

ZIMBABWE CONFERENCE ON 'PROGRESS'
BULAWAYO, 3-6 NOVEMBER

Rough notes typed by Patrick Bond

With apologies for typos, gaps, errors.

(1) Nov 3: PM 16:00-18:00 The Philosophy of Progress and Zimbabwe
Chair: David Moore
Speaker: John Hoffman
Discussants: Colin Stoneman, Amanda Hammer

I'll be sending some notes from a conference which began this afternoon in Bulawayo: "Progress in Zimbabwe", organised by David Moore (UJ) and Showers Mawowa (UKZN and Zimcodd). For the sake of those with easier downloads through ascii (instead of attachments), I'll put whatever I can get hold of in the text box, but if you want .pdf or .doc files I can try and send those to whomever wants, if you ask offlist.

Below, first, are the conceptual introduction and the first paper presented, by 'Dialego', a.k.a. John Hoffman. The Zimbabwean socialist philosopher Hoffman has mainly been debating within Britain the last two decades but has a history supporting post-Mugabe politics from the 1980s. His intention is to attack 'static and ahistorical' notions of progress from the conservative and liberal traditions. The paper he delivered is below.

The discussion was rich. As Colin Stoneman said, the 'momentum concept' is itself too abstract. And as Amanda Hammer added, there are different concrete dimensions to grapple with: supply of basic material needs; symbolic and spiritual progress; political freedom; dignity; creativity; technology; and other notions. The central problem, she insisted, is the hierarchy of priority as to what is 'progress' and what needs to be changed. That's what we should be exploring openly, collectively and politically: how do those hierarchies get constructed. One voice from the floor, former higher education minister Fay Chung, denied 'things were better under Smith' and criticized nostalgia using education as an example. Hoffman agreed, and also thought Hammar was correct to introduce 'paradox' to accompany the dialectic.

Then Lionel Cliffe insisted we try to put progress in context of 'structural changes', the first of which was colonialism, and fortunately it proved reversible, and he sought further questioning of what kinds of structural changes were in play and how durable these would prove to be. Brian Raftopoulos asked, is the discourse that has emerged in the last two decades about modernity or anti-modernity. Second, what about the fracture between political rights (and law) and redistribution – given that both sides have been impoverished. The question is whether we can find a 'new language', since so many are so tired of the old divisions. Blessing Karumbidza turned to a local version of progress within his family – a debate over

whether a PhD or buying a truck presented more 'progress' – and he contextualized in terms of rural-urban migration.

Hoffman replied by suggesting we distinguish between short, medium and long-term strategies for progress. He links modernity and liberalism, by way of seeking a post-liberal society, along the way to which the translation of the notion of progress into concrete terms is vital, in 'small steps'. Hoffman replied to Stoneman: John Gray's problem is his mistrust with anything abstract, and he is also wrong in his idealistic support for markets. Hoffman's strategy is to contest the market by making real people's challenges more visible, to show the limits of the market. The notion of progress had to come, then, from social collectivities in their contestations, not delivered top-down on a silver platter.

John Saul criticised the conference for its central idea of 'progress', because it's impossible to factor out what's progressive and what's not. Every politician under the sun works for 'progress'; hence the issue is who defines the hierarchy? It's a political struggle, not a philosophical one. The same holds for the word liberation, said Saul, because it disguises so much and distracts us from the actual contemporary struggles of peoples, especially Zimbabweans struggling to be fully free. Rob Davies advocated that we avoid teleological concepts tied to 'progress', and suggested the evolutionary biological metaphor instead: 'things change'. Hence, he asked, 'Is progress the opiate of the masses?' Rebutted Stoneman: 'Thank you John Gray', for there was resonance with the Gray thesis. In contrast, he said, let's adopt 'pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will' (Gramsci) as our guide. To be sure, progressive experiments were defeated and have never recovered. Zimbabwe progress during the 1980s included a modicum of land reform, industrial growth – and all that's gone, with very little chance to pick up the pieces. Neoconservatism and neoliberalism are in disarray but nevertheless, the IMF/World Bank will continue to impose their prescriptions on Zimbabwe – and that's where the will of the people must come in. We need a utopistic vision – call it progress if you like. Joe Hanlon adds that the progressive movement was something we all felt part of two decades ago, and that we would be part of 'good change' (Chambers). That's why we got involved in liberation movements. Patrick Bond said that the progressive movement has strands including liberalism, nationalism and the left project, and after wedges were broken into them (Raftopoulos) the search now should be for alliances aimed at rebuilding the progressive movement (and also in search of the Zimbabwean left – his quarter-century quest in Zim work). Chung said that one problem today, to pick up Stoneman's point, is deindustrialisation – but nevertheless there was fundamentally wrong with 1980s industrialization, because it was a continuation of the Smith regime's project. To do so today will entail competing with the Chinese, whose zhing-zhong products are aimed at the poor, and to bring people out of a status of such desperation as to do 'anything' to survive.

A sobering note, from which to move to the next day's sessions.

Conference on 'Progress' in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's severe crisis – and a possible way out of it with a transitional government – and the new era for which it prepares the ground – demands a coherent scholarly response. 'Progress' can be employed as an organising theme across many disciplinary approaches to Zimbabwe's societal devastation and reconstruction. At wider levels too, the concept of progress is fitting. It underpins 'modern', 'liberal' and 'radical' perspectives of development pervading the social sciences and humanities. Yet perceptions of 'progress' are subject increasingly to intensive critical inquiry.

John Gray's *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia* indicates the 'pessimistic' side of the progress coin. John Hoffman (a retired professor with a long involvement in left-wing Zimbabwean politics), whose *John Gray and the Problem of Utopia* is a sophisticated rebuttal to this pessimism, will launch the conference with a survey of the ideas underpinning 'progress' and their relevance to Africa and Zimbabwe.

For many analysts, the end of progress is signified in the political projects of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF – not to mention the government of national unity. This conference will interrogate Zimbabwean history and its current conjuncture through the lens of the idea of 'progress' in the social science disciplines closely associated with politics, policy and civil society as well as the investigation of the structures underpinning these...

Keynote Address on Progress – John Hoffman

Introduction

This address will seek to do two things. The first is respond sympathetically but critically to John Gray's view of progress, and the second is to link the concept specifically to Zimbabwe.

I will argue that Gray's view of progress is too negative. He is right to dismiss the naïve and linear concept of progress linked to the European Enlightenment, but wrong in his unwillingness to reconstruct the concept along what I will call post-liberal lines. When we do this (with more than a little help from Marx and Engels), we see that progress is a contradictory concept but a meaningful one all the same. There is no 'end of history'. The existence of problems is part of the 'human condition': the solution of one problem inevitably leads to the existence of others. I will link the concept of progress with the idea of a momentum concept in order to

show that while we move forward, there is no final resting point – no millennium in which progress comes to an end.

The struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe demonstrates, in my view, just how contradictory progress is, since the national liberation war to end colonialism was a momentous step forward even though it has brought about an autocracy which the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is currently challenging.

Gray's Critique of Progress

Gray is right to be critical of the European Enlightenment. This Enlightenment enshrined the basic principles of classical liberalism, and although it challenged the despotic and hierarchical character of the medieval period, it substituted a despotism and repressive hierarchy of its own.

The problem with Enlightenment thought is that it was abstract – by which I mean that it abstracted from the social realities of power. Beneath the benevolent dictums of freedom, equality and the individual lay the grisly realities of class division, patriarchy, and colonialism. Above all, it had a naïve and linear concept of progress – a belief that liberal societies would usher in a higher order in which human nature would be perfected and people would only obey laws which they had prescribed to themselves.

The very young Marx subscribed to this Enlightenment. He consciously identifies his position with what he calls rather grandly 'the ever new philosophy of reason' (1975: 202) – a philosophy that extends back to Heraclitus and Aristotle, Machiavelli and Campanella, Hobbes, Spinoza and Grotius, Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel. Marx's position can be described here as Rousseauian in character, since he speaks of the state as 'the great organism, in which legal, political and moral freedom must be realised, and in which the citizen in obeying the laws of the state, only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason' (1975: 202).

Along with an abstract view of reason went an abstract view of progress. Gray characterizes progress as a modernist myth (1993: 138), the imposition of a plan of life in which the prejudices and anxieties of the late nineteenth century European intelligentsia are made mandatory for all (1996: 260). While progress is a fact in science, he argues, when it comes to ethics and politics, it is a superstition (2004: 3). As an idea, it is usually accompanied by a vulgar and unreflective meliorism that assumes that progress entails endless economic growth (1995: 108).

This is certainly true of the classical liberal and Enlightenment view of progress.

While Rousseau dissented from a mechanical and naïve view of progress such a position can be seen in John Stuart Mill and in most liberal theory certainly in the English speaking world. It is impossible to disagree with Gray's argument that even the American liberalisms of Rawls, Dworkin and Rorty, for example, (complex and

nuanced as they are) have been reliant on a particular philosophy of history in which the idea of progressive cultural convergence on a universal civilization is central (1996c: 131).

From a pluralist view, Gray argues, history can have no meaning: it is, at best, a series of adventures in civilization, each singular and discrete, leading nowhere (1996: 292). It is true that Christianity and the Enlightenment do have static views of the concept of progress, and this is because they postulate an ideal society embodying ahistorical notions of emancipation and freedom. But this is certainly not true, as Gray argues, of Marx.

Marx and Engels' Conception of Progress

By 1843 Marx has become increasingly critical of the Enlightenment. In his work *On the Jewish Question* Marx distinguishes between political and human emancipation and sees Rousseau as merely depicting the abstraction of the 'political man'. Although there are (in my view) abstract echoes in the 1844 Manuscripts of the Enlightenment, from now on Marx seeks to place the notions of reason, freedom and emancipation on a dialectical footing. Critical of the Enlightenment, he attempts to establish what I have called a postliberal view of the world.

Marx does not abandon the notion of progress but rather emphasizes its contradictory and historical character, and the case I will make later for a momentum concept derives from the dialectical character of Marx's argument. At the end of *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* Engels comments that 'every advance in production is at the same time a retrogression in the condition of the oppressed class'.

What is a boon for one is necessarily a bane for the other (Marx and Engels, 1968: 592).

Already Rousseau had argued in his celebrated essay on the arts and sciences that progress had brought with it deceit, superficiality, greed and above all inequality (Rousseau, 1968) and *The Communist Manifesto* superbly demonstrates the progressive character of capitalism despite the fact that it enshrines the exploitation of the working class.

I remember when I was doing the course on African government at UCT arguing in an essay which a bemused Jack Simons read, that capitalism and colonialism were progressive and therefore we should not condemn them. In his attack on the British rule in India, Marx draws out the contradictory argument of the Manifesto – that capitalism both advances and yet tramples upon humankind. The material basis of a new world has been created, even though the effects have been devastating. Only when a social revolution has mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, comments Marx - only then 'will human progress cease to resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain' (2000: 366-7). It is a

gross oversimplification of Marx's views to say with Gray that he 'defended colonial rule' (2007: 61).

It is precisely this notion of contradiction that Gray's concept of progress lacks.

The only notion of progress he can envisage is additive - one improvement after the other (2007: 188). The idea of progress, he complains, encourages us to view our lives 'as moments in a universal process of betterment'. He quotes the New Right thinker, Hayek, to the effect that progress is movement for movement's sake, a nihilistic dictum he says, that has led to the destruction of modern conservatism as a result of its embrace with neo-liberalism (1995: 89). Gray quotes Santayana attacking 'mechanical progress' (1995: 89). The idea involves an 'all but irresistible tendency to improvement', and as one of the 3 tenets of the modernist pseudo-religion of humanism, it is a sort of historical theodicy (1996: 23).

But the point about a viable concept of progress is that it is dialectical, and not mechanistic. It involves development and thus contradiction. Progress is not the linear vision of the Enlightenment - the erroneous idea that with the development of science there is a felicitous concomitant improvement in morals and social behaviour generally.

Progress, in reality, involves the development of instruments of exploitation (at least under class-divided societies) and therefore the oppression of humanity, but the fact that progress is contradictory, does not make it impossible. There is no doubt that capitalism provides the possibility of a world in which emancipation, self-government and freedom can be won - not as the end of historical development, but as an important step forward in the infinite progress that can be made.

The point is that the notion of progress must be reconstructed.

Reconstructing the Concept

Porritt in his recent work on capitalism cites the words of the Sustainable Development Commission where they speak of sustainable development as providing 'a framework for redefining progress' and redirecting our economies to enable all people to meet their basic needs. The Commission is acutely aware of the limits of the natural world but it still operates with a (post-Enlightenment) concept of progress (2006: 290). Elsewhere, Porritt quotes the words of Richard Reeves who complains that our political systems and cultures have failed to adapt to a new world in which 'economics does not equal or even equate to progress' (2006: 309). Progress can be reworked as a concept so that it incorporates a critical view of Enlightenment abstractions.

In his work on Berlin, Gray insists that the pluralist rejection of perfection is fatal to the idea of human history as at least potentially progressive (1996: 71). But why? The rejection of perfection is only fatal to the notion of progress if we assume that

humankind is progressing towards a fixed goal beyond which no progress is possible.

Once we challenge that abstract notion of progress, the argument falls. Gray is unable to distinguish between an abstract humanism that does indeed postulate a static notion of human emancipation, and a concrete humanism that recognizes difference and contradiction and is rooted in history.

To endorse Kraus's dictum, which Gray quotes, that 'progress makes purses out of human skin' (1997: 161) is wrong. Kraus's comment involves a curious misreading of fascism and the holocaust: the Nazis may have believed that they were carrying history forward, but their policies were reactionary. They were reacting against progress – or the threat of it – not carrying history forward. Their antagonism to the French Revolution and the Enlightenment crystal clear, and it is far better, in my view, to see Nazism as an extreme form of anti-liberalism in which the achievements of the bourgeois epoch are (almost all) rejected rather than built upon and transcended. Gray is fond of quoting the words of Koestler's Nazi intellectual who speaks of the grand enterprise upon which Nazism has embarked – 'there are no more impossibilities for man now' (Gray, 2003: 13) – but this is linked to a genocidal project that is profoundly at odds with the rationalism and liberal ideals of the Enlightenment.

Progress is contradictory – drinking nectar from the skulls of the slain – but it is real nevertheless. It is often tragic and bloody, always complex, but this does not negate it.

Progress as a Momentum Concept

In his celebrated analysis of democracy, de Tocqueville argues that democracy is a concept which has no stopping points. Democracy opposes the hierarchies of a feudal society but it also challenges the divisive nature of private property. It is true that Tocqueville's analysis is inconsistent. He assumes that a providential force – the hand of God – lies behind this movement, and this argument points to an abstract and static reality driving democracy (1966: 8). But it is perfectly possible to formulate the notion of momentum without such a 'foundationalist' (i.e. static and ahistorical) base.

The point about the momentum concept is that it is infinitely progressive, and to put the matter philosophically, it is both relative and absolute. It is eternally restless but because it is rooted in reality, it can only manifest itself in historically specific forms. It shuns the repressive hierarchies associated with patriarchy, the state, violence and class.

It looks to the future even though it works in the present.

Momentum concepts – like equality, emancipation and freedom etc. – can never be

realised. There is no point at which one can say: 'thus far and no further'. Momentum concepts are part of the historical process and hence I say that they are infinitely progressive. What bedevils the Enlightenment concept of progress is that it assumes some ultimate goal – some final resting place – a traditional notion of utopia. Hence as Gray rightly argues such a notion embodies conventional religious connotations. Marx does sometimes imply that communism is a kind of culmination of history – 'the riddle of history solved' he says in 1844 – and he could and should have made the historical character of communism clearer.

Nevertheless the notion of progress can only be consistently handled as a momentum concept.

The National Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe

I was struck even in 1990 when I was last in Zimbabwe how people often said how much better things were under the Smith regime. Reading the Zimbabwe press on the internet one often comes across comments that under Smith people had education, jobs and healthcare – under Mugabe they have nothing.

Yet it has to be said that the defeat of white minority rule by the forces of liberation was a massive historical step forward. Inevitably many of us were rather starry eyed about this. We know now that ZANU in particular employed a good deal of coercion in its battle for hearts and minds and those who say that Mugabe and ZANU ruled Zimbabwe successfully for the first ten years, have forgotten the slaughter of some 20,000 civilians in Matabeleland in the Gukurahundi in the early 1980s. For the dying Lookout Masuku and the detained Dumiso Dabenga things looked rather different.

Judith Todd in her remarkable book *Through the Darkness* cites the words of the veteran Aaron Mutiti who warned just before the 1980 elections that if Mugabe gets to power, '[F]amily life, religious life, economic life as we know it, will progressively disappear' (Todd, 2007: 423). Yet it has to be said that the triumph of liberation movement was progress even if it has proved to be what Hegel once called a slaughter bench of peoples.

Even if things are in some ways worse now than they were under white minority rule, this is still progress, for the liberation of Zimbabwe from colonial rule has created the basis for democracy. Democracy involves far more than elections. It involves greater and greater popular participation in a way that makes the state as an institution claiming a monopoly of legitimate force increasingly redundant. Engels once said that freedom has to be asserted in principle, before it can be put into practice. The freedom and equality, democracy and self-government which the liberation movements espoused in theory 5 (and had begun to put into practice) make it possible for the oppressed people of Zimbabwe to demand that these values become a reality.

Gray argues that property rights are crucial to democracy. This is right for the land issue in Zimbabwe is crucial, and of course it was not resolved at Lancaster House.

But a rational solution to the problem involves a strategy of dividing white farmers so that those who are well meaning and sympathetic could assist in training and aiding African farmers and those who are died in the wool reactionaries. This would be a democratic solution: alas since 2000 a policy has been pursued of handing land over to cronies and Ministers and as a result, productivity has slumped and the land issue has not been resolved.

Of course it would be naïve to imagine that the ousting of Mugabe will lead to some kind of liberal or socialist promised land in which autocracy and corruption will magically disappear. I remember in September 2008 Brian Raftopolous saying to me that it is important that Tsvangarai does not concentrate power in an elitist manner and all we can say for certain is that a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe will be difficult and dangerous. A crucial step forward: but one inevitably littered with mistakes, wrong turnings, blind alleys, etc. It will continue the historical process, with tremendous problems to overcome. The legacies of the Mugabe period are formidable – economic and environmental catastrophe, education and health non-functional, poverty and patriarchy, starvation and unemployment, corruption and violence. Patriarchy is made more complex by the colonial denial of manhood to black males so it is only after independence that the concept of a hegemonic masculinity acquires an increasingly negative connotation. A hard headed notion of progress, rooted in painful and complex realities, is needed as never before.

Despair and nihilism are not helpful, but nor is naïve optimism and wishful thinking. Liberation like progress itself, is a momentum concept. We must strive to advance it without ever thinking that it can become a static reality. Attaining liberal institutions in Zimbabwe would constitute a massive advance – but they will hardly be the end of the road.

References

Gray, J. (1993) *Beyond the New Right* London: Routledge.

Gray, J. (1995) *Enlightenment's Wake* London: Routledge.

Gray, J. (1996) *Post-Liberalism* London: Routledge.

Gray, J. (1997) *Endgames* Cambridge: Polity.

Gray, J. (2003) *Al Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern* London: Faber and Faber.

Gray, J. (2007) *Black Mass* London: Allen Lane.

Marx, K. (2000) Selected Writings ed. D. McLellan 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1968) Selected Works (in one vol.) London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1975) Collected Works Vol. 3 London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Porrit, J. (2006) Capitalism As If the Earth Matters London: Earthscan.

Rousseau, J.J. (1968) The Social Contract and Discourses London: Dent.

Tocqueville de A. (1966) Democracy in America Vol.1 London: Fontana.

Todd, J. (2007) Through the Darkness Cape Town: Zebra Press.

November 4

(2) Nov 4 AM 1 8:30-10:00 Narratives of Progress: Zimbabwean Historiography
Chair: Gerald Mazarire

Author: Ian Phimister

Discussants: Muchaparara Musemwa, Pathisa Nyathi

Lead Participants: Munyaradzi Nyakudya, Luise White

Ian Phimister (Zimbabwean Marxist historian based at Sheffield) started the day with a critique of Patriotic History as well as liberal narratives originally friendly to authoritarian nationalism. National liberation, according to Zim's official history, is a historically necessary conclusion to the fight between 'the people' (undifferentiated) and imperialism/colonialism. Hence the 'end' of a history (as Melber critically points out). Hence for the nationalist regimes to be overthrown would be 'counter-revolution' (not progress). Mugabe's 'Inside the Third Chimurenga' is emblematic, viewing Zanu(PF) as the 'Alpha and Omega of Zim's past, present and future'. This historiography centres on land, race and loyalty to the liberation movement, along with reassertion of sovereignty especially against imperialist 'human rights' narratives. Such historiography is thus a succession of Chimurengas, heirs to Nehanda. It's easy enough to expose this, but if Zanu(PF)'s patriotic history declares the end of history (Fukuyama-style), then the subsequent division adopted by liberals is just as unsatisfactory: nationalist historians (bad) versus historians of nationalism (good). This division exhibits tendencies to flatten difference (class, gender, generation) and privileging of some voices above others. 'Terence Ranger, in particular, exercised a pernicious influence on Zimbabwean historiography', with factual errors, excuses for the second Chimurenga, etc, etc, providing 'useable pasts for authoritarian nationalism', most notably Ranger's mid-1980s article on Matabeleland which praised Mugabe's 'generosity' and ignored the Gukharundi

massacre.

