Xenophobia In South Africa and Beyond: Some Literature For A
Doctoral Research Proposal

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Seminar 2003/14

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Paper to be presented at 16:00 on Friday, 6 June 2003, in
Development Studies Seminar Room (D506)

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1 In my oral presentation I will offer some thoughts about the research design for this project.
1. INTRODUCTION

Cultural differences and social boundaries have existed at most times and in most places. Often tension and hostility are related to those boundaries. According to Gellner (1995: 8) hostility towards the ‘other’ is xenophobia. ‘Around 150 million people are foreign born, living outside their country of origin, and every year they are joined by two to three million more emigrants’ (Stalker, 2001: 8). Many international migrants receive a cold or even hostile and violent reception; indeed some are hardly treated as human beings. Xenophobia has become commonplace. Most often, whether in Europe or Africa, international migrants experience similar problems usually hatred based on ‘fear’; particularly, fear of economic competition and fear for an increase in crimes and for loss of identity. In a world of increasingly heterogeneous societies, matters of identity politics and the links between collective identities and national, racial and ethnic intolerance have assumed dramatic significance and have stimulated an enormous body of research and literature. The proposed research transcends the limitations of a national perspective, and is attempting to produce a comparative study. The comparison is aimed at showing how African and European societies have historically confronted and currently confront matters of national, racial and ethnic inclusion and exclusion.

Hjerm (1998: 337) argues that the condemnation of individuals or groups based on perceived differences, i.e. xenophobia, is part of everyday life all around the world. Xenophobic attitude or sentiments are not new, nor are they likely to disappear in the near future. Cashdan (2001: 760) argues that ‘people readily though not inevitably develop strong loyalties to their own ethnic group and discriminate against outsiders’. This statement seems to imply that ‘outsider(s)’ do not necessarily have to be foreigners, meaning someone from another country, but could be someone from another society or community (Pedahzur and Yishai, 1999). Watts (1997, 272-273) noted that ‘xenophobia is not only rejection of what is strange, the socially weak can be victims as well’.

In this proposal, however, xenophobia will be used to denote to negative attitudes and behaviours against people who are non-citizens of South Africa. In order to make a contribution to wide discussions on a concept such as xenophobia, it is important to know what is happening in various parts of the world. In that way a better understanding of reasons causes and further developments of the phenomenon will be acquired.
Xenophobia seems to be a contentious issue all over the world. In Germany and other European countries the phenomenon has generated heated debates and analyses (Ford 1992, Gellner 1995, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 1995, Ride, 1998, Vorster, 2002). Xenophobia is also increasingly receiving attention in South Africa, through specific individual studies on international migrant populations and their experiences of xenophobia in different cities and towns (Harris, 2001, Sichone, 2002, Shindondola, 2002, Nhlapo, 2002). It is also being tackled from different angles by organised groups such as the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign, Lawyers for Human Rights, National Consortium on Refugee Affairs, South African Human Rights Commission, the United Nations Higher Commission for Human Rights and the Jesuit Refugee Services. Foreigners are also organised through organisations such as, the International Organisation of Foreigners in South Africa, South African Nigerian Friendship Association and the Association of Zimbabweans living in South Africa.

This research aims at overviewing and analysing different forms of manifestations of xenophobic trends in selected countries in Europe and South Africa. It will also analyse the responses to the rise of xenophobia in the countries to be studied. Broadly, the research will try to develop some models to suggest explanations for these trends as well as possible ways of overcoming and opposing them. In the end an attempt would be made to answer the following general questions: (1) what is the scope of hatred towards foreigners, especially in South Africa (2) what are the factors that bring about hatred? (3) is there a link between a specific set of factors and a specific type of hatred? (4) can we talk about pre and post 1994 xenophobia in South Africa?

The study will shed light on how xenophobia as a phenomenon is comparable in time and space and how attached it is to specific historic, social and cultural contexts. The patterns in which xenophobia becomes dangerous and socially catastrophic are no doubt extremely diverse. The severity and frequency of incidents, groups that propagate them and those affected differ. The questions that are fundamental to the proposed thesis are as follows: What are the underlying factors that sustain xenophobia? How different is South African xenophobia from what is called ‘xenophobia’ in other countries? is South African xenophobia a mere ‘fear or hatred’ or is it actually violent, and if it is the latter, how ruthless is the aggression? what is the relationship between
xenophobic tendencies and overall level of intolerance in South African society? and what is the relationship between the legitimacy of public xenophobic rhetoric and the levels of everyday xenophobic practices? In broader terms, it is anticipated that the thesis will shed light on the question, what is xenophobia? The proposed research will pass four stages namely, defining, documenting, explaining and policy recommendation. At this stage I will stick to the first two.

The study will utilise both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Data will be collected through a semi-structured interview guide, followed by a questionnaire for a more representative sample. Johannesburg will be the main focus of the study. However two other urban centres in South Africa will be included for comparative purposes. These will be identified at a later stage, but the possibilities are Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein. The questionnaire will be developed from the data collected through face-to-face interviews. The questionnaires will be administered in all study areas, but might have to be adjusted to suit the specific characteristics of the different population groups, since these will differ in terms of race, size and perhaps gender.

2. XENOPHOBIA: ROOTS, NATURE, &, MANIFESTATIONS

The main concern of this research is to provide an answer to the question: what is xenophobia? The word xenophobia is derived from the Greek words 'xeno', meaning stranger or foreigner, and 'phobia', meaning fear. It refers to an ‘unreasonable fear and dislike of foreigners or strangers’ (Crowther, 1995). It is also used specifically as ‘an intense dislike or fear of foreigners or strangers’ (Hornby, 1994: 1482). Xenophobia tends to consist of various unexamined prejudices rather than considered and consistent views (Klegg, 1993). Xenophobia is also related to a fundamental fear of difference that can result in cultural shock. This is when a person is uncomfortable among individuals of other cultures (Reynolds and Vine, 1997). According to Hjerm (1998: 341). Xenophobia can be seen as a negative attitude toward, or fear of, individuals or groups of individuals that are in some sense different (real or imagined) from oneself or the groups(s) to which one belong(s). In South Africa, these largely unfounded fears are that foreigners are to blame for all social problems (Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign 2000). Vorster (2002: 302) expands on this as follows:
Xenophobia may have a rational basis to it, such as when it refers to a worker whose job is threatened by the intrusion of migrants whom he labels as outsiders and therefore fears. It may also take an irrational form for example, when a citizen fears a foreigner because he or she believes mistakenly that they carry knives for use as potential weapons. But to call a person xenophobic does not necessarily say anything about the rationality of that condition. Nor does it include examining the underlying causes of their characters.

