

Luxemburg had much the same in mind, after reading voluminous literature on South African relations of production, in arguing that ‘Capital cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist organisations, nor … can it tolerate their continued existence side by side with itself. Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of non-capitalist organisations makes accumulation of capital possible.’⁷

Although this understanding of an articulation of capitalism and non-capitalist relations is essential to correcting teleological Marxist (especially Warrenite) understandings of Southern African political economy, Ari Sitas placed Wolpe’s contribution in context:

We must remember that the dominant idea in South Africa at that historical moment was the liberal idea which argued that the economy was in essence ‘colour-blind’ and there was, through Apartheid, an imposition on it by forms of racial domination that were irrational. The separation between the forms of domination and the economy allowed for only one conclusion: the economy, left to itself, would set everyone free and more or less equal.⁸

Since formal apartheid has ended, and since socio-economic conditions have deteriorated for the majority in the post-apartheid era, the fallacy of the liberal promise is exposed in reality. And one key reason is that while the race of the rulers has changed, the basic structure has continued relatively undisturbed. We thus need to pay the kind of attention to articulation that Wolpe insisted upon, as Sitas notes, especially ‘the link between the reserves, the homesteads, their social welfare provided by women working the land in pre-capitalist ways and what was happening in the city through the migrant labour system… [and] if we stretched it further, issues of cultural pluralism, of ethnicity and of “homeland independence” could be read as so many attempts to buttress the sustainable and sustaining exploitation of black people’. This attention to articulation provides us

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the kind of research agenda that Wolpe – who died in 1995 – might well have been underway with now, according to Sitas:

First, he would have followed up on his work on the state, a project he did not complete, asking the same question: what is the degree of space within the state for a transformation project? Secondly, he would have been still concerned about the customary areas and how the urban and the rural get articulated in post-Apartheid South Africa. The third, he would have had to think about the democratic content of policy in a class society.

Yet, even in his absence, we are goaded to think how the elements of perceived reality interconnect. What steers, who steers and how? The world after all is an unequal, interconnected, patterned and evolving sociality? Do we have anything substantive to say about it or is it enough to enumerate social issues and crises? Wolpe would have thought the former; we have become experts in avoiding.

With strong foundations provided by Luxemburg, Mhone, Negrão and Wolpe covering the global, the regional, the rural and the urban-rural linkages, there is no excuse for neglect of primitive accumulation, enclaves, rural marginalisation and articulation in our ongoing work. And as each scholar-activist would have enthusiastically agreed, there is an enormous amount to be understood from praxis, from tracking the left project in civil society during this era of state/party drought, a time when neoliberal encroachments in all these areas quicken and deepen, and are also sometimes repelled.
Personal Reflections on Guy Mhone

Thandika Mkandawire

Guy Mhone’s death – on March 1, 2005, in a Pretoria hospital after an extended illness - is a great loss. It is difficult for me to talk about Guy without getting personal. Our lives were so intertwined that we often joked about how often we found ourselves in the same places. ‘Tawonanaso’ - ‘Here we meet again’ - was what we often said when we met. I also recount the story in a personalised way to acknowledge my great intellectual indebtedness to Guy, with whom I have maintained the longest intellectual conversation.

Guy’s early education was at Gloag Ranch Mission in Zimbabwe and Livingstonia Secondary School and Junior College in Malawi. He excelled, winning both the national student essay competition and a scholarship to the Ivy League’s Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, USA. His masters and doctoral degrees in economics were awarded by Syracuse University in New York. While completing his thesis on ‘The Legacy of the Dual Labour Market in the Copper Industry in Zambia’ (1977), he also served as associate professor at State University of New York. He later lectured at the New School for Social Research in New York City, Howard University in Washington DC, and the University of Zimbabwe, before coming to Wits Graduate School of Public and Development Management as a full professor in 1998. He was also director of the school during the early 2000s.

Guy and I were brought up in the same town, Luanshya, on the Copperbelt of Zambia, and we lived in the same ‘sections’ of the mining township. We were also relatives. Guy’s father was a great administrator and award-winning gardener. One consequence of Guy’s father being a gardener was that Guy and I were once sent out to sell vegetables in the then exclusively white residential area. It was an eye-opening experience. As children living in the ‘locations’, we were shielded by family and neighbourhood from the ravages of the racial order. This walk through the white area just across the river confronted us not only with unimaginable opulence, but also with the insults of children our age who happened to be white and the boundless curiosity of other white kids who wanted to reach out to us but were prevented by the ‘colour-bar’ from doing so. This must have left a mark on our understanding of the world. I believe this was probably a significant source of Guy’s abiding interest in ‘dualism’ and racial injustice.

