The Politics of Decentralisation and Donor Funding in South Africa’s Rural Water Sector*

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Decentralisation appeals to actors across the political spectrum and has become a cornerstone of development orthodoxy. Although the new South African government has adopted a range of policies that promote decentralisation, competing tendencies toward centralisation have become increasingly evident. This article examines how donors have supported decentralisation in South Africa, how they have affected the implementation of decentralisation policies, and what impact, if any, donors have had on the form of decentralisation. The implementation of decentralisation is considered in the context of the rural water sector, which has been a priority arena for decentralisation. Based on key informant interviews with 47 government, donor and NGO officials, we outline three donor-supported programmes in Northern Province and KwaZulu-Natal. Our findings lead us to differentiate between community-oriented and state-centric forms of decentralisation. Although donors claim to support community-oriented and state-centric forms of decentralisation, in practice they promote state-centric decentralisation. Not only does this reinforce the institutional bias of government, but it also undermines the original motivation and rationale for decentralisation. There are indications that some donors have begun to recognise this danger and are intervening to promote community-oriented decentralisation. However, given South Africa’s structural realities, we conclude by questioning whether this is possible at the present historical juncture.

Introduction

Decentralisation is an inherently political process. It is favoured by political and socio-economic actors because it is seen to advance their interests. However, the interests of the various social groups in society differ quite dramatically. Societal interest groups concerned with poverty and economic inequalities advocate decentralisation because it is seen to bring development closer to the people, promote participatory approaches and consolidate democracy. Other interest groups, such as state technocrats, support decentralisation because of a belief that it will lead to the more efficient delivery of services. And still others, such as economic elites, advocate decentralisation in the hope that it will undermine the regulatory capacity and lead to the shrinkage of the national state. This coincidence in motives, as James Manor recognises,¹ accounts for the widespread support for decentralisation among political actors across the ideological spectrum.

The evolution of decentralisation as a cornerstone of development orthodoxy is most
evident in its treatment as a central theme in the World Development Reports of the World Bank. It is also evident in the development literature, which builds on this by emphasising the importance of state–society partnerships at the local level and their synergy for development. Despite the almost hegemonic status of decentralisation discourse in the contemporary era, progress toward this goal has lagged in most developing countries. While making grand statements about the importance of decentralisation, new national leaders have tended to perceive decentralisation as undermining their ability to manage development and to retain control of its processes and resources.

Decentralisation came to be accepted by the South African post-apartheid regime as a result of the constitutional negotiations. The African National Congress (ANC) government was forced to compromise on its commitment to unitary government by accommodating the concerns of minority groups. In the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum, the ANC agreed to allocate greater levels of authority and responsibility to lower levels of government than it had originally envisaged. Indeed, South Africa has subsequently embraced international best practice in terms of its decentralisation policies. Jay Naidoo, the then Minister without Portfolio responsible for the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the flagship programme of the post-apartheid regime, referred to local government as the ‘hands and feet of the RDP’. This sphere of government was envisaged as playing a key role in service delivery, and NGOs concerned about their financial sustainability were advised that they could expect local government to become a source of work and funds. Moreover, the treatment of decentralisation in the Constitution and the White Paper on Local Government is on the cutting edge of international theory. The Constitution supports devolution by giving local government a new status as one of the three spheres of government with the ‘right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation’. Instead of introducing a hierarchy of tiers, the Constitution supports the principle of cooperative governance between the three ‘spheres’ of government. The White Paper on Local Government also develops a polished vision of the ‘developmental’ role of local government, leaving behind the challenge of implementation.

Yet despite the rhetorical commitment to decentralisation in policy papers and legislation, competing tendencies toward centralisation, which prevail in many of the political systems of the developing world, undermine the implementation of these policies. Nowhere is this more evident than in South Africa. A number of political commentators have already noted the centripetal tendencies of the political system and the resultant concentration of

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5 Minister Naidoo made this reference in a number of NGO workshops and conferences.


power in the Presidency and the National Executive Committee of the ANC. For instance, President Mbeki is now empowered to appoint both provincial premiers and the mayors of major metropolitan areas. Thus, simultaneous with the decentralisation dynamic, there has been a concentration of power and authority at the apex of the political system in South Africa.

Moreover, government did not exhibit a strong commitment to decentralisation when confronted with the practical difficulties of introducing local government in rural areas. Under apartheid, rural areas did not have any local government. The only governing presence was Traditional Authorities. New structures thus had to be formulated and developed in the lead up to post-apartheid South Africa’s first local government elections in 1995–1996. There was a notable delay in establishing rural local government as efforts focused on urban areas and Transitional Local Councils (TLCs). Debate and ongoing uncertainty over the rural model continued after the 1995–1996 elections. The main sticking point preventing resolution was the issue of a lower tier of local government and the role of the amakhosi (chiefs) in provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Northern Province. This issue was resolved in some provinces by establishing Transitional Rural Councils, the rural equivalent of TLCs. However, these received few, if any, resources and councillors typically operated in name only. In KwaZulu-Natal, no lower tier was established and the amakhosi joined District Councils (called Regional Councils in KwaZulu-Natal) in an ex officio capacity. The Municipal Structures Act legislated changes that were introduced through the second local government elections in November 2000. The Act specifies that district and local municipalities will cover the entire country. The amakhosi issue, still an unresolved ‘political hot potato’, has prevented this from being put into practice in KwaZulu-Natal. In any case, demarcation in preparation for the second local government election widened the coverage of TLCs to surrounding rural areas, permitting the rural to be subsumed by the urban.

Western donors, of course, want to promote decentralisation since it is seen as a fundamental plank of democracy and development, but their direct influence is limited. This is because donor funding in South Africa, as in most middle-income countries, comprises only about five per cent of the government budget. Donors wish to use this aid strategically, contributing to the democratic transition rather than funding services per se, and plan to exit gradually after the first ten years. They thus limit their influence to strengthening institutions, facilitating processes and expanding the capacity of the post-apartheid regime to pursue plans that were on its agenda but might otherwise not have received immediate attention. It needs to be noted that the institutional responsibilities for coordinating funding lies with the International Development Coordination Chief Directorate within the National Treasury, although the process leaves considerable room for individual departments to negotiate directly with donors.


10 Local Government Negotiating Forums, comprising 50 per cent statutory bodies and 50 per cent non-statutory bodies, supervised the formation of Transitional Local Councils (TLCs). TLCs were formed by combining existing racially defined authorities.