In addition (Bogushevic & Tsilevich 2002: 1, Cashdan, 2001) argues that Xenophobia is often explained as a response to growing competition for scarce economic resources. They however noted that this explanation as it stands is not satisfactory. Xenophobia is most often understood as non-acceptance of diversity, rejection of and hostile attitude towards 'otherness' and 'others', the latter being immigrants, ethnic or national minorities, indigenous peoples, clergies of different faith, etc. Xenophobia without a basis is not common, often xenophobic sentiments are disguised under certain objective reasoning. Those who explicitly or implicitly adhere to or propose xenophobic views often claim 'insecurity' about their future because of some threat of some kind posed by 'the others'. These threats are often based on stereotypes related to economic issues, for example, 'immigrants occupy all jobs', ‘foreigners do not wish to work and only consume social funds’ or ‘foreigners commit crimes’ (Bogushevic & Tsilevich, 2002: 2).

Most often, the assumption is that the more difficult the economic situation, the higher the level of intolerance and xenophobia. The facts however reveal that there is actually no direct correlation between economic downturn and high levels of xenophobia. Xenophobia is not only a phenomenon in post-colonial states with transitional economies. Even well developed states with strong historical democratic traditions are not necessarily immune (Wimmer, 1997). Xenophobic slogans in recent years were heard in electoral campaigns in Austria, Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands. The same trend was also evidenced in France, which could be regarded as a 'trendsetter' of high standards of political culture and equality, with increased support for Le Pen (Bogushevic & Tsilevich, 2002: 3). We should therefore not simply reduce xenophobia to a simplistic explanation such as a 'growing competition for scarce economic and social resources'. The phenomenon is not simple; therefore simple explanations are not adequate. Xenophobia can be manifested differently and the targets depend heavily on
which element of a person’s identity is regarded as determinant or important in a given society. For instance, hostile feelings towards those practicing other religions are expected to be more intensive if ‘belief’ is declared one of the most important elements of a person’s identity. In addition, if the society’s division goes along linguistic lines, than linguistic minorities become targets of xenophobia (Bogushevic & Tsilevich, 2002: 3).

Xenophobia can perhaps also be understood as a ‘bitter’ outcome of the exertion of collective identity. This identity is characterised by the dominant ethnic, religious, economic, political and cultural demands. It is not wrong to have an ethnic identity, because it helps in developing a personal identity of who you are. Thomson et al (1993: 83) maintains that identity signifies the sense of self, which we acquire over time as we encounter and analyse our own important characteristics. One of these important characteristics is national identity. Already during childhood we are provided with a sense of inner solidarity with our own ethnic group’s ideals and sense of belonging to the larger group.

During the construction of our own identity, at times we do not recognise the presence of others diversity. Most often we note difference, and sometimes we believe we are ‘special’ and often even ‘superior to those with other identities. Prejudice becomes unavoidable and results in feelings of superiority. By ‘superiorising’ our own personal identity, we may alter others identities in the process of achieving a sound and sustainable self. Ethnic identity consists of two sides. On the one hand, it is a source of pride, empowerment and self-understanding on the other it is a basis for judging, stereotyping or feeling bitter or discontented or under siege from others (Todorov, 1993: 39).

Having a strong identity is therefore not necessarily harmful to others, but it is often displayed across a broad spectrum. A positive feeling toward one’s own ethnic group and feeling of closeness to its customs, traditions, rituals, history and language could be regarded as ‘positive’ patriotism. But as soon as one has the perception that one’s ethnicity is threatened, negative perceptions against other groups typically start to surface. These feelings or perceptions are initiated through different processes. Initially there is a transfer of your own group’s negative characteristics onto others, passing on your own unwanted features onto the ‘other’, simply creating ‘we and them’, ‘good and
bad’ scenarios and pinpointing the ‘other’ as the source of all ills. What we do not realise is that one’s own group is in reality a diverse, historically grown composite of people, influences, cultures and customs. There is a tendency to perceive it as a homogenous group, this instead result in negative perceptions that other groups are homogenous, narrow-minded or dangerous (Todorov, 1993: 39-40).

According to Volkan (1997: 102), when large groups start seeking answers to questions such as who are “we” now? how different are we from “them” and what will become of “us” in the near future? the path to finding answers is often a tense and unstable social and political atmosphere. It leads to an increase in attachment and cohesion to our ‘own’ group or cohesive identity. Energy is diverted into what makes ‘us’ different from ‘them’. In some situations, this process becomes so powerful that it greatly influences the political, legal, economic, military and other domestic and international relations.

The most important motivation for extreme negative behaviours and perceptions about the ‘outsider’ is the relationship between ‘me’ and the ‘others’, or ‘us and them’. This behaviour is not in principle race related. It can be based upon class, religion, or social and ethnic differences. As soon as differences are perceived to be declining, maybe through integration, then it leads to an arousal of positive feelings towards the others. As a result, when we talk about xenophobia we are talking about people whose ethnic or national identity is transcending other kinds of identities (Volkan, 1997: 106). As soon as one’s own group is perceived as the ‘proper’ and another as ‘indecent’, then ground for dehumanising the ‘other’ is prepared. Sometimes new negative characteristics are assigned and the important feature is that people internalise them even if they are false. Xenophobia is therefore a latent dreading of foreigners or strangers or people from other groups, inspired by a social (culture shock), economic (unemployment) or political crisis (transition) situation that helps initiate an ethnic identity climax.

Wimmer (1997: 21) used following theories to explain the causes of xenophobia: Firstly he refers to the Power theory. He argues that when people feel insecure in the face of threat, they will portray resentment and hatred. Hatred does not necessarily depend on real competition on the job market, but as long as the perceived threat is strong enough to induce resentment. According to him xenophobia stems from an ‘intense rivalry between migrants and locals’ (1997:21). Xenophobic fears of foreign domination do not
necessarily increase when wages drop or unemployment rises, although both seem to be indicators of an intensive competition in the job market. He used Switzerland as an example, and argued that the ‘first wave of fear about foreign domination occurred at a time of modest, but steady economic growth during the 1880s’ (1997:22). During that time the working class complained about the competition with Italian immigrants. The bourgeois Swiss-Germans complained about the number of German workmen and journeymen. In Zurich there were riots and pogrom-style evictions of Italians in the outer Sihl district. These protests were related to economic growth. Economic prosperity was accompanied by a shortage of housing, and it was this shortage that encouraged xenophobia.