Like all Nyasa migrant workers, Guy’s parents were deeply concerned with giving their children the best possible education. While we others went to the local mining school, Guy was sent by his father to a boarding school in the then
Southern Rhodesia where he did his primary school. My own father, also unhappy about the mining school education, decided to send his children to Malawi for our primary education. I went to Mzimba Primary School and then to Zomba Catholic Secondary School. During one of my school vacations, I was grilled by Guy’s father on education in Nyasaland. I believe he was also interested in finding out what good it had done to me. I believe I gave a sufficiently good impression of education in Nyasaland that he, too, decided to send Guy to Malawi for education. Guy went to Livingstonia. Guy and I met again when he came to visit me in Blantyre, where I was at Malawi News. Guy then came to the United States, where I had gone in 1962. He frequently came to visit me at Ohio State University, in Columbus. We spent hours discussing the future of Africa-from literature to politics to music, especially jazz and South African music.

In 1965, we were both made persona non grata in our own country. I was in Latin America when this news reached me, and I eventually ended up in Sweden as a political refugee. We continued our intense conversation through incredibly long letters on a whole range of subjects. For a while the subject was literature, with me taking a more ‘social realist’ perspective and Guy a more existentialist view. Guy wrote great poetry and it was only his modesty that let me continue pontificating on the arts and literature. His poetry was engaged. When Guy was in Belize he sent me a poem that so poignantly captured underdevelopment that its imagery is permanently etched in my mind. He described a situation of such extreme poverty that dogs were so starved, they had to lean against a tree to support their barking.

Through our correspondence, we came to the conclusion that we did not have to spend our exile years out of Africa waiting for Malawi’s liberation. In 1978 I moved to Senegal. We were to meet again when I visited him in Oneanta, New York, where he was teaching. We spent hours together comparing notes, engaging in some of the most rewarding discussions I have ever had with anyone. Once again the subject matter of our late discussions ranged wide. By this time Guy had become an accomplished saxophonist, deeply influenced by John Coltrane and Ornette Coleman. Something became clear to me: Guy was definitely not happy working outside Africa. He had also decided to move back to Africa. And although he was professionally doing well in the United States, he longed to return to the continent.

In 1982, I moved from Senegal to Zimbabwe on secondment to the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. To my absolute delight I learned that Guy was coming to join the University of Zimbabwe. During the two years together in Harare we were closely associated and spent huge amounts of time together. This was as close to home as we could get. This was also at the time when
Kamuzu Banda’s security services roamed freely in the region, assassinating Banda’s enemies.

One thing that was striking to many who knew Guy was his devotion to his teaching. I first noticed this during one of his lectures at the New School in New York. I was to be privileged later to observe him in action while teaching in the same department of economics at the University of Zimbabwe. He was respected by both his colleagues and students, and across the racial divide. It is this devotion to teaching and to students that explains his anger at the fact that so little self-examination had taken place within the white university establishment in South Africa, and that so little was being done to facilitate the lives of black faculty and students in South African institutions of higher learning.

In his scholarship, Guy was convinced that the struggles against poverty and injustice were served best by rigorous analysis and disciplined work. He disliked name-calling and uninformed polemics.

Guy’s major intellectual concern was the problem of poverty and inequality. He was most particularly interested in the ‘dualistic’ manifestation of poverty in the Southern African region. For Guy, capitalism in Southern Africa emerged as ‘racial capitalism’, which was superimposed over pre-capitalist social relations. These structural features did not suddenly end with liberation. Policy initiatives that failed to address this legacy were condemned to reinforce and reproduce the legacy of racial discrimination. His Ph.D. thesis addressed the problems of dualism in an original manner, suggesting clearly that the dualism of Southern Africa was not the benign one recounted in development economics texts, but a malicious one that was premised on racism and exploitation. Guy’s understanding was that to the extent that the new governments in the region adopted the existing economic structure and logic of the ‘economies of discrimination’ that underpinned them, they would produce ‘enclave economies’, with all that entailed. He later took up this idea while looking at Malawi’s agricultural performance. As was usual with Guy, this position was formulated in a rigorous matter. In his article on Malawi agriculture, he demonstrated how the ‘bimodal’ mode of agricultural development pursued by Banda would lead to the great impoverishment of the peasants. This was the time when the Malawi economy was being treated as a success story by the World Bank. Guy also demonstrated this argument in a chapter on ‘Social policy in Zambia’, part of a collection I edited, in which he argued that attempts to simply ‘Africanise’ the racist ‘welfare regime’ that had been set up for whites in the copper mines would simply reproduce the social order and would be fiscally unsuitable. Guy extended scholarship to gender analysis, where again he insisted on understanding the structural underpinnings of gender discrimination.
It was from this perspective that Guy looked at the failure of agricultural development in Africa. For him, the issue was not simply producing more for export or ‘food self-sufficiency’, but the institutions and agrarian transformation that would do away with the immiserising tendencies of dualism that would produce a mutually beneficial dynamic of interaction between the sectors. His point was: ‘We need development strategies that absorb the economically marginalized and excluded—the vast majority of the population—into a dynamic, growing economy.’

The dualism that interested Guy was not merely that within each country, but that of the entire region where, just as within each of the countries, the development of the ‘modern sector’ tended to lead to greater immiserisation in the ‘traditional sector’. He noted that the ‘white’ economies of the region tended to have similar effects on the ‘resource labour economies’. The structural features of these ‘enclave economies’ were such that even in the post-liberation phase of these economies, they would continue to play this role unless they were able to do away with their internal dualism.