Decentralisation is used broadly to describe a range of relationships, including deconcentration, devolution and delegation. Leonard suggests that all three types of decentralisation have very different consequences. Deconcentration refers to passing authority to a field office of the central government. In this case, the central government does not compromise its autonomy since it can review all decisions made by the lower body. This form of decentralisation simply extends the reach of national government to local areas. In contrast, devolution provides local bodies with the authority to make decisions. It thus provides local bodies with autonomy and weakens the authority of the central government. Finally, delegation is the granting of authority to an autonomous agency over which the central government maintains some power, in particular through the appointment process.13

Although most donors and state personnel insist that they were pursuing the goal of devolution, its particular form varies widely from area to area. One critical difference among the various ‘devolution experiments’ is the relationship between state institutions and societal groups. Such partnerships are between the state and either the private sector or civil society. We are interested in the latter case since this is the primary rationale used by all stakeholders in favour of devolution. The development literature typically presents devolution as being participative and community sensitive.14 Yet this need not be the case. We argue that the form decentralisation takes at the local level, namely whether it is state-centric or community-oriented, determines its participative nature. State-centric decentralisation may devolve power, but it does so to a lower level of government that acts alone. Community-oriented decentralisation fosters partnerships between civil society and local government, creating a far more participative process that ultimately enhances the democratic quality of local government.

This study examines how devolution has been pursued and supported by donor agencies, how donors have affected the implementation of decentralisation policies, and what impact, if any, donors have had on the form of decentralisation. Since the implementation of decentralisation is relatively meaningless without reference to concrete services, decentralisation will be considered in the context of the rural water sector. Water is often the most critical need in rural areas and has been a priority arena for decentralisation. We begin by describing the institutional context of rural water supply in South Africa. Thereafter, we outline three different programmes of donor funding of decentralisation and rural water supply by examining cases in KwaZulu-Natal and Northern Province. Donor support of decentralisation varied from Danish Development Assistance (Danida), German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and Department for International Development (DFID) building local government capacity, to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developing institutions for water provision, to the European Union (EU) supporting programmes promoting community-oriented decentralisation. On the basis of this empirical examination, we investigate donor influence on the form of decentralisation in South Africa. Finally, we conclude by summarising the major argument advanced in this article.

By investigating the effect of donors on the process of decentralisation, we do not mean to imply a direct causal relationship. Clearly there are many factors that influenced decentralisation. Donor influence is rarely direct nor is it decisive. Instead, we are

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investigating one variable in an overall context and network of relationships that contributed to environmental change.\textsuperscript{15} It should be noted that the term ‘donor’ is defined widely to apply to organisations like GTZ that provide technical aid as well as foundations, northern NGOs and official bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies. The methodology is based largely on key informant interviews with donors, government officials and NGO representatives at the national, provincial and local levels (see Appendix 1).\textsuperscript{16} Government and donor reports and other documents supplemented data gathered from the interviews.

**Rural Water Supply in South Africa**

Under apartheid, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) focused on dams and bulk water for commercial agriculture and livestock. Water for human consumption was the responsibility of homeland governments and the Regional Service Councils (Joint Service Boards in KwaZulu-Natal), which typically dug boreholes. In most cases, the sites of these boreholes were determined with little or no consultation with, or involvement of, communities. Moreover, since very little regular maintenance was undertaken on these boreholes, they fell into a state of disrepair, creating a huge problem for the post-apartheid regime.

In response to the drought in the early 1990s the Independent Development Trust (IDT), with Kagiso Trust,\textsuperscript{17} funded and participated in the National Drought Forum, a transitional body that drew together all relevant stakeholders to address rural people’s need for water. The IDT itself implemented a community-based water programme that repaired and provided boreholes and small dams. Its approach was to provide funding to Community Based Organisations (CBOs), which in turn hired consultants to implement projects and provide training. Although there were significant problems in ensuring that CBOs were actually in the driving seat, IDT’s approach was considered groundbreaking, in particular because of its focus on funding CBOs.

After the 1994 elections, the government committed itself to the aims of the Reconstruction and Development Programme which set ambitious targets for water provision, and DWAF formulated a White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation. In order to meet these targets, the then Minister of Water Affairs, Kader Asmal, restructured the department and established RDP programmes. A Community Water Supply and Sanitation (CWSS) Directorate was established in DWAF, although its provincial structures did not immediately emerge in provinces like KwaZulu-Natal where Minister Asmal was wary of threatening the old guard.

The impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided to DWAF has been assessed in the Development Cooperation Report II.\textsuperscript{18} According to this report, only

\textsuperscript{15} We are following the approach used in an unpublished study by R. Taylor, J. Cock, A. Habib, A. Lekwane and M. Shaw, undertaken on behalf of the International Study of Peace and Conflict Resolution, which explored the influence of conflict resolution organisations on the peace process in South Africa. It stated that ‘impact is best assessed by considering the totality of peace work influence in bringing about some social change … interviews should endeavor to tap and trace network relationships’ and that this required looking at various relationships ‘all in the context of relations of power’. In the case of donor funding, it is not only direct interventions, but also the development discourse as articulated in the World Bank’s *World Development Reports* that influence environmental change.

\textsuperscript{16} A total of 47 semi-structured interviews were held with donors (13), government (16) and NGOs (18).

\textsuperscript{17} Kagiso Trust was a South African grant-making organisation that served as a channel for European Union funding. It was established by the European Union to circumvent South African legislation preventing it from making grants to local organisations.

two per cent of ODA in the water sector went to NGOs. Nearly all ODA went to DWAF, and the national DWAF Office actively controlled most programmes. Of the 23 donors that provided ODA, only three provided any funding for capital (hardware) elements. Instead, ODA focused on institutional and policy components and pilot projects. Finally, funding has tended to be project-based, and donors have each worked directly with DWAF with little coordination among themselves. It needs to be noted that DWAF’s International Liaison Office was responsible for the target and geographical focus of donor funding. In the 1990s, Australian Aid (AusAid) focused on KwaZulu-Natal, Danida on North West Province and KwaZulu-Natal, DFID on Mpumalanga and Northern Province, and the European Union initially on the Eastern Cape and subsequently on the Northern Province and KwaZulu-Natal.19

Since the CWSS Directorate was newly established, its capacity was expanded through subcontracting to NGOs and the private sector. The Mvula Trust, an NGO formed with funds from the EU and the IDT in 1993, influenced DWAF policy and implemented many of its RDP projects. In fact, this relationship between DWAF and Mvula was codified in a five-year contract. The same year, the Rural Advice Centre, an NGO focusing on rural water, lost its EU funding and was forced to close. Some of its staff members formed provincial, multi-disciplinary NGOs focused on rural water. These NGOs joined together as the Rural Development Services Network and obtained a five-year grant in 1995.