There was a second wave of attack on foreigners in Switzerland, which occurred around 1917. At that time there was also an increase in real wages in the building and industrial sectors. Direct competition for jobs might have gone down during that time, the issue of ‘too many foreigners’ was still high on the political agenda until the mid-1930s. In the mid-sixties, the economy started growing again and even real wages were increasing and full employment prevailed, and that’s when ‘voices hostile to foreigners were heard once again (1997:23).

Secondly, he referred to cultural-symbolic theory. Wimmer holds that animosity towards the other is not as a result of economic competition between rival groups but a product of political and value socialisation (Wimmer, 1997: 22). The immigrant’s different cultures lead to conflict with the locals. In the United States immigrants from Southern or Eastern Europe were seen as better able to assimilate compared to those from the Third World who were seen as incapable of integration because they came from societies, which, had a mainly agrarian and often semi-feudal or feudal structures. Those structures were internally still, in part, strongly oriented to tribe or clan, and sometimes equipped with religions, which have not experienced so-called reformation and enlightenment. Besides cultural incompatibility, apparently low educational qualifications and professional experiences also contributed to their inability to integrate into the class structure of the host society and therefore, these third world immigrants found themselves ghettoised and marginalised. Those culturally, or even racially different, were targeted for public sentiments hostile to foreigners, which spread in times of social crises. Thus, according to this view, the inability of certain minorities to integrate into the structure and culture of
the host society lead the majority population to xenophobic rejection (Wimmer, 1997: 23).

The third approach is referred to as phenomenology. According to Wimmer (1997: 27) Deep-gripping crises occur after intensive phases of modernisation and if the promises of a social welfare state for example can no longer be kept. Anomic tensions spread over all social positions. This leads to a crisis of collective identity in which the calm self-certainty that might enable unproblematic relations with the minorities gets lost. According to this approach, xenophobia can be used as a way to reassure the national self and its boundaries, and as an attempt to make sense of the world in a time of a crisis.

Wimmer argued that ‘xenophobic views are not instrumental to a fight for scarce jobs and housing. Nor is it appropriate to interpret them as an outcome of a culture clash that is caused by migratory movements across countries and continents’. Instead they should be understood as expressions of ultra-nationalistic ideologies. Groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy appeal to the state institutions and nationalism to reassure their place in the core of the social fabric. These groups then perceive people who are outside this community as competitors for state solidarity and security. People do not only use xenophobic sentiments to reassure identity when nationalistic self-images run into a crisis, but is a political struggle about who has the right to be cared for by the state and society (Wimmer, 1997: 27).

Since many studies have shown that xenophobic attitudes are distributed very asymmetrically over the population, this form of coping mechanism with a crisis seems to make sense especially for people with little or no formal education. These people fall back on all forms of nationalistic stereotypes, such as “we” and “them”. They do not use other means to reduce complexity and anxiety such as those offered by the categories of class, profession, sex, age, religion etc. Wimmer (1997:28) believes that for this approach to be acceptable, it should be combined with an analysis of ‘power strategies and interest policies that focus precisely on the interplay of ideas and interests in social action’.
Wimmer therefore provided a useful basis to explain the causes of xenophobia firstly by, holding that xenophobia can occur as a result of the competition for jobs and other state benefits between locals and immigrants. The fear of foreigners increases in times of economic crises, because that’s when competition for jobs becomes intense. Secondly and most importantly he caution us against being caught up in that theory. He did that by convincingly arguing that fear for foreign domination can also occur during modest and steady economic growth, because, it is usually during these times when access to housing becomes a problem, and this difficulty in accessing housing might encourage xenophobia.

Thirdly he discusses ‘cultural differentness’. He argued that it is the inability of the migrants to integrate that leads to xenophobia. It is because of seemingly low educational qualifications and professional experiences that contribute to their inability to integrate into the structures of the host society and this leads to segregation and marginalisation. Immigrants become relegated to the bottom of the social hierarchy, and domination over them is established. This exclusion becomes institutionalised in immigration policies. The immigrant’s cultural differentness is used as a scapegoat for exclusion and impoverishment. This leads to a crisis of collective identity. Now the entire society is in a crisis, anomie kicks in, and problematic relations with immigrants continue. Xenophobic sentiments are used as scapegoats when groups of people are experiencing a crisis.

Xenophobia therefore encompasses two important facets. On one hand, it indicates that there is an emotional or psychological side to the issue, and ‘foreigners’ or ‘strangers’ provoke ‘reactions most often negative. Those reactions are not strictly based on animosity toward others with a specific skin color, cultural background or physical characteristics. They are however unevenly distributed. On the other hand, there is an implication that there is a jurisdictional or state role in ‘regulating’ the number of foreigners admitted to one’s country, the rights they are accorded, and the process through which they are assimilated, integrated or incorporated.

On a different note, not all the earlier mentioned explanations of xenophobia contain the word ‘foreigner’. What this perhaps mean is that xenophobia can also be directed at the most vulnerable or minorities in society who are not foreigners, but ‘outcasts’ or at the
bottom of the social ladder. The reference to ethic group by Cashdan (2001) makes this point imperative. Most of the definitions are biased towards attitudes and feelings only, but as the country-by-country analyses indicates, behaviours and actions most often accompany the phenomenon. The proposed study will therefore also try to establish a more encompassing and perhaps context specific definition of the phenomenon.

3. XENOPHOBIA: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Xenophobia is encountered in many contemporary societies. Its targets are different across countries and nations. In 1997, the European Union carried out an EU-wide survey in member states. The results were in its own words ‘worrying’. It was found that nearly 33 percent of interviewees were ‘quite xenophobic or ‘very xenophobic’. Dissatisfaction with their life circumstances, fear of unemployment, insecurity about the future and low self-confidence in the way public authorities and the political establishment worked in their country were the main characteristics of those who put themselves at the top of the xenophobic scale. Those who scored highly were more likely to agree with negative stereotypes of immigrants and minorities. The minorities who were the target of hatred in participant countries differed in terms of colonial and migration history and the recent arrival of refugees (Eurobameter Opinion Poll, 1997).

Although the interviewees in the EU study felt that democratic principles should be extended to immigrants, opinions became more negative when asked about specific rights to be accorded to immigrants. Many agreed to limit the rights of those who were considered illegal, criminals and those who were unemployed. In Europe xenophobia, racism, nationalism and identity are organised through extreme right-wing parties, such as the Movimento Soziale Italiano (Italy), Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National (France) the Republicans, through the Republikaner in Germany, and the British National Front. Voices for the xenophobic, nationalists and racist can be heard through these parties (Eurobameter Opinion Poll, 1997).

