Jubilee South Africa

Cyrus Rustomjee

2004

A case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa

This study was commissioned as part of a broader research project entitled Globalisation, Marginalisation & New Social Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa, a joint project between the Centre for Civil Society and the School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal. The project was funded primarily by the Ford Foundation and Atlantic Philanthropies whose support is gratefully acknowledged. For more information, visit: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/ and click on ‘social movements’ under ‘research’.
1. Introduction

Jubilee South Africa (JSA) is a growing new social movement. Launched as Jubilee 2000 South Africa, in November 1998 at a conference of more than 60 civil society organisations, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) and churches, it changed its name to JSA in 2001. Initially closely associated with the international Jubilee 2000 Coalition, JSA would, in the early years of its existence, shed this association and establish itself as a South African movement, with programmes, campaigns and objectives firmly rooted in local struggles. From an almost exclusive initial focus on debt-related issues, JSA’s programmes and campaigns shifted to a campaign for reparations, and thereafter, to broader concerns for the achievement of social and economic justice. As observed by the movement’s former National Secretary, JSA was established as part of wider global jubilee movement, and that movement represents ‘not only a call for total, unconditional cancellation of developing countries’ odious debts […] but about general economic justice’ (Neville Gabriel in Ballenger 1999a).

Background and focus of the paper

The term ‘Jubilee’ is drawn from the biblical chapter Leviticus, and represents two closely linked injunctions. The first urges the cancellation of the indebtedness of the poor by all creditors, and the second urges a fresh start to all debtors. The injunction is evoked every fifty years and is considered to apply not only to financial obligations, but also to other obligations that burden the poor.

The international Jubilee movement, which effectively commenced in 1996 in the United Kingdom, arose after the birth of the new democracy in South Africa. Even after the international jubilee movement arose and spread, it was not clear what application the biblical injunction of jubilee had to democratic South Africa. The 1994 elections had already represented, in some sense, South Africa’s ‘Jubilee’. Considered in the context of financial indebtedness, there had been no large-scale demand prior to the democratic transition for a cancellation of debts. Yet, by 2004, a vibrant, active, and significant new social movement has been established.

This paper seeks to trace the evolution of JSA, outlining its objectives, the manner in which it has pursued these, its organisational capacity and structure, its relations with a variety of other actors – including other Jubilee movements, other new social movements in South Africa and the South African government. The international
character of some of its programmes makes JSA an unusual new social movement in South Africa, and I focus a portion of the current paper on this aspect, tracing in particular JSA’s contribution to the development and sustenance of the global Jubilee movement.

To illustrate the movement’s evolution, I focus attention on three of JSA’s major campaigns since its launch: those focused on debt-related issues, campaigns based on reparations for past injustices, and other broader campaigns focused on economic and social justice.

JSA’s debt-related campaigns have focused on at least three major issues: the debt burden of low-income countries, the debt utilised to finance destabilisation in Southern Africa during the apartheid period, and the national debt inherited by the new democratic government in South Africa from the previous apartheid era, notably those debts owed to foreign banks. I shall focus particularly on the campaigns relating to South African debt.

A campaign for monetary and non-monetary reparations for the victims of apartheid represents the second major component of JSA’s work. I examine how the campaign came about, how it has proceeded, and the extent to which the campaign has influenced relations between JSA and the national government. More recently, JSA has initiated a third set of campaigns, focusing on broader issues of economic and social justice.

JSA is one of several Jubilee movements worldwide, and one of three, along with the Jubilee 2000 Coalition (J2000) and Jubilee South (JS), which have had some presence in South Africa. JSA’s evolution has been closely associated with developments in both of these Jubilee movements, and the current paper seeks to understand both the relationship between, and the extent of influence of, the latter two Jubilee movements on JSA.

Several sources of information were used in preparing the paper: firstly, an array of published positions, media statements, and other publications of JSA, JS, and J2000. These are extensive. Secondly, a review of a range of other published material, commentaries and critiques was conducted, along with, thirdly, a series of interviews with some of the key role players in JSA. To guide the process of assembling information for the comparative elements of the study, a standard template of issues and key questions, applicable to each of the three movements, was prepared. This proved useful both in coordinating the information needed for the study of the three movements, and as a basic questionnaire for the conduct of interviews with key personnel. The template is attached as Annexure 1 to this paper.

In the remainder of the introductory section, I examine the origins and outline some of the organisational characteristics of JSA. Thereafter, the paper is divided into five further parts. Part 2 examines some facets of the relationship between JSA, J2000 and JS. Part 3 focuses on JSA’s debt-related campaigns. Part 4 examines the Reparations Campaign. Part 5 considers the more recent focus of the movement on other, broader campaigns for economic and social justice. Part 6 concludes.
In the remainder of this section – and before turning to the substantive campaigns of JSA – I consider JSA’s origins, organisational structure, support base, modes of mobilisation and protest, and its relations with other Jubilee movements, particularly JS and J2000.

**Origins**

JSA was established at a time when the international debt campaign led by J2000 was gaining strong momentum; yet, its campaigns six years after its launch are much broader than those waged by J2000 and are fundamentally rooted in domestic struggles. Was JSA a domestically inspired social movement, or were its roots fundamentally based on the international Jubilee 2000 Coalition, established in 1996? The Chairperson of JSA clarifies, ‘JSA was really of native origin, in the sense that the problem of South African debt began to engage us before JSA was formed’ (Interview, Giyose, 07:10:04). Accompanying literature also points to a clearly domestically inspired genesis for the movement, with the appearance as far back as early 1997 of the publication ‘Challenging Apartheid Foreign Debt’ (AIDC 1997). Rudin explains that the publication, prepared in South Africa, was sent to the Jubilee 2000 Coalition for information (Interview, Rudin, 04:10:04). From mid-1997, a nucleus of individuals, largely based in Cape Town, pursued work on developing the intellectual framework to establish a local Jubilee movement, culminating in JSA’s launch the following year.

George Dor, central to the establishment of JSA in 1998, observes that:

> By 1998, there was a certain sense of concern around the post-1994 transition – concern with budgets, with social policies, with GEAR. At that stage there was no organisational structure to capture the issue. JSA stepped into that set of discussions and created a vehicle to discuss the Apartheid debt issue, as a key obstacle to release the resources for development. JSA was also established as a platform to discuss macroeconomic policy. (Interview, Dor, 08:10:04)

JSA’s focuses at its launch were multiple. Its founding statement cites apartheid debt, macroeconomic policy, the international debt campaign, the implications of apartheid debt in Southern Africa, and issues of economic and social justice as areas in which JSA would work. Hence, while clearly inspired by local challenges, the movement would retain from the outset, as one element of its agenda, a focus on the international debt campaign.

**Organisational structure**

Since its establishment, JSA has exhibited characteristics variously akin to an organisation, a network, a campaign and a movement. For example, in many of its campaigns, JSA has operated as a coalition, relying for its support on coalition partners. As it has grown and as the ambit of its campaigns has broadened, JSA has begun to assume more formal organisational characteristics. The movement has its own National Executive Committee (NEC), comprising nine elected officials, who meet as often as necessary, and a National Council, comprising the NEC as well as two officials from each province, which meets three times a year.
In addition to its national campaign, JSA has established branches throughout South Africa, most of which were established within two years of its launch, including the Gauteng branch, launched in March 1999 (‘Gauteng Launches Jubilee 2000’ 1999), and the KZN branch, launched in the following month at the University of Durban-Westville during a conference on apartheid debt (Witness Reporter 1999). As of September 1999, Jubilee 2000 South Africa had established organisational structures in eight provinces, and was expanding into the Northern Province (Ashley 1999). At the provincial level, members are elected to the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC).

The gradual shift toward a more defined organisational structure has been both difficult, with respect to the coalition that inspired JSA’s establishment, and uneven, with the provincial structures evolving at different paces. Giyose explains that, at the launch of JSA, an executive committee was established, ‘[t]hen all the coalition partners went back. The NGOs went back to do development; the women’s organisations went back to mobilise for women’s issues; the youth organisations went back to work on youth issues. And the executive remained, holding the can. They did what executives would do first, which was to establish provincial organisations all around South Africa’ (Interview, Giyose, 07:10:04).