Why have alternative accounts not asserted themselves? Radical scholars were not slow off the mark. Starry-eyed attitudes to liberation were contested by John Saul, Colin Stoneman, Lionel Cliffe and David Moore, who were always skeptical about Zanu(PF)'s progressive credentials. But even for these scholars, doubts were voiced about the national democratic state's commitment to resurgent capitalism, not about democracy. Norma Kriger's skepticism was an exception. At the same time, conditions for radical history degenerated, as hard-won political-economic insights of the 1970s were obscured by postmodernism and post-colonial studies. The ensuing crisis of intellectual confidence affected radical analyses more than most. Some historiographical space was subsequently won. Labour history in particular remained a bastion of radical analysis – in particular, Brian Raftopoulos – and served as a springboard for a series of wide-ranging critiques of authoritarian nationalism. In that tradition, Alois Mlambo and younger scholars have given us *Becoming Zimbabwe*, and in this work we see 'progress' as a momentum concept (Hoffman) with all its contestations and contradictions, and within the interplay of local, national, regional and international contexts. As for its treatment of nationalism, the idea emerged of the 'party accumulation project of Zanu(PF)' (Raftopoulos), an example of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey). In this context, the best historical writings invariably address prioritization of progress or development or exploitation. Hammar's questions – who determines this?, who sets the agenda? Zim's best historiography has sought to historicise and understand power relations to answer those questions.

In comments, Muchaparara Musemwa noted the long debate about the limitations of liberal and Africanist discourses and challenges by new radical historiography (Raftopoulos). The hope for a 'distinct paradigm' of radical historiography since the early 1980s 'proved too confining a perspective'. Historians lacked cohesion and purpose. Environmental history might provide a sanctuary for those who feel that writing history is currently rudderless, though there is little to celebrate here so far. Historians' failure to grapple with environmental factors may be due to concern about environmental determinism. But ecological asset deterioration is one example of the way environmental history can be used to contest bourgeois economics, for example. Nature is not mere backdrop to human affairs, but integral. (There is, however, some writing on conservation, animals, culture and nature, and state displacement under both colonialism and post-colonialism.) Consider deforestation (increasing in power outages as biomass substitutes for electricity), drought, municipal water tariff increases, the cholera epidemic, the impact of mining in Chiadzwa and other communities, and other examples, which suggest this is the moment for environmental history, regenerating a fresh understanding of Zimbabwe's 'progress' or regress.

Pathisa Nyathi provided formal comments focusing on the teaching of history in universities and polytechnical universities. All students must pass a subject, 'National and Strategic Studies', which triggered a new debate. By most accounts,

this was 'meant to indoctrinate', as employees of teachers colleges must now be vetted by the War Veterans. UZ history department teachers are accused of Patriotic History, as churned out by the Mugabe regime. Terri Barnes is trying to correct misimpressions. The problem is that Patriotic History is mainly journalistic, and is propagated through the media. There is a great need for critical history to be reinitiated, Phimister says. But even in the colonial period we had a racist settler historiography, mirrored by Patriotic History today. But that racist past didn't stop a nationalist history from developing. Having a critical history against Patriotic History occurs in the same spirit, and we shouldn't be quite so fearful of the latter.

Gerald Mazarire added that the economic history department is also struggling against Patriotic History. Luise White noted her work in Zimbabwe, mid-career, began with trying to figure out why so many different controversies had emerged. Such as the timeline – does history begin in 600 (Becoming Zimbabwe) or 1890 with the Pioneer Column or where inbetween? There is an inherent looking back in, e.g. the phrase 'unimpeded progress towards majority rule' (Macmillan) meant a return to the 1961 Constitution. Today the slogan 'Zimbabwe will never be a colony again' suggests Zim is bedeviled by the past. An imaginary past is what 'progress' must be away from. As a fan of John Gray, White notes his observation on Margaret Thatcher: her vision of conservative Britain never existed, it never existed, it was harking back to a mythical time under Wilson, and in struggling to get back to that imaginary, she nearly destroyed Britain. Mugabe's imaginaries – especially about land and decolonization – are shaping policy and politics in unfortunate ways.

Munyaradzi Nyakudya observed that for the nationalist rulers, 'the past is the future' because the best times were in the liberation struggle. Patriotic History reflects the nationalists' desire to win state power, above all. Independence thus became the be all and end all. The ruler then rules until he dies, in the nationalist ideology. Staying in power was then about recourse to the past, a persistent reminder to the ruled. Father Knight remarked first on Ndebele critical perspectives of Patriotic History, starting with Nkomo's able leadership in the 1950's-60s, then the distraction of the Zanu split-off, but Nkomo continued to make progress through Zapu. Zipra fighters did a great job. But then Independence was a big betrayal, especially with the marginalization of Zapu as a regional not national party. Then everything went backwards through the 1980s including the Unity Accord. There is another perception of history, the MDC official history of Liberation going wrong. All these have an authentic character.

Another local historian argued that progress would ordinarily mean 'increasing prosperity for our communities, living in peace'. No one lives in peace now. The Fifth Brigade was an attempt to intimidate the Ndebele but the genocidaires did not understand that 90% of the people were original inhabitants: the Karangas who joined the 'Ndebele' nation when it was created by Mzilikazi. This region has not lived in peace since independence, and since 2000 the whole country has suffered. Today, ALL the participants in the GNU are a block to progress.

Phimister replied with agreement about the need for environmental history. The UZ departments of history and economic history might engage in study of the intellectual roots of Patriotic History. White's remarks are very serious, about 'unimpeded progress' being backward-looking; reminds of the Organisation of African Unity's declaration of Zanu and Zapu as the 'sole and authentic representatives of the African people' in Zimbabwe. And he endorsed other sentiments from the floor.

Said one speaker, 'You don't throw away the friends of your father', as a vernacular slogan has it.

David Sanders notes the parallels in Ranger, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, and nationalist history, based on the view of how Independence is the first stage of socialist revolution, so that the vicissitudes of national liberation were acceptable. But the suppression of critical currents – like Wilf Mhanda's Zipa – long antedated Independence. There were fundamental ideological forces in Gukhurahundi. It was not only the government but even the NGOs that sponsored us in the UK – CIIR especially – denied that this was going on and told us to be quiet. The truth only emerged in the public domain in the late 1990s. These are powerful forces behind the histories that were written.

Wilbert Sadomba asks us to begin at the point before slavery and colonization, a vision that was behind his own choice of going to fight in the Liberation War. When I now look at progress I am looking at the 'ultimate end of African liberation'. Nationalism is part of that progress, but limited. The conjuncture in which we are requires a further revolution, beyond formal Independence.

Sabelo Ndlovu asks how we arrived at Patriotic History, including the impact of the 2000 crisis, which left us rudderless. As historians we had to become relevant, to try to explain the crisis. Ndlovu asks, what is 'non-Patriotic History'?

Bill Freund endorsed Terri Barnes' critique of post-independence racist school syllabi, in relation to pejorative analyses of coloured people, Asians and whites.

Sindisa Marasha argued that we can't have progress when we don't have a target: is it redistributive justice; is it to remove Zanu(PF); is it to remove Mugabe?

(3) Nov 4 AM 2 10:30-12:00 Landed Economies: Farming & Farmers Then & Now

Chair: Itai Zimunya

Author: Blessing Karumbidza

Discussants: Jocelyn Alexander, Esther Chigumira

Key Participants: Bill Kinsey, Prosper Matondi, Lionel Cliffe, Wilbert Sadomba, Ben Cousins, Philan Zamchiya,

Joe Hanlon

Break 14:30-15:00

Blessing Karumbidza: Zimbabwe's Landed Economies: Considering Farming and Farmers Then and Now using Lessons from the 1980s. The implication of the change of hands in Zimbabwe following the land occupation movement should consider the experiences of the Zimbabwean government in facilitating production in resettlement schemes as well as how beneficiaries have treated their new land. Zimbabwe's tumultuous land history, a series of occupations, is associated with important shifts on the nature of farming and the farmers themselves at each point. The arrival of the Ngunis (firstly, the Shona and then followed by the amaNdebele), underwrote the land-use patterns of the land now known as Zimbabwe. The arrival and occupation of the British during colonial expansion towards the end of the 19th century established a new pattern of farmers and farming that competed for space with the now indigenous Shona and Ndebele communities. The land and agrarian regime imposed by the English under the auspices of a colonial economic policy became part of the major rallying point for an armed struggle for liberation. The resulting political independence attained in 1980 became an opportunity for altering the land/farming scenario, albeit limited by a number of constraints ranging from; constitutional limitations, limited resources and the lack of political voice of the African land/farming sector to demand more elaborate and resolute government action. The most recent occupation movement revolutionized Zimbabwe's farming sector and its constituency in a manner unprecedented in the country's history. This chapter discusses the lessons from Zimbabwe's post independence land and agrarian reform efforts and suggests the key aspects for optimism from the post-Land Occupation Movement (LOM) crop of farmers and spread of land ownership. It suggests that the new scenario forms an important basis for a truly restructured and dynamic farming sector IF (and if only) the support mechanisms and institutional regimes necessary for land and agricultural rationalization in a transforming society are put in place.

Esther Chigumira, as respondent, summed up Karumbidza paper. She noted that bifurcated land ownership continues, not by race but by class, favouring elites who are politically connected. Karumbidza's optimism is based on food self-sufficiency. But what differences are there between now and then? Patronage. Multiple farm ownership. Better commodity markets from 1980-99, and until early 2009 there was hyperinflation. And spatial organisation – time, scale and every day practices – should entail better environmental stewardship. The new resettled farmers are not utilizing their land optimally. Long-term degradation of land is underway. Gold panning and sand farming are major problems. There's a missing link: A2 commercial farmers. They were meant to move from national food self-sufficiency objectives to exports. Not much case for optimism given these empirical findings. *More optimism can be found in places like Kerala where mobile phones help to give people security against malfunctioning ag markets.)

Jocelyn Alexander focused on Karumbidza's variable of productivity, which was associated with cash crop production, and carried a moral narrative of blame, as well as of state conquering of nature and human nature. Blame was passed to Communal Area farmers and squatters ('actively criminal'). Karumbidza handles

these contradictions well. By way of an historical detour, the evidence from the colonial state parallels the post-colonial in disturbing ways. One Rhodesian pamphlet noted that Africans are bad farmers for cultural reasons and laziness ('loafing in the reserves'). Time-honoured traditions should be replaced by progress, growth and efficiency. Tenure and the market are routes to progress. (More examples from this racist colonial tract, with White Man's Burden to save the land from the indigenous people.) Questions for Karumbidza: What about 1980-2000? And what does rural progress after 2000 mean? It's a complex mix that needs some unpacking. Resistance by victims to 1959 Native Land Husbandry Act might be a basis for comparison.

Karumbidza reply: 2000-2009 was a lost decade, but it did set the stage for restructuring. Zim state is still beholden to the LSCFs, and promotion of that sector is considered vital, to the neglect of other rural sectors. Optimism is 'work in progress' as new farmers negotiate the policy space. The response to Alexander began with a reflection of parallels from colonial discourse to the present day. And the strongest parallel from colonial conservation narratives today is actually to the degradation of land in Southern Tanzania, where global capital and donors are attempting to reorganise the land via Clean Development Mechanism forestry investments, called REDD.

Lionel Cliffe observed that inherited biases may need reconsideration; even a white farmer told Cliffe that in a couple of hundred years, the 2000-09 experience might be seen as the most powerful progressive impulse in African agriculture. There are numerous case studies of perseverance by peasant beneficiaries, and new analyses will surprise many. Wilbert Sadomba noted that the war was highly contradictory, and during the ZIPA period the challenge was briefly joined, but the faction of the nationalists who defeated ZIPA 'hijacked that revolution', in connivance with international capital. We war vets are opposed to both Zanu(PF) elites and MDC elites - we see neither being able to take the country forward. The land occupations were a revolution. There are other aspects of the last decade's revolution, of which land is minor.

Ben Cousins remarked on how difficult it is to evaluate land reform. There are messy, contradictory and nuanced realities. Plaas teams and other studies have shown that there are many positives, including: changing structures of ownership and new agrarian structure. This is known about livestock in southern Zimbabwe and also new producers of flue-cured tobacco for the market. Significant investments have been made by A1 farmers with potential for levels, and even accumulation from below, with many more beneficiaries, although also class differentiation (especially in fast-track areas). About a third of the A1 are succeeding, a third getting by, and a third getting out. But ultimately land reform is not an answer to poverty. The negatives are important: the collapse of LSCFs contributed to wide-scale economic decline; the motor force of land reform was the Zanu(PF) power grab; the decline of the rule of law; violence. There were other more important factors including rent-seeking and the currency's degradation. How

many farmers were seized by the elites? We don't know. In Masvingo, relatively few. We don't know how much farmland is productive. We don't know about the fate of displaced farmworkers. A couple of hundred thousand hectares are still unaccounted for. What source for capitalization of farming? What role for the state? There are mainly contradictory and ambiguous findings. The positives probably outweigh the negatives.

Philani Zamchiya remarked that progress is still seen within a paradigm of efficiency, usually tied to economies of scale. What about political significance of land? But the overarching problem is the systemic crisis of livelihoods, and the challenge of people becoming full farmers. Joe Hanlon notes he hasn't yet done much land reform – but works in the region on Mozambique. Two observations from comparative experience: institutions are crucial – with Agritex, Grain Marketing Board and others, which was a key factor in white farmers' success (and in white farmers' subsequent failure in Manica Province in Mozambique after 2000); and the difference between Zim and neighbours in attitudes about land, because of its centrality to liberation. Farming is terribly important for accumulation, including elites who are actually utilizing it. Mozambican elites are very different. Here, land is a route to accumulation. Urban-rural links become important, with urban capital being leveraged for agriculture.

Richard Kamidza asks, what kind of advocacy do we adopt to improve agriculture? How does it fit into the broader regional ag economy? John Saul asks about motivation for land reform? An anti-racist revival of nationalism? Or a tactical, desperate move by Mugabe to maintain power? Elinor Sisulu noted the lack of considerations on downsides from rural restructuring: food security, environment, HIV-AIDS, gender analysis, class analysis. There is a Zimbabwean exceptionalism which is unfortunate; this is one of the most food-insecure regions in the world. There isn't any discussion about agricultural education, veterinary services, biotech, etc. The ag colleges are not being discussed.

Karumbidza replied: staying in KwaZulu-Natal, there is not a single major farmer who is simply a farmer. The idea of creating a pure farmer is not relevant. Even in the 1980s resettlement schemes, the lack of institutional support was a problem. Beneficiaries of Zim land reform do indeed have the educational capacities to farm. For policy advocacy, the challenge now is facilitation of productivity and environmental sustainability. The history of imposed and planned projects always generated resistance. Plenty of commissions have also been attempted across the region, generally ineffectually.

David Mupamhadzi argued that land is one of the key factors of production, but a problem is that land has no formal value in Zimbabwe, with titles worthless. There's a need, he argued, to put value to land to support farmers. In the 1980s one of the reasons for success was borrowing using title deeds, which are now a worthless piece of paper – a dead asset. Wealthy beneficiaries of land reform are leasing out their land, which is wrong. As a result of these problems, it's cheaper to import a

chicken from Brazil or maize from South Africa than to produce it locally. In addition, more emphasis on cash crops is needed.

In contrast, Colin Stoneman noted the limits of the 'dismal science' and remarked that 'opportunity cost' needs to be introduced: what might have been achieved if a better land reform had been adopted, with due course of law, sufficient funding, institutional support to beneficiaries. You can't go back on this, but the main lesson is that the institutions that existed before must be brought back, like Grain Marketing Board. Graca Gracian noted that there are no generalizations possible. There are no current studies. Situations are changing on a daily basis. Historical analyses are no use now.

Karumbidza mainly rebutted Mupamhadzi, arguing that many ways of organizing agricultural relations beyond the markets and ownership. No title deed was necessary for investments in CA areas, for example. And there are many reasons for the higher priced local chickens given the international context, this is not just a Zimbabwean problem. We have to think beyond the idea that there are only capitalist arrangements for rural Zimbabwe – it will lead us to biofuels, timber plantations and land takeovers by carbon traders.

(4) Nov 4 AM 3 13:00-14:30

Economy and Society Restructured:

New Formations of Labour and Capital

Chair: Bill Freund

Authors: Showers Mawowa and Richard Saunders

Discussants: Joseph Chaumba, Sobona Mtisi

Key Participants: Claude Kabemba, Farayi Maguwu

Authors: Showers Mawowa and Richard Saunders

Discussant: Sobona Mtisi

Showers Mawowa began by arguing that mining should be seen in the context of development discourses. Minerals always played a key role, and China now has a huge appetite for minerals. But this can lead to underdevelopment, associated with extraction and the Resource Curse. From 2000-07, the 'painful paradox' (Saunders) included a global commodities boom, but the Zim mining sector suffered decline. By 2000 Zim was the third largest producer of gold in Africa, but that suffered huge decline during the 2000s. Zim also has a massive external debt and it has been suggested that these resources be used as collateral. Negotiating with China has not proven beneficial so far. Platinum mining has been the only highly profitable subsector, but HR policies and skills transfer are controversial. Dismantling of small-scale mining is a problem, too. Overall, the 'accumulation networks' of ruling party elites, in mining and fiscal/financial circuits, was terribly destructive. The role of the state in driving this kind of accumulation is crucial, and whether the state can succeed in changing the Resource Curse is a big question.

Richard Saunders argued that resources are both a curse and a blessing. Resources are not responsible for the corruption since 2000, nor the distributive regime. In both cases, to amplify Mawowa's thesis, it's the changing political economy of the state that sets the crucial context. We're dealing with three mineral regimes of accumulation. There's been uneven and periodic development of state relations to the minerals. The history of resource management and regulation featured 1980s state-led management (building on Rhodesian state); the 1990s liberalization of mining, land tenure and finance (more TNCs with fewer strings attached); and in the 2000s the collapse and restructuring. The most problematic narrative is the argument that the 1990s boom can be replicated – and while the second half of the 1990s witnessed a boom, a US\$750 mn investment in four years (including vast exploration), the conditions for success bred future failure. Local labour was squashed and local participation was downplayed. The state's marketing mechanism failed as well. From being third in Africa and tenth in the world, Zim's gold declined. Part of this was due to the state's clawing of forex, as well as access to electricity and then of pliant labour. In 18 months a large part of the gold mining capacity was shut, with 14 mines closed in 2000-01. From a peak of 30 tonnes of gold in 2000, the figure fell to 12.5 in 2003, and then to 3 in 2008. Any sense of a 'developmental state' became very difficult to argue in these circumstances. The public sector's mining regulator was deprofessionalised and became politicized and ad hoc. New players reflect this confusion. 800 000 artisanal miners are mainly desperate, and are regularly attacked. South African mining capital is playing a negative role. Blood diamonds in Marange entailed dispossession from peasants as well as the undermining of the Government of National Unity – and there appears no way to control those assets for the benefit of all. The state/party institutionalized the diamond grabs in 2006-07. The major large-scale minerals resources are controlled by transnational capital and by local elites. There seems to be very little grounds for hope.

Sobona Mtisi put resources in global context, stressing water as an example of power and politics, especially during colonialism. Subsequent history of water included a 1998 Water Act (supported by international financial institutions) which was a 'takeaway from the poor'. Roger Southall asked about SA capital's role, given the thesis of subimperialism, as well as ANC-Zanu(PF) political interlinkages. Clever Chikanda noted lots of resistance to mineral extraction across Africa, and the debate about the Kimberly Process, and concern that there is more violence coming with extraction. Erin McCandless asked whether there are ways to extract resources so as to achieve peace, and link that to land. David Mupamhadzi noted the problem of the way GDP is calculated to overstate the impact of extraction on GDP, and the lack of trickle-down benefits to either the fiscus or local communities. Can future generations survive, especially if finite non-renewable resources are taken away? For Chiadzwa diamonds, a key problem is lack of transparency. The other problem is that people who hold claims to land are selling them across the world, illegitimately.