In Germany and Belgium the main xenophobic targets are ‘guest workers’, mainly Turks and Greeks. In France they are North Africans. In Switzerland, the targets are political asylum seekers and in Norway, the targets are Pakistanis and Vietnamese.
Below follows a country-by-country analysis of intolerance, xenophobia and discrimination and how these are overtly expressed through hatred and physical violence against minorities in Europe. Ford (1992: 49) provided highlights of serious xenophobic events in Europe during the late 80s and early 90s.

**Belgium**

According to Cools (1995: 29) Belgians who hate foreigners expressed their feelings readily, even those who may get along quiet well with a foreign neighbour. It is however not implied that racism and xenophobia is not widespread in Belgium. In 1997, the Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN) distributed leaflets stating ‘Halt the Barbarians’ with cartoon drawings of Arabs during national elections. It has become acceptable to refer to immigrants, in particular North Africans, as ‘barbarians,’ since the interior minister uttered the word in 1997. When he was questioned about it he denied it and later admitted that the word should be understood in its Greek sense, meaning foreigner (Cools, 1995: 29-30).

In Belgium the most hated and discriminated immigrants are Turks and North Africans. There are however more serious incidents of violence and harassment against African asylum seekers and students in particular, Zairians and Ghanaians. This happens in the form of systematic ID checks and beatings of black asylum seekers in the Brussels detention centre or at the entry points. There have also been reported deaths. In 1986, during *ramadan* about 150000 copies of booklets containing false information were distributed to schools. These were depicting North Africans as terrorists and religious fundamentalists who were associated with drug dealing and addiction (Ford, 1992: 53-54).

Relations between the police and the immigrant population, with youths of North African origin in particular are not good. They are considered to be responsible for crime. In August 1988 the media reported that a Moroccan youth was hospitalised with a concussion and other injuries after the police arrested him. The police did not provide any other grounds for his arrest other than that he was resisting arrest and immediately dismissed the issue as an unusual situation. The situation changed in 1982 when the extreme right party, the *Vlaams Blok*, did well in the elections. The government started
taking the problems of immigrants seriously. A commissioner was nominated to help draft a report on the problems of co-existence among ethnic minorities and encourage peaceful coherence among people of different backgrounds in cities and towns (Ford, 1992: 55).

Germany

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and formal unification in October 1990 there was a dramatic increase in the number of assaults and other crimes against foreigners (Watts, 1997: 71). Most serious crimes were occurring disproportionately in the East (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1995: 17-8).

The people in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) were isolated from foreigners, even the long-term contract workers who lived there before unification. This resulted in 'deep ignorance of foreigners, coupled with a sense of social disintegration and fear of perpetual unemployment' (HRW, 1995: 18). Upon interviewing the German commissioner of foreign affairs in 1994, the HRW/Helsinki uncovered that people in the new Federal States exaggerate about the number of foreigners in their respective states. Most often the percentage of foreigners was blown out of proportion. Surveys revealed that people in Brandenberg believed that about 30 percent of the state population were foreign, when in reality foreigners only made up about 1.2 percent of the population (HRW/Helsinki, 1995: 19). Similarly a survey was conducted in Germany among the adult population in 1992. The results were shocking. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents believed that foreigners misuse the social welfare system, 74 percent said they increase the housing shortage, 69 percent said they contribute to the high unemployment rate, and 59 percent said foreigners were a danger on the streets (Watts, 1997: 16).

The size and density of the city determines the levels and intensity of violence against foreigners. The more dispersed a population, the higher the chances that xenophobic attacks will go undetected and the higher the possibility that the police will exercise control over xenophobic attacks. According to the HRW/Helsinki (1995: 19) German government statistics for 1993 and 1994 showed that in actual fact the North Rhine-
Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg showed the highest incidences of violent anti-
foreign crimes. Xenophobia was widespread throughout Germany, the anger and
frustration about foreigners was much more pronounced in the East and much more
widespread among the young population. The attack on foreigners by the youth was
evidenced in 1987, when a Greek family was arsened in Wüppertal. The attack also
resulted in serious burns of other 18 foreigners (Human Rights Watch, 1995: 18).

Almost a year later, on 17 December 1988, a Turkish family was killed in a fire as well as
the father of a German family who was their neighbour in Scwandorf. The person
responsible was a 19-year-old German who had relations with extreme-right wing
groups, and his reason for the attack was 'that he hated foreigners'. In Hamburg in
October 1988, a Turkish woman was beaten up and pushed in front of an oncoming car,
and again a group of young people was responsible for the attack. The Turkish and
Roma community (Gypsies) bears the most brunt. Another not so well spoken about
group is the Afro-Germans, who considers themselves as Germans but are not really
recognised as such by the masses (Ford, 1992: 58).

In another incident in 1990, a mob of extremist’s firebombed a shelter for asylum
seekers in the German town of Röstock. A crowd of bystanders applauded. The police
stood by idly. On 28 January 1994 some university students in Münster found signs on
both entrances of their canteen ‘foreigners on one door and Germans on the other’. This
was organised by ‘German’ students who wanted to test the reactions of foreign
students. Perhaps because of fear of further attacks, the students complied (Fabbro,

The police in Möln received an anonymous call with the caller saying ‘there is a house
burning in Müllen street’. The arson attack left nine Turkish immigrants injured and three
women dead. A patron at a bar in Wüppertal got involved in a political argument with
Neo-Nazi skinheads. They trampled him to death, douse him with alcohol and sat him on
fire (Finzsch & Schirmer, 1998: xi).

The ‘influx’ of Germans from GDR, east Europeans of German descent and the high
number of asylum applicants has worsened the housing shortages and existing negative
sentiments towards foreigners. In the 1989 opinion survey, 75 percent of West German
participants felt that there were too many foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany, 69 percent felt that asylum seekers were exploiting the social welfare system. A whooping 93 percent were calling for a reduction in the number of ‘economic refugees’. Migrant workers were less negatively perceived in relation to asylum seekers. There were however very strong feelings against the Turks (Ford, 1992: 59).

Before 1990 during the FRD xenophobia was more subtle. People gaped at immigrants. They were not always greeted and sometimes were completely ignored. Shopkeepers and government officers were often unfriendly and impolite. Landlords were often critical when it was a foreign applicant or tenant. Germans were not always pleased to have a foreign neighbour and sometimes they transferred their children to schools where there were none or few foreigners. Xenophobia then was less physically threatening (Fabbro, 1995: 141).

After 1990 violent offences against foreigners increased. With the rise in unemployment and a declining economy, foreigners became the scapegoat and the source of all social ills. Habits or skin colour served as primary indicators for the targets (Fabbro, 1995: 146).