Its status as a coalition has also meant that JSA has frequently grappled with the challenge of determining the rights and interests of the various partners, including church groups, NGOs and others. Some of JSA’s campaigns have not always been fully supported by all coalition partners. Particularly, strong divergences have arisen within the movement in regard to the issue of the reparations campaign, detailed below. Some, particularly church-based coalition partners, have perceived JSA’s position to be excessively contrary to that of the South African Government. As the chairperson of JSA notes, ‘[t]he reasons are probably connected with the politics of our country. The main issue has been the litigation issue, with some partners being influenced from the top to persuade JSA to change course… Government has a lot of influence over COSATU, less over the affairs of the Churches. Yet the Churches have strong connections with government.’ While the different views regarding litigation have been significant, ‘there is not a single coalition partner who wants to stay out of the movement’ (Interview, Giyose, 07:10:04).

To cope with these evolving challenges, a dialogue emerged within the movement as to whether it should begin to assume the form of a formal organisation, rather than a coalition. As the provincial structures have established themselves, they have begun to establish campaigns in their own right; and have come to exert a stronger influence on the movement. A national planning strategy was developed in 2002, culminating in a decision to preserve the full rights of the coalition partners, while also recognising the growing influence of the provincial structures and their campaigns. As Dor notes, ‘[a]t the end, it was decided that we would be a bit of each of these’ (Interview, Dor, 08:10:04). The planning strategy also observed that provincial preferences had emerged in the four years since the launch of JSA, which had not been fully recognised by the national structure. As a consequence, provincial strategies have been developed, outlining the individual preferences and objectives of the various provinces. The exercise has revealed that the provincial structures are at different levels of advancement in terms of organisational capacity, focus, and the nature of their campaigns.
Support base

JSA’s support base has been closely reflective of the initial coalition character of JSA and, since its launch, JSA has relied on an extensive network of support, both in terms of finance and campaigning.

By far the most important grouping in terms of initial support were the faith-based groupings. There would not have been a JSA without their support. It was really ecumenical, including Christian denominations, also Muslim and Hindu denominations (Interview, Rudin, 04:10:04).

Rudin notes that the support provided by faith-based organisations was both logistical and financial. This was particularly the case at the launch of JSA, when several key office-bearers were seconded from the faith-based organisations to work full-time on establishing JSA. Reliance on financial support has continued: ‘[f]aith-based finance remains a very important source. (Interview, Rudin, 04:10:04)

Since 1998, however, JSA’s support base has shifted: ‘[t]he support base now is less faith-based. We have come to rely more on other social movements, particularly for campaigning’(Interview, Rudin, 04:10:04). This support varies, depending on the theme and geographical location. For example, in the Free State, the Provincial branch of JSA has been closely allied with a range of other environmental groups in campaigning for environmental justice, particularly focusing on the mining sector and the issue of ecological degradation (Interview, Nthako, 15:10:04), while the Gauteng provincial branch has jointly campaigned with the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee and more recently waged a campaign against the presence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in South Africa (SAPA 2004).

As a new social movement in South Africa, working to build an “Africa Consensus” on development for the continent’ (Ashley 1999), JSA has received widespread domestic support since its launch, from such groups as the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), SANGOCO, the South African New Economics Network, the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the National Progressive Primary Health Care Network (NPPCHN), the Environmental Justice Networking Forum, and the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG), the latter two working particularly closely with the Free State provincial branch of JSA. JSA has also collaborated consistently with the Khulumani Support Group (KSG) and has worked closely with the Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC).

Modes of action, participation and protest

‘Surely we have not forgotten the great wonders mass struggles can achieve?’ (Harvey 1999). JSA has used a wide variety of modes of action, participation and protest. These have included small street protests, mass protests, contributing to the organisation of large national conferences (on reparations, for instance), objecting to the South African government’s proposal in 2001 to borrow from the World Bank to finance hospital restructuring in South Africa (Dor 2001b), assisting in launching a major lawsuit in the US to seek reparations against multilateral corporations that transacted business in South Africa during the apartheid era (discussed below), and supporting other social movements in South Africa in their objectives. As Nthako states, ‘you need to engage
all the emerging international dimensions […] viz environmental, gender, democratic, working class, and gays and lesbian’ (Interview, Nthako, 15:10:04).

Action, participation, and protest have consistently been marked by considerable sophistication, not only in the mode of participation, but also in the complexity and comprehensiveness of argument used in support of a particular objective. This has been particularly the case in the movement’s reparations campaign and in its portrayal of apartheid debt as ‘odious’, a characterisation that, as I note below, has enabled JSA to contribute to a renewal of the international Jubilee movement’s agenda.

2. Relationship with other Jubilee movements

Two other Jubilee movements, the Jubilee 2000 Coalition (J2000) and Jubilee South (JS), have been influential in the development of JSA.

J2000 commenced as a small UK-based advocacy group in 1987, with the launch of a UK-based campaign, the Debt Crisis Network, for the cancellation of developing country debt (Pettifor 1998: 117). Subsequently, in 1990, at a meeting of an All-African Council of Churches, the call was made for the debts of African countries to be written off in 2000, the year of the Jubilee. From 1990-1995, two individuals, the first the leader of Debt Crisis Network and the second the leader of a similar, small, UK-based organisation, worked together, establishing an informal Jubilee 2000 founding committee.

In April 1996, when it became apparent that the IMF and World Bank would launch a debt relief initiative at the Spring Meetings of the two organisations, a Jubilee 2000 office was formally established and staffed with a very small group of personnel. By January 1997, a website had been launched. On 6th April of that year, a symbolic initiative, which would come to represent a pivotal step in galvanising global support for the movement, was launched, represented in the form of a Jubilee 2000 Countdown Clock, marking the remaining 1000 days to the millennium (Jubilee 2000 UK n.d.). The Countdown Clock precipitated rapid growth in institutional membership, providing a visible symbol of the challenge and its time-bound nature. By the end of 1997, Jubilee campaigns had been launched in the US, at the G-7 Denver Summit, and in Germany, and the coalition of UK organisations coalescing around the Jubilee call had grown significantly.

JS was formally launched prior to the arrival of the new millennium, in November 1999, at a South-South summit held in Johannesburg, involving activists from Africa, Latin America and Asia. A major purpose of the summit was to discuss economic and social conditions in these countries. Several important social movements attended the summit, which was preceded by a meeting of civil society representatives from several African countries, with the objective of challenging the IMF/World Bank approach to economic and social development (Jubilee South n.d.).

JS quickly established itself as a network of debt campaigns, jubilee movements, social movements, peoples’ organisations, communities, NGOs, and political formations. Since its launch, JS has evolved into a network comprising 85 groups of members in over 40 countries, from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia/Pacific (Jubilee South n.d.).
The objectives of J2000 and of JS differed markedly. ‘The Jubilee 2000 Coalition does not seek to write off every penny owing on 31 December 1999. Rather, it seeks to have the inert, unpayable backlog of debt written off, and debts reduced to a level which will permit sustainable human, environmental and economic development’ (Pettifor 1998: 121).

By contrast, the launch of JS marked a significant shift in the terms of discourse pertaining to developing country debt issues, in comparison with that which had prevailed since 1996 and the formation of Jubilee 2000. The launch was marked by a strong sense among supporters of the new movement that J2000 and the HIPC Initiatives had not adequately reflected the interests of the South, and that there was a need for a new movement espousing the needs and realities of majority world countries. ‘We cannot […] confine our Jubilee advocacy to the terms and framework largely dictated by the paradigm of debt. Rather, we are compelled to speak from the perspective of those who suffer the consequences of debt domination’ (Jubilee South 2000).

