


This article was downloaded by: [University of Sussex Library]

On: 30 July 2013, At: 16:59

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Third World Quarterly

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20>

Middle Range Powers in Global Governance

Hongying Wang & Erik French

Published online: 25 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Hongying Wang & Erik French (2013) Middle Range Powers in Global Governance, *Third World Quarterly*, 34:6, 985-999, DOI: [10.1080/01436597.2013.802509](https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802509)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802509>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

Middle Range Powers in Global Governance

HONGYING WANG & ERIK FRENCH

ABSTRACT This article compares and evaluates the contributions of middle range powers to global governance initiatives. Examining participation in terms of personnel, financial and ideational contributions, we test several hypotheses derived from neorealism, critical theory, liberalism, constructivism, and post-internationalism against six cases: Canada, Japan, China, Russia, India and Brazil. We find that material power has a negative impact on contributions, while a country's leadership's attitude towards the international order, the length of its membership in major international organisations and the strength of its civil society all seem to have positive effects on its participation in global governance. Trade dependence, however, does not seem to exhibit the expected impact. The article indicates that multiple theoretical approaches may prove useful for evaluating the behaviour of middle range powers, and that further research should be conducted on the relative importance of each of the factors mentioned above in explaining middle range power contributions to global governance.

What are middle range powers? In this article we define middle range powers as countries that are neither at the apex nor the bottom of the international power structure. They are not so powerful as to be able to exert decisive influence on major issues of international security and economy. Nor are they so powerless as to be unable to protect themselves from the undesirable impacts of other countries' actions. They have considerable resources and capabilities, but are not dominant in international relations. In the post-World War II international system many erstwhile great powers—such as Britain, France and Germany—fell into the middle range of the global power structure dominated by the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA. Since the end of the Cold War Russia—the successor of the old USSR—has also fallen off the apex of the world power hierarchy. As some analysts have put it, great power status rests on the ability to project military power on the world stage.¹ By that criterion, 'there is, today, only one Great Power, and this is a situation that is likely to persist for the foreseeable future'.² In such a unipolar world one could

Hongying Wang is at the University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada. Email: h279wang@uwaterloo.ca Erik French is a PhD candidate at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA. Email: edfrench@syr.edu.

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/13/000985-15

© 2013 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802509>

argue that middle range powers include countries ranging from the middle of the international hierarchy all the way to those just beneath the USA.

This description of middle range powers is similar to the way some scholars define 'middle powers'.³ But for other scholars 'middle powers' are not so much defined by their size as by their behaviour. For them, middle powers are in the middle, exhibiting a certain level of autonomy from the great powers, seeking peaceful solutions to international problems and ameliorating gross injustice in the international system.⁴ Active involvement in global governance would be a natural characteristic of middle powers so defined. Some middle range powers behave like middle powers, notably Australia, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and – until recently – Canada. But others do not.

Although the USA remains the sole super power in the world, its relative decline has been unmistakable. Believers in the hegemonic stability theory worry about international instability in the post-*Pax Americana* era.⁵ Institutional liberals, on the other hand, are hopeful that international cooperation will continue after hegemony and will be a new source of peace and economic prosperity.⁶ Post-internationalists have yet another view.⁷ They see the world as not only experiencing a decline in American hegemony but also a decline in state power more generally. In this new era, they argue, states and inter-state institutions are joined by non-state actors and networks in the management of major issues in the world. Many of them use 'global governance' to refer to the complex of institutions and processes that govern how things happen in the world. In its origin 'global governance' was intended to express something that could be distinguished from 'global government'. In some ways it resembles 'international regimes', but it has three distinctive features: 1) it seeks to address the global (rather than the regional); 2) it involves transnational as well as inter-governmental institutions and processes; and 3) it aims to achieve goals not only at the inter-national level, such as peace and trade, but also inside different societies, such as human rights and accountability. The mechanisms of global governance consist of international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the World Health Organisation (WHO); transnational networks, such as the World Economic Forum, Greenpeace, and Amnesty International; and various formal and informal processes that bring together these and other actors to deal with global issues ranging from nuclear proliferation to financial crises and from environmental protection to democratisation.

Much of the liberal and global governance vision depends on the active participation in multilateral and transnational institutions and initiatives of the middle range powers. In other words, its realization relies on more than a few middle range powers behaving like middle powers. In the early 21st century a large number of newcomers has joined the rank of middle range powers in the international system. Some are from the former socialist world, and some have risen from the lower echelons of the global capitalist system.

However, not all of them have been keen to be involved in international institutions or—more broadly—global governance. Yet global governance will depend on the contribution of these middle powers if US relative power continues to decline. Understanding the conditions that encourage or constrain participation will be vital to determining how to coax middle powers into

assuming more responsibility in a post-hegemonic international order. The issue of participation in global governance is under-theorised, and there is no clear pre-existing theoretical explanation for this variation in middle-power participation. In this article we seek to address this important gap by describing and explaining the different behaviour of middle range powers in the area of global governance. We focus on six countries in this wide middle range. They include two from the industrialised world, Canada and Japan; two (former) communist countries, China and Russia; and two emerging developing economies, Brazil and India. Through this comparative study we hope to improve our understanding of the variation among middle range powers with regard to their behaviour in global governance, and the factors underlying the variation. Our findings provide partial support for neorealist, critical, constructivist and post-internationalist perspectives, but not for the liberal perspective.