Mapowa noted the recent Southern African Resource Watch delegation to the platinum mining zones, and found it revealing how much anger there is against the companies. The first thing one mining company did in one area was to build a mortuary, for example. There's a reawakening, though, leading to community development trusts. On the portion of mining in GDP, there's another huge problem according to a 2007 statement by Reserve Bank governor Gono: 16 tonnes of gold, \$800 mn in diamonds and another \$200 mn in other minerals were smuggled out of SA illegally. Some estimate the Zim GDP at \$8 bn, but the state's decline in statistical capacity is a big problem. Saunders noted that the state institutions that existed in the 1980s aren't there, but it's also delusional to expect neoliberalism to solve the problems. The state needs to rebuild capacity. Efforts at building civil society voice from below have been repressed. There was radical redistribution of land, but not minerals – mainly because of the large-scale capital required. Without access to capital, you cannot take over a mine and make it work. The South Africans came in with both political and financial capital. Regionalisation and elite pacting around mining services are very important, and many connect SA, Zim and the DRC.

John Saul asked about what info should be taken back to the Northern Front of struggle, and how to address the claims of Mamdani, Moyo/Yeros and a December 2008 Codesria initiative (including stated fear of US/UK military invasion) regarding Mugabe's liberatory credentials. He asked whether there is any anti-imperialism in the mining sector? Ibbo Mandaza argued that in relation to Chiadzwa diamonds, a debate has emerged over their origins. The Economist magazine called it a 'bonanza' with \$10bn/year revenues. Mandaza phoned Biti to ask whether that could be reinvested, and he said, over the last four years, only \$30 million was taken out. He thought only 10% are gem diamonds. Is there substantive information about whether these diamonds are genuine? In 1996, Zimbabwe had \$3.8 bn in mining (no platinum), which fell to \$1.5 bn (including platinum); lots was stolen – how much? Truckloads of Zim platinum has been found in SA. Sostina Takure asked about the Kimberley Process and blood diamonds. With intimidation and violence still being used in the Constitution-making process, and with an election next year, there will be terror. Are there mechanisms in the KP to safeguard people? Claude Kabemba noted contracting problems and transfer pricing around minerals. David Sanders raised the health/safety issue. Patrick Bond (and Eleanor Sisulu) mentioned Farai Maguwu's heroic role in bringing this to our attention, and the possibility for linkage to the Boycott Disinvestment Sanctions movement against Israel, whose \$20bn/year diamond industry is in solidarity with Mugabe's generals, as was made clear in May. Mawowa agreed that there is liberation-movement solidarity that explains some of these processes, and that the KP process is not only technical but political. Saunders argued that there is no anti-imperial content given the links to London, although empowerment rhetoric is used. The Chiadzwa diamonds were initially overestimated by Gideon Gomo. KP is good for diamond footprint mapping. There are lots of diamonds, and the good quality stones go to India, but there are switching techniques to Sierra Leone. A good place to get a critique of the KP is from one of the original KP drafters, Ian Smilie: 'Blood on the Stone'.

(5) Nov 4 PM 3 15:30-17:00 Roundtable: 'Intellectuals' and Progress in Zimbabwe
Chair: David Moore

Participants: Ibbo Mandaza, Brian Raftopoulos, Fandyroy Moyo, Lawton Nikwa,
Luise White

Ibbo Mandaza (leading Zimbabwean political economist) recorded the trajectory of development dates from modernization through Marxism. History is all about struggles, hence the centrality of class. It's self-serving to discuss the role of intellectuals because others should judge. The first decade of Zim's independence was impressive; the first venture at that time was with Bernard Chidzero, "Zimbabwe: Towards a New Order". We quickly sought to put Harare on the map, against some in US and UK academia who claimed hegemony. We were active in the formation of Codesria and AAPS, and at ZIDS, there were many of us at ZIDS and SAPES. Did we put Harare on the map, as Dar es Salaam had been? Nationalism was at the centre of that – and what was wrong with nationalism? I see post-modern attacks on nationalism. Rather than attack it is challenging to ask, why is it still here? But most of us who were radical intellectuals were fired from the Zim state by the late 1990s, including Sam Geza. This was because of our opposition to structural adjustment. There was a Zanu(PF) that we were part of, the liberation movement, and then there was Mugabe's Zanu(PF), which is very different. Mugabe is essentially rightwing, notwithstanding the anti-imperialist rhetoric. John Saul raised questions about the current situation – but it is very clear, the major project has been the introduction of the comprador bourgeoisie, entering cross-border deals. But there is engagement between that class and international capital, including the British. The main concern for capital is stability, not human rights.

Brian Raftopoulos: The African Association of Political Science and the SAPES Trust where many cut their intellectual teeth: Sam Moyo, Lloyd Sachikonye, Raftopoulos. The "Zimbabwe: Political Economy of Transition" book stands as a strong statement. It was still written from within the radical nationalist political economy standpoint, including all the limitations. The position was one of critical support for the Zimbabwe state. It was an important first attempt to critically assess that state. The second formation was the crude Marxism emerging from the University of Zimbabwe, particularly the Law Department. It was reductionist and found expression in the ZBC show "Road to Socialism". Very very crude. Many of those students trained by those in that department often moved from that kind of Marxism to human rights work – quite a transition. It was attached to the Journal of Social Change and Development. The 1990s saw a new kind of intellectual engagement, particularly from the human rights movement. They coalesced around the National Constitutional Assembly – and then a polarization of intellectual debate. It's Mark 1 of Jonathan Moyo's various incarnations, as a liberal critical of the state – but not linked to the social movements. He had little sense of what civil society politics meant. It took an emerging state crisis and a growing opposition from labour, students, the constitutional movement – and new questions not only

about the state but also nationalism. In my work on labour I showed the various tensions with nationalism. In the post-2000 period we see extreme polarization of intellectuals – over the authoritarian nature of the state, the land question, constitutionalism and democratization. You see clear human rights and law questions on one side, and redistribution questions on the other side. There were novel developments, and we needed to deconstruct the language of anti-imperialism. There was truth in Mugabe’s critique of empire, based on a repressive notion of national citizenry. It was both progressive and regressive. This discourse threw off many African scholars – most importantly in the Mamdani debate in December 2008. Legitimacy and citizenship and violence were simply not discussed by Mamdani. We need to look beyond the polarizations. But there indications that we may see more divisions, including the origins of this crisis. But real progress has been made, around how to respond to nationalism: in critique, and recognizing the continuing relevance.

Fandyroy Moyo: The truth, according to intellectuals, is based on certain ideologies. We learn about these through land reform and intellectual reform. The group around Sam Moyo sees land reform, while messy, as acceptable. Others say that this should not have happened because we need to arrive at an outcome with production. Then the constitution-making process has been another source of division. There has been progress, however: overall agreement about the need for a new constitution. Intellectuals have entered the political arena to influence governance. That is good, but intellectuals have been too lazy to publish, or are hiding. So many events are unfolding that can be documented, but there seems to be little effort. There needs to be more writing of contemporary events. (Let me also suggest you reclaim titles like ‘comrade’.) There are intellectuals that stand for good and those who stand for bad – destructive to human rights and progress and transformation. We have known these intellectuals who make U-Turns, especially Jonathan Moyo, who used to attack Mugabe, but now says we need Mugabe as president for life. But there are progressive intellectuals standing for transformation. I am privileged to be with you.

Luise White: The Rhodesian memoir industry – including Peter Godwin who seems to be the most hated man in Zimbabwe – looks like a new bittered post-colonial whinge, but it has deeper roots. Within four to five years of UDI in 1965, the same thing happened. The pattern of white writing is very interesting. Under UDI nationalism was never really developed; white nationalism became a cottage industry in these texts. The literature picks up again in the 1990s and then more recently – and becomes the cottage industry it was again. But these are childhood memoirs, extraordinarily narcissistic (like Godwin’s being everywhere). It’s a struggle for inclusion, being everywhere at once, never irrelevant. It’s a very specific and rarified notion of progress – Alexandra Fuller lays claim to a country she didn’t live in after being 19 years old. There’s a claim to a national belonging that makes these texts not nearly as weird as they look.

Lawton Nikwa: Comrades (to reclaim that word), there has been progress.

Academics represent chains of disciplines that engage in scholarship: as much for individual as for collective development. The other role of academy is innovation. Musemwa's presentation on environmental history was fascinating. The Bulawayo water debate is terribly important, including the fight against the takeover of water. That fight and the coincidence of a scholar working on this, is amazing. The issue has become national not just regional – which is progress. (The idea has been around since 1912, though.) The other comment is about the massive scholarship around land reform – and helps us ask about the contributions of intellectuals both in the academy and in NGOs. Intellectuals have been at the point of departure in interrogating broader issues like transparency.

Showers Mawowa admired the intellectual history tied to liberation discourse. The links of John Saul and Nathan Shamuyarira were linked in Dar – but beyond 1980 what are the commonalities? John Hoffman asked about the problematic nature of nationalism – which puts the nation above the law, democracy, gender and so on. We need an integrated approach, and nationalism doesn't do that. Philani Zamchiya noted that radical intellectuals were chased out of the state and system. Did radicalism around material issues like land allow vultures in the state to attack democracy? Now aren't intellectuals concentrating on democracy at the expense of material redistribution? How do we address material questions and also address democratic modalities?

Raftopoulos noted the destructive role of those intellectuals still in the state, as highly destructive. On the other side intellectuals worked with the opposition and civic movement. That has had both good and bad effects, forcing us to engage with immediate processes – but at the same time a loss of critical instinct by intellectuals on both sides. John's point about nationalism is well taken, as is Philani's point on the fractures – as we need a new framework that deals with both these questions. Big areas of redistribution and political economy were not being dealt with and very quickly Zanu(PF) filled that gap by raising the land issue they way they did.

Mandaza noted that the radical nationalist intellectuals were merely an appendage in the liberation movement. We were backroom boys and wrote fantastic speeches. We helped in many respects dress up an essentially rightwing regime in leftist clothing. When you look back we were caught up in the euphoria of independence, sometimes uncritically. Scholars whom we looked up to tried to remind us that we were too euphoric. This era of new democracy seems to have numbed the analytical sensibilities of the left. Democracy has a material basis, which we have forgotten. We have to understand the state in terms of class. The new scholars have ignored the class character of the state. If we were uncritical in the early 1980s, it was for missing the basic political economy of the Zimbabwean state.

Wilbert Sadomba comments on an alleged missing link: between intellectualism from independence, to the current period. The guerilla movement's intellectuals were repressed. Those intellectuals outside the movement displaced those of us from within the war. Those from the diaspora continued with their own agenda.

Intellectuals coopted by the nationalists ignored the agenda of the war vets, the poor, the workers. Wilfred Mhanda notes that Mugabe himself sets the agenda – and seems to take advantage of a vacuum. Intellectuals are not setting the agenda – what is the problem here? Aside from the constitutional movement, intellectuals are in the backseat. But intellectuals don't resonate with the people on the ground. Mugabe talks left and walks right – how does he get away with it? Erin McCandless asks what lessons there are for emerging scholars so as to not feed into harmful polarizations? Joshua Mpfu notes the lack of a common agenda, because of Mugabe's excessive power. Mandaza's idea of the comprador bourgeoisie is very strong – a layer of consumers of intellectual products. These people are living well, buying the most expensive items, as they wish. John Saul notes that Shamuyarira was not an ally in Dar es Salaam (though Lionel Cliffe was his tennis party). Shamuyarira had to leave to Zambia to start Frolizi – where he was a voice on the right of Zimbabwean nationalism. At the same time we became aware of the politics of ZIPA – on the left of Zimbabwean nationalism. The early MDC also linked to trade unions and civil society, and was also another expression of nationalism. Now there's just one group claiming nationalism: Zanu(PF). In class terms, civil society is crucially important – but intellectuals should clarify that nationalism is a diverse multiplex reality, and cannot be monopolized. The amplification of those voices from below by intellectuals is crucial, so that no one can monopolise the voice of nationalism. Elinor Sisulu confronts Mugabe's anti-imperialism. What constitutes an anti-imperialist project in this conjuncture? We speak a language which doesn't resonate with young people. There was reference to the Mamdani debates. There hasn't been an adequate response; Mamdani was responding – there at Columbia – to Western imperialism, but doesn't in any way address the lived reality of people on the ground. What is the activist implication of Mamdani's argument? That you should support the Zanu(PF) regime and dismiss those struggling against that regime. It dismissed people as ones without agency – a similar argument to the apartheid regime's. We need an anti-imperialist project and more clarity on what constitutes an anti-imperialist project – certainly not support for Zanu(PF). David Moore records: We did invite Mamdani but he was the first to say he couldn't come.

Raftopoulos on anti-imperialist discourse: you see a hugely impoverished anti-imperialist to mobilize the region and the continent. It's not based on national legitimacy. It doesn't empower. It is based on exclusions and repression. Elinor's point is correct – we don't know how to articulate a different discourse both critical of empire and of repressive states. It's the main lesson: finding that discourse very urgently. Moyo traces the problem to the failure to distinguish between party and state. Zanu(PF) central committee made the decisions, not Cabinet. There was no difference between Mugabe and the state. But in our deliberations in this area about the constitution, we found that no one could sing the national anthem. Mandaza noted that there were very different expectations. The major mobilizing ideology was socialism – even if not clearly understood. We are now very far from that, which is why the comprador bourgeoisie has triumphed. Not surprising given the power of mining and finance capital. The anti-imperialism ideology is strong because the current crop of opposition intellectuals have not put

class analysis at the centre of their analysis. The question is how to raise that in a way that doesn't let Mugabe and his cronies monopolise that term anti-imperialist, as a tool vis-à-vis the popular politics. We need to get back to that. White noted that the crude anti-imperialism was cynical, but perhaps because it comes from a space of fighting anti-imperialism as a lived experience, something we have to come to grips with.

(6) Nov 4 PM 5 17:00-18:30 SAPES Trust Policy Dialogue Forum
National Heroes, National Shrines and Joshua Nkomo's Legacy: Policy Implications?
Chair: Cyril Ndebele
Presenter: Pathisa Nyathi

Pathisa Nyathi aimed to describe why the Nkomo statue in Bulawayo 'did not take off'. Nyathi covered Nkomo's early political biography, and then turned to the way a sculpture might aesthetically capture the essence of Nkomo's contribution. But consultations were not done properly, and there were expectations on the part of the Nkomo family that were not met, mainly related to size of body, size of pedestal and its lack of imposing, landmark status. 'It's pathetic,' said a family member. Then a long look at statues around the world, from Mandela to Stalin, and gripes about how dignity and patriarchy were insulted by the size, quality and pedestal.

(7) Nov 5 8:30-10:00 Economy and Society Restructured: New Formations of Labour and Capital
Chair: Showers Mawowa
Authors: Lloyd Sachikonye & Godfrey Kanyenze
Discussants: Colin Stoneman, Rob Davies
Key Participants: David Mupamhadzi, Richard Kamidza

Godfrey Kanyenze:
'Development Deferred' (with Lloyd Sachikonye)

Overview

Four phases/epochs:

The First Decade: 1980-90

The ESAP Period: 1991-96

The Crisis Period: 1997-2008

The Period of the Inclusive Government: 2009-

The Inherited Economy

At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a relatively developed and diversified economy by African standards. The contribution of agriculture to GDP at only 12.2% for Zimbabwe was much lower than the average level for Sub-Saharan

Africa (SSA) of 31.6% between 1980 and 1989. By 1980, the manufacturing sector was already the largest contributing sector to GDP at 25% in Zimbabwe, compared to an average of only 10.4% for SSA over the period 1980-1989 and 23.3%. Industry already consisted of some 1,260 separate units producing 7,000 different products. Diversified export base: with agriculture accounting for 41% of export earnings in 1984, followed by manufacturing at 32% and mining (27%). However, the economy was characterized by economic dualism, with a relatively developed and diversified formal sector employing about 1 million people (a fifth of the labour force) existing alongside an underdeveloped rural economy, the home of 70 percent of the black population. From a capitalist perspective, pre-capitalist forms of work constitute non-productive labour in that the activities for which it is engaged are not profit-oriented, being of a survivalist nature - underemployment manifests itself as non-productive labour in that it is not harnessed by capital for accumulation. While both developed and developing countries have both elements of productive and non-productive labour, it is the predominance of non-productive labour in developing countries that constitutes the major problem. The tragedy is that the majority of the labour force, mainly women, is trapped in pre-capitalist forms of production, which are not driven by the need to employ labour to generate profit and the further expansion of capital. Moreover, the relatively diversified manufacturing sector had its own contradictions:

- The import substitution industrialisation strategy, which had performed well during the sanctions period, (particularly during the fastest growth period of 1966-74), was already showing signs of severe stress by 1980;
- All easy and moderately hard industrialisation had been exhausted by 1975;
- The deliberate policy of compressing imports to contain the balance of payments situation left capital stock in an obsolete and depleted state;
- The high level of protection created a monopoly structure such that 50.4% of manufacturing products were produced by single firms, 20.6% in subsectors with 2 firms and 9.7% where there were 3 firms, implying that 80 percent of goods produced in Zimbabwe were monopoly or oligopoly products.

The First Decade: 1980-90

Characterized by constrained policy environment:

- Opening up of economy, removal of sanctions, favourable commodity prices, good rains resulted in high growth rates in 1980 and 1981: gave false hope resulting in liberalization of external payments; aggressive incomes policy;
- Onset of drought and three years of recession (1982-84) resulted in the adoption of a stabilization programme beginning December 1982 – abandonment of growth with equity policy agenda;
- South African destabilization and the civil war in Mozambique;
- Contradictory policy framework: socialist objectives and continuity with colonial economic policy framework;
- Government had banked on the US\$2.2 billion that had been promised at the ZIMCORD donors' conference in March 1981. However, by the end of 1984, only a fifth of the amount had been disbursed.
- Disconnect between economic planning and management:

The TNDP (1982-1985) and FFYNDP spelt out ambitious economic targets without a strategy to address constraints in the domestic economy preventing the implied change; Real GDP grew at 4.6% during the period of 5.1%; Employment grew at an average 1986–90, against a planned rate inadequate to deal with a labour force rate of 2.7% during the same period force growing at 3% per annum; Private sector investment remained at decade. The cumbersome foreign exchange depressed 10% of GDP during the allocation system, the tightly regulated business environment in relation to pricing, labour and investment controls together with uncontrollable fiscal deficits deterred investment – few new players – state paternalism The budget deficit for the period 1986–90 averaged expansion especially in education and health. 9.8% of GDP – social Meanwhile, the World Bank and IMF continued to put pressure on the government to adopt market liberalization and deregulation. For instance, in 1987, the World Bank refused to sign an agreement for an extension of the export revolving fund until measures were taken to liberalize trade. The adoption of investment guidelines in April 1989 marked a major shift in government policy. This was followed by the establishment of the Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) in mid-1989, a move designed to create a ‘one-stop’ investment window and the signing of the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Convention (MIGA) in September 1989, and the USA’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) Agreement in June 1990.

The ESAP Period: 1991-96

When it became clear that the economy was not generating sufficient jobs, especially in the context of depressed investment, government adopted ESAP in 1991 at the behest of the World Bank and the IMF. ESAP marked a paradigm shift from the state-led economic development of the 1980s to a more market-driven development strategy. The key targets of ESAP were to:

- achieve annual GDP growth of 5 per cent over the period 1991–95;
- raise savings to 25 per cent of GDP;
- raise investment to 25 per cent of GDP;
- achieve export growth of 9 per cent per annum;
- reduce the budget deficit from over 10 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent by 1995; and
- reduce inflation from 17.7 per cent to 10 per cent by 1995.

To achieve these objectives, the government set out to liberalize markets.