In addition, JS regarded its emergence as the outcome, not of a change in direction in the struggle for the cancellation of developing countries’ debt, but rather as the outcome of a series of unrelated initiatives which took place since 1997/1998 among countries in the south with the objective of articulating a united position and agenda on the establishment of a broader South-South process (Jubilee South n.d.). ‘Jubilee, therefore, is not a demand for relief or for cancellation. It is a demand for the respect for rights and human dignity’ (Bandaña 1999). Another document stated that ‘This is a vision springing from the sacred and moral responsibility to limit power and uphold life’ (Jubilee South 2000). This process would include debt cancellation as a part of its objectives, but not as the sole purpose.

We are not undertaking these campaigns and making these demands as short-term and single-issue events in isolation from broader struggles. We are only too aware that the forces that damaged us in the past can return to damage us again…We need to move beyond this system to one in which the upliftment of the lives of the poor takes centre stage. This includes delivering on people’s entitlement to jobs, land, food security, water, electricity, housing, transport, education, health and social security. But it is also far more than this. It is also about workers and the marginalised across the world coming together in social movements and political organisations and taking the lead in shaping their own future. (Reparations Towards Another World 2001)

With J2000 emphasising the objective of reducing developing country debt to sustainable levels and with JS calling for outright debt cancellation, JSA has been careful to identify benefits in both concepts, recognising both the merits and disadvantages of utilising the concept of sustainability of debt: ‘Sustainability, while important in focusing on the impact that debt was having on poor countries and their capacity to attend to the basic needs of their people especially in the fields of education, health and social welfare, tended to deflect attention from the unequal and unjust relations that underpinned the indebtedness of Third World countries. Sustainability does not consider questions like what was the debt used for, who
contracted the debt and on whose behalf, who benefited from and who suffered as a result’ (Ashley 2003).

In general, however, JSA’s stance since its launch has closely followed that of JS. JSA has focused on debt cancellation, not debt relief, its campaigns represent broader struggles for economic and social justice, and its objectives are more closely akin to those of JS. In one particularly important respect, JSA’s work has precipitated a renewal of activism in the international Jubilee movement, including in JS, through JSA’s work on illegitimate and odious debt.

Driving the distinction between illegitimate and unsustainable debt has enabled JSA to define its own specific framework and basis for struggle and to differentiate itself from the Jubilee 2000 Coalition, which, until 2000, endorsed a debt reduction framework based on the objective of reducing the external debts of developing countries to sustainable levels (not cancelling them in their entirety). Apartheid debt and apartheid reparations were clearly not part of the discourse of the Enhanced HIPC debt relief framework established by the industrial countries, and in the absence of an analytical framework, based on the concept of illegitimacy of debt, JSA would have represented simply a lobby movement for the international Jubilee 2000 Coalition.

Instead, highlighting and building upon the concepts of illegitimacy and odiousness provided the catalyst for defining a new body of debt and past historical obligations and contracts more directly relevant to the South African case. Focusing on illegitimacy and odiousness also proved analytically convenient, enabling a cluster of concepts to be brought to bear – the historical concept of jubilee, international norms of justice and morality, and restitution and international juridical precedents.

The shift in discourse, from sustainability to illegitimacy, has also served other purposes. Propelled by the South African case, the focus on the illegitimacy and odiousness of debt has offered the broader international jubilee movement a new focus for action, providing a bridge from the time-bound J2000 campaign, to the broader and far more ambitious transformative objectives pursued by JS. In this sense, unlike many other social movements, JSA has sustained itself not through its external linkages. Instead, it has established and defined for itself a new agenda that has fed back into and revived a flagging international social movement.

3. Debt-related campaigns

Introduction

Debt cancellation has represented a central campaign since JSA’s establishment. There have been three distinct areas of emphasis: the debts incurred in South Africa by previous apartheid governments, the debts incurred by neighbouring countries as a result of apartheid, and the debts of other low-income countries. The three-fold focus has been consistent with JSA’s origins as both ‘a native movement’ (Interview, Giyose, 07:10:04) and as an international one in its concern to address the debts of low-income countries. I focus below on JSA’s campaign to cancel the apartheid-era debt, as this has represented by far the strongest and most vociferous debt-related campaign initiated by the movement to date.
Apartheid debt

We’re calling for the cancellation of Apartheid debt, the reimbursement of debts already paid by democratic South Africa, and the return of company profits made during Apartheid in the form of reparation payments. Reparations should also be paid to the people of Southern Africa, who also suffered under Apartheid (Gabriel in Rotoreda 2000).

Apartheid debt is considered to constitute the indebtedness incurred by pre-democratic era apartheid governments in South Africa, as well as by governments in Southern African countries. ‘Our argument in the local chapter of Jubilee 2000 is that the apartheid government was undemocratic and that much of the money it borrowed was used to beef up its military power in order to conduct cross-border raids into Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe in pursuit of South African citizens who had sought refuge in those countries. Those loans did not benefit ordinary South Africans’ (Mofokeng 2000). JSA argues that, ‘the loans made by the Apartheid government were not used by the white Apartheid government to uplift the living standards of its black section of the population, but to stamp its authority in the region [and] suppress the emerging struggle […] for freedom’ (Interview, Nthako, 15:10:04), and that the current democratic government, in accepting an obligation to repay such debt, is legitimising an illegitimate obligation.

In this way, JSA argues that the debts incurred during the apartheid era are odious. As Gabriel states, ‘if there ever was an odious debt’, it was that acquired under apartheid (Gabriel in Keeton 1998). The Doctrine of Odious Debt suggests that a debt has to meet two criteria to be odious: it must be contrary to the needs and wishes of the population; and creditors must recognise that the loans they provide have been acquired by illegitimate regimes for their own very narrow advantage (Ashley 2003; Khalfan et al 2003). ‘If Apartheid was a crime against humanity, is the debt inherited from that terrible system not equally criminal? […] We cannot allow our country to be held accountable for debt which we not only did not incur, but which was incurred to be used against us’ (Harvey 1999). The debt is also considered to be substantial, with JSA asserting that the stock of debt inherited from the apartheid era aggregates US$26 billion. Because of its magnitude, the stakes are high:

‘If the campaign succeeds, it will release funds to enable the government to fulfil its promises to the electorate: accelerating delivery, poverty reduction, and job creation’ (Harvey 1999). The campaign argues, for example, that reducing the interest servicing of approximately R40 billion on South Africa’s national debt, would free up resources for social services. This is considered particularly appropriate because of the tight fiscal policies and in the context of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy of the post-1994 government. The argument has been consistently used to lobby support for the objective of unilateral debt cancellation.

In further arguing for the cancellation of apartheid debt, JSA asserts that adequate – indeed unnecessarily large – profits have already been made by creditors and, moreover, that there is a moral and conceptual linkage between apartheid reparations and compensation to victims of the holocaust: apartheid debt cancellation and the provision of reparations for apartheid victims would be akin to the victims of the
holocaust receiving compensation. ‘The World Bank and Pretoria’s other international creditors made excellent profits from Apartheid loans, and we won’t allow them to dawdle for 50 years before repaying our democratic society, the way Swiss banks did with holocaust victims’ (Giyose and Dor 2001). As Archbishop Ndungane states, ‘We cannot wait 50 years [for reparations] like the victims of the Holocaust’ (KSG 2003).

The government’s response to apartheid debt cancellation

Crucial to the outcome of the campaign to cancel apartheid-era debt has been the government’s stance. Initially, JSA adopted a cautiously optimistic approach, expecting tacit government support. As Dor notes, ‘[a]s we were calling for the cancellation of the debt, we wanted the quiet support of Government’ (Interview, Dor, 08:10:04).