Other programmes were also implemented to extend DWAF’s capacity. First, DWAF introduced the Build, Operate, Train and Transfer (BOTT) programme, which allowed the Department to select a consortium of consultants to implement a range of large water projects. It should be noted that critics argued that BOTT gave private sector consultants too large a role in water provision and was not cost effective. Second, during this period of institutional flux, water forums were established, such as the Water Supply and Sanitation Forum (Watsan) in KwaZulu-Natal, which drew together organisations involved in water provision to avoid duplication, to help direct RDP funds, and to make an input into policy debates. Finally, since it was clear that decision-making needed more local input, DWAF began to encourage the establishment of water user committees at the water catchment level. This process was pursued in some provinces, but never took off in others as it was seen as a threat to local government.

When local government was elected in 1995–96, district and regional councils lacked the capacity to assume their constitutional responsibility for water provision. DWAF, in consultation with new local government structures, continued to work with and through Mvula on small- and medium-scale rural water provision. Although significant progress was made in the delivery of water supply, DWAF put all new projects on hold in the late 1990s to ensure that existing projects were completed, maintained and sustainable. In spite of these efforts, popular estimates suggest that 70 to 80 per cent of projects are non-functional.20

Meanwhile, the legal framework for the role of local government structures was established in the Water Services Act of 1997. The Act specifies the provision of water and sanitation services as a function of local government, noting that the national and provincial governments must ‘by legislative or other measures support and strengthen the capacity of

19 Interview with A. Vienings, Consultant to DFID WSSU, Pretoria, 12 February 2001.
20 This estimate is cited by officials from both government and the non-governmental sector; however, its source is unknown. Projects are most typically non-functional because they have broken down or users have not paid for electricity or diesel. However, the difficulty of quantitatively describing the status of rural water projects is evident in a study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council in 2003. Although it provides a summary statistic of 75 per cent of KwaZulu-Natal’s rural water projects as working, it also argues that many of these schemes do not meet basic RDP standards, raising the question of how to classify them accurately.
local government to manage their own affairs, exercise their powers and perform their functions. Although many local government councils still lack the capacity to assume responsibility for water and sanitation, official sources place their hopes on the distinction made between Water Service Authorities and Water Service Providers. Local government serves as the Water Service Authority, but it can contract out the function of Water Service Provider to consultants, water boards and/or NGOs such as the Mvula Trust. The role of DWAF has been conceived as a regulator of water provision through development, monitoring, and coordination.

The hand-over of responsibility for water systems to local government has been preceded by an audit and assessment of systems in each area, so that local government can know the financial responsibility it is assuming. Moreover, the process of transferring water projects to local government has been delayed by the need to make sure that projects are up and running, finances and budgets have been established, and councils have the capacity to take on these projects. Until such time as the transfer process has been effected, however, the Division of Revenue Act requires local government to sign-off all projects being funded in its area.

This legislative commitment to decentralisation is not endorsed by all. DWAF officials at a national level, for instance, are reluctant to hand over the reins to local government. This reluctance can be explained by two factors. First, although there is a transfer policy for personnel, the changing role of DWAF means that the jobs of individuals are insecure. Second, DWAF officials have invested enormous energies and resources over the last few years to get systems going, and they want to be confident that these will be maintained by local government.

Nevertheless, whatever the concerns of individual officials, DWAF as an institution is under substantial pressure to speed up the transfer process. The Department of Finance is the driving force behind this pressure, in particular through its capacity to change funding relationships. It has announced, for instance, that DWAF’s overall water budget will be reduced by twenty per cent per annum. The danger of this approach is that DWAF is essentially forced to implement an exit strategy, whether or not this results in a reliable service after the transfer. The situation is further complicated by Minister Kasril’s announcement of six kilolitres of free water per household per month, implemented from February 2001 (following President Mbeki’s local election delivery promises in 2000). Without tariffs, there is uncertainty as to how local government will finance this water provision. The result could thus be a fiscal crisis, a decline in services and a crisis of delivery in the water sector.

**Donor Funding and the Policy of Decentralisation**

South Africa’s new democratic government developed impressive policies to introduce local government and deliver services in rural areas. Bilateral and multi-lateral donors were keen to offer their support. Instead of providing funds for service delivery, however, most donors targeted funding towards the reformation and strengthening of institutions in order to build the capacity of government to deliver services. As a result, funding related to the decentralisation of rural water supply focused on three areas: building local government

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22 Ibid.
23 Interview with P. Ntsime, DWAF Deputy Director: Capacity Building and Training, Pretoria, 3 April 2001.
24 Of course the positive side of this promise is that communities succeeded in forcing the government to recognise the urgency of need at the local level.
capacity, developing institutions for water provision, and supporting community-oriented decentralisation through budgetary support.

(i) Danida, GTZ, DFID: Building Local Government Capacity for the Delivery of Water in Rural Areas

Danida, GTZ and DFID have each worked to build local government capacity in the rural water sector, although their actual programmes have been very different. From about 1996–1997 Danida’s programme in KwaZulu-Natal and Northern Province focused on ‘strengthening the capacity of DWAF to implement an integrated, sustainable community water supply and sanitation programme’.  

27 Interview with T. Rauch, GTZ Adviser, Durban, 23 February 2001.

It had not intended to support this sector, but responded positively to a request for assistance from the South African government. Given that a central tenet of the agreement between the South African government and Danida was host country ownership of the programme, DWAF national took responsibility for providing leadership.

In both KwaZulu-Natal and North West Province, the programme provided technical assistance and pilot projects to facilitate devolution. In North West, a multi-stakeholder task team undertook a groundbreaking negotiation to effect the transfer of functions from DWAF national to local government. In KwaZulu-Natal, workshops were held with local councillors to develop their understanding of their role in water supply and sanitation. Danida followed up on these initiatives in 1999 with the formulation of a Local Government Training Programme that enhanced the existing capacity of councils, built councillor awareness around legislation and responsibilities and developed the key competencies of councillors.

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In contrast to Danida’s work at the council level, GTZ has effectively played an advisory role to the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) since 1998. As one GTZ adviser explained, ‘South African government departments are good at producing white papers, but need help developing and implementing concrete programmes around the process of decentralisation’.  

27 GTZ did this by supporting the process of Integrated Development Planning (IDP), which essentially represents a new system of governance undertaken by local governments in order to facilitate the involvement of civil society in the construction of municipal budgets and the establishment of planning and development priorities.  