- Economic growth, which had averaged 4.2% in the 1980s, declined to an average of 2.8% during the ESAP period.
- Significant de-industrialization.
- The rate of inflation, which had averaged 12% during the 1980s, rose to an average of 26.6% during the ESAP period.
- Employment growth also declined from 1.9% in the 1980s to a lowly 0.12% during the ESAP period.
- Re-emergence of labour and civil society, attempts at reaching a Social Contract and state repression

The Crisis Period: 1997-2008

A. Macroeconomic Management

- Cumulative economic decline of at least 51% between 1999 and 2008 (48%

between 2000 and 2008) – GDP growth projected at 8.1% in 2009

- The savings ratio fell from an average of 15% (1995-2000) to 4% by 2008; a level of 25% is considered optimal, China achieved 40%
- Hyperinflation officially estimated at 231 million percent by July 2008
- Unsustainable budget deficits and unmanageable public sector debt, foreign and domestic
- Uncontrolled monetary expansion driven by quasi-fiscal activities
- Volatile and unpredictable exchange-rate systems (multiple exchange rates, rapid dollarization and a collapsing currency)
- External repayment arrears of US\$3.1 billion – government defaulted in 2000

B. Productive Sectors

- Diminishing international competitiveness
- Lack of secure and predictable property rights
- Rapidly-worsening shortage of skills arising from out-migration
- Hostile investment climate characterized by excessive, volatile and mutually-conflicting government interventions and uncertainty over economic empowerment initiatives
- Acute shortages of essential inputs, especially fuel, raw materials and intermediate inputs
- All sectors operating well below capacity levels (capacity utilisation in industry was below 10%)
- High operating costs on account of infrastructural deficiencies, especially electricity
- Business decision-making undermined by volatile, often contradictory, regulatory environment
- Inadequate and dilapidated productive infrastructure
- Inefficient and subsidy-dependent public enterprises

C. Social

- High levels of unemployment and decent work deficits: 72% of the population below the poverty line by 2003, up from 55% in 1995
- Per capita GDP declined from US\$720 during 1997-2002 to US\$265 by 2008
- The percentage of the population employed in the formal sector declined from 14% in 1980 to 10% by 2004 & around 6% by 2007.
- Growing informalization and deepening dualism in the economy: 4 out of 5 jobs were informalized by 2004
- Inequality worsened: the gini-coefficient increased from 0.53 in 1995 to 0.61 in 2003.
- The disappearance of a middle class: the 'missing middle'
- Serious and rapidly increasing social distress and chronic food insecurity
- Inadequate and dilapidated social infrastructure
- HIV and AIDS (adult prevalence rate of 13.7%) & the re-emergence of diseases that had been controlled (malaria, TB, cholera).

D. How the State Does Business

- Predatory state behaviour – failed state characteristics
- Fixation with short-term considerations: fire fighting mode
- Institutional incoherence, inconsistency & overlap

- Contraction of the revenue base
- Deteriorating governance indicators
- Estrangement from traditional development partners and processes
- Zimbabwe's isolation from the 'mainstream' of international development means that when reengagement takes place it will have a poor understanding of how to do business with the aid community
- Concepts, principles, processes developed since 1997 will be new to the country.

E. Data deficiencies

The quality of data has declined over the last few years. This is serious given that reliable baselines are key to the formulation of sound strategies, the setting of targets and the monitoring of progress. Zimbabwe is basically starting afresh.

The Global Political Agreement (GPA)

Economic Aspects in the Agreement

Article III of the agreement on 'Restoration of Economic Stability and Growth' commits the parties to a full and comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate the economy. It proposes the creation of a National Economic Council made up of the parties and representatives of the following sectors; manufacturing, agriculture, mining, tourism, commerce, financial, labour, academia and other sectors. The National Economic Council gives advice to government and formulates economic plans and programmes for approval by government.

- However, it is silent on what would become of the existing fora for stakeholder consultations such as the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) and the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF).

Critique

- i) Contradictory Diagnosis of the Causes and Nature of the Crisis: the old narrative and template remain in place (e.g. issue of sanctions – Article IV of the Agreement)
- ii) No focus on re-engaging the international community, which is largely blamed for the country's predicament

ii) The President Still Calls the Shots

iii) Fiscal Implications of the Agreement: On account of its bloated structure, the Inclusive Government is overly consumption-oriented, comprising 71 ministers, deputy ministers and governors. This figure is far too big, and is unsustainable for an economy and population the size of Zimbabwe. Just before the advent of the Inclusive Government, the 2009 budget & Monetary Policy Statement introduced the following measures:

- use of multiple foreign currencies; 'multicurrency.'
- Liberalization of the domestic pricing regime with the role of the National Incomes and Pricing Commission (NIPC) reduced to monitoring price trends in the region.
- Decentralization of the management of water to local authorities with effect from 1 February 2009, with ZINWA reverting to its status prior to 9 May 2005.
- Payment of allowances to civil servants at US\$100 a month.
- Cessation of quasi-fiscal operations with the RBZ reverting to its core mandate of ensuring price and financial sector stability. The Short-term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) unveiled by the Inclusive Government had 3 key goals and 3 priority areas. The goals were:
 - To stabilize the macro and micro economy

- To recover the levels of savings
- To lay the basis of a more transformative mid-term to long-term programme that would turn Zimbabwe into a developmental state. The priority areas being:
 - Political and governance issues
 - Social protection
 - Stabilisation.

Commentary: Fairly conventional approach - In December 2009, government launched STERP II (2010-2012), which seeks to complete the unfinished business of STERP I, improve capacity utilization, strengthen social protection programmes, strengthen public institutions, restoring basic services, ensuring food security among others. Government has adopted partial dollarisation because it cannot finance full dollarisation, with official foreign currency reserves at 0.8 months of import cover in 2008. Full dollarisation involves the RBZ buying the deposits of the banks and financial system as a whole, and converting them to US dollars, which is not feasible without external assistance

The major advantages of (partial) dollarisation include:

- Enhances policy credibility
- Promotes macroeconomic stability by immediately killing hyperinflation
- Instills fiscal austerity.

Its main disadvantages are:

- Loss of financial sovereignty
- RBZ loses its role as lender of last resort
- Limits government's capacity to respond to economic shocks
- Loss of seigniorage revenue (revenue from printing money)
- Leaves the majority of the people out of the system: 65% of the population is unbanked (as stated by the Minister of Finance, 'you eat what you kill.')

Some Positive Developments: Recovery fragile

As a result of the measures undertaken since end of January 2009, some positive developments emerged:

- Deflation of 7.7% in 2009; inflation of 4.2% for September 2010
- Capacity utilisation in industry increased from less than 10% in 2008 to 32.3% (CZI 2009 Manufacturing Sector Survey) – still below the year-end target of 60%
- Capacity utilization improved from below 10 percent to around 30 percent to 50 percent (see 2010 Mid-Term Fiscal Policy Review Statement of 14 July, page 16).
- Re-opening of industries and mines, e.g. Zimbabwe's largest gold mine, Metallion Gold which accounts for more than 50% of gold output re-opened two of its 5 mines after getting credit lines of US\$15 million – removal of forex surrender requirements helped
- Mineral prices are picking up, except for chrome and nickel
- Hospitals that had closed or scaled down operations re-opened: the bed occupancy at Harare Hospital rose from 180 patients in March to 576 patients by May
- Vacancy rates in the education sector declined from 60% to 35% by mid-June 2009.

Challenges: Notwithstanding these positive developments, there are still some inherent challenges as evidenced by the persistent decline in Zimbabwe's position on the World Bank's Doing Business Indicators and the World Economic Forum's

Competitiveness Index. Policy incoherence and inconsistency: For instance, on 29 January 2010, the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Regulations were gazetted stipulating that any business with an asset value of US\$500,000 should cede 51 percent of ownership to indigenous Zimbabweans. It later emerged that there had not been any consultations even in the Inclusive Government itself. The regulations were promulgated to implement the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act No. 14 of 2007. Major challenge remains the limited fiscal space: For instance, of the first half of 2010 expenditures, as much as 82 percent went to recurrent expenditures. Employment costs took up 53 percent of total revenues, leaving very little for capital expenditure. According to STERP II, efforts by government to mobilize external support for STERP I achieved limited results, with support targeting humanitarian assistance. The adverse impact of the global recession: The value of exports declined from US\$1,819 million in 2007 to US\$1,657 million in 2008 and an estimated US\$1,591 million in 2009. The balance-of-payments deficit deteriorated from US\$323 million in 2007 to US\$725 million in 2008 and an estimated 1,908 million in 2009. As a result of firming commodity prices, the balance of payments deficit is projected to improved to US\$597 million in 2010 (see 2010 Mid-Term Fiscal Policy Review Statement of 14 July). Debt overhang: Zimbabwe's total external debt is expected to rise to US\$6.7 billion by end of 2010, with total arrears of US\$4.6 billion. The political bind: Economic recovery is closely related to the resolution of the political impasse. STERP II recognizes the close link between economic and democratic parameters, including strengthening governance and accountability; promoting governance and the rule of law. STERP II bemoans the time spent in unnecessary political disputes, attrition and conflicts in the GPA. Thus, resolution of the political issues is a precondition for economic recovery – re-engagement of international partners cannot happen without this.

Rob Davies commented: Kanyenze was a UZ econ student in 1984. Ntuli Ncube (now chief economist of African Development Bank) and Carl Brecher (SA trotskyist) were also students. Crit of Kanyenze is that it is too backward looking, and the post-1998 period is based on what is already known. It repeats conventional wisdom, dating a quarter century. 'Been there done that'. Need to look forward now. Critiques of Sam Moyo on long-wave National Democratic Revolution, and of David Moore on primitive accumulation. A crucial process was deindustrialization, far worse the last ten years than during ESAP. And it's not over. Wages were very low during hyperinflationary period but in 2009 the wage bill suddenly soared to 80% of total costs. This will get worse; a permanent structural change. In the time these businesses have suffered the Zanu state, 'the world has moved on'. And the industrial working class has been decimated. If you're an old-fashioned Marxist the exploited working class would see that the condition of exploitation would lead to class consciousness and solidarity. But this has gone backwards. Solidarity comes from civic movements but is probably conjunctural not structural. Also, if you thought there would be an indigenous productive capitalist class, Zanu disabused with his rentier analysis. Wages are too low in ag to hire farmworkers. Relations between multinational mining houses and small-scale panners have changed.

Colin Stoneman suggested shifting to the idea of 'progress'. On the face of it, negative progress. But let's move back and look at it in historical context. Successful development nearly always depends on industrialization. Zimbabwe had a chance in the 1980s and was trying to follow some 'late-comer' industrialization policies, as did the new NICs. Problems: small size, isolation, destabilization derailed. Minor successes, as a semi-NIC. Experience since then has been opposite direction. There's no way of trying to resurrect the partial success story. Zim has changed and the world has changed. If we're looking for progress on the basis of industrialization, it has to find some alternative mode. One possibility is integration into the globalised world system on the latter's terms, and so will be condemned to being peripheral forever. This is most likely. This would be progress as it would deliver some small improvement in living conditions. Once a model in Africa, it will just be an also-ran in what is happening to a marginalized continent. Another possibility is African continental development, or a Southern African economy. Regional cooperation has to be one way to look forward, where progress might occur. EU trade negotiations with ACP include Zim's signing onto an Economic Partnership Agreement – a withdrawal of Lome Convention benefits (non-reciprocity). Those have gone, and Africa is in a free-trade area with Europe and is not allowed to protect itself. The one exception is for the LDCs. Progress for Zim might occur if it gets LDC status (!).

David Mupamhadzi reply: The first issue is to what extent was growth leading to poverty reduction? Moz had one of the fastest growing economy but not sufficient jobs or poverty reduction. The second issue, deindustrialization, is the reliance on imports. Even the water we are drinking is from Botswana. With this level of dependency how can we industrialise? We are heading for a disaster with 30% capacity. Ill-informed indigenization policies will set this back.

Richard Kamidza studied in political economy and policy. How do economic strategies correlate to political reforms? That requires us to focus on the structures that are existing right now. What else can we put on the table that is not yet there? How can we speed up the economic and social transformations? What are the structures, systems and policies?

Lionel Cliffe says, how do we rescue a discussion on economy from the economists? One phrase that jumps out is dualism – and we need to go back to our understandings of dependency, not dualism. It was the reproduction of labour in the reserves that was inherent in colonial structures, and this needs to be remembered. What has changed is the whole process of labour production isn't like it was in 1980, nor in the 19th century. Secondly, what is the economy? Should we look at the economy of Zimbabweans? If we do the latter we bring in lots of major dimensions. That would include remittances from abroad. That would radically change Kinyenze's calculation of the savings rate. What is the future for all Zimbabweans? What next? The terms of engaging the world economy are to be negotiated – but some crucial decisions will have to be made in the short term. International financial institutions, EU EPAs, etc. What should Zimbabweans going to negotiations consider as basic demands, to go not on the terms of IFIs and international capital generally?

Blessing Karumbidza agreed with Cliffe. Until African intellectuals think about opening up balkanised African economies, there will be decline. To David and Godfrey, we need to look at those statistics about GDP as they are very hard to evaluate. The baseline is very low, because it's coming from a very low base.

Brian Raftopoulos remarks that in the face of anti-imperialist rhetoric, we are more vulnerable to the deprivations to international finance than ever before in our history. Is there any basis, though, for an expanded agriculture-industry linkage given the land reform?

Amanda Hammar reiterates the import of diaspora. But no mention of what the ag economy could become – including food as a higher-priced commodity.

?? comment: We need to look at how people are really surviving, and what they're surviving on. The role of women especially in cross-border trade has been very impressive, supporting families and husbands in a way that reversed gender roles. This in turn has caused sociological and psychological problems. Utilisation of farm land and agricultural wisdom. The structure of business is worrying – are public-private partnerships really a solution? What good will new credit lines do?

Ibbo Mandaza noted the success of the panel in citing the crisis, but as Cliffe points out, in terms of what's actually happening, how do we chart a way forward? Stoneman should realize that regional integration has died. There is nothing new about the Zim economic structure, so regional integration – after thirty years – is dead. The current operations of the Zim economy – is there no possibility that the land can be an engine of growth? What about mining? There's a rush to mining now. What about the comprador class that has emerged? We need to examine all this but it's not as depressing as some of the panelists have suggested. If you look at the economic development prospects in the region, Zim is not the worst case.

John Saul reiterated Cliffe's concern, and promoted Samir Amin's idea of delinking – not autarchy. The centre of gravity of the economy must be domestic. Mandaza is right that at the first level, that should be at the country level. The work of Clive Thomas (Guyanese in Dar es Salaam) raised the quality of developmental socialist concepts, away from an exaggerated reliance on external linkages. Ag and industrial development drive each other.

Fay Chung asked to strengthen the optimism: we are unlikely to get outside aid which is probably a good thing, and we need to emphasise food security. We need to be skills-based and look at our engineers, doctors and teachers and see what could be done for the region. We could do 6000 small dams in Zimbabwe. Medical services are bad but we have many good doctors – and that's the basis for regional integration. Finally we don't need to imitate the 1980s industrialization process. Why can't we be the dam builders of Africa? Ag has been mentioned – why can't we look at the ag industries – which we've been trying to destroy. We are short of a

million houses – but we don't even build the taps and pipes ourselves. We are all taking medicines and until recently we bought medicines made in the US, and we should be building up our own pharmaceutical companies.

John Makumbe said he would have looked at it differently – as beginning in 2000, and looked at 1997, 1998 and 1999 – and then the last ten years, to see where is the baseline. Secondly it is not true that SA doesn't need Zim – if every Zimbabwean comes home tomorrow, it will be a disaster for SA. The poli econ approach must look beyond numbers and look at winners and losers – otherwise we are chasing the wind, but economists are like that, not very different from lawyers. We need to look into who is benefiting, who is losing. If the rate of unemployment is 90% and poverty is 92%, this is staggering, devastating. Who is 'we' – when Mandaza says 'we are doing better than a lot of countries.' Academic salary of \$500/month; what is the per capita income in other countries compared to Zimbabwe? The crisis chewed up the middle class – none left. You are either at the top or pauperized. Will remittances save us? No, 60% of the people who live their country of birth don't return.

Hopewell Gumbo reiterates Makumbe's critique. He notes the inverse relationship between ESAP and people's livelihoods, and the centrality of distributional considerations.

Stoneman said that agriculture has potential, reminding of industry and agricultural relations during the 1980s, and that will remain possible, for fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation equipment. Davies noted that he doesn't have answers. The diaspora may be helpful, but we won't see the ag-related industry coming back. Zambians are buying plows in Bulawayo to take back but we don't understand how linkages between the sectors have been destroyed and the technological limits. To repair a tractor requires sophisticated computers. For reindustrialization, it's not the same industries that can recover. South Africa and China are better dam builders than we are. Can we think of a range of things we can do – like call centres. This means we need to bring in policy and institutions but there's a strong danger to falling into a voluntaristic policy. If only we can agree, then that's what will happen. Policy comes from interest groups. That's why I think poli econ is so important – what are the new power relationships. There's a very strong possibility of a consolidation of Zanu power and this time 'no more mister nice guy'. Rent-seeking through printing money doesn't work, they know, and they will go to normal rent-seeking. If you really want to be pessimistic – what forces could stop that? To Makombe, who wants to know winners and losers, there are a large number of papers about this but political scientists don't read papers with numbers in them.

Kanyenze replied to criticisms: To Cliffe, the point about dualism is very true, hence the reference to Mhone's 'enclave' economy but didn't have time for that. To Davies, the question was how far to go – especially on labour. Then we can synthesise the issues. We need to go back from our macroeconomic aggregates, that we are losing sight of the whole concept of development: it's about people. Let's put them at the

centre of development, such as food security. That peasantry used to give us a surplus, using an older mode of production, but feeding the region. We need to go back to prioritization; we needed the donor community, while ministers spent their money buying luxury cars. From civil society, we must believe that things can change. And governments are a site of class struggle – so what are we doing to influence state bureaucrats away from neoliberalism? On linkages, what's interesting is that linkages are already taking place, without state support. What is our pro-poor framework, to enhance the poor with skills and redistribution. A land audit is very critical for these purposes. We need to look more at inwards strategies, instead of the huge leakage out of Zimbabwe. And we need to engage the diaspora. We need to build a mass movement for change, in terms of coming up with human-centred economic policies.

(8) Nov 5 AM 2 9:45-11:15 Labour's Past, Present and Future

Chair: Roger Southall

Author: Brian Raftopoulos

Discussants: Tapiwa Chagonda, Kumbirai Kudenga,
Hamadziripi Tamukamoyo

Break 11:15-11:30

Background to labour, especially Bulawayo history. Messages from the 1980s state: Zanu(PF) substituted ZCTU for existing unions and encouraged splinters; politicization of industrial relations; attacks on Zapu in Labour Department; calls for greater productivity of labour and normalization of IR; in 1990s, liberalization and corporatism and 2000-09 period of breakdown of IR processes and labour-state relations; and GPA phase with continued labour-state problems. In order to avoid political intervention (before and after 1980), ZCTU promoted modernized labour-capital relations. Labour typically pushed universal rights discourses. Some say that this is about incorporation into an imperialist framework, which is not correct. Tensions continue between ruling party and opposition parties, affecting labour. Core problem found in 1978 Zanu document: National Democratic Revolution against racial oppression, leaving labour deemphasized. The 'revolutionary armed struggle' was central, with strikes, etc submerged and deferred. From 1950s, there were tensions over autonomy, funds (int'l donors), and other conflicts. From 1980 there were from 200-400 strikes, and the state began to replace old Rhodesian IR officers. Problems include lack of transport, political interference, corruption, etc. ZCTU begun in 1981 as a Zanu(PF) project couldn't deliver, and by 1985-86 older unionists reassert (Jeff Mutandare) and then in 1987 rise of Morgan Tsvangirai. By late 1990s civil society becomes political society, and then repression is intensified: beatings, torture, arrests and an alternative trade union federation (ZFTU under war vet Chinotemba). Farmworker sector destroyed. ZCTU worked with ILO to produce 2009 report documenting repression. Raftopoulos criticizes Moyo/Peros on origins of rights discourses and relations to imperialism. New problems: decimation of the urban working class; unevenness of who wins and who loses as the crisis plays out;

IR machinery broke down; collective bargaining became meaningless under hyperinflation; labour turned to international lobbying and pressure, continuing its discourse of globally recognized rights as against authoritarian nature of sovereignty.

Kumbirai Kudenga noted the problem of deindustrialization, and how traditionally the trade union movement was structured around the urban working class. What, he asked, is the role of informalised labour?

Tapiwa Chagonda from Zim Labour Centre: support for Mugabe government in 1982 when minimum wages were established. Through ESAP we had to demonstrate that we could stop that programme. But Chidzero said, 'it's a home-grown thing', meaning nothing would be done to change ESAP, it would continue. Workers were retrenched as companies closed. We continued to demonstrate. In 1997, the War Vets thought they were superior people, not supporting workers. They said they had to demonstrate, also, against their own exploitation. By the late 1990s an elephant was stepping on Mugabe's feet, and in 1998 he challenged the labour movement leaders to start a political party. This was a voice, 'come out'. Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda looked here and there for the Working People's Convention in 1999, and the civic organizations gave the mandate to establish the MDC. The workers' attempt was to start a Workers Party, mark my word. We canvassed the urban areas and rural areas to speak of change. People were scared, but became supportive. Then came a congress of MDC – that's where we made a mistake. We came out with a mixed bag. There were businesspeople, intellectual people, lawyers (representing employers not employees). And this group of people had their own individual agendas. The workers' agenda was left by the first congress of the MDC. As workers we still support our established MDC and we think one day we will come back to the drawing board with the workers' flag. What are we doing in the Zimbabwe Labour Centre? We are trying to organize many other workers, the Democratic United Front, to carry out the agenda of the workers and poor, to take this to a people-driven constitution. But if the constitution does not take our issues forward we will not hesitate to campaign for a no vote.