While JSA recognised that the post-apartheid South African government would be in a difficult position in publicly accepting the validity of the debt cancellation argument, and that financial markets were likely to be adversely affected, at least initially, by governmental endorsement of the claim, to JSA such reasoning did not justify the lack of state support for 100% debt cancellation. ‘[I]f our government’s fears are well-founded, if it is the faceless financial markets, the selfish profit-seekers from abroad who ultimately tell our government what to do, then the struggle for national liberation has still to be won’ (Ashley 1999). JSA also made sure to remind the democratically-elected ANC government of its apartheid-era debt position: that, in the 1980s, the ANC ‘publicly condemned the banks’ role in rescheduling the debt as an act of inhumanity and said that “when the time comes, the South African people will not be unmindful of the role of banks in making profit out of the misery of our people”’ (Ashley 1999).

Clearly, JSA hoped that a neutral stance would prevail, in which government neither committed itself publicly to the debt cancellation campaign nor rejected it. These hopes have been dashed. Government, through the National Treasury, has rejected the claim that apartheid-era debt should be cancelled, challenged the claim that apartheid debt exists, and proclaimed that apartheid debt represents, if anything, only a portion of the country’s external indebtedness, asserting that ‘[f]oreign debt is only 5% of our total debt and most of this was borrowed after 1994’ (in Rotoreda 2000); and that foreign debt accumulated by apartheid governments aggregates ‘at most 1% of government debt’ (Kganyago in Eveleth 1998). With the largest share of foreign obligations argued to have been assumed after 1994, the Treasury’s argument is that there is no apartheid debt (Ashley 2003).

Furthermore, if apartheid debt is defined to include domestic debt, the Treasury argues that there are valid arguments against its cancellation. The presence of international sanctions after the debt moratorium declared in 1985 obliged successive apartheid governments to impose a system of prescribed assets, obliging government to borrow resources from the local financial services sector (Kganyago in Eveleth 1998). Government sold bonds to these entities, including insurance companies and the public service pension fund. Accordingly, when the claim to cancel apartheid debt was initially made in 1998, approximately a fifth of all government debt was held by private insurers (Kganyago in Eveleth 1998).
The Treasury argues that cancelling the bonds, and therefore cancelling the governments’ obligations to these private insurers, would result in the cancellation of the ‘investment of ordinary people who hold insurance policies’ (Kganyago in Eveleth 1998). Consequently, for the Treasury, accepting the notion that apartheid debt includes governments’ domestic debt incurred during the apartheid era would result, in part, in ordinary people losing their savings.

By contrast, JSA rejects all of these arguments, and in several interviews key officials express puzzlement and dismay at the government’s stance on debt cancellation - shifting quickly and unexpectedly from neutrality to one of open rejection. While none are accepted, JSA cites several reasons for the government’s approach, including concern over the effects of open support, concern for international investment behaviour in South Africa, a sheer refusal to engage with JSA, and a sense that there is substantial data on Apartheid debt that is not being shared with the public. Rudin observes, ‘[o]ur government’s policy was desperate to attract foreign investment and anything like debt cancellation was seen as counter to that imperative’ (Interview, Rudin, 04:10:04).

Dor, citing the examples of Poland, which received debt cancellation, and, more recently, Iraq, which is seeking cancellation, observes, ‘even within GEAR it is easy to maintain debt cancellation and still retain investor confidence’ (Interview, Dor, 08:10:04). Giyose further notes that the Treasury has most recently accepted the principle of debt cancellation in the case of Iraq, and that the same principle should inevitably apply to post-apartheid South Africa: ‘The government appears to be half understanding the issue and half not’ (Interview, Giyose, 07:10:04).

The cancellation of developing country debt

JSA has also actively campaigned for international debt cancellation. While failing to gain government support for the cancellation of apartheid debt, initially JSA appeared to be gaining government’s support for debt cancellation elsewhere. At JSA’s launch, the tone was upbeat, with JSA perceiving government to be directly supportive of the objective of debt cancellation: ‘Democratic South Africa has shown them (industrial country creditors) the way. Notwithstanding its own financial constraints, it cancelled the odious debts of Namibia incurred under South African occupation. In doing so, the ANC government did not consider whether unilateral debt cancellation could be “afforded”; nor did it impose adjustments or other preconditions on its neighbour. We call upon the rich countries to follow the example of the new South African government…’ (Jubilee 2000 South Africa 1998). Indeed, indirect support appeared to be forthcoming from the ANC Parliamentary caucus for the call for international debt cancellation.

Subsequently, differences have arisen regarding the proposed scope of international debt cancellation. JSA has called for outright and complete cancellation of developing country debt, while Government has supported the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. The Initiative focuses on reducing debt to a defined ‘sustainable’ level and stops short of outright debt cancellation. As George Dor stated in response to the Initiative, ‘[t]here is progress, but we are a long way from victory on debt relief’ (in Eveleth 1999). Harvey puts it more bluntly, stating, ‘In the face of the enormous poverty, starvation and death in this country, Africa and the entire Third World rescheduling of debt or minor debt
relief is a miserable concession. Total debt cancellation, which is not what President Thabo Mbeki called for […] is the only appropriate remedy’ (Harvey 1999).

4. Reparations campaign

More recently, the claim that apartheid-era debt should be cancelled has moderated, and JSA has shifted strategic focus toward a second campaign – reparations for the victims of apartheid. In part, this may be due to recognition that the quantum of debt specifically contracted during the apartheid period, either by the South African government or by governments in Southern Africa, is diminishing and being replaced by new debt instruments. As Ashley observes,

As you may know, most of the apartheid debt has now been repaid. This has necessitated a shift in strategy by JSA. On the one hand, we are now focused on pursuing reparations against those commercial, financial and multilateral institutions that did business with Apartheid South Africa. On the other hand we are focusing on the illegitimate new loans that the ANC government has taken out especially in relation to a very large arms procurement deal. (Ashley 2003)

The passage of time and the diminution in the quantum of loans embraced by the original loan obligations has presented a significant challenge to JSA as, if there are no debts left to cancel, a major platform of JSA is removed, and its debt-related objectives and campaigns are obliged to focus on debt cancellation elsewhere. JSA’s response has been to recognise this potential challenge and to devise a new strategy, focusing on reparations. The shift does not represent an abandonment of the claim for cancellation, and indeed is considered to be part of a logical progression in campaigning. As Rudin observes, ‘[r]eparations was presented as early as 1997 as one form of debt cancellation’ (Interview, Rudin, 04:10:04). Furthermore, the linkage between debt and reparations offers important advantages for JSA:

Linking debt and reparations simultaneously avoids duplication and potential divisiveness. Furthermore, the linkage ensures that each campaign concurrently builds on and strengthens the other so that the combined campaign exerts sufficient influence for each one to be taken seriously. (Ashley 2003)

This strategy has been useful for JSA, providing an opportunity to shift focus at a moment when the national government has proved unwilling to accept JSA’s claims regarding apartheid-era debt, so enabling JSA to maintain momentum, as well as both domestic and international support, while at the same time retaining the ability to resuscitate the claim for debt cancellation. It has also enabled JSA to ensure that a historically solid support base, the international anti-apartheid movement, does not disappear as the apartheid debt claim winds down.

One of Jubilee’s strengths in its apartheid debt campaign has been its ability to draw on the international anti-apartheid movements that played such an important role in the defeat of apartheid. The solidarity provided by these international groups can be expected in support of Jubilee’s reparations campaign (Ashley 2003).
That JSA has not abandoned, but essentially shifted, its strategy, is illustrated by the sentiment expressed by JSA’s chairperson when referring to the issue of apartheid debt: ‘Mr. Manuel has never wanted to sit at a table to have a discussion. The days are coming when he or his successor will do so’ (Interview, Rudin, 04:10:04).

**Apartheid reparations**

In the year of its launch, JSA embarked on an Apartheid Debt and Reparations Campaign (ADRC). The Reparations Campaign can be summed up by its slogans ‘Won’t pay for Apartheid Twice! Cancel the Apartheid Debt!’ (Ashley 1999), and ‘Apartheid is ended, Mandela is free, sanctions are finished. But the people of the region cannot celebrate, because they are being asked to pay a second time for Apartheid’ (Hanlon 1998). The initiative has subsequently vigorously campaigned for the cancellation of debts owed to the UK, US, German, and Swiss banks that lent to the apartheid government, as well as reparations from companies, both domestic and international, which invested in South Africa during apartheid.