France

Between 1986 and 1992 about 20 foreigners were assassinated. Nineteen of the victims were North Africans or French citizens of North African origin. One was Romanian. No racist motives were proven in most cases, but in the majority of the cases the main reason was the ‘craving’ to kill a foreigner (Ford, 1992: 630). North Africans are the main targets of most exclusion and the centre of all the hatred and frustration of xenophobes in France (Ubbiali, 1995: 128).

In another incident, a Tunisian father of five was kicked to death by six youth. The officer who was investigating the murder said the culprits were not showing any remorse, and appeared as if they had not committed anything deserving blame or censure. Similarly, three youths shot and killed a Harki youth and the reason for the murder was self-amusement. A Moroccan youth was shot and killed and the offender did not deny guilt, but his plea explanation was that he made a mistake because he thought the victim was of Chinese descent. In incidents where the motives were provided they were as
unconvincing as ‘the victim broke a window, he refused to pay for his bread or drink, or he was making noise’ (Ford, 1992: 63).

Besides murder, there were other serious events that resulted in serious damage, such as amputations, physical and mental handicap and permanent and complete paralysis. Most of those responsible for these events were police officers. Not many events got published unless death is involved or the victim is an influential figure. Sentences or actions were not harsh enough to deter further incidences (Ford, 1992: 63-5).

There were no reports of full-scale attacks on immigrant homes and centres in France, but, according to Ubbiali, racist attitudes are becoming the most widely accepted national attitudes at most levels of society. Politicians are almost freely making xenophobic statements about the ‘high’ number of foreigners in the country. Ex-Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was accused of making public remarks about the ‘smell of immigrants’ (1995: 128-9). This is illustrative of an irrational argument coming from a prominent public figure.

The working class is the most threatened group by immigrants. The irony is that the immigrants are statistically less qualified than most French nationals. A significant number are blue-collar workers and without any qualifications (Ubbiali, 1995: 124).

Spain

Xenophobia in Spain, as in most countries, is uneven. Apart from North Africans and Gypsies, other foreigners, such as Latin Americans and Filipinos, hardly complain of racist practices (Vincen, 1995: 320). An increase in drug trafficking and crime led to more discrimination against African foreigners. Arbitrary arrests often targeted black foreigners, even those with valid residence permits, are often persecuted and some have been deported back to their own countries. Sometimes innocent foreigner’s residence permits are destroyed (Ford, 1992: 61-2).

After North Africans, gypsies constitute the next worst treated group in Spain. They are often only appreciated for their dance and music, but as soon as they attempt to become part of Spanish society they are questioned. Other serious events involved the ostracism of black and North African workers. Landlords reject them and as a result most live in
wooden huts with almost no basic services, such as electricity and running water. There were reported incidences of people who sought refuge in pigsties (Ford, 1992: 62).

Arson against gypsies has also been attempted in Spain. In July 1986, more than 30 gypsy families in Andalusia fled to a nearby village when their homes were burnt down. Riots erupted in Andalusia and they had to sleep under protection in tents provided by the Spanish Red Cross. In November 1986 another group of gypsies fled an arson attack. At times gypsy children were prevented from attending school (Ford, 1992: 62). Xenophobic violence broke out in Madrid on 14 November 1994. Dominican squatters were attacked. This resulted in one murder and one serious injury. Some young people almost in a ‘skinhead style’ began roaming the streets of the main immigrant residences intimidating and attacking them. Direct immigrant attacks on the street and anti-immigrant graffiti became common place (Vincen, 1995: 327).

Xenophobia is also expressed in different forms, for example the derogatory use of the words ‘moro’ for Morroccans, or a ‘little brown’ (morenito) referring to blacks. As in other countries, immigrants complain about inhospitable neighbours, colleagues, schools, landlords as well as being barred from entering public places such as bars. Law enforcement officers aid in mistreating immigrants, especially the special security police. The everyday targets for the police are foreigners of African or South American descent. It is not the number of immigrants in Spain that nationals have a problem with, but it is their origin, that is the problem. As a result, the groups mostly affected by xenophobia are the Maghrebi notably Morroccans, black Africans, Portuguese and the Latin American. Because of lack of language problems, the latter two groups face the list problems with integration (Vincen, 1995: 328-9).

There is, however, no truly organised xenophobic movement in Spain, despite the two organisations that are striving Nazi ‘copy cats’. These are the Spanish group of friends of Europe (CEDADE) and the Unity Centre National Socialist (CUNS) (Vincen, 1995: 327).

**United Kingdom**

The analysis of England start of with criticism against the newspapers, which gives exaggerated and often false information about immigrants and asylum seekers who
apparently, abuse the social security system. Xenophobia also appears in the form of hooliganism and terrorising ethnic minorities. Foreign children deal with racial violence on a daily basis. Immigrant families receive threatening phone calls and racist literature through their letter boxes. At times they are threatened with petrol, which is then ignited. An Asian mother witnessed her children being spat on and stoned every morning on their way to school. On a number of occasions excrement was smeared on her front door. She took long to report because she thought that this was normal behaviour and only sought help after knives were thrown at her children. At a conference in London in 1990 it was pointed out that discrimination was contributing in a major way to mental illness among black people and immigrants in Britain (Ford, 1992: 78).

4. CONCLUSION

Overall, xenophobia in Europe has diverse targets; Immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, guest workers, provoke different reactions. Three events in Europe lead to the rise of xenophobia. First, the appearance of anti-semitism more overt than at any time since World War II. Secondly, there is clear spread of racist violence and fascist organisation to the countries of the former communist bloc. Thirdly, there has been an electoral breakthrough by the extreme right in Germany in particular (Ford, 1992). Xenophobia occurs along three lines in Europe. The legal discrimination of foreigners, especially of foreign workers, the anti-foreign attitude of parts of the population, and lastly, but not least, as right-wing extremist.

5. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

After transition South Africa faced an increase in the size of the migrant population from African countries. This increase has been accompanied by a substantial growth of xenophobia and numerous attacks on foreigners. Xenophobia in South Africa has irreversible roots in the apartheid past. Inequality in South Africa was institutionalised, and the country’s resources were heavily skewed towards the white minority. This has affected the psyche of some of the local population (Kadima & Kalombo 1995, Morris 1998, Peberdy 1999, Shindondola 2002). One can draw a distinction between people’s value expectations (i.e. getting the goods they believe they are entitled to) and their
value capabilities (i.e. getting the goods they think they are capable of getting and keeping), which includes clean water, electricity, health services, welfare, jobs and housing. Under the new South Africa, the former ‘have nots’ have developed high expectations, both social and economic. Xenophobia is believed to be as a result of people believing that they deserve what they consider theirs. The unfulfilled expectations lead to nationals taking out their frustrations and bitterness on foreigners. The poor are perhaps now more conscious of their rights and that creates good ground for xenophobic sentiments. Some South Africans have a subjective feeling of discontent and that emotion is based on the belief that they are not reaping what they sowed (De la Rey 1991, Harris 2001, Morris 1998, Tshitereke 1999).