Hamadziripi Tamukamoyo noted his PhD about the response of the working class to the hyperinflation crisis showed a long history. There were important continuities in the post-1997 crisis period, back to colonial times. In the post-2000 period, there was a partial degradation of labour. Formal employment peaked at 1.4 million by the late 1990s with only 700,000 a decade later. Most sections of labour resorted to survivalism: forex dealing, petty commodity trading. Workerist responses of strikes and mass stayaways dropped substantially. Forex, property and real estate became the speculative outlets. About 50000 teachers left the profession. After 2009 most speculative activities were killed off by dollarisation. Applause to Raftopoulos for work to date, but more PhDs by emerging scholars are also worth taking on.

John Saul noted that in the US, Mugabe turns to black nationalism. In the battle of trade unionists versus nationalists, a key writer is Bill Fletcher, formerly of TransAfrica and a great unionist, who wrote an article, 'Some of my best friends are

being tortured in Zimbabwe', in the Black Scholar.

Ibbo Mandaza noted the need for a close analysis of the current situation – what happened to the labourites of the 1990s?

Raftopoulos noted that the international labour discourse is one of the best antidotes to Mugabeite rhetoric. An Yieung arms ship showed exemplary solidarity, one of the very few. But that depends on the effectiveness of national mobilization, which is difficult given the weakening social base. On the civil service, the 1996 public sector strike was the first major signal to the Mugabe regime that they were in trouble. After 2000 the public sector became highly politicized. To Mandaza, the answer is the working class was decimated, and key leaders went from civil society into politics. The idea of reindustrialization from the informal sector is romanticized.

Kudenga noted that 2006-07 was the worst period. Tsvangirai had to move from area to area, observing the situation, which made him agree to sit down and agree to negotiate in late 2008. As workers we still support the MDC, and are sure that one day they will come, the way they did at the Working People's Convention. As for the Workers' Party idea, this is why I said 'mark my words'. The Convention gave us a mandate to establish the Workers Party. The ZCTU special congress came out with a mandate to establish a party. The interim leaders were workers themselves. This is where Comrade Sibanda said, this should be a workers' party. Then the decision came, this should be a Movement for Democratic Change.

(9) Nov 5 AM 3 11:30-13:00 The Parties & Their Politics

Chair: Norma Kriger

Author: Ibbo Mandaza

Discussants: John Makumbe, James Muzondidya

Key Participants: Nqobizitha Mlilo, Joshua Mpfu

Ibbo Mandaza: class analysis is crucial. The nationalist movement was born here in the labour movement. The delinking of the two and rise of the MDC, with its class interests in opposition to labour, is important. The post-colonial state is modeled on the European bourgeois state but without a national bourgeoisie. This accounts for the pathologies in Zimbabwe's political parties. If not in power, it splinters and fades. The strength of a party is its relationship to state power. The main features are that they are weak and amorphous; mostly movements not parties; ideologically and intellectually and organizationally vacuous, except in period of nationalist party origins, in overthrowing colonialism; in opposition the single goal is to get into office. They design methods to retain power and those out of power become relation-based. The MDC won the last four elections but have not been able to take power. With the passage of time, the liberation party survives only in conflation with state power, which becomes its main purpose – at any cost. Once out of power,

that means the death of the party: Malawi Congress Party (Banda), UNIP (Kaunda), Zanu(PF) but securocrat state took over, living independent of the party. With the party dead, 'we the securocrats are the new custodians of the party's legacy', the generals say. One state, one party, one leader. The pillars of the Zim state are patronage – crucial during economic crisis – and violence (or threats thereof). The problem of the new democracy then generated the MDC; especially its failure to understand the nature of the post-colonial state. MDC rose (founded in 1999) in part because of crisis, but there was nearly a coup when in September 1997 the war vets were infuriated by fund scandal and got Mugabe to reconfigure political alliances. The 2000 election raised the stakes and gave the MDC the confidence to take on Zanu(PF) in the subsequent decade. Unreliable data on the elections but we know that the Zim state has extraordinary means to rig elections. The MDC may have actually won the last four elections – by huge spreads. We were therefore surprised that the MDC has cried for elections next year; they don't learn the lessons. MDC is amorphous, lacking in direction and lacking in capacity. The MDC has been virtually swallowed in the GNU. The GPA brought peace and a modicum of economic recovery but the opposition movement has lost its leverage; with every day of the GPA the opposition is losing leverage. A year from now it will be difficult to see what kind of opposition it will be. The hope is that the younger generation will take up the battle – no hope within the two major parties for rejuvenation of the Zim political process. The party Mabango – meaning to build – is actually dead, after birth on 4 December 2007. The new Zapu has become singularly a regional party.

John Makumbe: Mabango is 'to begin' but it began and ended quickly and Ibbo was in the middle of it. I learned from Ibbo and treasure what he taught me – that's why I didn't join him. One of the things we should have mentioned is that intellectuals who joined political parties effectively abandoned intellectual work. Fay Chung was a minister and now in civil society. But politicians are opportunistic in Africa. Good old Brian, and when the going got tough in Zimbabwe, he fled to Cape Town. The cowards go out and the brave stay to face the dictator. The parties are personalized by the Dear Leader – who when he loses power, his party dies. The nature of their DNA is that they are allergic to handing over power to anybody else. In Southern Africa south of the Zambezi, no liberation party has EVER handed over power to another party. Liberation movements are necessarily dictatorial, and it is naïve to expect to move them from power through democratic means. The MDC will have to devise ways and means of removing a dictator from power – extra-democratic or undemocratic. In African politics, the Constitution reads that every citizen can join a party of their choice. In Zim we have a penchant for forming parties. If you leave two Zimbabweans on the moon you will have found they formed three political parties (Masipula Sithole). The third party is called the GNU. The first-past-the-post system means the proliferation of parties benefits the ruling party. The opposition parties stay in the political wilderness. As for the constitution, MDC did not really campaign for the inclusion of its preferred provisions. But Zanu(PF) is not keen on a constitution with a level political playing field. At the end of the day we will have a compromise document – not such a bad idea. If MDC wins, Mugabe will refuse to concede defeat so there will be new negotiations for GPA and GNU Round 2. And

maybe COPAC Round 2. We will slide back to where we were in 2008. That is the most likely scenario. In scenario 2, the MDC wins and Zanu(PF) concedes defeat and lets MDC run the country. But this is unlikely. Scenario 3 is that Zanu(PF) wins and even if MDC screams and shouts, SADC will say Zanu(PF) won. In Scenario 4, the Big Event is that Mugabe dies and parliament elects the next president, and there is Zanu(PF) chaos, as various factions fight. Eventually SADC comes in, mediates and dissolves parliament and elections are held. MDC wins the elections because Zanu doesn't have anyone to stand shoulder to shoulder against Tsvangirai. That's variant 1 of scenario 4; but variant 2 is that Tsvangirai dies, and the same chaos happens. That Big Event scenario will throw the nation into problems – that's the nature of political parties in Zim and it's very worrying.

Nqobizitha Mlilo conceded the lack of strong organic link between class and party, both for MDC and Zanu(PF). Power and the use of the state as a vehicle for accumulation is also a problem. Zanu(PF) has more intellectual capacity than MDC. Tragedy of MDC is reluctance to mobilize intellectual power. Also, like Zanu(PF), MDC has strong indications of authoritarianism (power of top 6) and violence. On economic restructuring, the message is indigenization (problematic), and the MDC believes in the free market (problematic).

Joshua Mpfu: Talking about political parties is like chewing gravel. Military culture never died, and a lot of public institutions are headed by brigadiers and generals. There were military clashes between Zanu and Zapu, e.g. Entambeni township in Bulawayo and Connimara. Fierce fighting and high casualties. They never became civilian organizations. This has left a culture of political intolerance and human rights abuse. Youngsters will have to work hard to remove this stumbling block of militarism. If the constitutional process is properly handled, then we might break through.

Bertha Chivu asked about a representative electoral system (e.g. Lesotho example). If political parties are this disappointing, can we consider the women's movement? Can someone campaign for people's refusal to vote?

Elinor Sisulu: that was a sober and pessimistic assessment. Makumbe needs a more complex analysis of liberation movement hegemony and solidarity. CCS, Frelimo, Swapo have all affected transitions within and reinvented themselves. A level of internal democracy occurred – but why not in Zanu(PF)? Inability to change Zanu(PF) is also replicated within the MDC. How do you change that political culture? It has to go across the board.

Blessing Karumbidza: Why would we expect them to hand over power and access to resources?

Hopewell Gumbo: In the 1990s the motivation for the MDC was the struggle for social and economic justice – and that's the crucial unique character of the MDC's origins. But the trend to neoliberalism within the MDC means we will not see

progress. We need to look for new alliances and new formations.

Mandaza: Securocrats in charge since the late 1970s, and civilian leadership was a decoration. The securocrats are now organizing a succession, and they already have a chosen candidate. There would be succession within Zanu(PF), so if Mugabe dies, someone else comes in as president. Then no election. The ANC would love to emulate this: the military is in solid charge. On the matter of the movement and the party, the Leninist model is informed ideologically, and in Africa our parties have not relied on these factors – but instead, they rely on violence. One generational problem in the MDC is the uncanny way they made alliance with the commercial farmers. The photo of Tsvangirai with Mike Nicol (who had detained Mugabe during the late 1960s) was telling. External factors sought to use MDC for their own purposes: British goals of regime change cannot be divorced from their support for MDC.

Makumbe: Clarified remarks on parties not giving up power, and need to eliminate violence. The first draft constitution is likely to be rejected by both MDC and Zanu(PF). This will revert to Lancaster House which favours Zanu(PF), leaving MDC between a rock and a hard place. But you cannot compare Zanu(PF) to MDC in terms of violence or authoritarianism – there is simply no comparison.

(10) Nov 5 PM 1 14:00-15:30 Civil Society: Strategies for Emancipation?

Chair: Amanda Hammar

Author: Kirk Helliker

Discussants: Erin McCandless, Mike Davies

Key Participants: Rose Marie Depp, Booker Maguire, Mary Ndlovu, David Sanders, Frances Lovemore, Elinor Sisulu

Kirk Helliker: Civil society is a slippery concept, as slippery as progress. Most liberal civ soc analysis does not build in power, does not see civ soc as potentially regressive, and is universalizing – against the particularistic repressive state. Civil society defined against the state. Two other more radical civ soc sentiments have risen, including state-centric and society-centric versions. In first, state sometimes captures party which had captured civ soc, and results in authoritarian state. Society-centric critics are connected to anarchist, libertarian and autonomist-Marxist varieties. Both the liberal and radical state-centric notions are captured by the logic of the state. Zim has seen a playing-out of the controversy especially in relation to state power. Agrees with Raftopoulos that there is reductionism in the approach, but likewise that the land liberation movements were not just a Zanu(PF) election ploy from Feb-June 2000. Peasants and war vets have more agency. The debate with Sam Moyo captures the tensions and contradictions but it's possible to go beyond the acrimonious debates and find more fruitful spaces.

Erin McCandless: Agrees wholeheartedly with Helliker crit of dualisms in civ soc

scholarship and activism. Agrees with Helliker's crits of liberal and radical state-centric civ soc. However, if state has been a key source of ills, then engaging that state is crucial. Progress in peace/conflict studies has epistemological coincidence with social sciences, and this debate. Liberal peace-building has been pursued 'blindly' in recent years and often exacerbated causes of conflict, where liberal economic policies are imposed in fragile settings. A strong healthy state is needed to manage transitions, and policy processes. Complexity of social contract is crucial, as is recognition of endogenous roots (not donor-driven). Progressive strategies include addressing structural roots of conflict. Peace settlement strategies also are admitting that root causes have to be included. Both Raftopoulos and Moyo were advisors. Two strategic dilemmas were the subject of doctoral research: civil/political rights and redistribution debate (why were these goals at loggerheads? baffling! – and crucial in relation to minerals); and second, participation and resistance (process-oriented dilemma: how can civ soc engage powerful actors?, and how confrontational should civ soc be?, and what should be nature of reengagement with donors and IFIs? Zim civ soc should take this on). Dedication of Zim civ soc activists and scholars is not in question; problems are indeed universal.

Mike Davies:

I would like to preface my contribution with both a caveat and a question. As with all of our fields of speciality, the available time in this great space is of course far too short to do anything but give a broad picture, omitting any nuances or details so I present pose a few challenging perspectives and questions not to offend but to stimulate a dialectical process.

And can we really talk about progress in Zimbabwe when the struggle of the last decade has been to reverse the slide into failed statehood?

INTRODUCTION

Political progress is perhaps conventionally seen as a linear movement from the patrimonial State towards a rational-legalistic State that operates according to well-defined processes mediated by functional institutions. A democratic state is one in which its inhabitants are citizens who can exercise differing degrees of influence upon these institutions and processes as opposed to those who are merely subjects of an autocratic ruler and his elite. This structuralist bias is reductionist and universalist, a sort of build-it-and-they-will-come faith in the power of the determinist role of the State. An alternate view is there are more nuanced forces at play: in a complex dance of formal and informal processes, legalistic and traditionalist responsibilities compete for prominence. The superstructure of the State is occupied by a bureaucratic class and overseen by a political elite that operate according to opaque rules, that are not predicated upon legalistic notions but derive from the logic of power underpinned by mythologized and monopolised notions of liberation overlaid with more visceral allegiances to race, class and ethnicity.

The growth of civil society organisations (CSOs) would appear to me to be in inverse proportion to the capacity of the State to meet the expectations of its citizens, whether these are material (e.g. the delivery of public goods) or political (e.g.

participation in the processes of and access to power). While inefficiency, corruption, incompetence and other endogenous bad governance practices are certainly causal, the diminished and diminishing ability of the state to provide public goods is a direct consequence of the anti-statist policies promoted by the Washington Consensus. In this view, the resurgence of the State would lead to a withering away of civics, especially delivery-based ones. For example, if the Ministry of Health was adequately resourced to meet the requirements of people living with HIV/AIDS, the rationale for the existing plethora of self-help and delivery NGOs would be removed, leaving those groups working primarily on advocacy and policy issues. While this view can be seen as statist or even dirigiste, and implies that a return to state-driven and managed political process will see a withering away of civil society, this is not the case since a rationale for independent ie non-state social formulations to monitor the State would still exist.

While the diverse notions of civil society are important definitional tools towards understanding the phenomenon, others have unpacked these far more ably than I could and this paper does not seek to become enmeshed in normative or definitional arguments. Instead I present an experiential analysis based upon a lengthy time served in an organisation that exhibited contradictory aspects, often contemporaneously, that are perhaps common to many other CSOs. sources necessary for subjects to become citizens.

Figure 1 provides some identifying characteristics of NGOs and CSOs. Of course these are not binaries, merely broad labels for the termini on continua upon which an organisation constantly shifts position, a crude checklist for observers in the field to assist in species identification.

Many civics combine volunteer-based activism with professional institutionalisation - volunteers and professionals contest within these organisations for influence. As an example of this attenuation, both the Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) shifted positions substantially after 2002 from confederations of organisations to mass-based populist movements while networks became increasingly professionalised and institutionalised. CHRA perhaps succumbed to the institutionalisation curse while the NCA suffers from a 'personality cult' that has undermined its effectiveness.

The Super-NGOs and Networks of Networks

The role of the networks of networks deserves scrutiny. Created to enhance and extend the capacity of member organisations, these super-NGOs tended to acquire a self-preserving aspect perhaps more concerned with continuation than function.

They became more remote from their members, even elitist, losing their accountability, more concerned with meeting donor aspirations and requirements than serving the needs of their members. In part this is a procedural problem - donors fund them directly rather than through the members thereby undermining accountability - but also a structural issue - the super-NGOs, just like all social structures - are often occupied by opportunistic elements who derive direct material advantage from their hegemony and who will make every effort to

preserve their positions, often at some cost to their member organisations and undermining their stated goals. In my opinion, we failed to identify and contain these elements as well as the vehicles that carry them. As a result, the super-NGOs captured the voices of civics and domesticated them for the consumption of an increasingly externalised audience of international donors and Zimbabweans in the Diaspora.

Civil society and Political Parties

The relationship between CSO's and political parties is instructive. The MDC was created by civil society to provide a louder and unified voice and to contest directly for State power. This was possible because of our broad consensus regarding the primary goal – a democratic legal-rational State. Trade unionists, students, civic activists united around the constitutional reform process and were able to suspend broader political and ideological debates in pursuit of this goal. The MDC therefore was a super-network in its early years, driven by activists with a massive mandate from Zimbabweans. I do not want to go into the Movement's "participation" following its electoral victories over the years. Rather I would like to consider the MDC/CSO conflation in the early years and the messy disentanglement that took place (or didn't) subsequently.

The decision to pursue the political kingdom through direct participation in electoral politics was problematic from the start since it subordinated the voice of the civics to the party. Civics became adjuncts to rather than determinants of the democratic struggle: instead of directing their appeals to the State these concerns were either voiced through the MDC or tailored not to antagonise the opposition party. Even some donors fell into this constrained discourse and opposed projects that would subject the MDC to scrutiny. The few independent civics and critical individual voices who raised concerns became increasingly marginalised, unfunded and castigated. The reduction of the democratic struggle to a simplistic binary of "good MDC" versus "bad ZANU-PF" allowed a partisan atmosphere to permeate civil society. There were oft-heard refrains of "don't rock the boat" or "we know he/she is problematic/not a democrat/opportunistic but we will address the issue after we win the struggle" were disingenuous and dangerous, allowing the entrenchment of such elements in positions of power. I suppose this reflects the weakness of the theory of the two stage national democratic revolution – it allows non-democratic elements to capture power jointly perhaps with democrats and then to cement their grasp on power at the expense of the democrats.

Beyond these concerns lies a more specific and structural challenge specific to my field of activism - the residents' movement. The partisan binary permeated RAs and demonstrated itself in a number of ways. The infiltration and cooption of RAs by the MDC undermined their capacity to engage in critical analysis of the MDC when the opposition party captured political power at local government level. Secondly the cooption of RAs resulted in a general exodus of leaders to contest in local government elections in 2002 and 2008, resulting in leadership turmoil but also confirming the partisan realities of RAs. In Masvingo the RA essentially moved into council and the opposition ZANU PF then occupied the RA. In Bulawayo we now have the ZPF-aligned BURA and the MDC-aligned BPRA. Such developments undermine the very *raison d'être* for RAs which is to provide an independent and

critical watchdog over public and elected officials.

How do we hold ourselves accountable? Who shall judge us? How do we develop clear mechanisms for accountability that are not prone to ego-based empire building, opportunistic rent seeking and other negative impacts. I do not have definitive answers but any rejuvenation of civil society must be based on real commitments to genuinely democratic principles of constitutionality accountability, openness and independence underpinned by critical self-analysis.

Civics are a diverse group that cannot be treated as a unified entity. Consequently it is not possible to make macro-level evaluations about their roles(s) in 'progress'. Certainly some are non-democratic sites of rent-seeking but I think the social movements certainly have introduced new possibilities of a politics that is not the preserve of an elite, a generally positive force that allows us to perceive a future, however dimly, where Zimbabweans are truly citizens in a free republic rather than subjects of a neo-feudal patrimony.

Rose Marie Depp: Collaborative or competitive? United or divided? Proactive or reactive? Do we buy into the language of the state? (e.g. land 'reform') Promoting own programmes, or donor agenda?

Booker Maguire: civ soc played a similar role in contesting power in SA, and a model for mass organisation and advocacy is SA's United Democratic Front. The agenda in Zim is being set by post-colonial state so it is important to have civ soc to bring issues for government to consider.

David Sanders: mainly familiar with the 1980-92 period. Intellectuals had an uncritical perspective, in some measure manipulated by Zanu(PF). But there were three other players: an unholy opportunistic alliance between foreign NGOs (wanted Mugabe as an exemplar), Western imperialism (favouring stability) and the Soviet Bloc (which justified involvement through its first-stage-of-NDR theory). It was impossible to raise a critical voice – you were called an ultra-left. No one talked about assault on Matabeleland. Dossiers submitted to Oxfam documenting Gukhurahundi and Oxfam, CIIR and War on Want told us to shut up. They covered it up. Self-organisation in the rural areas of community healthworkers, and innovative programmes – either ignored or marginalized by the state. Workshop Negative (a play) was one of the first public critics of what was happening in Zim – and shown at UZ and when people were assembled to debate it, mainstream civ soc denounced the play as an ultra-left version of Zim, and the the playwright Cont Mhlanga was prohibited from taking the play to Botswana.

Frances Lovemore: We have a problem trying to tell the truth. The Truth is Very Stubborn is on our To Do board. It doesn't matter if you examine the situation through Marx, Mandaza or Moyo – or western imperialism. International law has been broken. There's been a loss of faith and process. The state-centric position is wrong. We have a challenge inserting the truth into the debate, in this context.