28 In effect, then, GTZ simply ‘provided the tools for policy already designed’.  

29 Its Decentralised Development Planning project with DPLG at the national level, for instance, involved working with two provinces and two local-level municipalities to help implement the IDP. GTZ supports fifteen senior expatriate staff in four focal areas: decentralisation and public administration, community development, vocational training, and employment and business promotion. These staff members are financially accountable to GTZ, but their managerial responsibilities are supervised by, and their lines of accountability are drawn to, DPLG.

Two important aspects need to be noted about the IDP process. First, as a result of GTZ’s learning approach, forums ensure the inclusion of representatives of both geograph-

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ical areas and organised groups. This is intended to ensure that councils use a more participative approach in formulating plans. Second, the planning process is being carried out by local government councils, and once their plans have been formulated, they will then take into account plans developed by other sectors. The GTZ adviser to DPLG denied the claim that it had any influence over the process. He emphasised that, although GTZ is getting the process going, its direction is decided by the Task Team which, while funded primarily by the former is nevertheless comprised largely of South Africans.\(^{30}\) This view, however, is too modest and politically correct. As the adviser himself acknowledged, GTZ has influenced the process of integrated development planning by institutionalising participation, and by simply getting things moving.\(^{31}\) Without GTZ input, integrated development planning would not have happened, due to both a lack of energy and political will within DPLG.

While GTZ engaged DPLG, DFID assisted local government in the water sector. Its work in this area falls under its Sustainable Livelihoods focus and was allocated £4.5 million between 1996 and 2001, from a total budget of £30 million per year. One of its main projects is the Water Service Support Unit (WSSU), which has three partners: DWAF, DPLG and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA). The partners established the terms of reference and selected consultants to manage the project. The WSSU assists in the transfer of water responsibility to rural local authorities. Its aim is to create leverage for doing things differently.\(^{32}\) The WSSU’s representative is located in SALGA and is responsible for coordinating a programme in Northern Province and Mpumalanga.

DFID’s focus on local government, and hence its support of decentralisation, did not emerge from an ideological conviction. Instead, it emerged from a review that highlighted the need to increase support to local government.\(^{33}\) Following this review, DFID developed a project logframe with seven aims, all of which received broad support from all three partners. Its first three aims include: being instrumental in facilitating interdepartmental meetings, making consumers aware of rights and communication channels, and promoting public–private partnerships. The other four aims focus on local government and involve assisting the latter in being ‘in possession of and using: integrated planning tools, information related to transfer, by-laws and regulations, and information related to practical management’.\(^{34}\) It needs to be noted that DFID was one of the first donors to concentrate on decentralisation, in particular since its focus has always been on local government.

Although DFID’s aim is to involve all three partners, its flagship programme, the WSSU, works mainly with DWAF. This is because there is no work from DPLG. The latter is preoccupied with generic local government work, the integrated development planning process, councillor training and frameworks for private–public partnerships. It does not have the capacity to engage with other sectoral initiatives. DPLG did not act on DFID’s offer to fund an individual within it to interact with the WSSU programme. In short, the involvement of local government takes place through SALGA, not DPLG.

DFID’s main impact has been to create an enabling environment in which ideas can be formulated into programmes. The WSSU Project Manager, for instance, indicated that she had initiated the idea of rating individual local government councils in terms of their capacity to handle ‘developmental decentralisation’, the processes of which include, among others consultation, implementation, operations and maintenance.\(^{35}\) The WSSU thus creates

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\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Telephonic interview with K. Harris, DWAF, 3 February 2001.

\(^{33}\) Vienings, 12 February 2001.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
an environment that allows such individuals to introduce new ideas and fresh ways of looking at the dilemmas of implementing decentralisation.

All of these programmes undertaken by Danida, GTZ and DFID focused on strengthening the ability of local government councils to engage in the rural water sector. By intervening at different levels, these programmes aimed to make decentralisation possible. The three donors directed their initiatives to ensuring that councils had the necessary foundation for engagement in service delivery. Other than GTZ, which encouraged the participation of civil society groups in the IDP process, none of the other agencies took any special steps to promote a community-oriented form of decentralisation. This does not mean that they are opposed to such a form of decentralisation, but merely that projects dedicated to building local government capacity have taken a state-centric route, to date.

(ii) USAID: Developing Institutions for Water Provision in Bushbuckridge

USAID’s intervention in South Africa is organised around six strategic objectives, each of which is managed by a unit. Its involvement in decentralisation and water supply is managed by the Democracy and Governance Unit and the Housing and Urban Environment Unit. The objective of the Democracy and Governance Unit is to assist the South African regime with the establishment of democratic and developmental local government. The coordinator of this unit holds that its funds are able to have an impact only because of South Africa’s existing legislative base, its democratic elections, and its existing councils and their resources. USAID is not responsible for a ‘sea-change’, he maintains, but rather for building capacity and legislative frameworks.\(^{36}\)

The Democracy and Governance Unit pursues this objective through an $18 million grant that funds a local governance programme with the Department of Provincial and Local Government, begun in September 1998 and scheduled to conclude in September 2004. The programme aims to build capacity in local government councils by providing them with direct assistance for implementation, technical assistance for policy support and local government knowledge banking. Most of the funding is dedicated to assisting the 22 municipalities selected under this programme with implementation, in particular by facilitating their engagement with citizens.\(^{37}\) In addition, the unit works to support civil society–government partnerships by funding projects related to tax legislation, identification of best practice in-service delivery, and diagnosing civil society. Finally, the unit established programmes and is involved in other initiatives related to strengthening South Africa’s justice system.

The Housing and Urban Development Unit supports nearly 50 programmes, with only one focusing on water. This project provides training and technical assistance to the Water Board and the municipality in Bushbuckridge (BBR). Its aim is to improve the delivery of water to over one million people in this rural township in Northern Province. Institutional divisions within USAID ensure that decentralisation support provided in BBR falls under Housing and Urban Development rather than the Democracy and Governance Unit. This false division between decentralisation in the abstract policy sense and decentralisation as a reality of service delivery is not only reflected in donor practice, but is also evident within South African government departments.

In 1994–1995, former President Mandela identified the water initiative in BBR as a Presidential Lead Project, prioritised politically to neutralise conflict around provincial boundaries and the amalgamation of homelands.\(^{38}\) The following year, the Minister of

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37 Ibid.
Water Affairs, Kader Asmal, requested assistance from USAID and a $4.2 million bilateral agreement was subsequently signed between the latter and the South African government. Of this grant, R1.1 million was allocated to Rand Water to serve as the Implementing Agent for an Institutional Development Programme designed to establish a water board for the area. This water board was to be responsible for the bulk water provision in line with an earlier recommendation by the British Overseas Development Agency (now DFID) that bulk and retail water be treated as discrete focal areas with separate operations and maintenance systems. In addition, USAID provided institutional support to local government to enhance its capacity and thereby enable it to take over retail water. Given its relevance to decentralisation, this retail water project is described in detail below.