JSA pursues its reparations campaign through the ARDC in collaboration with the Khulumani Support Group (KSG), which represents the victims of apartheid state violence. The group was established in 1995 to support apartheid victims revealed by the Truth and Reconciliation process (KSG 2003). ‘In this claim, we express our commitment to the future of apartheid’s victims, to the protection of human rights, and to the rule of law’ (ADRC 2002b).

The campaign has pursued significant international initiatives. Legal action was launched in 2002 against eight banks, as well as twelve oil, transport, information technology and arms companies in the US, based on the Alien Tort Claims Act (ADRC 2002b). The Act permits the filing of claims by foreigners against companies active in the US that are alleged to have committed human rights violations.

**US litigation**

Several legal complaints have been filed in New York, ostensibly on behalf of the victims of apartheid. The process has been marked by confusion and initially by denials and a series of claims, counterclaims and clarifications. The first of the lawsuits was announced and filed by a US lawyer, Edward Fagan, on 17 June 2002.

The initial claim spurred denials and demonstrated a significant degree of confusion, both within ADRC, and between ADRC and its legal counsel. JSA had been in dialogue with Mr. Fagan prior to the filing of the complaints, but the complaints were apparently not filed on the instruction of the ADRC (Abrahams 2002). Indeed, the complaints ‘were neither on our instruction, nor had we planned to file claims on that date. The claims were nonetheless filed by Mr. Fagan with the full knowledge and participation of the South African led advocate we had mandated. This raised further serious concerns about the manner in which the cases were being handled and resulted in a breakdown of communication between the ADRC and the South African and US lawyers involved in the filing of the June 17 claims’ (Abrahams 2002).
In late 2002, JSA, through the ADRC, as well as the KSG, instituted separate legal proceedings (KSG 2003). A different US Attorney, Michael Hausfeld, was engaged to proceed with the claims on behalf of the ADRC (ARDC 2002b). The purpose was to seek reparations from a group of banks and international corporations that conducted business in South Africa during the apartheid period and which were accused of having incurred secondary liability for the system of apartheid by having aided and abetted the system (‘Summary of the Complaint’ n.d.). The ADRC and KSG asserted that the lawsuits were filed ‘after four years of failed attempts to get multinational banks and businesses that propped up the apartheid state to account for their “odious profiteering”’ (ADRC 2002b). Subsequently, JSA has sought to highlight several important distinctions between the Fagan-led suit and the Hausfeld (i.e. ADRC/Khulumani)-led suits, in particular asserting that the ADRC/Khulumani/JSA supported suit only focuses on non-South African corporations, whereas the Fagan-led suit includes both South African and non-South African corporations (Financial Services Correspondent 2003).

In a statement outlining the basis for the US lawsuit, the ADRC explain that the legal basis has comprised customary international law, with the latter representing the ‘conscience of the community of nation-states as a whole, as it is the expression of norms acceptable and those unacceptable to humanity as a whole’ (Abrahams 2002). Following the outlawing of slavery in the 18th century as an abominable trade, there have been a series of acts recognised as abominable and unacceptable international behaviour, the most recent of these being apartheid, which was declared a crime against humanity by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973. Moreover, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court explicitly cites apartheid as an international crime over which it has jurisdiction. The ADRC notes that South Africa is a state party to the Rome Statute (ADRC 2002a).

For all of these reasons, the ADRC has considered there to be a prima facie case, based on secondary liability in customary international law, to proceed against foreign banks and corporations operating in South Africa during the apartheid period:

The corporations aided and abetted a crime against humanity whose persistent social damage requires urgent repair […] They made massive profits while the suffering of the victims of apartheid intensified. The banks and businesses have consistently ignored our attempts to engage in discussion about their role in supporting broad social programmes for the reconstruction and development of affected communities and in compensating specific individuals for the damage that the corporations made possible (ADRC 2002b).

The actual claimants cited in the lawsuit are individual members of the KSG, as well as the group itself, all of whom claim to have suffered injuries resulting from recognised categories of violations of customary international law, including torture, extra-judicial killing, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, sexual violence, long unlawful detention, and the ‘disappearance’ of relatives.

A third group of litigants in US courts has comprised a group of South Africans living in Connecticut, USA, who claim to have been victims of apartheid.
Why litigation has been pursued

The ADRC argues that there have been several opportunities, none of which have been taken up, for the relevant banks and corporations to seek amnesty from prosecution (ADRC 2002a). The first opportunity was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a key finding of whose final report is the direct assigning of blameworthiness to businesses operating during the apartheid period:

> Business was central to the economy that sustained the South African state during the apartheid years. Certain businesses, especially the mining industry, were involved in helping to design and implement apartheid policies. Other businesses benefited from cooperating with the security structures of the former state. Most businesses benefited from operating in a racially structured context. (‘Summary of the Complaint’ n.d.)

The ADRC argues that, despite this observation, none of the banks and corporations facing litigation came forward at the time of the TRC hearings. The ADRC acknowledges that the TRC provided opportunities for individual, not institutional, amnesty, but argues, ‘this should not have precluded foreign corporations and banks to come forward and reveal their complicity with the Apartheid regime’ (Abrahams 2002).

JSA notes that the second opportunity to come forward was presented by JSA’s ‘Cancel the Apartheid Debt’ campaign, which provided a clear opportunity for banks and corporations operating during the apartheid period to acknowledge their cooperation with the apartheid regime and to cancel their debts ‘as an act of reparations in favour of the people of South Africa’ (ADRC 2002a).

The extent of the claim for reparations lodged by the ADRC and KSG is significant, with the plaintiffs claiming the combined value of all loans made by US banks and companies to the apartheid state, including the value of all loans already repaid, as well as the profits made by these institutions from these loans (Ashley 2003).

The filing of the initial Fagan-led suit prompted an immediate rebuttal by JSA. In a joint statement with the ADRC and KSG, JSA indicated, ‘[l]awyer-led complaints filed in American courts against South African corporations for Apartheid reparations are untimely’ (ADRC 2003). The statement carefully distinguished between foreign and South African corporations. In regard to the latter, ‘a different approach is required…to repair the persistent social and individual damage done by Apartheid’ (ADRC 2003).

The ADRC statement emphasised that insufficient contributions had been made by South African corporations toward reparation funds for the victims of apartheid. While these corporations were complicit in and benefited from apartheid – ‘[t]hose that helped the Apartheid government do its dirty work should be made to pay’ (Mosikare in Friedman 2003) – the statement urged that the corporations be engaged through processes of national dialogue within the framework of the TRC. For South African corporations, reparations should be forthcoming through a process of dialogue and only as a last resort through court proceedings: ‘[w]hile we hope that SA corporations will consider dialogue, if there is no willingness on their part to do so, then Khulumani
could consider adding SA corporations to its list of defendants’ (Gabriel in Financial Services Correspondent 2003).

Clearly, JSA, the ADRC and the KSG sought to adopt a dual strategy: foreign corporations would continue to be pursued through the courts, while South African corporations would be pursued initially through dialogue. Several factors, however, may appear to be relevant to JSA and KSG’s decision to distance themselves from the lawyer-led complaints in the US.

Firstly, South African corporations are likely to have been perceived to be more amenable to the provision of reparations and more likely to respond to dialogue. Archbishop Ndungane discusses how the lawsuits were filed out of ‘sheer frustration’ after calls for dialogue were not taken seriously (in SAPA 2003). Secondly, there is likely to have been some concern about the legal costs involved. Thirdly, there appears to have been concern that the course taken by the US-based lawsuits could be damaging to the integrity of the claims being lodged by the ADRC and Khulumani. And finally, both JSA and the ADRC are likely to have identified an opportunity to emphasise their broader intent to contribute to consensual approaches to societal change. Indeed, the latter reason appears to be discernible from the media statement: ‘[s]uch engagement will go a long way to avoid the negative consequences of long legal battles. It will also contribute to building a broad national consensus towards a new South African society, which the lawsuits cannot achieve in isolation’ (ADRC 2003).