Harris (2001) grouped the origins of South African xenophobia into three hypotheses: scapegoating, isolation and the bio-cultural. Harris located xenophobia within the context of social transition and change. Hatred of foreigners in South Africa can be explained in relation to limited resources, such as housing, education, health care and employment, coupled with high expectations during transition. Foreigners can easily be blamed for all social evils and personal frustrations. The foreigner comes to symbolise unemployment, poverty and deprivation. Nationalism is a very important feature of such scapegoating. The isolation proposition of xenophobia situates foreignness at the heart of enmity towards foreigners. The role of the struggling economy, unemployment and the struggle for scarce resources are some of the factors to be taken into consideration when trying to understand the causes of xenophobia in South Africa.

The role of international sanctions and isolation from the rest of the world can also be used to understand xenophobia in South Africa. According to Morris (1998: 1119) apartheid separated South Africans from other nationalities beyond Southern Africa. With political transition, came the waiving of international sanctions and the opening up of South African borders to the rest of Africa. This has brought South Africans into contact with people seemingly physically different to them, ‘the unknown’. Contact between the previously secluded South Africans and the strangers generates room for bitterness to build up. According to Morris (1998: 125) ‘when a group has no history of incorporating strangers it may find it difficult to be welcoming when faced with such a situation’. 
Xenophobia is understood as the product of social transition, as a defence against the anxiety induced by the unknown (Harris, 2001: 58). This could be applied directly to the isolation hypothesis, which situates xenophobia in the South African context of change and a large ‘world of the unknown’ out there.

Xenophobia can be located at the level of physical difference, or otherness. That is, in terms of physical and biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners in South Africa. Morris (1998: 1125) argues that:

Nigerians and Congolese are easily identifiable as the other, because of physical features, their bearing, their clothing style and their inability to speak one of the indigenous languages, they are in general clearly distinct and local residents are easily able to pick them out for scapegoating.

‘Almost locked for looking illegal’ was the headline in ‘The Star’ newspaper. According to Heckle (2001) [page number missing] ‘if you have a dark skin, wear your hair in braids and cannot pronounce the word ‘elbow’ in three different South African languages, you could be picked up by the police as a suspected illegal immigrant’. The young woman Lydia Ackerman was apparently standing outside her home in Forest Hill South of Johannesburg, when the police approached her and questioned her nationality. She maintains that the police did not give her a chance to show them her identity documents, they instead immediately bundled her into the back of a police truck to a deportation centre. Whilst on the way, she spoke to them in Afrikaans; they quickly and unhesitantly stopped and dropped her off somewhere in Krugersdorp. Ackerman, is just one of the many South Africans who become victims because of their complexion, dress code and general physical appearance. According to Heckel, Ackerman is a South African citizen originally from Eldorado Park in Johannesburg.

Some of the Incidents that highlighted the spate of violence against foreigners are the events that took place in Joe Slovo informal settlement in the Western Cape, in January 2002 and at the Zandspruit informal settlement outside Johannesburg in October 2001. Four people were killed in clashes between immigrants and local groups in Joe Slovo, and in similar tensions in the suburb of Du Noon in the Western Cape 70 Angolans were forced to flee. The local authorities resettled them, but harassment seemed to continue. Seventy-four homes were burnt down and more were looted in Johannesburg Zandspruit informal settlement. In July 2001 riots broke out in the Kwanobuhle township in Port
Elizabeth when rioters attacked Somali-owned shops, looting homes and mosques (Kellet 2002, Molefe 2001).

All the above mentioned events seem to have similar patterns in terms of where they occur, the victims and the reason for the attack. They occur exclusively in low-income areas. The majorities of the residents are unemployed or under employed and as a result they do not have proper access to basic socio-economic resources such as health care, sanitation and training. South Africans attitudes towards foreigners differ according to whether the foreigners come from southern Africa, west Africa, Europe or North America, and whether the South African is black or white. Black and white South Africans regard Southern and West African foreigners as unfavorable and Europeans and North Americans more favourably (Warner and Finschelescu, 2003: 40).

Harris (2001: 4) for example linked South African immigration legislation to the country’s history. Racism is a key feature of South Africa’s immigration legislation and practice, both historically and, despite the country’s transition to democracy and equality, currently. For example, the discriminatory and exploitative ‘two gates policy’, which differentiated between black migrants and white immigrants during the apartheid era, effectively remains legislated in contemporary immigration policy. Beyond the legislation, racism impacts on xenophobic practices, with black African foreigners bearing the brunt of xenophobic discrimination, both at the hands of the public and at institutional level. In certain cases, South African citizens have also fallen victim to xenophobia because they are perceived in racist terms to be too dark to be South Africans.

In May 2001, President Thabo Mbeki urged all South Africans to be vigilant against any evidence of xenophobia against African immigrants. He noted that it is fundamentally wrong and unacceptable that South Africans should treat people who come to South Africa as friends as though they are enemies. According to Jonathan Crush from the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), ‘this is a long awaited and critically important statement from the highest level of the South African government’. These words were uttered in the aftermath of the World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Crush, 2001).
Although the government seems to have good intentions, ‘South Africans in general do not support the idea of immigration amnesties’. SAMP did a study in 1999 comparing the attitudes of South African’s attitudes to immigration. The study found that the white respondents were more antagonistic at 76 percent. Black South Africans, on the other hand, seem to be more generous to amnesties and undocumented migrants, with only 40 percent opposing it. Overall the response was negative, since the majority of South Africans stated that immigration and migration impact unfavourably on the country with nearly 60 percent believing that they weaken society and the economy, and over 60 percent believing that they put strain on South African resources. Fear of crime, threat to jobs and the economy, and diseases are the leading reasons given for opposition to immigration (Crush et al, 1999).

Although the South African Constitution guarantees basic rights and freedoms to ‘everyone’ living within the boundaries of the nation-state, many South Africans do not seem to support this stance. ‘Around 40 percent are opposed to Africans from elsewhere enjoying the same access to health and educational services as South Africans. More than 54 percent oppose giving the same right of access to housing to foreigners (Mattes et al, 1999: 18).