The principal decision-making forum for this project was the Nsikazi Bush Water Forum, comprising USAID personnel, project staff and councillors from BBR North, Central and South, and the Nsikazi North and Hazyview municipalities. The only civil society organisation represented on the forum was the Association for Water and Rural Development (AWARD), which was invited to join when it was contracted to complete a preliminary project plan. In the preliminary phase, AWARD implemented a one-year pilot project that involved working with the five local councils to familiarise them with the Water Services Act and to assist them in designing a process to appoint a Water Service Provider. It also held workshops to raise community awareness about the supply of water. Finally, AWARD compiled a ‘terms of reference’ for the next phase and recommended that another agency with appropriate skills be contracted. In the course of implementing the pilot project, AWARD developed close relationships with BBR North and Central. BBR South was not really involved, although the reasons for this are not entirely clear. It has been suggested that BBR’s lack of participation may have emanated from strong personalities’ within the organisation resistance to being dictated to by another body.39

In the next phase, the Forum reviewed tenders and selected Chemonics, a US-based firm as a Water Service provider. At first glance, this selection reinforces a criticism often levelled against USAID, namely that it brings in US contractors when local ones are more appropriate and capable. Indeed, one member of the Forum did claim that the selection criteria favoured US firms.40 However, the Chemonics Chief of Project contests this view, arguing that his agency was successful through a competitive and transparent tendering process. In fact, to substantiate his case, he claims that the competition between his firm and a South African one was incredibly close and was only resolved through interviews with the proposed project managers.41

In any case, the substantive element of the retail water project is the provision of technical assistance for four years (2000–2004) by USAID to local government in BBR. This assistance is structured to support the Council in its role as a Water Service Authority. The second local government election in 2000, however, has given rise to significant problems in the BBR project. Much of the training of councillors undertaken in the pilot phase needs to be repeated because there has been a close to 95 per cent turnover in councillor representation. More significantly, the project has ground to a halt until such time as a new project steering committee with new councillors is formed.

Ironically, the BBR initiative is no longer about devolution, but rather centralisation. Responsibility is essentially being transferred upward from the local council that has some capacity, to the District Council that lacks such capacity. After the first local government

39 Interview with P. Sokhobela, AWARD Director, Wits Rural Facility at Kruger Park, 19 April 2001.
41 Interview with R. Mbwana, Chemonics Chief of Project, Bushbuckridge, 18 April 2001.
election, responsibility for water provision was devolved to three amalgamated TLCs (North, Central and Southern BBR). These were essentially acting as the Water Service Authority by overseeing policy formulation, tariffs, by-laws, water development plans, and operations and maintenance. The structures, however, were reformulated in preparation for the second local government election. As a result, the number of District Councils increased from two to six and TLCs/TRCs were amalgamated and reduced to a third of their number. The new District Councils have just been established and lack dedicated water staff – in some cases there are simply no people or computers to undertake plans, operations or maintenance in the water sector. Even though the three local councils had developed capacity to handle water supply, the new District Council is legally responsible for water provision. Although the Water Services Act does not specify the level of local government that is to be responsible for water services, the Municipal Structures Act specifies that this is a type C or District Council responsibility. This means that a change in responsibilities can only be effected legislatively, although it needs to be noted that the Act allows for provinces to delegate specific responsibilities to local government in selected areas.

Most of those associated with the BBR project would concur with the view that the USAID Project Officer, Sergio Guzman, is actively and positively involved in the BBR initiative. His counterpart in DWAF argues that the BBR retail water project is a typical partnership, where USAID does not dictate but rather helps with conceptual design, monitoring, evaluation and the provision of technical assistance. USAID has an interest in what is going on and checks on whether the project is meeting its objectives. The Director of AWARD also confirmed that his organisation had open access to the USAID Project Officer, who was integrally involved and had a lot of influence on how things were run. The Chemonics Chief of Project in BBR argues that this ‘open door’ policy facilitates a sense of partnership and helps avoid problems with local government and other stakeholders. Moreover, he maintains that having the donor present when there are discussions about the project gives local players greater clout in negotiations.

USAID wants to make devolution a reality, so it is encouraging DWAF to transfer schemes by building administrative, financial and legislative capacity at the local level. Progress in this regard, however, is slow in particular because of municipalities’ reluctance to take on more responsibility, DWAF’s policy that insists that local councils be administratively prepared prior to the transfer of authority, and finally the tendency of DWAF to maintain control. The result is that no transfer has occurred to date. Financial arrangements need to be made – with over 60 per cent of the population unemployed, there is no tariff base. In addition, the infrastructure is not working.

The impact of USAID’s water project in BBR is not clear, as yet. Perhaps it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, two features are clearly evident in this initiative. First, as a result of the project there is greater community awareness about water supply. Second, the involvement of NGOs in the initiative has been kept to a minimum. While AWARD was integrally involved in the first stage of the project, later stages eschewed NGO involvement. Instead, local government became the principal player in the project. The result is that USAID, whether consciously or not, is progressively advancing a state-centric vision of decentralisation in BBR.

42 Ibid.
(iii) The European Union: Challenging State-centric Decentralisation

Donors are increasingly realising that local government cannot be the only player in the game of service delivery. If this delivery is to be sustainable, then other parties, including NGOs, need to be brought on board. Donors are thus increasingly establishing specific preconditions to promote a community-oriented devolution. The European Union, for instance, has introduced a requirement that local government works with NGOs. Similarly, other donors such as DFID have supported NGOs on condition that they work with government. In both cases, donors are taking the lead in promoting state–NGO partnerships for service delivery.

The European Union, which is the main funder behind DWAF’s flagship programme called Masibambane, is one of South Africa’s main donors, providing R3.2 billion between 1996 and 1999. In the past it has funded NGOs through the Kagiso Trust. Its support in the water sector entailed financial assistance for the Rural Advice Centre prior to 1994 and the Rural Development Services Network in the post-election period. It was also one of the founding donors of the Mvula Trust. EU programmes take the framework of a Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP), agreed with the South African government and having a lifecycle of three years. One of the principles in the MIP is an ‘indicative amount’ requiring that 25 per cent of funds be spent on ‘decentralised cooperation’ or NGOs.