In October 2003, the KSG issued a press statement seeking to further distance its suit from the two other suits being pursued in US courts (KSG 2003). The statement highlights four differences: firstly, that the Khulumani suit is not a class action suit seeking redress on behalf of vast sections of South African society, and instead focuses on the claims of 82 individuals and an organisation of apartheid victims. Secondly, that the suit is not seeking broad social relief, unlike the other suits. Thirdly, that the suit does not rely on ‘domestic legal theories’. And finally, that the suit does not seek relief against South African multinational corporations. The KSG statement accordingly suggests that, instead of consolidating the three suits, as had previously been suggested, the three suits should be ‘coordinated’.

The press statement signals an important shift in the approach of Khulumani/ADRC and JSA. The quest to utilise the US litigation process to advance broader social objectives is being jettisoned, and a far more circumscribed set of objectives is being put forward. Distance is being put between the two other suits, which allege conspiracy and unjust enrichment, in favour of a narrower argument that the corporations being sued aided and abetted apartheid. KSG, ADRC and JSA have all at various times campaigned for broader social transformation in part to overcome apartheid’s legacy, and the rhetoric in support of reparations as an instrument to this objective has been strident. Yet the scope of litigation against corporations that are said to have connived in apartheid is comparatively modest, and distance is deliberately put between the Khulumani case and the two other suits that have set broader, social transformatory objectives.

Explained as being on account of different legal strategies (KSG 2003), the movement has strongly distanced itself from the, in the words of Gabriel, ‘cowboy tactics’
(Gabriel in Terreblanche 2002b), used by the Fagan-led suit, which has been characterised, for example, by advertisements in South African newspapers seeking victims of apartheid (AFP 2001), and by media road shows of Holocaust survivors and apartheid victims (Burkeman 2002). ‘We should ensure that the process is South African-led and that no one personality should take the spotlight away from the cause itself and the victims of Apartheid’ (Ngcebetsha in Burkeman 2002). As Gabriel states, ‘This is not a lottery where people can buy their ticket and expect to win. We have raised criticisms of lawyers who have given that impression’ (Gabriel in Burkeman 2002). Jubilee South Africa has sought to distance itself from this approach, to avoid the perception that the purpose of the suits is to extract large payments, and seeks instead to focus on the economic and social consequences of apartheid and to appropriately compensate its victims.

A further reason may comprise a degree of embarrassment, as well as concern by Khulumani/ADRC/JSA, that the litigation process has taken an unexpected and unwanted turn, with totally foreign-directed intervention, through the jurisdiction of US courts, in South African affairs. The Khulumani press statement, while amply clarifying the position of the group, also suggests a defensive strategy.

The initial comment of the judge adjudicating all three claims has indicated a reluctance to grant them consideration. Judge Sprizzo has expressed scepticism about bringing a case against the corporations, questioning the proof of the corporations’ influence on the South African government’s policies: ‘[e]njoying the benefits of crime is not enough to prove participation. There’s no indication that the defendants helped shape the policies of the South African government’ (in Lauria 2004). Secondly, he appears to reject the contention that United Nations General Assembly resolutions represented a prohibition on apartheid, and thirdly, questions whether there are any international conventions or treaties that make ‘aiding and abetting’, a principal charge in each of the three suits, a crime (Lauria 2004).

The results of the initial hearings have reduced the prospect that the three US suits will succeed. Nevertheless, no decision has been taken to dismiss the suits, and the cases have proceeded with the expectation that they will run for several years (Rostron 2002).

The domestic struggle for reparations

While the US litigation by KSG does not include South African corporations, JSA makes it clear that domestic corporations share blameworthiness. ‘We call upon business, both local and foreign, to acknowledge their complicity in making profit out of Apartheid and of protecting the regime for all but, in some instances, the terminal years of Apartheid’ (Giyose 2003).

JSA has also made specific demands on South African corporations, insisting that they enter into dialogue with the movement and other stakeholders, ‘with a view to making contributions to a debt and reparations fund; with the R100 billion the South African mining industry is making available to create a tiny number of black mine owners serving as a benchmark of what is meant by a meaningful contribution’ (Giyose 2003). Reparations include not only monetary compensation, but also educational, human rights, justice, redistributive, and transformative dimensions (Giyose 2003).
Recently, there has been growing frustration at what the movement considers to be a lack of progress. In late 2003, the movement launched a new component of its domestic reparations strategy, involving the initiation of community-level hearings, at which communities express and define the scale and nature of reparations they feel are likely to adequately address the damage caused to them under apartheid. The process is envisaged to culminate in a People’s Tribunal, where the victims and perpetrators are determined and reparations are set out.

The People’s Tribunal approach was utilised with significant success in the Jubilee 2000 coalition, generating effective and, in some instances, comprehensive popular pressure against ‘creditors.’ The approach has also been used internationally, for example during the World Social Forum, as a method of concentrating attention on the key allegations and claims associated with debt (International Peoples’ Tribunal on Debt n.d.). Its use is likely to prove successful for JSA and the ADRC, particularly in escalating a naming and shaming process and, in so doing, extracting tangible concessions for victims of apartheid.

**Modes of mobilisation**

The campaign has enjoyed robust international support, with the issue of reparations raised through media campaigns, direct meetings with government officials, public events, as well as a series of international conferences that brought together victims and alleged perpetrators, government officials, and others involved in the international campaign.

In addition, a strong international research capacity has developed. A national research team assists the ADRC, while an international network of researchers also supports the campaign and was particularly useful in preparing the legal strategy prior to the launch of the US litigation in November 2002. Partner campaigns have been established in Switzerland, Germany, Britain, and the US. In addition, a variety of networks, which are partners of the ADRC and of JSA, have supported the campaign in Namibia, Canada, and the Netherlands, and church groups and trade unions have secured international support.

Domestic mobilisation has taken several forms, including the establishment of ADRC and successful mobilisation of several civil society organisations, all focused on the theme of reparations. The response to the government’s statement on apartheid reparations in April 2003 is a case in point, with JSA, KSG, and SACC initially proposing separate conferences, then establishing instead a combined steering committee including several church, civil society and other movements, to prepare for a national conference. A Jubilee Preparatory Conference was held in July 2003, attended by 35 organisations, and the national conference, entitled ‘Opening Civil Society Dialogue on Reparations’, was held in late-August 2003, endorsing the view that the monetary quantum for reparations offered by government was inadequate, agreeing that the number of victims far exceeded the number specified by government (19 000), expressing near-unanimous support for US litigation, and proposing a new Reparations Movement to be coordinated by the ADRC (Minutes 2003).
Government’s response

Governments’ response has focused on two issues: its response to the US lawsuits; and its decision in respect of the compensation of the victims of apartheid, following the release of the final TRC report. In respect of the lawsuits, it has rejected these, refused to be a party to them and refused to accept any verdict that would compel government to act, in respect of both the Fagan- and Hausfeld-led suits.

Instead it has asserted a pre-eminent claim to represent the sovereign interests of the country, with Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Penuell Maduna sending an unsolicited affidavit directly to the court, asserting the Government’s position that the lawsuits undermine South African sovereignty and asking the relevant courts not to adjudicate in the suits, but instead to dismiss them (SAPA 2003). As Maduna stated, ‘[w]e consider it completely unacceptable that matters that are central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts’ (in Friedman 2003).

By contrast, Khulumani Executive Director Ike Tlholwe states, ‘[t]here is no intention of diminishing or nullifying the sovereignty of the government but rather a willingness to work with the rulers that we lived and died to put in office’ (KSG 2003). The unsolicited affidavit was regarded as particularly antagonistic by JSA, who argued that both the Minister and government as a whole had initially indicated tacit support for the suits, but then betrayed the movement by opposing the actions; government was also accused of interfering in the court process (Dor 2003).