Elinor Sisulu: What politics does one advocate coming from Helliker's paper? Very

unclear. What kind of action? That leaves activists paralysed. It is impossible to act outside the logic of the Zim state here. In addressing state-sponsored violence, and being based in SA, one feels safer in Zim. But rural opposition activists are targeted by the state. Documenting state-sponsored violence is one of the main accomplishments of Zim civ soc. But is that liberal or radical? We can be critical of civics the way Mike Davies is, but what kind of alternative politics are there? Is there a transition to post-capitalism? Are Zim civics able to envisage this, and is there anywhere in the world this exists? Enviro history offers some good prospects for increasing activism that relates to people's lives. We have seen a decline in nutritional status and life expectancy from 60 in the early 1960s to just above 30 now. So we should also have a history of the health of the people.

Mary Ndlovu: Being a social justice activist for many years, most closely associated with Women of Zimbabwe Arise. Civ soc has a great role to play in building democracy. There's a long-term struggle. Progress involves building democracy. Trade unions have been strongest, because they are membership organizations.

Joy Mabenge: The 1980-2000 period has many good studies. But the 2000-09 period is difficult: what did the crisis do to civil society? We have seen the greatest demobilization of progressive civic forces since late 2008. Now with calls for elections, we should have preserved those movements like NCA.

?? Religious sector was also important. CCJP documented atrocities in Matabeleland. NCA was part of Zim Council of Churches. Same for Save Zimbabwe Coalition.

Tawanda Sachikonye: how do four million in the diaspora contribute?

Murray McCartney: 'Fiction reveals truth that reality obscures.' Owen Maseko had the same experience as Cont Mhlanga very recently here in Bulawayo. Artists are difficult to organize. But this stands in contrast to what happened in SA 25 years ago.

Wilf Mhanda: We need more strategizing about being more effective. The role of civ soc in Zim needs to include providing alternatives. Intellectuals have abandoned their role. We need something that moves the country forward, not exhausted nationalism.

John Saul: Survey is needed of what's still standing here? There's a counter-hegemony in the making. There was strong skepticism from Ibbo and either the MDC needs a kick in the ass from civ soc, or another political party to represent civ soc interests is needed. And where are the relationships of trade unions and other civ soc groups?

Helliker: Critique of the state is based on failure to make any progress through the state. We need to think outside the National Democratic Revolution. We need prefigurative politics as we do it and as we feel it and as we experience it. Someone

like John Holloway ends his book *Change the World Without Taking Power* criticizes Lenin (*What is to be done*) because you have to think politics as you do it. That's the basis for avoiding authoritarian politics.

McCandless: Civ soc can't work outside the logic of the state – it gives the state too much power. Engaging the state doesn't mean agreeing to a state-centric logic. We need to engage in policy debates. Change happens both top-down and bottom-up. We have to search for truth, including documentation of violence. Counter-hegemonic movements are proliferating. Peace research shows that having a clear strategy – not just more activities – is essential.

Mike Davies: Civil society is not a singularity, it's a huge range of diverse interests and agendas. We've ignored an ideological alliance, and instead moved to strategic alliances. For example, white commercial farmers don't have a democratic bone in their body but they helped finance the MDC. As Lovemore says, the concerns of ordinary people is of primary concern; put aside theoretical discussion to do so. The state is crucial to confront – it's created by society as a site of struggle. If we go in an autonomist direction, we leave the state to authoritarian elements.

(11) Nov 5 PM 2 16:00-17:30 Identities: Gender, Ethnicity, Race, Displacement

Chair: John Hoffman

Author: Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi

Discussants: Joy Chadya, Blair Rutherford

Key Participants: Amanda Hammar, Sabelo Ndlovu, Sostina Takure, Pathisa Nyhathi

Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi (Dr)

Associate Professor, History

Crandall University, Moncton, NB

State Configurations of Gender, Race and Ethnicity: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe
Introduction

The year 1980 witnessed the displacement of the Rhodesian colonial administration and its replacement with an African majority government. The new Zimbabwean leadership drew its legitimacy from having been voted into power by an African majority that was enjoying universal adult suffrage for the very first time in the country's history. While the displacement of the colonial regime opened the way for many more displacements and placements, it will be shown in this discussion that, in some respects, key elements or features of the old order were merely rebranded, but in essence, remained in place. This paper looks at Rhodesia and Zimbabwe as successor states, observing that they sought to articulate their identities, and formulated their survival and self-preservation strategies, drawing from primarily the same political resources. Starting with an illumination of the interaction of gender and race in Rhodesian state politics, the discussion will go on to address the picture arising from the colonial state's tribal branding of indigenous people, and

the ill fated collaboration of the nationalist parties in cultivating divisive ethnicities. This will be highlighted as marking a dangerous path for the future. From Rhodesia, the discussion will examine the appropriation and reconfiguration of those identities as political tools by the Zimbabwean state. It will be argued that, in both the Rhodesian and Zimbabwean times, the key objective has been the preservation of the state, or promoting the hegemonic interests of the ruling elites. It will be shown that along the way, the power elites of both states may have formed convenient alliances with non-state actors and even with popular causes. However, in measuring the progress made, instead of asking how much the state has served those causes, we may need to ask how much the causes have actually served the state.

As white-dominated Rhodesia became black-dominated Zimbabwe, one needs to take greater care in analyzing the more subtle features of the state as it defined its identity. A review of state uses of gender, race and ethnicity, is an instructive way of measuring change and continuity as white nationalist power elites gave way to black nationalist leadership, affording us the chance to interrogate some of the key elements these successive nationalist states exploited, as their leaderships designed measures to augment their power, as well as to keep perceived opponents to that power divided and weakened. While this discussion would have benefitted immensely from the inclusion of the equally-important dynamics of class and religion, time and space place limits on what the paper can realistically address. That is why the discussion will flesh out general themes for the colonial era before proceeding to the post-colonial period where a selection of political events and episodes will be examined to see how issues of gender, race and ethnicity played out through them. Arguably, in Zimbabwe's history, those three have received more projection than others as political subjects, which may speak not just to their importance as identities around which states mobilize support, but also to the forceful ways in which they can be used to claim the attention of key political audiences, and often, to their potency in the hands of those vying for state power and for the ownership of the country

As explained, a re-visit to Rhodesia's political practices is essential to set up a comparative context for Zimbabwe. In reviewing the Rhodesian period, it will be seen that race was critical in mediating many relationships, including women's subjection to colonial-era patriarchies. It was also critical in defining the form of those subjectivities across the racial divide. Not only did race colour gender experiences in Rhodesia, it also legitimated the existence of Rhodesia as a nation, while justifying its imposition over the 'primitive tribes' of the conquered territory, of which the Shona and the Ndebele roughly emerged as the chief representatives. Ruled along those terms, African nationalists and the future leaders of Zimbabwe faced challenges in articulating Zimbabwean nationhood across the ethnic fault-lines. As competing state leaders during the liberation struggle, ZANU and ZAPU leaders quickly learnt that the divisive nature of ethnicity could serve their interests as well as it had served the interests of the colonial state; they realized its potency in forestalling oppositional alliances. It will be suggested that the fuzziness or woolly nature of the definition of ethnic identities since the colonial era, has allowed for creativity in the political uses of ethnicity, allowing users to pick it up when it suits

them, and run with it in whatever direction best serves their political agendas or interests.

Configuring Black and White Gender Identities in the Rhodesian Era

Starting with race and gender in Rhodesia, it is important to point out that while there were commonalities in that both white women and black women were subordinate members of their respective societies, white women experienced that subordination as members of a dominant race while African women experienced it as members of a conquered group. Perhaps one could say that, theoretically, when gender relations amongst whites are considered against those that existed amongst Africans, European men seemed better-placed to exercise power and authority in their households, as their presence and economic contributions there were stable and regular. Apart from the advantage of heading households that could draw lavish subsidies and cheap domestic labour from an economic system designed to give exclusive social protections to Europeans, white men had even more instruments of control at their disposal; they had the power to make the laws by which everyone lived. Jock Mcculloch teased out some of these intricate dynamics in his book on race, sexualities, and the evolvment of Rhodesia's criminal laws. He showed that, as a white minority state, Rhodesia thrived on fear-mongering, which resulted in laws that treated European women like a threatened species. They were to be insulated from the sexual predators that the men on the other side of the colour bar supposedly were. The possibilities of 'unhealthy' familiarities with them had to be erased. With 'black peril' fears pervading white discourse, and with European groups infected with the laager mentality historically-associated with Southern African settler populations, stringent measures were designed to protect white women, but those same measures were also about censoring the latter.

Instead of invoking resistance among the controlled and censored women, however, the measures generated a patriarchal form of activism among them, or they alternatively had the effect of smothering them. This served the interests of the male-dominated colonial state very well as it could always count on the loyalty of these largely dependent women. An illustration of this dynamic can be drawn from comparative perspectives emerging from Jacklyn Cock's sociological study of aspects of race, labour relations and gender in the white domestic household in apartheid South Africa. In it, she probed the intimate and complex relationship between white women and their female domestic servants, while also drawing attention to the reduced status of those European women in relation to men in white society. Their inferiorities arose in the context of economic dependence on husbands, and often times, reliance on the apartheid state's largesse. Confronting the underlying structures that trapped both women, that is, the white madam and her African maid, the findings of the study riled the South African white establishment so much that Cock received death threats when those findings were first published. (ref needed). As a white woman herself, her probing of exploitative relations in the European household was viewed as unforgivable disloyalty to one's group, thus inviting the full wrath of the establishment upon her. Without doubt, the book touched a raw nerve in the complex set of assumptions and relations, designed to advance the myth of white racial supremacy.

On the other side of the racial divide, and unlike white men, the demands of the

migrant wage labour system made it impossible for African men to maintain a regular presence in their family homes. With lowly remuneration from wage employment, they were left exposed to deeper dependence on the labour inputs of their womenfolk, in order to provide for the African household's economic needs. Sometimes, the women carried the full burden of meeting the family's welfare needs without male help. This had problematic implications for the enforcement of African patriarchal authority; women were occasionally able to capitalize on these male insecurities to claim social space and salvage some of the traditional powers colonialism had deprived them, and in so-doing, subverting male authority. However, that apparent advantage for the women was offset by the colonial state's imposition and enforcement of perpetual legal minority status upon African females. Added to that were severe economic restrictions the state placed on African women, often with the aim of appeasing its male colonial subjects. In other words, placing women in male bondage was a cheap form of collateral for the investment the colonial state had made in the wage labour system.

As colonial subjects and as females, black women constituted the outer layer, the lowest, and the most exploitable component of the colonial state. They were subjected to numerous restrictive laws and practices, aimed at immobilizing both the women themselves, as well as the colonized group with which they shared membership. Any transgressions they endured at the hands of white men, including sexual violations, did not raise criminal charges against their abusers at all. Those committed by African men upon them were mostly viewed as civil matters. As the women had no legal status, as perpetual minors under colonial laws, the state assigned such matters to the control and resolution of the women's male guardians (that is to fathers, brothers or husbands). With African men's hold on family life slipping under anti-family wage labour systems, and with their sense of personhood undermined in the day-today humiliations that colonialism entailed for members of their race, the era of European rule produced deepened forms of violence against African women by their male counterparts, with the latter acting both as individuals and as low key or unranked state functionaries. Like the typical "wretched of the earth" in Frantz Fanon's psycho-analytical examination of colonial relations (ref needed), it was on the women that African men often took out their own miseries. Bearing in mind that European women had been accorded voting rights as far back as 1919, with such possibilities being inconceivable for any blacks at the time, and let alone for African women, who remained legal minors until after the end of colonial rule, six decades later, one cannot fail to see that there were much wider inequalities between racial categories than there were between gender categories. That means that for white women, the advantages of whiteness far outweighed and substantially compensated for the disadvantages of womanhood. In state power games, loyalty to the race paid more dividends than loyalty to the sisterhood, and that is why the European women invested little in the latter. Even for those aspiring for political office, race was a more pragmatic identity to project than gender. In fact, Ethel Towse Jollie, the first female parliamentarian in Rhodesian history was a staunch anti-feminist. Right to the period just before the end of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, white women continued to be associated with a patriarchal form of activism. Even their increased uses of public platforms in the 70s, served to do

nothing more than shower the state with expressions of loyalty, and glorifying it. As beholden wives, mothers, and lovers to the men in the bush war, their roles hardly advanced beyond cheerleading, albeit rhetorical proclamations suggesting that Rhodesian women were stepping out of their traditional horizons. A report produced by the Rhodesian Women's Service that had come into being in 1975 to support men's war efforts related: "They had had their fill baking cakes and knitting balaclavas." However, the women quickly drew boundaries for themselves as an auxiliary unit:

men-folk were becoming more involved...the women felt strongly that if the army could be persuaded to recruit women, they could be used to great advantage in many tasks which would release able-bodied men for more active work.

It seems from the above that the women did not quite think of themselves as fully able-bodied as men. By the end of the war, it did not seem, either, that much had changed for the lifestyle that accounted for the white women's apparent contentedness, even as they assumed second-class citizenship status in relation to their men. Most importantly, the latter brought the dough home, and often, lots of it. Despite the 1970s war and the hardships of sanctions, the affluence of European life had hardly been altered. In 1979, the newly-arrived Governor Lord Soames saw it immediately, and knowing this would have implications on how seriously his white subjects would regard him, he strove to raise his own office's standards to their levels. Commenting on that dynamic, a Guardian reporter remarked in awe:

Government House in Salisbury is decorated and furnished in a manner which makes Versailles seem, well, middle-class. Amid the silken splendor of the chairs and the carpets which are so thick you could lose a cat in them...the head waiter looks like a gift-wrapped present ...after a while you realize who the trappings are designed to impress: the Lost Race of Africa, the Tribe that Lost Its Head, the whites of Southern Rhodesia.

Remarking particularly on the white women's apparent political immaturity, and perhaps lack of understanding that a change in government might leave them without the protections and privileges that the Rhodesian state had pampered them with, the news report continued, and in a way also reflecting the reporter's chauvinism:

If you listen to the British officials...They swap amusing stories about the childlike white folk they come across; a woman who thought Lord Soames could cancel her parking ticket, another who complained because she did not have two votes in the election...women who wear their name on gold necklets...There is something particularly disconcerting about hearing those famous racist views...coming from someone whose rounded figure is straining out of a thin nylon dress.

The woman in the thin nylon dress was said to be an English teacher who had 'accosted' the British reporter and his mates. References to the name-inscribed jewelry and revealing dress style alluded to the women's craving for male attention and affection, which for the British visitors probably fit very well with what they had heard of white Rhodesia's "golf widows". The teacher is said to have professed love for Ian Smith, but perhaps also revealed naivety in thinking that her hero was equally-loved amongst Africans:

I have heard you are journalists, and I have come to tell you that Ian Smith is the

greatest politician in the western world. He is so honest and straight...If the blacks could vote for him, they would. He's the only reason we've had 14 years of civilisation.

Alluding to the changing racial composition of the former white classrooms, fearing the content of the literature she now had to teach, and perhaps also echoing the 'black peril' warnings that Rhodesia had raised her white offspring on, the teacher reportedly mourned:

Last year we had King Lear. Now they've given us Alan Paton...and Othello. I've this big black buck sitting at the front of my class and I have to teach him about Desdemona's murder, thanks to you British.

Sharply contrasting with the life of affluence, the sheer contentment with auxiliary roles in the war, the obsessive protections offered to white women by the state, and reflecting their own alienation from the core of that state and from the centre of power and privilege, African women had the least interest in the perpetuation of Ian Smith's rule. They were hit hardest by the abuses it fostered. Admittedly, they were the least equipped to confront it, which is why their struggles against that state and with African men (as oppressed groups pitted against one another), initially assumed latent forms. However, by the liberation war period, African women's struggles had become part of the main anti-colonial movement, and statements from the camps suggested that a gender revolution was underway. However, that aspect of Zimbabwean history has been more comprehensively examined in other works and we will not dwell on it here. (List of key refs needed)

While their white compatriots sought to make contributions to the war generally from the relative safety of their well-guarded homes, African women had no such state protections, no husbands' backs to hide behind, not to mention that many lost their homes in the war. For those joining the guerrilla armies and expecting them to be transformative organizations, they soon realized that the African liberation movements functioned like states-in-the-making; their masculinized military organs controlled many vital aspects of camp life - from decision-making to logistical supplies. This gave the men clout similar to that enjoyed by European men in the white household in Rhodesia; increased dependence on men's good will allowed for very little female agency. By the end of the war, the liberation movements had fully subsumed the women's interests to male-defined national interests. A select group of politically-connected women had now taken over the responsibility to speak for others, and to unquestionably glorify the liberation movement's 'progressive' policies towards women. As we note that both the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU were beginning to function like governments-in-waiting in their respective external bases, we also ought to see that their reconfiguration of gender dynamics occurred synonymously with reconfigurations of other political identities, especially ethnicity. Their dealings with ethnic constituencies very much resembled the same ways Rhodesia had patronized those same ethnicities. There were similarities in how it had re-invented them, and how it had assigned them status in the hierarchy of the state.

Rhodesian Era Patronages of Ethnicity

Unlike the colonial states in places like Rwanda and Burundi where the authorities invented tribal identities based on measurements of cranial widths, noses, body

width and height, and perhaps levels of dark skin pigmentation (ref needed), Rhodesia used less-defined forms of 'science'. However, her own evaluation resulted in a demotion of pre-existing ethnicities, or even nationalisms, to 'tribes', before contentiously ranking them in relation to one another, or injecting external content to hybridize and 'improve' them.(ref needed)

Recent writings illustrate through examinations of the activities of cultural Associations and Home Societies, that, Africans were not mere by-standers as their ethnicities were being invented. In the same way Rhodesian settlers promoted their own ethnicities as English people, as people of Scottish ancestry, or as Dutch, the post-World War II era also saw Africans actively promoting their languages and cultural awareness through the activities of Home Societies and other cultural associations. Although there were divergent opinions on the boundaries of each of the emerging ethnic identities, and although attempts to find common positions on that remained works-in-progress, ethnic voices were making their mark in the domain of African politics, and in some instances, beginning to alarm the colonial state that had initially been happy to sponsor tribal membership drives. Thus to render Associations and Societies redundant, the colonial state installed state-appointed chiefs to direct and monitor 'tribal' matters. It has been argued that the Associations and Societies' ethnic projects did not necessarily run contrary to any involvement their patrons may have had with the nationalist movement. While that might be true, what also needs to be said is that the nationalist and ethnic projects did not necessarily influence one another in ways that were always healthy. For those projecting ethnicity as a preservation of culture, that development might have been viewed as retrogressive. However, in relation to state interests, that provided a valuable tool in the politics of self-preservation, and would therefore be viewed as facilitating 'progress'.

By the 1960s, ethnicity had become such a significant factor that those organizing the earliest nationalist parties had to give serious thought to ethnic balancing. However, the balancing act did not work for long; the war period saw the main liberation movements degenerating into tribal campaigns, as leaders pursued individualistic political agendas, at the expense of building a common front against colonialism. It can be argued that as both ZANU and ZAPU came to constitute themselves into governments-in-waiting in their respective external bases, they were already beginning to exhibit state-like characteristics that were worryingly similar to the political style of the Rhodesian state they both sought to displace and replace.

By the end of the war, there had been such active exploitation of Shona-Ndebele language and regional differences among the fighters that the ZANU and ZAPU leaders returned home with potentially tribalized parties and cadres. Emerging from the 1980 elections with only a third of the total African vote, all secured from Matabeleland, Nkomo and ZAPU came to be cast in the image of a 'tribal' grouping, while ZANU PF came to speak for the Zimbabwean nation and for the post-colonial state. When the war-time ZANLA-ZIPRA rivalries exploded in clashes in 1981, the stage was set for a confrontation, and one which the ZANU PF post-colonial state took the liberty to name without hesitation. Using the language of the ZANLA and ZIPRA rivalry from the liberation war period, and functioning from the same

mentality the colonial state had functioned in, a 'Ndebele' tribal problem called for a 'Shona' tribal solution. The result was the tragedy of Gukurahundi between 1981 and 1987.

The period's gross violence also mediated conflicts between several competing state systems. On the one hand, there was the victorious ZANU PF, contentiously constituting itself into a nation state. It was determined to resolve, by whatever means, its long-standing rivalries with ZAPU, who it also accused of wanting to violate Zimbabwe's territoriality in alleged plans to set up a parallel state system. On the other was the withdrawing Rhodesian state, partnering with the very apprehensive South African apartheid state to cause more havoc and destabilization. A combination of these competing state interests produced one of the bloodiest phases of Zimbabwe's post-colonial history.