Early EU Programmes

It is interesting to contrast the donor-led work of the EU in the Eastern Cape with the donor support approach it used in Northern Province. The EU moved deliberately from running its own project, in the former case, to buying into the government programme, in the latter case. This experience in Northern Province ultimately led to the development of the Masibambane programme.

In August 1996 the EU initiated a programme in the Eastern Cape with a budget of R100–120 million in the form of technical assistance. The technical assistants managed and implemented the programme differently from DWAF projects. Although it had eight components, approximately 75 per cent of the funding was allocated to Community Water Supply and Sanitation for infrastructure projects. This component involved about twenty projects, ten of which were implemented by the Mvula Trust. These did not directly support decentralisation because the Kei and Wild Coast local government councils were not considered strong. But the projects did help build the capacity of Water Service Providers in the region. Other components included the establishment of monitoring and evaluation, a geographical information service, institutional restructuring of DWAF, local capacity building, environmental agreements and coordination of these components. The EU programme in the Eastern Cape established one model of operations that had the effect of enhancing provincial capacity.

In contrast, Northern Province received R250 million over three years from the EU in the form of budgetary support. Almost all of this funding was spent on bulk infrastructure

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49 The channelling of 25 per cent of EU funds through NGOs is detailed in the special conditions of the financing agreement signed between the European Commission and the Government of South Africa: ‘DWAF will ensure meaningful participation of NGOs during the implementation of the programme (it is envisaged that 25 per cent of the EC contribution will be channelled by DWAF through NGO structures)’.
involving 50 to 60 projects. These funds were directed via BOTT. A main concern about
the EU programme in Northern Province is its sustainability, in particular because of the
lack of capacity in DWAF, which was not as developed as in the Eastern Cape. The BOTT
consortium, Metsico, focused on and built its own capacity to speed up delivery. NGOs
were involved in this programme through Mvula, which was a member of BOTT in
Northern Province.

Some of those involved in the EU programme argue that DWAF should have done more
to strengthen the capacity of local government. However, it needs to be understood that
there was a massive contradiction between government’s twin objectives, to meet the
service backlog and simultaneously to effect decentralisation. In order to meet the first
objective, DWAF took charge of implementation, but in doing so it undermined the second
objective of decentralisation, which required enhancing the capacity of local government.
The first was the then Minister Asmal’s priority but donors have subsequently tried to
influence DWAF by placing more emphasis on sustainability, capacity building and
institutional support. As the EU Project Manager Charles Reeve maintains, donors are the
‘driving force of decentralisation’ because sustainable schemes cannot be managed by
national government, but must be decentralised.

Masibambane and Planning

The EU has clearly prioritised the water sector. In 2000, its member states decided to
integrate their initiatives, pool their resources and intervene in South Africa as a single unit.
As a consequence the EU launched, in partnership with DWAF, the Masibambane
Programme, which integrates its commitment to institutional reform with DWAF’s focus on
service delivery. The Masibambane Programme provides budgetary support, essentially
adding R500 million to DWAF’s R2.2 billion budget. It is unique in that it develops a
holistic approach rather than serving as an additional donor-funded programme in DWAF.
Two criticisms, however, have been raised about the Masibambane Programme. First,
budgetary support may give the EU more influence over the entire DWAF budget, since it
essentially ‘tops up’ all DWAF line items. Second, the EU is providing funding through
national DWAF to ensure central coordination and to provide the latter with the leverage
required to introduce programmes and processes outside of its normal approach. But
channelling funds through national DWAF creates a competing centralising tendency to
Masibambane’s express aim of supporting provincial roleplayers and putting local govern-
ment at the centre of its focus.

In any case, Masibambane will focus on three priority areas: consolidation of support
for institutional development and capacity building in the Eastern Cape, Northern Province,
and KwaZulu-Natal, including further technical support to a range of actors; assistance with
preparing Water Services Development plans; and support for DWAF’s monitoring and
evaluation system. As the National Coordinator of Masibambane asserts, ‘donors did not
set the trend but articulated the objectives they were aiming for and there was resonance
with people within government’. DWAF is very clear about where it wants to go and
donors have been used because their aims coalesce with DWAF’s objectives. Although
Masibambane is clearly ‘DWAF led’, it is directed by a Coordinating Committee of all
stakeholders, which holds the Project Manager accountable.

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50 Interview with C. Reeve, European Union consultant to DWAF, Pretoria, 12 February 2001.
51 Ibid.
53 Interview with L. Colvin, Project Manager of the Masibambane Programme, 12 February 2001.
54 Ibid.
Masibambane is trying to do things differently by adding impetus and support, getting fresh faces involved and strengthening the culture of decentralisation. It is pursuing integrated planning by having all stakeholders involved. Its emphasis is on sustainability, capacity building and basic institutional reform. In the past, DWAF focused almost exclusively on addressing the backlog in services. Now it has the space to consider its role vis-à-vis other roleplayers. The EU’s Masibambane Programme facilitates this by stimulating strategic planning processes and partnerships between local government, NGOs and DWAF. It forces DWAF to consider its work programmatically. Plans are to be formulated through the development of provincial strategies referred to as Multi-Annual Action Plans (MAAPs). The MAAP process gets the actors together and requires them to reach consensus or a common view on strategic objectives. In the words of Louise Colvin, the Coordinator of the Masibambane Programme, ‘MAAP focuses the mind’.\textsuperscript{55} It is hoped that this process will create an ongoing strategic debate about sustainability. As the EU Project Officer, Wont Soer, argues, ‘the water sector is like a huge oil tanker – you need to start miles away to change direction and reorient it’.\textsuperscript{56}

The impact of the Masibambane Programme can best be summarised in the words of Charles Reeve who asserts that ‘without donors, decentralisation won’t happen in the water sector’.\textsuperscript{57} He maintains that there is a need for a different approach in South Africa. In addition to the traditional focus on the provision of infrastructure, there is a need to create an environment that gives rise to and supports experiences, processes, procedures and approaches that allow for and facilitate decentralisation.\textsuperscript{58} The Masibambane Programme achieves this in three ways. First, the EU contributes to an enabling environment and provides support to DWAF for what it is already doing and helps it achieve what it wants to achieve.\textsuperscript{59} Second, the Masibambane Programme pushes government to focus on planning. Finally, it prompts NGO involvement and increases DWAF’s focus on gender and environmental issues. DWAF in turn will push local government to do so, as well. These leveraging mechanisms of the Masibambane Programme, then, put into motion a process that should ensure that national policy gives consideration to issues that would normally be overlooked by an over-stretched government in a developing society.