Subsequently, former President Mandela has supported the government’s approach, however, Archbishop Tutu, the former chairperson of the TRC, lodged a separate appeal to Judge Sprizzo, urging him to support the litigation and arguing that the litigation would not harm investor sentiment (Peryman 2004).

Regarding compensation for apartheid victims, the TRC and JSA, on the one hand, and the government on the other, have differed significantly on the extent of compensation that should be granted to victims of apartheid. In its final report, the TRC recommended that victims be paid a total of R3 billion. To achieve this, the TRC recommended that government introduce a wealth tax on South African businesses to contribute to the payment of reparations. The government responded by indicating that it would pay R30 000 each (or about a fifth of the amount contained in the TRC’s recommendations) (Zuma in Terreblanche 2004) to approximately 19 000 victims of apartheid identified by the TRC, with an aggregate compensation of R571.5 million (Mbeki in Wanneburg and Chege 2003). The government also rejected the TRC’s recommendation to introduce a wealth tax, arguing that it would damage investor confidence (Sebelebele 2003).

JSA has criticised government for abandoning the victims of apartheid and having usurped the right of victims to speak for themselves by announcing the extent of relief without prior consultation with the KSG. In addition, government has been criticised for having instituted a process, in the TRC, which favoured the perpetrators of apartheid and not the victims: ‘[t]he TRC process will have given far more to
perpetrators than to victims… Victims are still marginalised and socially excluded and are struggling to rebuild their lives. They do not accept the argument that the improvement of general infrastructure in the country is equivalent to the direct assistance they were promised’ (KSG 2003).

5. Campaigns for broader economic and social justice

As observed by the movement’s National Secretary, JSA was established as part of wider global jubilee movement, and that movement represents ‘a call for […] economic justice’ (Gabriel in Ballenger 1999a).

Along with many other new social movements, JSA cites an array of government policies to make the claim that there has been a decisive shift away from pro-poor policies toward a neoliberal approach. Arguments include the adoption and persistence with GEAR, partial and, in some instances, full asset sales, a strong relationship between the South African authorities and both the IMF and the World Bank Group, tight fiscal and monetary policies, as well as a host of microeconomic policy measures. Dor cites GEAR as a major reason for South Africa’s public health crisis, stating, in reference to the proposed World Bank loan for public healthcare, ‘[t]he World Bank wrote the section in GEAR on cutting funds for social expenditure and ensured that this was implemented. Therefore, the government is turning to the same institution largely responsible for the crisis to bail us out’ (Dor 2001b); there is ‘no use asking the arsonist to put out the fire’ (Giyose and Dor 2001). Dennis Brutus states, ‘[w]hen the World Bank says South Africa is on the right track it means we are following their policy which leads to greater poverty and joblessness’ (in SAPA 2000).

The movement recognises the close nexus between debt, macroeconomic policy, and basic needs, noting, ‘Jubilee structures throughout the country have a lot of work to do to make the link between debt, GEAR and people’s needs more tangible to workers and the poor and to develop a broad support base for the campaign’ (Dor 2001a).

Consequently, throughout its campaigns, debt has been deployed as an instrument, not an end in itself: ‘[f]or those of us who were at the forefront of the formulation of Jubilee, the taking up of the issue of Apartheid debt was a means by which we could expose and challenge this shift to neoliberalism and facilitate the coming into existence of a broader movement that could start challenging not just the Apartheid debt but also neoliberalism’ (Ashley 2003).

There have been several specific methods of intervention, including, in particular, working closely with COSATU, the SACC, and SANGOCO in support of a People’s Budget: ‘A People’s Budget entails the scrapping of the Apartheid debt and imposing appropriate levels of taxation for companies and higher income earners, thus releasing resources for social expenditure sufficient to meet people’s basic needs and to stimulate the creation of jobs in the process’ (Jubilee 2000 South Africa 2001). This involves continual work in making connections between debt, the budget, privatisation, and HIV/AIDS (Jubilee South Meetings 2004).

The movement’s approach to contesting the arms deal has followed a similar approach, opting to work in conjunction with a broad group of other social movements and NGOs, in particular the Coalition Against Military Spending (CAMS), on the Ceasefire
Campaign (CAMS 2000). Making the connection between debt, arms spending and social expenditure, Dor states, ‘if the government scraps the Apartheid debt and the R50 billion arms deal […] it can do away with its GEAR policy and replace it with a policy that addresses people’s health and social needs’ (Dor 2001b). JSA asserts that apartheid precipitated enormous, wasteful expenditure on arms, and that the ‘impact of the arms deal on the majority of South Africans is central to Jubilee 2000 South Africa’s concern. The vast amounts being swallowed up by the deal represent vital resources that could be allocated to service delivery’ (Press Statement n.d.). In this vein, JSA demands ‘the prioritisation of the eradication of poverty before spending public funds on armaments’ (Declaration of Civil Society Anti-Corruption Summit 2002). The movement has accordingly been active in preparing position documents, contributing to the organising of rallies and marches, and in its work on the People’s Budget.

JSA has also campaigned for a reversion to a pre-1990 method of financing civil service pensions, as a means of freeing up financial resources to address the country’s socio-economic challenges (Eveleth 1998). JSA argues that the government’s interest bill, including for domestic debt, has increased very significantly in the past decade and a half, in part as a result of a switch in 1990 from a pay-as-you-go system of funding civil service pensions, to an interest-based system, in which pension fund contributions are invested and the interest from the proceeds is used to finance the payment of pensions of retired civil servants (Eveleth 1998). The National Treasury has publicly dismissed the demand to return to the previous system as ‘irresponsible’ (Ensor 2004).

6. Conclusions

In the six years since its launch, JSA has evolved from a coalition initially focused on debt-related issues, to a movement that has developed strong and effective campaigns for reparations on economic and social justice. Although a relatively new movement with challenges ahead, JSA has so far proved adept in many respects. It has successfully switched priorities at defining moments, as in its shift in focus to reparations at a time when the quest for the cancellation of apartheid-era debt appeared to be flagging, while simultaneously building stronger provincial structures to later resume the apartheid debt campaign; it has utilised coalition support in struggling for economic and social justice, and established a new set of doctrines in regard to international debt via its use of the Doctrine of Odious Debt. Throughout, the movement has succeeded in maintaining and building support.

Nthako notes that Jubilee ‘started as an international movement, but [that] the campaign can only be strengthened if national movements can be developed’ (Interview, Nthako, 15:10:04). Effectively linking past apartheid struggles with present-day struggles for economic and social justice, Jubilee South Africa demonstrates the possibilities of collective action in democratic South Africa.

Acknowledgement

I would like to acknowledge the detailed, obliging, and crucial assistance in the preparation of this paper of Ms. Roya M. P. Damabi of the School of Development
Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Without her help, the completion of the paper would not have been possible.

References


Apartheid Debt and Reparations Campaign. 9 April 2003. Media Statement – Apartheid Reparation Lawsuits Against South African Corporations are Untimely.


Ashley, Brian. 1 March 2003. Apartheid South Africa as a Case Study for Cancellation of Illegitimate Debt.


Bandaña, Alejandro. 1999. Jubilee South and the Call for a New Strategic Alliance.


Khalfan, Ashfaq, Jeff King, and Bryan Thomas. 2003. Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine.


Press Statement. n.d. No Loans for Weapons!

Reparations Towards Another World: Declaration of the Jubilee South Africa and Jubilee South Workshop, 28 to 30 August 2001.

Rodoreda, Geoff.2002. ‘Coughing up for Apartheid’ in Mail & Guardian 8 December.

Rostron, Bryan. 2002 ‘The Business of Apartheid: The Role of Multinational Corporations and Banks under South Africa’s Racist Regime is Finally Coming to Light. Some would Rather it Didn’t’ in New Statesman 12 August.


**Interviews**

Dor, George. General Secretary, Jubilee South Africa. 08:10:04.

Giyose, MP. Chairperson, Jubilee South Africa. 07:10:04.