Having addressed the above, the discussion's focus now needs to move to the Zimbabwean era, tracking the same aspects of gender, race and ethnicity, and making comparisons between the past and the contemporary state system.

Zimbabwe is born: It's a Boy!

Several questions flow from the above: did post-colonial gender practices mimic the colonial-era constructs or did they substantially depart from them? How did gender play out once the prospects to alter the racial identity of state power elites were raised in the general elections of 1980, and what happened as that colour change became a reality through the victory of ZANU PF and its assumption to the governmental throne?

In considering the political culture of Zimbabwe's state leadership, if the revolutionary rhetoric of the liberation war era was to be engaged, gender is a key aspect by which their commitment to revolutionary change could legitimately be measured. After all, that leadership had made unequivocal official statements, claiming that gender reform was on their national liberation programme. The condition of African women, as illustrated in the first section of our discussion spoke to the need for change, showed how they could only have ignored gender at their own peril; they had to be seen to have an active gender reform programme. Other works have already demonstrated how they configured their war-time slogans to impress on their audiences that positive change for women was underway.

However, some hints on the illusion of gender reform could be discerned from the language used in the transitional period. It is interesting to note that the campaign slogan for the February 1980 general elections escaped political scrutiny despite its glaring political incorrectness. Although, the nationalist leadership, (like the Rhodesians before them), badly needed not just the men's votes, but the women's numbers as well, it is instructive to see how easily they repeated their predecessors chauvinistic political style and still got away with it in the electoral campaign of that year. The supposedly gender-enlightened leadership happily adopted the not-so-inclusive campaign slogan, "One man one vote!" Of course, at a practical level, all adult Africans were included in the definition of 'manhood' for voting rights, and so one could say that the women got honorary male status to qualify.

However, when examined in retrospect, and against the continued and increasing dominance of men as key determinants of Zimbabwean electoral processes since then, it seems important acknowledge how the February 1980 campaign slogan

reconfigured the war-time gender rhetoric of reform. There was a comfortable reversion to the masculine norms that official pronouncements from the war had seemed to challenge, this time embracing a campaign slogan that projected only one gender. In view of the continual treatment of women merely as numbers, without any meaningful decision-making powers or representation in electoral processes, the 1980 campaign slogan might have been a not-so-subtle pointer to the official view that elections were men's business. A gendered analysis of the composition of parliament since independence seems to confirm that. For example, women were a mere eight percent of Zimbabwe's first parliament (ref in Nh-Sim); only three got ministerial positions, reaffirming the continuation of government business as a male affair. In the last and contentious round of elections held in 2008, female representation still stood at a lowly ...percent. That speaks volumes about the gender orientation of the post-colonial state; it remains a male-serving institution like the colonial establishment it replaced, yet has continued to extol itself as a champion of women's rights.

In projecting the state's unchanged male identity while continuing with the rhetoric of female inclusion, it is instructive to borrow from the 1986 poetry collection penned by ex-combatant, feminist, and development activist, Freedom Nyamubaya. In one of her poems, "A Mysterious Marriage", a boy named Independence and a girl named Freedom met in the war and planned to get married. According to the poem's story line, after the war, people gathered to witness the union of the two, but the girl Freedom did not appear at the wedding. However, the would-be bride's absence did not stop the celebration. Years later, Independence was still a bachelor, and even as he staggered into old age in barrenness, Freedom never showed up.

Deconstructed, Nyamubaya's poem revisited the liberation war discourse that paired independence and freedom as natural marriage partners, while also joining men and women as participants in a national project. In this discussion, one could build on Nyamubaya's satirical but fairly instructive representation of Zimbabwe, which seems to be making two very poignant points, one alluding to the absence of the freedom that was supposed to come with independence, and another, to the retrogressive, unproductive and prolonged bachelorhood or male gender of the nation that came into being in 1980. The retention of the displaced colonial government's authoritarian state machinery, and the male-defined gender of the Zimbabwean state, were two sides of the same coin. Outside the token placement of women in window-dressing positions in the upper levels of the state hierarchy, the unwillingness of the Zimbabwean state's male leadership to partner with women, demonstrated more than their aversion to the idea of female equality; it also testified to their lack of qualms about renegeing on the other undertakings they had made during the war, including the promise that they would free the country's political space and deliver democracy. Rhodesia's constrictive tendencies were convenient to maintain, so was the cultivation of exclusive loyalty groups. However, where Rhodesia had rallied the white minority population around race, the post-colonial state could not marshal the newly-enfranchised African majority to form a similarly-cohesive political identity around blackness alone. Thus the state laid its base in the ruling ZANU PF party, and from that base, made targeted investments in patriarchal womanism and in ethnicity, drawing on the legacies of the Rhodesian

era.

(Acting for the State) In Support of the State: From Gender Reformists to Patriarchal Womanists

1. Statements of distrust leveled against women's orgs operating outside the fold of the party Julia Zvobgo falling out with other women for refusing to wear the party dress

2. The Women's Coalition split just before the Constitutional referendum when Womanists returned to the fold of party politics after flirting with gender reform in the period of the constitutional review exercise in 1999.

Thus independence came to be about replacing one set of male rulers with another. It was not about altering the nation's gender nor the repressive state instruments that had sustained the previous regime. Contrary to the public image it had built of itself in its formative years, as a state-in-the-making in the liberation war period, the postcolonial state, predominantly black and clearly male in identity, positioned itself to inherit the repressive instruments the preceding state had built and abused its subjects with. However, knowing how critical women's support had been during the war, the post-colonial state sustained the rhetoric of gender reform, appointing the Ministry of Women's Affairs as the instrument through which resources for such reform would be channeled. Officials in the Ministry also doubled as functionaries in the ZANU PF Women's League, a critical mobilization tool in the ruling party's political machinery. As compensation for their support, the lower levels of the League settled for food and drinks, while happily clothing themselves with colourful cotton prints showing pictures of the Party leader Robert Mugabe. At the upper levels, occupied by the women associated with the men in the ruling circle, their lives very much came to resemble, if not out-do that of the women who had supported the white establishment. Their association with the newly-constituted state suddenly transformed them into the to the madams of well-secured suburban homes and terraced gardens in the hilly parts of Harare; with hordes of servants; chauffeur-driven cars with abundant legroom and parcel-storage space; the state took care of their children's school fees; and access to government books showed their husbands that senior government membership entitled them to generous holiday packages. However, where their white predecessors had been golf widows, the new madams were initially rally widows before they became night club and 'small house' widows. Typical of the protectionist tendencies of the previous state, the troops of servants and chauffeurs were provided to serve them as much as they were to watch them on behalf of their powerful state-leader husbands. Smothered by the protectionism, the patriarchal activism previously associated with Rhodesia's white women came to have new patrons. Where a select group of women – white backing it with given the male leadership's failure to silence the echoes of the war-time rhetoric that had claimed that a gender revolution was underway, the state reconfigured their gender definitions to give the impression of changing pre-existing norms but, in essence, leaving them unaltered.

Apart from the gender reconfigurations of the transitional period,

Remember reports on Nkomo dressing as an old woman to flee Zimbabwe; later, the previously emasculated Nkomo was resurrected in death as a powerful patriarchy

and re-assumed his previous titles as “Father Zimbabwe”.

Mugabe patronizingly referring to Joyce Mujuru after her appointment as VP: “she is just a little girl, don’t be fooled by the big body”. Similarly on Dongo, earlier on when she challenged ZANU PF, ‘she is just a little girl who my late wife liked and spoil’. Does not use such patronizing language with the junior men in his ruling circle.

Not having “gone to war” emasculates MDC; JOC won’t salute Tsvangirai), but elevates Joyce Mujuru from the lot of women ZPF treads upon; because ‘she went to the war’.

Race and fear-mongering

Jabulani Sibanda’s statements after votes had been cast in March 2008 : spreading rumours that whites were returning to the country

Jonathan Moyo’s Ministry of Information uncovering MDC/white plots

“Uncovered plot” between Tsvangirai, Eugene Terry Blanche(sic) and others to re-install Rhodesia Government, with ailing Ian Smith at the helm of it!

The real work lay in reconfiguring them to appear changed, especially if such features had been targeted in the liberation struggle and marked as warranting significant change under a newly-democratic dispensation.

It will be shown that, in the case of ethnicity, ‘tribal’ constructs remained woolly concepts, though for some, as dispossessed groups pitted against one another, there was a misguided hope that they would strike a better deal with the colonialists if their claim to recognition was on firmer ground than others. Albeit that insecure background, the liberation war and the Gukurahundi periods saw previously CULTURAL ethnic consciousness intensifying to become a destructive Political instrument in the hands of post-colonial power elites.

The nationalist parties that came into being in the 1960s started off without ‘tribal’ affiliations but by the end of the war, there had been such active exploitation of language differences among the fighters that they returned home with tribally-informed party membership identities. This is what made Gukurahundi possible, producing for the victims, shared experiences of danger, insecurity and loss, and for the future, a shared sense of persecution among the inhabitants of Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands. On that, it is necessary to point out that the pre-dominance of ZAPU in Matabeleland and ZANU elsewhere meant that in the ZANU PF state’s war against the rival nationalist party, it, there was a calculation that it would be most effective in eliminating ZAPU’s structures if they targeted Ndebele speakers. It is also important to point out that no one felt safe in Matabeleland then, including Shona-speakers who changed to Ndebele names and practiced their clicks.

Sure those identities are owed respect and recognition but are they as different (through and through) as some of the spokesmen make them out to be?

(Interestingly, ethnic differences /regional representation/Mthwakazi Project have not yet brought in any visible female representation. All subscribers remain male and elite...where are the women? Where is the voice of the grassroots? Perhaps that

is why, to this day, ethnicity researches typically unearth more political than cultural consciousness. For example, (1) no gender and ethnicity works yet on Zimbabwe. (2) Ndebele religious identity struggles to extricate itself from pre-existing religious shrines such as Mwari's Matonjeni-Matopos which have always been critical to the Shona.

Joy Chadya comments: Josephine starts off by looking at gender and the colonial state. She argues that the political and economic privileges that the white society enjoyed meant that white men largely did not participate in migrant labor and therefore stayed with their families while African men were forced, directly and indirectly, into labor migrancy. Thus, unlike their African counterparts, white men were better able, due to their presence and economic privileges, to exercise power and authority in their households. Meantime, being from the ruling race, white women irrespective of class, were privileged in comparison to African women. Like other colonized women in third world countries African women suffered from double subordination at the hands of their husbands as well as the colonial state. Whereas white and African women could have joined hands to fight for women's rights, the provision of privileges along racial lines precluded their working together for a common cause – thus the absent sisterhood that Julia Wells discusses with reference to South Africa and many feminist African American scholars in relation to the US. For white women, loyalty to race paid more dividends than loyalty to sisterhood.

In her discussion of women during the nationalist and liberation war phase, Josephine argues that women's issues were subsumed under those of nationalism forcing women to abandon their own causes until after independence. Other scholars like Ann McClintock have made the same argument in relation to women and nationalism. She states, and I quote:

“All nationalisms are gendered. They represent relations to political power ... legitimizing or limiting people's access to the rights and resources of the nation state.”

This succinctly captures the position of women during the nationalist phase in Zimbabwe. Thus support for women's causes during the war, and the intervention of nationalist combatants in favor of women, was meant to yoke as many “mother's of the revolution” as possible as their support was crucial in their successful campaign against the Rhodesian state. However, Josephine argues, women's participation in the liberation war was limited to an auxiliary role. After independence women, including those who had participated in the liberation struggle were relegated to the margins of decision making as very few educated women were incorporated into the government structures.

While the discussion is interesting and informative, there is one major silence that needs to be addressed regarding women and the war and that is how the war-induced violence led to the rural-urban migration of largely women and children by both racial groups. A number of military memoirs by Rhodesian ex-servicemen narrates how white men were displaced from their farming activities to go on call-up duty. In their absence, women replaced them as farm managers. However, the intensification of the war forced the women off the farms. Peter Godwin's Mukiwa,

for instance, provide ample evidence of how women and children were internally displaced from their rural homes to urban centers where they sought sanctuary for the duration of the war. The displacement was however, colored by race. White women were accompanied to the towns/cities, by long convoys of the police and the military when they were forced to abandon their farms displaced.shop or when they decided to abandon their farms. For African women, the Harare City Council Archives has many files that bear testimony of rural African women who had fled to Harare between 1974 and 1980. In their homes, white women had the agri-alert system that could be used in times of danger. In addition, whenever white women went for shopping, African women did not have that luxury. At the beginning their flight was in relay format – from one village hard-hit by the war to another which was relatively safe. But by 1977 when the war had engulfed most of the country flight was usually direct to the cities. While most rural white families either had houses in town or they could afford to rent accommodation for African women either had to stay with their extended families while about 15 000 of them settled at Mbare Musika where they were referred to as refugee squatters by the donor community. As the April independence celebrations approached these refugee families were tucked away in the Mbare Hostels and the New Lines pre-fab houses in Majubheki (J'oburg Lines) supposedly on temporary basis. They are still living there!

There is also need for disaggregating the African race and it's relationship to nationalism and liberation war. Class for instance can be a useful analytical tool in this respective. One example will suffice – African nationalists found it easy to mobilize effectively on the basis of racial or cultural aspects because focusing on class exploitation of the masses would be difficult without exposing their own class position in relation to the African masses.

Another silence that I thought needed to be addressed, to have a more inclusive analysis, is the discussion of the state's relationship with the Colored and Asian communities. I thought books by Mandaza and Muzondidya would be useful for such an analysis.***

Through a policy of divide and rule, the Rhodesian state had managed to foil an alliance between the Africans and Colored. For instance, the color question divided African and Colored workers as Coloreds were treated and paid better than their African counterparts. As a result, African nationalism – which was essentially an ideology of the African male petit bourgeoisie, left out the fold Coloreds and Asians.***

Rhodesian Era Patronage of Ethnicity

In her discussion of ethnicity, Josephine contends that both the colonial state on one hand and the nationalists movements on the other exploited ethnicity to their own advantage. The bifurcation of the two nationalists movements in the 1960s were so deep that they continued in the post-colonial state culminating in the Gukurahundi violence of the 1980s that we have heard so many scholars making reference to since yesterday.

Let me conclude by making a few observations:

1. There is a running theme of continuities from the colonial period to the post-colonial period in as far as the state's relationship with race, gender and ethnicity – what Josephine has called the rebranding of the old order for purposes of the preservation of the state.
2. To a certain extent there is change over time i.e. between the state and race, gender and ethnicity
3. the notion of progress in relation to these three issues is always shifting. I will give you one example – during the liberation war, when rural women joined the military and began wearing pants the young women saw that as progress, a sign of equality between men and women. The older generations simply saw that as being misguided. The holding of the gun by women also denoted the notion of gender equality while the patriarch despised the power that these young women got from the guns. Thus the notion of progress differs according to class and generation among other factors and the idea of progress can also change over time. What might be deemed bad today might be seen as progress over time.
4. During the liberation war, liberation movements made promises that equated black majority rule with political independence and the improvement of the masses' material condition. Most of us remember the jingles of the early 1980s that promised racial and gender equality for all. I leave Blair to talk about what happened after independence.

Blair Rutherford: Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi has provided a good overview of how progress has been a key raced, gendered, and ethnicized political resource in Zimbabwe, tracing how these were mobilized for various colonial projects as well as anti-colonial projects, such as the nationalist movements. Nhongo-Simbanegavi also shows how some mobilizing claims of progress, such as gender equality, were not actually practiced as such within the liberation movements, and such patriarchal practices continued once ZANU became ensconced in power. Her key focus is on the re-crafting, remobilization, of political resources that shaped colonial administrative practices by the Zimbabwean state, examining how “progress” in its racialized, gendered, or ethnicized dimensions have ultimately operated as a means of regime preservation. In so doing, she also points to how state projects may converge with those of non-state groups given their definition of “progress,” but not completely or always. Yet, she reminds us, that gender, race, and ethnicity as forms of identification have been potent platforms for state projects given their ability to “grab the attention of key political audiences.” As a way to build on her insights, I want to reflect a bit on this interpellation, this ability of these discourses, dispositions, and bodily practices to “hail,” or not, various Zimbabweans (and non-Zimbabwean audiences), including defining some of the socio-political fault lines so apparent today in the Zimbabwean body politic. To me, this is a key insight and to ignore it, to assume that one can promote – or implement – “progressive” policies or politics without engaging with, challenging and working through, the ways in which racialized, gendered, and ethnicized progress has been narratized and entangled in administrative practices, party platforms, and expectations of, and dispositions toward, public action, one is not only setting oneself up for frustration, for dashed hopes, but also for poor analysis. Racialized narratives of progress are the most

obvious. From third chimurenga proclamations and its land distribution from white to black to explanations of the vast agricultural decline as due to the forcible and violent politicized eviction of white farmers and calls for moving beyond racialized calculations of citizenship rights and political participation, race is a visceral category of analysis, action, and marker of future goals and teleological end-points, even if it is in liberating one from its hold. Accounts of racialized progress or dystopia not only can miss out other economic and social dynamics occurring, as Ian Scoones and his collaborators have critically pointed out in terms of the emergent web of commodity chains occurring in Masvingo missed out by poignant tales of woe and destruction in rural Zimbabwe since 2000, but, of course, they enable new dynamics of accumulation, new points of collaboration (“indigenous investment,” for example), while excluding others. As Josephine pithily notes with her section title, “Zimbabwe is born: It’s a Boy!,” postIndependence Zimbabwe has been deeply gendered. While what she calls the “war-time gender rhetoric of reform” amongst the nationalists is still pervasive, amongst NGOs, social movements, and some politicians as a way to criticize gendered inequalities in terms of laws, economic practices, personal security, health vulnerabilities, educational opportunities, amongst others, as gendered inequalities and discrimination is widespread, if not, even more extensive. How widespread the purchase of such progress narratives is, I don’t know, but one needs to also analyse and engage with other gendered visions of progress in which patriarchal authority, for instance, is praised.

Ethnicity, as she also notes, also has been a key factor of the relations of rule in Zimbabwe, most notably marked through the Gukuhurahundi, but also in the distribution of resources, jobs, and other forms of inclusion and exclusion. The major split which Josephine mentions, Ndebele/Shona, is key, but, of course, there are other ones that cross-cut such a division, and can play a role in localized projects aimed at the future, even if “progress” is defined in terms of a return to some sort of autochthonous rule, be they ethnicized/tribalized (e.g., Tonga, Venda, Kalanga, San, Karanga, Korekore, Coloured, etc) or ruling clans or lineages in contrast to “strangers” and “outsiders.”

I thus find Josephine’s analysis helpful and refreshing, showing how these three “political subjects” have been key factors in the ways in which states mobilized arguments about its plans, its interventions, its futures to Zimbabweans and “the international public” at large. As she works on refining this paper, I think she will need to think a bit more about how to frame her argument. The focus is largely on state projects, particularly their “survival and self-preservation strategies,” so drawing on the Gramscian concept of hegemony may be useful, examining the means by which the ruling class’s ideology become the “common sense” of the ruled, even if its tenets have not been universally adopted but rather are contested, or “entangled with,” to use Donald Moore’s fecund metaphor, with other projects.

Additionally, she may want to examine the ways in which progress has been a key raced, gendered, and ethnicized political resource in Zimbabwe as a way to mark forms of belonging and not belonging, be it constitutionally (raced and gendered

citizenship rights have been a source of litigation and political challenge, for example) or via representation in the political and discursive senses. How the, to borrow James Ferguson's phrase, "expectations of modernity" promoted by various political actors have been racialized, gendered, and/or ethnicized, leading to certain policies, communities of interest, and persuasive narratives for some constituents while excluding others is an important way to tighten the framing of her article. James Muzondidya's work and Amanda Hammar's work on citizenship, for example, could be productive here. By being more explicit about the conceptual frames one uses, one can also think reflexively about one's own calls for progress – for social science is indelibly stained by, if not arguably premised on, such calls – and the traditions in which they are embedded in Zimbabwe, the audiences they can hail or potentially shape and, as importantly, the contours of power of which you are operating against. For as Josephine documents, there have been mobilizations for freedom against racialized and gendered inequalities but many have foundered for a variety of contextual reasons.

The critique of this rebranding of old inequalities in new visions of progress, the features of the old order that haunt and are retooled in the postcolonial order, including this transitional affair of uncertain lengthy of time, to the detriment of many Zimbabweans is important and, as Josephine points out, has not been carried out as extensively as one would think. I am sure her paper, once finished and revised, will spark off more discussions, thinking, and debate about how projects of "progress" in Zimbabwe, including of course those with transnational linkages if not points of origin (be they from the West or East or South), frequently traffic in racialized, gendered, and ethnicized languages and social practices, working through social fields already highly saturated with such "political subjects."