\textit{NGOs}

The EU stopped its direct funding of Mvula and the RDSN at the inception of Masibambane. It argued that these organisations should derive their funding through the programme itself. The financing agreement signed by the EU and the South African government recognised that NGOs are well placed to assist with implementation, and stipulated as a result that ‘25 percent of EU funding will be channelled by DWAF through NGO structures to ensure meaningful participation of NGOs during the implementation of the programme’.\textsuperscript{60} Wont Soer, the EU Project Officer, explained the purpose of this clause as intending to achieve a partnership between NGOs and local government. If NGOs receive direct funding, he maintained, they cannot be held accountable to communities. However, if they receive funds through local government to provide services, they can be held accountable since the latter is answerable to consumers.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with Soer, Pretoria, 4 April 2001.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Reeve, 12 February 2001.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Colvin and Reeve, 12 February 2001.
\textsuperscript{60} See footnote 49.
\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Soer, 4 April 2001.
The EU precondition that 25 per cent of funding goes through NGOs has the potential to impact significantly on the form of decentralisation. Will it be implemented? Much depends on local institutional relationships. The shift in mandate elevates the importance of local government but it by no means follows that the latter would share DWAF’s (sometimes limited) acknowledgement of the constructive role to be played by NGOs.\(^62\) There is no provision for default if NGOs are not used, so some see it as a toothless recommendation.\(^63\) On the other hand, NGOs such as Mvula, which need core funding and additional staff, see themselves as being thrown to the wolves when they are at a distinct disadvantage.\(^64\)

The precondition to use NGOs is a problem for personnel of provincial DWAF for a number of reasons. First, the primary concern of civil servants is the delivery of services and the spending of their budgets. Second, they are not confident about NGO capacity to deliver. Indeed, questions have even been raised about the capacity of Mvula Trust, which is the largest NGO in the rural water sector. Third, councillors are hesitant about and/or resistant to using NGOs. The reason is that they frequently see NGOs as competition in representing and serving their constituents or, as in the case of KwaZulu-Natal, as having a political agenda.

The requirement that NGOs be involved in Masibambane has resulted in a triangular relationship between NGOs (particularly Mvula), local government and the provincial offices of DWAF. This relationship is playing itself out in different ways. In KwaZulu-Natal, both provincial and local government officials are disenchanted with NGOs. Although they couch their objections in terms of poor delivery, they often appear to be anti-NGO itself. Local government officials argue that they prefer to use the private sector as a conduit for delivery. By contrast, local government councillors in Northern Province work with NGOs, probably because this sphere of government is very weak and NGOs have greater capacity to deliver. However, local government officials face obstacles placed by the provincial DWAF office. For example, NGOs in Northern Province submitted project lists that had been endorsed by local government, but twice these were lost by DWAF. In the end, the projects funded under Masibambane were limited to those to which there was a commitment already. Mvula has projects that it will carry over, but other NGOs do not. It seems that DWAF in Northern Province has been directly involved in implementation and possibly sees NGOs as competitors.

There is already evidence that the EU’s precondition that local government must work with NGOs will backfire. Local government officials in KwaZulu-Natal report that councillors resent being told by DWAF how to spend funds, and may even choose to turn down these funds rather than work with NGOs.\(^65\) Although it is possible to explain the obstacles to community-oriented decentralisation by pointing to the perceptions of individual councillors, this only accounts for part of the phenomenon. The unwillingness of councillors to work with NGOs is taking place across the entire sector, which implies that this suspicion of NGOs is a product of institutionalised thinking on the part of local government.

Unlike the EU, some donors seek to encourage local government–NGO partnerships by adopting the reverse process, namely by providing funds to NGOs on condition that they work with local government.\(^66\) There are widely divergent views regarding the

\(^{62}\) Ibid.
\(^{64}\) Interview with M. Rall, Director of the Mvula Trust, Johannesburg, 3 April 2001.
\(^{65}\) Interviews with officials from four District Councils in KwaZulu-Natal, March 2001.
\(^{66}\) In this study, DFID was identified as one donor with this approach. Northern NGO donors typically use this approach as well.
effectiveness of this approach. For example, Wont Soer, the EU Project Officer, insisted that when the latter provided direct funding to NGOs, they failed to meet their obligation to work with local government. He argues that, for instance, the Mvula Trust tends to treat projects as ‘their own’ and it is no longer acceptable for different actors to work separately leaving local government on the sidelines.67 But the Mvula Trust coordinator in Northern Province argued that EU funding had helped her organisation to develop close relations with local government. EU funding of the Mvula NGO programme, she maintains, allowed Mvula–Northern Province to implement two projects that built relationships between local government and CBOs. All in all, fifteen projects were facilitated and twelve to thirteen agreements were developed between local government and CBOs as Water Service Providers.68

There are, of course, other cases of successful NGO – local government partnerships. The DFID representative, for instance, emphasised the case of the Tlhavhama Training Initiative, an NGO that her organisation supported in Northern Province, which implemented a programme in conjunction with local and provincial government, and proposed indicators to assess the programme’s impact on the latter.69 This type of NGO–local government relationship, however, is rare. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, for instance, has been seeking successful NGO–local government partnerships to support and to document, but has had difficulty locating such cases.70 Local government–NGO partnerships are the exception, not the norm. As a result, community-oriented decentralisation is still quite a distant goal in South Africa.

Community-oriented Versus State-centric Decentralisation

Have donors, then, influenced the process of decentralisation in South Africa’s rural water sector? Many state officials in South Africa take exception to the suggestion that donors are wielding influence on the process. They insist that donor funding is used to support aims and programmes set by the South African government. Donors tend to share this view. In fact, it is quite ironic that a stakeholder which has contributed millions of rands to a process, claims that it has had no significant influence on its outcome. Instead, donors maintain that they have simply supported the South African government to achieve its aims.71

In terms of policies and programmes, donors and government officials profess to support decentralisation as a means to deliver services more effectively and entrench participative development. In fact, they often claim to support what might be characterised as community-oriented decentralisation. In practice, though, the tendency of government officials is to promote state-centric decentralisation. This results from not only the centralised and hierarchical political traditions of the ANC, but also from the institutional legacies within government departments and local institutions. Despite their professed commitment to community participation, government agencies are often opposed to working with NGOs. This is often justified on the basis of a lack of NGO capacity, but there does appear to be a prevailing institutional bias against NGOs within government departments.