Rudin, Jeff. Alternative Information and Development Centre. 04:10:04.
Annexure 1

Questionnaire – CCS Project on New Social Movements

Jubilee Movements

The following questionnaire seeks answers to a range of key issues associated with the current study of three Jubilee movements, comprising Jubilee 2000 and its successor movements; Jubilee 2000 South Africa; and Jubilee South. The questionnaire focuses on ten key themes. These include the origin of the specific movement among the three mentioned above, with which you are affiliated; its objectives and means of achieving these; its membership; its leadership and organizational structure; its mode of communication and mobilisation; its geographical scope; its relationship with other Jubilee movements, including the two other Jubilee movements mentioned above; its relationship with government; and finally its relationship with other social movements.

For clarity, in the ensuing questionnaire, we will refer to the movement to which you are most closely affiliated, among the three movements we mentioned above (i.e.: Jubilee 2000 and its successors; Jubilee 2000 South Africa; and Jubilee South) as “your” movement; and to the other two movements we have mentioned, as the “other” movements.

Please indicate which movement you are most closely affiliated with:

……… (Your movement)

1. Origins

We are trying to better understand the origins of new social movements. In the case of your movement, your insights into the following issues would help greatly in appreciating how and for what reasons the movement arose.

1.1 Please can you indicate how the movement arose?

1.2 Were there any key events which gave rise to the movement?

1.3 Were there any key issues which gave rise to the movement?

1.4 Is there a founding charter, or similar document, for the movement?

1.5 Did the movement arise because of developments in South Africa, or as a result of developments elsewhere? Please explain.

1.6 Did the other movements have anything to do with the establishment of your movement? If so, please explain.
1.7 Since its first establishment, have the objectives of the movement changed or expanded in any way?

1.8 Did the movement arise as a broadly domestic or a broadly international movement? How has this changed since the first establishment of the movement?

2. **Objectives and Means to Achieve These**

2.1 Please can you describe the key objectives of the movement?

2.2 Have these objectives remained the same, or have they changed since the movement was first established?

2.3 If there have been changes in objectives, please indicate what has brought these changes about.

2.4 If debt forgiveness is one of the objectives of the movement, does the movement distinguish between different types of debts? Should all debts be forgiven?

2.5 Is the movement’s focus on debts owed by institutions or governments, or debts owed by individuals? In the view of the movement, is there any distinction?

2.6 Is the forgiveness of debt owed by South African institutions or South Africa people an objective of the movement’s work in South Africa? If so, what debt should be forgiven and who are viewed to be the lenders and recipients respectively? Please explain.

2.7 How does the movement view the claim that Apartheid Debt should be forgiven and what is Apartheid Debt considered to comprise?

2.8 Please can you describe the key means which the movement uses to achieve its objectives? To what extent do these vary, from theme to theme; and from geographic location to geographic location? Are there any other factors which cause these means to vary?

2.9 Has the movement been successful in achieving its objectives? What have been the key successes and what have been the key failures to date?

2.10 What would happen to the movement if it achieved all of its objectives?

3. **Membership**

3.1 Is there a formal process for obtaining membership of the movement?

3.2 If not, how does the movement perceive its membership base?

3.3 Please indicate who the members of the movement are. For example, which types of social and other groups are members?
3.4 In terms of individuals, what does the movement estimate to be its size in South Africa? And what does it estimate to be its size elsewhere?

3.5 Does the membership vary, depending on the specific objective being pursued?

3.6 In what way is the movement able to “demonstrate” its membership, either to itself, or to other agents, for example to government?

3.7 Is there any specific concentration of members in particular geographic areas of South Africa, or elsewhere?

4. **Leadership & Organisational Structure**

4.1 Is there a leadership of the movement? If so, how does the leadership come about? And how is leadership renewed and changed?

4.2 Is there an organizational structure? If so, what is the nature of this structure?

4.3 How important are leadership and organizational structure to the functioning of the movement?

4.4 How important are leadership and organizational structure to achieving the objectives of the movement?

5. **Communication and Mobilisation**

5.1 How does the movement communicate among its members?

5.2 If there is a leadership and/or an organizational structure, how is communication effected between these organs?

5.3 How does the movement communicate with other movements in South Africa or elsewhere?

5.4 How does mobilization take place and what methods are used to mobilize?

5.5 Does the method of mobilization depend on the issue being addressed by the movement, or are mobilization methods broadly the same regardless of the issue? Please explain.

5.6 Are communication and mobilization processes different depending on geographical location? For example do processes differ depending on whether the issue being communicated or the issue on which mobilization is taking place is based in South Africa, or internationally?

5.7 How hi-tech are the communications and mobilization processes? Please explain.
6. Geographical Scope

6.1 The study seeks to inquire into the geographical scope of the movement, both in terms of membership and in terms of its objectives.

6.2 Are the issues which the movement focuses on able to be defined in terms of specific geographical areas of South Africa? Are they localized themes and struggles?

6.3 Are the issues raised in these local communities or are they raised in broader forums and in areas outside the communities most directly affected by the issue?

6.4 Are the struggles which the movement takes up focused mainly in the areas where the members of the movement live or work? Or are the issues and themes raised by the movement relevant to people beyond the areas in which members of the movement live or work. Please explain.

6.5 Are the work and objectives of the movement largely focused on and dealt with in South Africa? Please explain.

7. Relationship with Other Jubilee Movements

7.1 A key part of the current study focuses on the relationship between your movement and other Jubilee movements. Please can you offer insights into the following issues:

7.2 What is the relationship between your movement and other Jubilee movements?

7.3 Are the relationships largely cooperative? If so, in what way?

7.4 Are the relationships largely antagonistic? If so, in what way?

7.5 Are there key differences in objective between your movement and the other movements? If so, what are the key differences? Please try to explain in terms of the following issues:

7.6 Aside from any differences or similarities in objectives, are there any differences or similarities in terms of any of the following. Please provide whatever insights you can, as this issue is of particular interest for the project:

- Mode of operation
- Local support base
- International support base

7.7 Did your movement arise as a result of differences with the earlier jubilee movement? If so, what are the key areas of difference?
8. **Relationship with Government**

8.1 One of the key areas of inquiry of the study is the relationship between the movement and the government. We are trying to understand what the nature of this relationship is. Your insights into the following issues would be very helpful in improving appreciation of this key theme.

8.2 What is the relationship between the movement and government?

8.3 In terms of objectives, do you consider that the objectives of the movement coincide with those of government? If so, in what respects? If not, in what respects. Please try to elaborate.

8.4 Does the movement see as one of its objectives a process of educating government?

8.5 Does the movement see as one of its objectives a process of replacing current government thinking and government policy with its own? If so, in respect of which policies.

8.6 In terms of operation, would you describe the movement as one which largely works with government in attaining the movement’s objectives?

8.7 Is government at all relevant to the objectives of the movement? And can the movement’s objectives be realized even in the absence of any relationship with government?

9. **Relationship with Other Social and Other Movements**

9.1 One of the key themes of the Centre for Civil Society’s study on new social movements is the extent of inter-relationship among new social movements. In this part of the questionnaire, we are seeking to better understand these relationships.

9.2 Are there any formal relationships between the movement and other social or other movements in South Africa?

9.3 Are there similar relationships with movements outside South Africa?

9.4 Are these long-established relationships?

9.5 Do they vary, depending on the specific objectives of the movement?

10. **Financing**
10.1 A further aspect of inquiry focuses on the extent to which finance plays an important role in sustaining new social movements.

10.2 How is the movement financed?

10.3 Are the sources mainly domestic or mainly international?

10.4 Is the movement particularly dependent on one or a few sources of financing? If so, is this considered to pose any difficulty?

10.5 Are there membership fees and do these constitute a significant share of the movement’s financing?

10.6 Is financing an important aspect of the movement’s operation and existence?

10.7 Does the movement accept financing from government? Would it do so if offered? Please explain.

10.8 Does the movement accept financing from other Jubilee-related movements? Would it do so if offered? Please explain.

10.9 Is there any formal accounting procedure for the movement’s financing?