According to Harris, generally all police officers in South Africa are given legal powers to apprehend individuals who are suspected to be undocumented non-citizens. If a foreigner is unable to satisfy a police or immigration officer with regard to his legal status, then the officer has the power to make an arrest. But, even in situations where people are able to identify themselves without delay, they were not guarantee freedom. HRW (1998) as quoted in Harris (2001: 29) provided quotes of people whose documents have been destroyed. Destruction of documents often involves corruption. According to HRC as quoted in Harris (2001: 29) there seems to be a market rate for release. These rates may vary according to individual police officer and the area where the arrest took place. It was however found that ‘R50 was the minimum amount required to obtain the release upon initial apprehension’. It might increase, sometimes up to a R100, if the individual ends up at a police station.

Once a suspected undocumented migrant is unable to pay, he is taken to Lindela, a specialised detention facility for undocumented migrants, which receives arrested
persons from all over the country. Violence is a daily occurrence at Lindela, but more intense at night. Detainees are woken up 2-5 times a night, apparently for security reasons. The security guards also enter the rooms and use force on those who are perceived to be ‘slow in waking up’ (SAHRC: 2000: 65 ‘see also Alexander & Shindondola 2002, Dlamini & Shindondola 2001). One of the headlines on 10 March 2002 of the Sunday Times read ‘five staff members jailed for bloody murder at Lindela’. The staff members were arrested after they severely assaulted a suspected undocumented migrant, but by the time the ambulance arrived, a 25-year-old Nigerian man has died. ‘He had severe head, back and chest injuries as well as lacerations from barbed wire’.

Once released from Lindela, either the immigrant is let go where he came from within South Africa, if the arrest was a ‘mistake’, or deported to the ‘country of origin’, in which case the abuse continues on the journey of deportation. I call it ‘country of origin’ because often immigrants are not taken to their real home countries and sometimes South Africans become victims. According to a deportee as quoted by Harris (2001: 38)

We are made to squat with our head between our legs [sitting chafo]. The police sjambok us on the train to make sure we keep our heads down. They ask if we have money and they beat us all the way to Ressano Garcia [the Mozambican border post]. It takes a long time, but about ten hours. We have to sit like that the whole time. It gets very painful and people get swollen. Many people bleeding, many people become unconscious. The police just laugh. If you straighten your head, you have to pay fifty rands, or you get beaten.

During the journey to the country of origin, some respondents get a chance to abscond. This is often made possible by corrupt guards, but not all survive the escape. Harris (2001: 38-39) reports:

Kenneth Simango, an illegal immigrant’ bribed a guard to let him jump from the window of a moving train deporting him back to Mozambique. While he was waiting in a line for his turn to ‘escape’, Simango saw a small leap from the train. He heard a heavy thud and saw sparks. Simango is certain the man fell under the train and was crushed.

In a separate study an illegal immigrant named Antonio explained when asked why he bribed the officers at Lindela. He further explained how his fellow deportees tried to escape from the moving trains and what happened on the way to Maputo:
When you don’t pay, then they send you to Maputo; but if you pay you can stay. When they send people on the train to Maputo, there are police on the train. You can pay them there and they let you off the train. He says ‘they push you off’ the moving train. People are scared of the moving train. People hurt themselves on their legs, their hands and their arms. He knows someone who lost an arm because of this. His hand fell underneath the train when they pushed him off and so he had to have his arm amputated. This person is no longer in South Africa because he cannot find a job (Alexander & Shindondola, 2002: 60).

Harris states that ‘not only are people allowed to jump off the trains for money,’ but it appears as if some are actively pushed or thrown of the trains by the South African officials. One Mozambican told her (2001: 39)

I had R250 hidden in my collar. They [the officials] took it and pushed me off the train. I hit my head and face and I was coughing blood. We heard a woman screaming as she was thrown onto the trucks. The train cut off both her legs.

This section has pointed out the realities of non-citizens in South Africa as provided for by the available and relevant literature. There is clearly a need to sensitisise and train police officers and immigration officers about human rights. The emphasis should be placed on freedom from discrimination and how it can be addressed in all its dimensions in practical situations.

South African xenophobia seem to be about anti-black foreign sentiments, and it is not about the fear of foreigners, but mainly about intense dislike, which is often expressed in terms of verbal and physical abuse. In the proposed research, the word ‘xenophobia’ will be used to signify not only attitudes of dislike and fear, but also violent actions against foreigners in South Africa and countries under analysis.

6. CONCLUSION

Xenophobia or ‘dread of foreigners (or strangers) implies that people actually perceive a threat. There is no single source for this perceived threat, nor are there valid (rational) reasons for the perceptions. Some cite a ‘flood of immigrants’, which feasibly could be perceived as threatening, but statistics do not confirm such a flood, and an increase in numbers alone cannot be the only trigger for xenophobic manifestations. It is argued that even in South Africa there are no reliable statistics to determine the number of no-

Some perceive that the presence of a large number of foreigners endangers their national identity, but there are no clear indications that identity is in fact being specifically eroded, or that foreigners cause a general cultural change that makes people feel uneasy. Nor is there clear or consistent evidence of a more general rise in ‘cultural fundamentalism’, which is a dread of change in general. It is most often certain foreign groups are the targets of xenophobia and violence, while others are not.

Xenophobia should be better understood as a notion situated within a large range of negative perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, and actions against foreigners. It does not necessarily imply violence against foreigners it can however evolve into vicious or violent forms such as racism, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. Although xenophobia can become dangerous, it is not easy to punish or combat directly. What Baumgartl & Favell (1995) found was that ‘there is no instant remedy against xenophobia, or information implying that there are not that many foreigners. There is also no due process, for example prohibiting discrimination against foreigners, no explanations, to clarify why foreigners leave their countries of origin, and no appeals against the fear of foreigners’. In South Africa for example the phenomenon can be explained as a response to national identity. South Africans might be experiencing a national identity problem and as a result, whoever is perceived, as not deserving to belong to the nation will be excluded (Pebedy, 1999: 327).

At the onset, the definition of the word xenophobia seems to suggest that xenophobes would dislike all foreigners the same way. The evidence however suggests that this is not the case. The targets are particular groups of foreigners and the ethnic origins of these groups also differ from country to country. According to Warner and Finchilescu (2003: 36) xenophobia is based on race in South Africa. The majority of xenophobic incidents reported indicate that the majority of the victims are African migrants and South African men are reported to be the most hostile (Shindondola 2002, Morris 1998). Xenophobia should therefore be defined as not only hatred and dislike, but attack of certain foreigners as well (Warner & Finchilescu, 2003: 36). Although xenophobia does not necessarily imply action against others, but when feelings and perceptions become conviction and justification for action then the phenomenon becomes physically
dangerous.