67 Interview with Soer, 4 April 2001.
68 Interview with K. Roper, Director of Mvula Trust (Northern Province), Pietersburg, 19 April 2001.
69 Interview with L. Nchabeleng, Executive Director, Tlhavhama Training Initiative, Pietersburg, 20 April 2001.
70 Interview with C. Kuljian, Director, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Johannesburg, 3 April 2001. It needs to be noted that the Mott Foundation has for some years now prioritised the strengthening of civil society in its funding allocations.
71 This claim is a sign of the political prudence of donors, who are responding to South African government officials’ concerns that there has been excessive foreign intervention in domestic affairs. Such concerns were first made evident publicly in former President Mandela’s speech at the ANC’s 1997 conference in Mafeking.
Donors who support decentralisation through the simple provision of funds or technical assistance to government, reinforce this institutional bias. This is clearly evident in many of the donor initiatives reviewed earlier on. These programmes were important in that they developed the capacity of local government councils, which is critical if these institutions are to function effectively. But because they paid so little attention to the involvement of NGOs and community structures, these programmes established and supported by Danida, GTZ, DFID and USAID helped lay the foundation for a state-centric form of decentralisation.

This should be of concern to both donors and the broader development community. The entire rationale for decentralisation in both the academic and policy literature is that it would enable community participation, and thereby facilitate participatory development and sustainable delivery. Yet this study indicates that many of the decentralisation initiatives in South Africa take a state-centric form, which then undermines the original motivation and rationale for the policy itself. This has recently become a source of concern for some donor agencies. Donors such as the EU, and even Mott and DFID, are beginning to consider the form which decentralisation takes, and are intervening to promote community-oriented decentralisation. Such interventions involve grant conditions that stress the importance of, and/or even make mandatory, government–NGO partnerships and community participation.

But these interventions are still in their infancy and are not widespread. Moreover, as the review of the EU’s Masibambane indicated, the initiatives undertaken to promote NGO and community participation have by no means been an unqualified success. This is because, even when donors and government actively support community-oriented decentralisation, two structural realities continue to act as obstacles. First, the historical absence of local government in the rural areas of South Africa means that the players are new and lack capacity to act as partners. Second, government departments and donors assign decentralisation programmes to local government and sectoral delivery programmes to line departments or units. As a result, there is a divide between decentralisation and service delivery programmes. This then leads to a situation where programmes either focus on building local government capacity in the abstract or they engage with service delivery programmes in a purely technical way. Either case inhibits community and civil society participation and therefore undermines the possibility for a community-oriented decentralisation programme.

However, alternatives do exist. In the absence of viable NGOs, a community-oriented decentralisation programme could involve Community Based Organisations (CBOs) far more greatly than they have done. Indeed, donors could take the lead in making resources available for the organisation of communities so as to develop the structural capacity for state–civil society partnerships in service delivery. Yet donors seem reluctant to foster community organisation, a decision that potentially undermines their stated aims and current projects.72

In sum, then, the lesson is that the South African government has implemented, and donors in the main supported, a state-centric form of decentralisation. Where donors have attempted to promote a more inclusive process, they have failed or are likely to fail as a result of the structural realities of South African society, which inhibit the realisation of a community-oriented decentralisation policy. It may be argued that it is pragmatic for all stakeholders to recognise that a more participatory decentralisation policy is not possible at this historical juncture. However, this effectively means postponing the development and democracy project. A more prudent alternative may be for stakeholders to recognise the

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72 In some cases NGOs foster community organisation, but this is becoming less frequent due to the financial pressures faced by NGOs.
structural constraints and to devise strategies to overcome these if participatory development and sustainable delivery are to be realised.

**Conclusion**

Through their financial and technical support, donors have influenced the process of decentralisation in South Africa. They have lent capacity to government departments, added depth to existing programmes and helped turn policy intentions into actual initiatives. They have trained local government councillors and raised their awareness of rural water issues. They have contributed to the institutional reform of government departments and strengthened their planning processes. Although these interventions have occurred through a range of programmes, each working with a different level of government and pursuing different objectives, they have helped translate into reality the policy of decentralisation.

This decentralisation, however, has taken a state-centric form. Recent initiatives by some donors to promote a more inclusive community-oriented form of decentralisation have not yet borne fruit. In fact, the structural realities of South Africa and the centralising tendencies within the government suggest that this goal is unlikely to be realised in the near future. In the absence of strategies to overcome these structural realities, both participatory development and sustainable delivery in South Africa might have to be postponed for the foreseeable future.

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**ADAM HABIB**
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**Appendix 1. List of People Interviewed**

**National**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adie Vienings</td>
<td>DFID/Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louise Colvin</td>
<td>DWAF Masibambane programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenny Evans</td>
<td>DWAF/Netherlands Embassy programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Reeve</td>
<td>European Union/DWAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Natiello</td>
<td>USAID Democracy and Governance programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergio Guzman</td>
<td>USAID Housing and Urban Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Lange</td>
<td>Konrad Adenhauer Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theo Rauch</td>
<td>GTZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Ntsime</td>
<td>DWAF/Danida and USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Rall</td>
<td>Mvula Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christa Kuljian</td>
<td>Mott Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wont Soer</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry Harris</td>
<td>DWAF (telephonic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubri van Meulen</td>
<td>DWAF (telephonic)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KwaZulu-Natal

Angela Rankin
Dumisani Mhlongo

NGOs from the KwaZulu-Natal Water and Sanitation Association:

Thoko Siwaza, Rob Dyer
Robin Husband
Craig Mowat
Duncan Stuart
Kamla Rugbur
Ben Zungu
Sipho Khuzwayo
David Stephen
Management Board
Gideon Breytenbach
Christo Nel
Paul Watson
Jabulani Ncabishe

Northern Province

Robert Mbwana
Z. Seerane
Peter Sokhobela
Kate Roper
Leah Nchabeleng

Namibia

Timo Palander
Brian Hollick
J. Fitter
Regina Ndopu
P. Nghiphandulwa
H. Kock
Lillian Moir
M. Kiggundu
Mary Seely
Wolfgang Maier
T. Keulder
R. Essack-Kauaira
Mr Kiiyala

BBR Chemonics Chief of Project
Nsikazi Bush Water Forum, local government councillor
Association for Water and Rural Development (AWARD)
Mvula Trust
Tlhavhama Training Initiative
MRLGH Project Manager (Finnish tech. assistant)
MAWRD
GTZ
MRLGH
MAWRD
MAWRD
Council of Churches in Namibia
United Nations Development Programme
Desert Research Foundation
Konrad Adenhauer
Namibia Institute for Democracy
Namibian Red Cross (telephonic)
National Planning Commission, Directorate: Development Services