Sabelo Ndlovu: All nationalisms are dangerous – especially the very idea of Zimbabwe itself. The founding fathers were not clear on what type of nation they wanted to build. Zvogbo told us the name was an accident – from a rally. Only one protest came from a Ndebele society who thought Zim is an ethnic name. There are many more ethnic groups than two. On violence, it is not episodic, it is integral to statecraft and nation-building (with various chimurengas following). Invitation to the nation is written in blood. But this crit of violence has potential to fragment and diffuse the experience – it's quite common. Then the land question, the 'conquest of conquests' – with its gendered dimensions and retraditionalisation of roles. Men were supposed to take the lead and women were meant to go back to the domestic sphere. Tsholotsho Declaration had a clear sense of managing ethnicity within Zanu(PF), with presidents to rotate amongst four ethnic groups.

Amanda Hammar: What are the terms of belonging? Displacement is complex and requires us to ask harder questions about the crisis. It's not just about those forced to move, but also those forced to stay, left behind, or imprisoned. There are those displaced in space (youth in Chitungwiza) – kianomics. Unemployment as a radical form of dislocation (Guyer). Many different actors to consider. Murambatsvina,

unemployment, urban crises, the migration to SA – the rebuilding of social fabric entails a temporal suspension, so the future is unclear. We have to acknowledge losses, violence... but also all the changing social relations, and making all this visible.

Pathisa Nyhathi: Racism and ethnicity are not false consciousness, they are real. And they relate to competition over finite resources – in a context where people have been labeled as inferior. The ethnic identity is very much alive.

(13) Nov 6 AM 1 8:30-10:30 Roundtable: Perspectives on Progressive Policies

Chair: Deprose Muchena

Participants: Patrick Bond, Bertha Chiroro, Fay Chung, Lionel Cliffe, Hopewell Gumbo, Jabusile Madyazvimbishi-Shumba, Wilfred Mhanda, John Saul, Elinor Sisulu, Colin Stoneman

Elinor Sisulu: Two points are crucial, first that better communications are required, to counteract propaganda. People have to demonstrate. “Mass action doesn’t work” is a class-biased conclusion from comfortable NGOs but the working class is ready to protest.

Bertha Chiroro: Mass mobilizations are critical. Without pressure, nothing will happen. South Africans have proven that. We have failed to get a simple system for elections into place. We have to push for a new electoral system. The SA system has worked. We need to first put our house in order for governance, and then get our pro-poor policies. The whole donor community is watching Zim and looking for ‘progress’.

Lionel Cliffe: What role for international community? Bertha has drawn out one thing missing so far: any discussion that leaves out the international dimension is unrealistic. Confrontation with DFID last year was revealing. They had already put together a palan for what they wanted in Zimbabwe. Led by the World Bank, a donor cartel called the ‘Fishmongers’ have already put proposals together. They definitely aren’t progressive. THinka bout what that means for strategies from within: an alternative framework to the disastrous policies of the last few years. Unless there’s thinking being done about a different relationship with the international economy.

Patrick Bond: citation of National People’s Convention Charter in February 2008, not only for the broad progressive socio-economic mandate, but also rich policy suggestions, such as “the right of the people of Zimbabwe to refuse repayment of any odious debt accrued by a dictatorial government.” Indeed throughout Zim’s history there has been a rich history of stronger and more balanced growth at times of relatively minimal world economic relationships: 1930s, 1960s, 1980s. (plus other remarks from prepared presentation)

Hopewell Gumbo: campaigning against the inherited debt is critical; \$7 billion should not and cannot be repaid; everyone agrees we're in an economic crisis, and until we get the child to school and medicine, we should not pay the debt. The People's Charter is still the core mandate for social and economic justice and we must not lose sight of that when so much attention is paid to civil and political rights.

Jabusile Madyazvimbishi-Shumba: Land reform was too fast and furious, and huge policy-related constraints exist. Interest groups have not been able to influence policy-making. Militarisation is another constraint. Key institutions like the World Bank and IMF are also competitors for policy space, shrinking it for the rest of us. The nature of the government's intervention in the economy is under debate, especially with such limited fiscal resources available.

Fay Chung: In first ten years, social policy was expansive and government was focused. With ESAP we suffered an ad hoc and confused idea of how to use the budget. The education budget jumped from 10 to 29 percent of the budget and back. It was ad hoc instead of looking at it in a more progressive way. On textbooks today, we spend US\$0.01 per child. 40 percent of schools had no textbooks at all. As far as the Chinese influence, whether we like it or not, the takeover of manufacturing for the whole world is affecting Zim. We have a 'look East' policy but it is ad hoc and not developed. We have Chinese goods and in the process destroyed local industries. A US\$1 Chinese tee-shirt undercuts our \$4 shirt. Same for Bata shoes: \$6-25; but Chinese is \$2. We need to protect our industries. The Chinese have access to technology and we are 15-20 years behind. So we need to look at these in a different way. What technologies can we get from China? Since we never had a proper industrial policy, it has been ad hoc. Massive deindustrialization since ESAP. What technologies can we get from whom? We need intermediate technologies, e.g. solar energy, and make them here. For ag equipment, machinery, and so on, we should be doing it all locally. As for the security state, we know the Fishmongers are interested in military reform: 'get rid of the top 15 and everything will be solved'. But we know better: the problems are not the top individuals, but instead the institutions. 'We are doing as well as Smith'. I remember in Cabinet talking about student protesters: 'Smith used to shoot them and we can shoot them too', said one Cabinet member. The idea is that inherited institutions must be preserved. But many were seriously problematic – the education and health systems. The CIO, prisons, police were all problematic – and we felt we should take the guerrillas and turn them into good armed forces. Before the guerrilla war started in the 1960s, there were horrific things done to kids at our school in Mbare. The military and armed forces need to move from 'interrogate' as being beaten up and tortured, and we have to really look at the institutional continuity from Rhodesia to today, and break that.

Wilf Mhanda: Let us talk about security in the context of what we need to achieve overall. There are two security concepts: the state and human security. It's a long-standing problem. The colonial state and its successor state have always been alienated from the people. The state has had to be protected from the people. Smith

needed to protect his white state from the people. From the early 1980s there was a perceived threat from Zanu. The obsession has been to protect the state. We need to shift the focus from the state to the people. Since 1997 since the emergence of the NCA and civil society, the security forces also developed their own strategies against the people. It is crucial for people to demand that security protect our interests – not the state. The income the security forces receive, after all, originate in taxes, from the taxpayer. The security sector now also protects its own leaders' interests. We have every right to take up these matters with the commissioners of police and prisons, and the armed forces commanders. The SADC Troika on Politics, Defense and Security and we need to look at these two other areas, not politics alone. Otherwise we won't be able to achieve our political objectives.

John Saul: With real people putting their lives on the line, international solidarity is merely helpful. The lead has to come from within. This is happening in a very difficult and dangerous situation. The spirit of this conference – and the fact that it can even take place – suggests that there is space to think the most profane thoughts against the despotic government. Instead of the false alternatives of despotic government and global neoliberalism there are lots of other options. Struggles are taking place and people are mobilizing – and adding up is terribly important. The small and large have to be kept in perspective. The concept used on the left (Gorz, Kagarlitsky) is 'structural reform' – not mere reformism in a marginal way, nor is it revolution, as if it all could be changed in one day. We have to think through what theorists have been developing as we self-consciously accumulate small victories into a much larger programme of change. We struggle for specific things in the short run but through dialogue (of this kind), we need a continuing sense of where we're going and why. It's for us who care about what's happening in Zim if we can take a lead from you to see what solidarity we can offer, once you articulate what you want.

Colin Stoneman: To avoid recolonisation, the most likely outcome, a lot of work needs to be done. Here, we have the people doing it. We need to do this in print, and get debates going more widely. The Journal of Southern African Studies, the Review of African Political Economy and the Journal of Contemporary African Studies (which are publishing papers from this conference) are three places we can do this. There's a special issue of Roape on Zimbabwe coming, too. JSAS is the foremost journal on the region, and the last issue covered Zim through the lens of displacement, edited by Amanda Hammer. These are journals of high intellectual standing, and some people are rejected, and what we recognize and aim to do in all three journals is to help you, with more helpful advice and recommendations.

Deprose Muchena: Your challenge is to work with our organic intellectuals in Zimbabwe and relate their voices.

Brian Raftopoulos: A prerequisite is to understand, what is the state of social forces in Zimbabwe. Without that the hope for mass action is wishful thinking. What organizational form might such protest take? After the discussion on labour and the

state of the economy, it's difficult to imagine how ZCTU can be effective today, as it was in the late 1990s. Given rapid displacement and informalisation, it's crucial to address the gap between our vision, and how it is to be delivered.

Esther Chigumira: Can we see any mass mobilization given how much fear there is in the society? Chairperson, are you saying that debate is not taking place over climate change? I think Zim has been progressive in going past the debate, as we have leading people in the UZ Geography Department, including people working with the IPCC and an FAO Working Group working on adaptation.

Ben Cousins: In looking at structural constraints, everyone can look at their pet idea. What the key factors to unlock structural conditions? A couple of them relate to Saul's structural reforms. How can we think systematically?

Rob Davies: What's important about understanding social forces is to avoid imposing a stagist conception. Social change is what happens while we're planning for the future. It needs to be an interactive and dialectical process; let's not wait until we publish our academic publications in journals. These things are going to happen – like the Working People's Convention and People's Charter – are happening and need to be encouraged.

Richard Kamidza: Afrodad and other groups have tackled debt elsewhere. What can be done to foster a Debt Audit?

Dumisani Moyo: Elinor has begun to get at media reform. The last straw for a friend was when in the shower he caught himself, accidentally, singing a Zanu(PF) jingle. So we need much greater access. And a sense of citizenship that comes from more open media.

David Sanders: What's very important is to expand the critical debate in different fora, and also to publish as Colin Stoneman said. But at the end of the day the state has to be confronted, notwithstanding its monopoly on violence. What John Saul is saying, though, is that policy is being prefigured now. Our antidotes are both democratization of institutions, and prefiguring what kind of society we want. I was surprised by Fay Chung's dismissal of what happened in health, because there were real innovations in this country. This happened not least because some of the popular mobilizations occurred in the early 1980s gave us a human infrastructure. Of course many were rolled back. With a new opening up, it is extremely important to use the space to democratize in every single institutional struggle, and to prefigure different policies for the future. With more donor money coming in, it's important to ensure that global policies are not imposed uncritically. Too many people in civ soc are members of externally-funded NGOs which are transmission belts, especially through Business Inspired NGOs and Briefcase Only NGOs have erupted. We won't start with a blank slate when change comes.

Blessing Karumbidza: Mugabe's cross to Mozambique puts him as both a politician

and a member of the military tradition which affects the way he sees his rule. Part of the propaganda Mugabe has used is to attack civ soc because of its connections to the West. Esther talks of 'We' but who is we? Aren't we an elite, petitbourgeois group, away from the masses? Do we have legitimacy? In terms of Africa's response in the world, we are interested in the Forum for China and Africa Cooperation – initiated by China. We need a continental-level discussion before we go to outsiders for assistance. As far as local journals, we have failed at peer-review, and we have failed to promote local journals. We need to start journals to allow access to other people like us. That question of publication is difficult for young scholars, and we invite senior scholars to work with us. Publication in journals is a despotic way of controlling and making sure young people cannot publish, that's a problem.

Joe Hanlon: what do we do to get the international community to worry about debt? What it wants is the opposite: recolonisation. It is exactly to do the opposite of what we are calling for here. There will be an opportunity for widespread corruption - \$300-500 mn/year stolen – so long as there is no security reform. The test is the World Bank's Business Index. The 'deal' is that Zim elites will 'not reform' on many of these areas, but instead promote foreign investment.

Kumbirai Kudenga: In terms of mass action, we need people without fear. For workers, what we need from you people is support. It's not for anyone. If you're not used to going to the ground, it's hard. Mass action is for people who are used to the ground. We have a Democratic United Front for the workers, especially for mass action. What we need is support. Can you take down our email: zimlabour@gmail.com That is if you are serious, we are there to act.

Claude Kabemba: how do we assure natural resources are used properly? We were asked to open up and let FDI come in and we have seen our resources pillaged. With China and India coming, the resources are reclaiming their strategic importance and the value has increased. We need to start taking advantage of the high price of minerals. We need to stop exporting raw materials. Zimplats say that they cannot afford to do transformation of platinum into higher-value production. That also means looking at the tax regime – we give too much tax relief. We have done good civ soc work on democratization but have come up short in building our knowledge about natural resources. The communities around Zim mines are the poorest in Zimbabwe.

Sabelo Ndlovu: We need to talk more about leadership.

Bond: On climate, there's a parallel to the failure of elite reforms that we have seen in Zimbabwe. The global elites are doing a terrible job. That's why they're not the 'international community', they're better understood as the 'imperial forces.' A debt audit would show why the 'international community' owes reparations to Zimbabweans. For example, not just ESAP in the early 1990s where most of the debt arose from. The last IMF tranche, on the 1997-98 loan, explicitly allowed \$97 mn of credit to go to pay for Mugabe's war in Congo, so long as the money was shifted from

elsewhere, as the Financial Gazette reported at the time. As for Claude's point, the resource curse is the crucial concern across the continent. The blood diamonds boycott of Marange diamonds could teach us a great deal about civ soc resistance. The same dynamic relates to fossil fuels: leave them in the soil. A year and three weeks from now, the South Africans will host the world climate summit and Zimbabweans will have to come and play an informed role. We would do well to listen to voices such as the PanAfrican Climate Justice Alliance.

Chung: in three minutes I couldn't talk through the Zim 1980s experience and didn't intend to dismiss the health progress. In 1980 in education we had 30 000 blacks with three years of high school; today we have three million. This is a huge change. Where are strategic policies at anyone time? We have many things that are doable. The RF was very secretive, so was Zanu(PF). How much money goes from Harare to any district, any school? We don't know. As for China we need to be extremely careful. The only area where there is FDI is mining. How are we looking at millions of dollars of retail goods coming into the country. Who is dictating to whom? Generals? They are very powerful yet haven't influenced health or education though. The generals and politicians try and control each other.

Cliffe: Karumbidza is right, don't let us out of the hotel until we have an alliance with you? What are the key structural and strategic questions? One thing on my list is a locally-based, nationally-owned fertilizer industry. This ticks so many boxes. On debt, I'd add one little thing to what Hopewell and others said, and at odds with Patrick a bit. Sarah Bracking made the point that, in Joe Hanlon's terms, there's pressure to repay debt. The last thing that the international community wants is repayment – but the last thing is to repay. It is the lever on which any kind of conditionality can best be achieved. Even if there is now a relaxation to allow nonpayment, it's still on the books. They can always look up the books from the past and can bring that back. The logic of that is whatever happens, a crucial part is to get the debt cancelled, not just put aside. Bargaining to do it – I don't know. This relates to a big contradiction: yes alternative futures, long-term visions, short-term strategies – but there's a contradiction, a tension between alternative progressive policies which I started off by calling for, and the very depressing bleak political situation. This complements Brian's points about the social forces. The picture presented yesterday about the political realities about those who would embrace alternative policies are in a very weak position. This means that political tactics have got to be compromised into coalition politics, certainly in short- and medium-term.

John Saul: A crucial question, obviously, is the question of space – is it opening? We don't want to exemplify the use of that space and move it an inch or two out? The democratization of the ongoing political process is crucial. These politics should exemplify the ways we prefigure future politics. Leadership here still comes from militarization, hierarchy, dictatorship – not a democratic leadership. So the future leaders will be created in leadership roles in the new struggle. The structural reforms that are important – the simultaneity of large and small – will be not mere reformism, but will become structural, and evoke constituencies and ongoing goals

beyond the individual struggles. Where are these forums with that kind of move forward? The accumulation of structural reforms will be a consolidation of forces for sweeping change.

Sisulu: I agree with Joe Hanlon and Saul have spoken about but I want to take issue with the issue of recolonisation. There cannot be recolonisation of Zimbabwe in terms of global capital – because it was never decolonised. Zim has been a neoliberal state. Zanu(PF) was a darling of the West. Even the so-called land reform has not transformed property relations, it has decimated the working class. Let us call it continued colonisation and neoliberalism; every single country on the continent is a neoliberal state. We should state this clearly and not buy into these narratives. I agree with Raftopoulos that there should be analysis of social forces, but if that analysis – in a middle class space – tells you that there's too much fear, then that's a problem. Clearly the MDC abandoned mass mobilization as a tool. People are afraid and won't demonstrate – but why do tens of thousands turn up at MDC rallies, and to hear what? These people come from areas where they are harassed and risk safety to come there. If there was fear, they would not be coming to rallies and not be voting. One woman had her arms broken, her relatives killed... and was asked, would you vote MDC? She said, yes, they killed me already. Woza is growing, from being a little Bulawayo civic group to becoming a huge organisation – and it offers nothing but the right to protest. The struggles of Woza have been invisibilised. You see the South Africans protesting, they are there on the screen. We need a strategy to assure that the struggles here are visible. That takes me to regional solidarity – those struggles need to be made visible, because Zimbabweans are seen as passive. When Zimbabweans talk to Sans, they are asked, haven't you agreed with the GNU? This is important for regional solidarity, and likewise the media space that is threatened in South Africa needs more commentary from Zim civ soc – as a warning. An injury to one is an injury to all. Political space is highly contested in the region, and it is good to be here where the CIO cannot tell us we cannot have this morning. We need to stop the picking off of Owen and Farai, so that they are given solidarity. The MDC needs to explain why they haven't done anything about this. An injury to one is an injury to all.

Gumbo: Therefore we must analyse the status of social movements here. Zim has lots of material resources for civ soc, and we are vibrant. But where do we miss the link? Bond touched on debt and I hope the professors here buy this: debt is a toxic issue here. The int'l demands for repayment are severe. But we don't stop at the IMF/WB and Obama, but reflect on international solidarity for resistance. The Joburg World Summit on Sustainable Development is an example of a great protest. There is a working group on climate change, with an emphasis on Cancun, but no overall strategy yet. In the last few days, government agreed to repay Reserve Bank of Zim debt payments of \$2 billion, with the military lining up first. The Zim people will have to pay, and so we fear there is no paradigm shift on that yet. We shouldn't pay without a debt audit. The current dispensation will require many of you to synthesise and analyse hard questions: does it offer a way to move beyond the 2nd Chimurenga against the Smith regime? Has Zim gone backwards by relying on the

MDC in a significant way? Finally, natural resources are being looted and many Zimbabweans know this, they recall back to colonial fields (even in Marange dating to 1947). We have the resources and can restore progress.

Mhanda: Responding to Rafotopoulos desire for a census, we need teachers, civil service, unions, diaspora and many other forces. The climate change debate has been limited to elite discussions, with survival being the main preoccupation of the masses. As for leadership, this always is a product of struggle. What we need from now onwards is in sector-specific groups, is accountability from those who lead us now in our own organizations. On transforming the security apparatus, leave the West out and let SADC take the lead.

Madyazvimbishi-Shumba: We are in a political transition and the current missing link is dealing with the military. The way forward there is to name this as the most important priority for a democratic transition.

Chiroro: The key issues are poverty, unemployment and demobilized civil society. What kind of national policies deliver, what markets can function, how do we get rights, and genuine security. For me, that is progress.

(14) Nov 6 AM 2 11-12:00 Wrap-Up

John Hoffman: Progress is dialectical, involving continuity and change. Too little of the latter, too much of the former. A decisive break in 1980, everyone would agree. What does liberation and how far should it be taken? Nationalist discourse is problematic we agree. Statism is a problem, we agree. There's tension with civil society. There are big problems on the gender front. Yes progress, no progress – both sides of the picture. No because people are pointing out that the MDC and labour movement is different than it is today. But yes, progress in 2009 with the GNU opening up a small space, an example of which is this small space. Congrats to David and the team for bringing everyone together. And progress because there's more realization that democracy is bringing us more insights about popular participation. Remember the comment of Gramsci: the pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will. One of many stepping stones, with a rushing current, swollen by the rainy season – but still, one of many strong stepping stones to a democratic Zimbabwe.

Felix Fandyroy Moyo: The artists can now speak. You concern with making people happy and staying happy. Once you become a politician you can't do that. In communication, it is what your listener understands that is important. To be effective, the speaker and listener should share the meaning. Do we all understand the meaning of the word progress? I saw many different understandings of different words. To historians, history that reconstructs the past and presents it as facts is tainted with the writer's perspectives. Tolerance of divergent views is needed. A

hero to me is a fool to someone else. Can history be progressive? To politicians, the daily endeavour is to improve ourselves. The key words are appeal, resources, control and power. If you are trying to be progressive, you can be stifled. Politicians promise progress, are given power, and don't deliver. As for communications, satellite television gives us more options to avoid the propaganda.