Warner and Finchilescu (2003: 36) concluded that there is a consensus that xenophobia exists in South Africa. They argue however that there is ‘a bias towards understanding the perpetrators rather than the targets’ (2003: 36). I nonetheless believe that there are not enough efforts being put on how the ‘perceived perpetrators’ are dealing with the increasing number of foreigners in the country. The question is, are they really as bad as the ‘targets’ are claiming. Hostility towards immigrants may be a generalised stereotyping rather than as a real reaction to individuals.

The question is whether Wimmer approach could be applied to South Africa? I believe theories explaining the causes of xenophobia should be applied with discretion and caution. It should be country specific and especially because it target specific groups. *Power theory:* Economic competition for scarce resources is without a doubt one of the causes for xenophobic tendencies towards foreigners, for example, Reitzes (1999) concluded that migrants in higher and very low-income jobs experience less hostility from South Africans.

*Cultural symbolic theory and phenomenology:* This approach can either be rejected in total or partly accepted. Rejection would be on the basis that South Africa unlike the US or Israel is not really a country of immigrants. Instead, the majority of South Africans could be regarded as ‘native’ born, although the country consists of diverse cultures and traditions. I would reject the acculturation theory. What South Africa is perhaps faced with is socialisation and acceptance of foreigners into their existing cultures. It is therefore very embryonic to argue that xenophobia is targeted at those who are regarded as disrupting the desired cultural harmony. Instead the country is faced with a national identity crisis, as Peberdy (1999: 327) argues:

The development of new and increasingly xenophobic discourses around immigration and particularly undocumented migration from the region similarly reflects the construction of a new national identity based on citizenship. Now that all South Africans are members of the nation, entitled to all the benefits that accrue to citizens, so have South Africa’s immigration anxieties embraced all those non-nationals who could become members of the nation, and claim access to the resources of the state. Therefore black Africans become the focus of the state’s fears of contamination.

One can therefore conclude that in South Africa competition for jobs appears to play a
more modest role than general fears of loss of cultural identity.

Another important conclusion is that there are no great differences in the nature of the discourse and the language that is being used to address this problem. What is worrying in these analyses is that xenophobia seemed to be spearheaded by members of institutions who are supposed to be central in providing solace and protection to foreigners, particularly the police and immigration officers. It has been indicated that some police officers have displayed attitudes and behaviours that demonstrate a growing insulation from ‘strangers’ around them.

Xenophobic resentment is most likely to be expressed violently by young males of modest education and occupational attainment in Germany in particular. The explanation is that they are more sensitive to threat and competition for economic opportunities. The under 25 years old do not only express their hatred verbally, but they are more likely to act out their hatred in a physically threatening manner. To some degree it is believed they act on behalf of the broader members of society, friends, families and the rest of society. Assaults in Europe are most often group crime; right-wing extremists who are indebted to popular fears of economic and cultural competition represent the xenophobes. In South Africa violent acts are acted out by communities, such as those in Zandspruit and among hawkers. One important distinction is that in South Africa there does not seem to be reports of graffiti as yet compared to Europe.

In all these country analyses, race seems to play a very important role in terms of the targets of xenophobia, blacks, and gypsies, but does legal status have an influence as well? Gender was not really explored in detail, though the literature seems to point to the fact that it is men who are the main culprits and victims as well. It would be helpful to find out the degree to which female migrants experience xenophobia. Another feature the above-mentioned countries have in common is how xenophobia is applied. Looting and burning of foreigner’s residences has been noted in Germany, Spain and South Africa. In England there are terms like Piki and Wog. Derogatory terms for foreigners in countries were English is not the first or only language spoken, amakwerekwere in South Africa and in Spain (‘little brown or morenito for black) are insulting terms for foreigner. It is clear that some people in Europe display a fear of cultural extinction, whilst in South Africa the fear is economic. Reasons for the hatred had nothing to do with culture or
other factors such as language, but unemployment, crime and housing.

The proposed research is expected to make a contribution in two main ways: firstly, on a contextual level, the study will expose the extent to which xenophobia is, explained and expressed in South Africa. On a theoretical level, not much has been done to link the xenophobic motives to specific targets as well as looking at the relationship between public rhetoric and xenophobia. This study will attempt to do so. Broadly the research will contribute to a general understanding of xenophobia and most importantly, come up with context specific definition South African xenophobia.

7. POSSIBLE STRUCTURE OF THESIS

Below is the possible outline of the proposed thesis. The thesis will consist of ten chapters and broken down as follow:

1. **Introduction**
   This chapter will introduce the area under discussion and present the motivation thereof as well as the organization of the remaining chapters.

2. **Defining the problem.**
   In this chapter I will look at the history of the usage of the word xenophobia by looking at international literature. Historical usage of the word in South Africa will also be examined. An assessment will be made to determine the extent to which xenophobia is a post-1994 problem. The chapter will also look at how distinct xenophobia is from other related terms such as nationalism, racism and ethnicity and tribalism.

3. **Explaining xenophobia**
   In this chapter I will first look at explanations of xenophobia in Europe then South Africa. This is a comparison to particularly help explain the particularities of the South African situation.

4. **Researching the problem**
   This is in short a research design section. I will consider the questions to be asked to assess the models provided. I will critically assess how these or similar questions been researched in the past. I will draw conclusions for research methods and design.
5. **Foreigners views**  
This chapter will present the empirical findings of the fieldwork conducted among foreign nationals in South Africa.

6. **South African views**  
This will be based on qualitative data. This chapter will engage with the state’s theory and practice. It will include general interviews as well as key informants. Both these interviews would help in formulating survey questions as well as modifications to models and questions.

7. **South African views**  
This will be a quantitative survey to be conducted among the general population in South Africa.

8. **Analysis of xenophobia in South Africa**  
This chapter will draw from all sources and not just the new empirical data.

9. **What to do?**  
This chapter will provide suggestions and remedies based on a comparison of what is being done about xenophobia in Europe, and a critical assessment of the present situation in South Africa, as well as provide lessons for South Africa.

10. **Conclusion**  
This chapter will draw the major findings together and discuss them individually. It will also include a reflection on the initial aims and objectives of the study, problem statement, hypotheses tested, limitations of the study, methodology employed, recommendations and suggestions for further research. The appendices and list of references will follow.
8. REFERENCES


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