Virtually everyone who has conveyed condolences to friends and family has remarked on Guy’s modesty and generosity of spirit. They have all recognized how principled he was as a person. His generosity extended itself to intellectual debates. However, there was a naughtiness to his humility. I was always impressed by how Guy would, in any argument, give the other side close attention and even grant it the benefit of doubt. He would go so far as to help the other side to more rigorously reformulate its position before embarking on the demolition of that position. He often joked about this as giving the rope to the adversaries with which to hang themselves.

Guy, like many African scholars, was preoccupied with the link between democracy and development, and with the need to think about ‘developmental democracies’. He was appalled at the turn in economics which had led to the displacement of developmental economics with a discipline concerned with static allocative efficiency and stabilization. He rigorously stated his argument in a major ‘summing up’ he was preparing for CODESRIA, and told me that he wanted to extend it into a full monograph.

One thing that may not have come out clearly is his immense love of life and sense of humour, which was often directed at the pompous and repressive.

Guy and I went back to Malawi in 1994 after more than 30 years in exile. We were there to attend the launch of the book (Malawi at the Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Economy) that he had edited for SAPES. He was so moved by the event and by the opportunity to finally participate in an intellectual event in Malawi.
that he broke down in tears and was not able to complete his speech. We planned
to come back on a less emotionally charged trip. During our last meeting, when
he and Yvonne spent some time with us in Geneva, we planned on spending
holidays together in Malawi. In the event, this did not happen. We definitely did
not plan for this tragic journey back home to honour a great African scholar and
a great human being.

Yvonne has lost a loving husband and devoted companion;
Tamara and Zimema have lost a caring father;
Many of us have lost a brother, friend and comrade;
African scholarship has lost one of its best and most committed minds;
This loss is difficult to understand given the vitality of the man.
Tribute to José Negrão

By Sabina Asselle and Joseph Hanlon

José Negrão, who died July 9 2005 at the age of 49 of a cerebral haemorrhage, was a Mozambican academic who always linked his research to political action. He finished secondary school in 1975, the year of Mozambican independence, and was swept up into the revolutionary activity of the era. As an undergraduate at Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, he was part of TBARN, a project to try to introduce appropriate technologies in rural areas. His PhD tackled one of the key areas for Mozambican development – the rural family economy. This led directly to the subject that he would make his own – access to land.

Unlike its neighbours, Mozambican land is owned by the state, peasants have rights to the land they occupy, and there is no obvious shortage of land. José Negrão’s research showed that the reality was much more complex and that the elite was claiming peasant land. In the mid-1990s he provided the key technical back-up and much of the political force to the 1997 reform of the land law, which increased peasant rights while resisting international pressure for land privatisation. Based on his rural research, he formulated the alternative, which was adopted, of collective rather than individual titling. But he also rejected false appeals to ‘tradition’, and ensured that the law guaranteed women access to land, replacing customary practices which only allow the access to land through the father, the husband or the maternal uncle.

The following year he became the driving force behind the Mozambican Land Campaign to inform peasants of the new rights and how to protect their land. The Land Campaign was not a new NGO and ‘did not aim to substitute the voice of the small farmers, but to inform the producers, as well as the operators and businessmen, about the rights and duties of each according to the new law,’ he wrote.

It also became increasingly clear that the rural family with its plot of land could not be seen in isolation, but had to be linked to the macro level of globalisation as well as to all the various actors who interacted with that rural family. The economic actions of the rural family can only be understood by realising that production (land and labour) and consumption (capital) are inseparable. By placing the rural family in context, Dr Negrão became a much more effective political actor.

In 1997 he established Cruzeiro do Sul (Southern Cross), a ‘research institute for development’, which encapsulated his belief that research is political and can be used to benefit the poorest. He believed that research had to be directly linked to
lobbying and social intervention, and that it could be used to bring people together, as in the Land Campaign. He was then a founder of (and, again, a driving force behind) the G20, a platform of civil society organisations, which created the poverty observatory and produced a non-government annual report on poverty in Mozambique, which used research to challenge the rosy picture of economic growth. Dr Negrão also developed research methods adapted to the reality of the country and through his research evolved development models appropriate for Mozambique. He was also an active participant in regional networks, including the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPEN).

His immense capacity for work allowed him to continue to do serious research on land while leading and giving a dynamism to Cruzeiro do Sul and the G20, while finding time for students and other researchers, and being politically active and important, and being seen as the Mozambican land expert. At the time of this death, he was visiting professor at the universities of Louvain la Neuve in Belgium and Coimbra in Portugal. He had also taught at the University of Bologna in Italy; Lund in Sweden; and Cape Town, Durban, and Wits in South Africa. And, somehow, he had a social and family life with four children and his wife.

In a young country like Mozambique, with too few skilled, dynamic and imaginative people, individuals can make a huge difference. José Negrão was one of those people, and Mozambican academia and civil society are still struggling to fill the gap.