Variation in participation in global governance

A casual survey of the middle powers leads to the impression that some of them are more active contributors than others to global governance institutions and initiatives. But how do we measure and compare countries' contributions to global governance systematically? Drawing on a framework we developed earlier, we suggest that a state's involvement in global governance be broken into three general categories: personnel contributions, financial contributions and ideational contributions to multilateral organisations and initiatives.⁸ Along these lines we shall lay out several indicators of each type of contribution and then build an index to measure and compare the six middle range powers mentioned above.

We measure personnel contributions by the staffing each country provides for the UN and its peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Specifically the number of nationals each state has working as UN staff members is the first indicator used to assess this type of participation. This figure is assessed relative to a state's population size and its gross national income (GNI), given that larger or more prosperous states should be able to dedicate more personnel to UN organisations.⁹ A state's presence in UN PKOs is a second indicator, which is measured in terms of both the number of contributed personnel relative to population size and the total number of casualties suffered in recent missions.¹⁰ UN staff and peacekeeping contributions are some of the most significant contributions which states can make to global governance. As mentioned earlier, the UN is the broadest and most comprehensive institution handling global governance, so UN staff contributions are critical to general global governance. Contributions to PKOs are especially important, given that these involve diverting national security resources away from the defence of the state, as well as putting the lives of soldiers, advisors and policemen at risk in the interests of multilateral cooperation.

Financial contributions refer to a country's donations to various funds, programmes and organisations dedicated to major global governance issue areas, such as poverty relief and global health. State financial contributions are evaluated by examining voluntary commitments to major funds addressing key sectors of global governance, as well as subscriptions at major international

economic organisations. These figures are evaluated relative to both GNI and GNI per capita. Wealthier states with stronger economies should be able to contribute more financially to these funds, and evaluating commitments relative to GNI and GNI per capita controls for this potential dynamic. Funding reports and donor data from 16 funds covering drug trafficking and criminal justice, global health, poverty relief and humanitarian aid, environmental protection, human rights and fair labour standards are used to compare states' financial involvement in global governance.¹¹ Additionally the article assesses each state's subscriptions at the World Bank and IMF, which determine voting powers in these organisations. Subscription data provide a useful indicator of the extent of countries' contributions to and involvement in major international financial organisations.

Ideational contributions refer to the ideas a country effectively puts on the agenda of global governance. Ideally one should evaluate this category of participation by the number and impact of ideas, norms and initiatives a country has sponsored or proposed. Canada, for example, developed the notion of the 'responsibility to protect'. Brazil initiated the World Social Forum. Indian activists and NGOs led the opposition to the spread of genetically modified crops by global agribusiness. Brazil—alongside France—helped propose and found UNIT-AID, an international facility to purchase drugs that combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. But these contributions are hard to quantify. Since they tend to come from civil-society actors, we use civil-society participation in global governance affairs as a proxy indicator. First, we examine the number of NGOs from each state involved with the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) through consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the number of NGOs from each state with memberships in the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the UN (CONGO).¹² Second, we examine the extent of NGO participation in the various UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs meetings, forums, commissions and conferences involving global governance. This allows us to evaluate the extent to which NGOs from each state are involved in actively participating in NGO—UN cooperation and consultation with regard to global governance.¹³

Although there are other ways in which states could contribute to global governance, and other institutions which they could participate in, these methods and institutions are the most inclusive and have the broadest focus. Most of these institutions, funds and conferences are either part of the UN or in partnership with the UN, or constitute a major international financial institution. These are the broadest global governance institutions in terms of membership, purpose and geographical scope. Although there are smaller, regionally-focused institutions as well as institutions with narrower memberships, we want to capture participation in the most comprehensive and extensive institutions.

Using data on these indicators, we have built an index to gauge the involvement in global governance by Canada, Japan, Brazil, India, China and Russia. Each country receives a score for the three major categories, as well as for several subcategories. Scores for the subcategories are based on the average ranking the country receives out of the six states in question in a given subcategory. For instance, China's score for drugs and crime is based on the average ranking of its contributions to the UN International Drug Control

Programme relative to GNI and GNI per capita and its contributions to the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund relative to GNI and GNI per capita. The scores for the three main categories (personnel, financial and ideational), which are presented in Table 1, are simply the average of all pertinent subcategories. Lower scores indicate a better average ranking and greater participation by a state in a particular category.

The data here suggest that *relatively* speaking Canada, India and Brazil have been active contributors to global governance, while Russia, Japan and China have been poor global citizens.¹⁴ This line-up does not follow any obvious cleavage: industrialised countries are not necessarily better participants than industrialising countries and mature democracies are not necessarily more internationalist than new democracies or authoritarian states. What, then, are the major factors affecting involvement of countries in global governance? More broadly, what conditions lead middle range powers to behave as middle powers? The next section turns to these questions.

Explaining the variation in middle power behaviour

The neorealist theory of international relations stipulates that a country's position in the international power structure is the decisive factor in determining its behaviour.¹⁵ It also posits that states are rational actors that try to maximise their security and autonomy. This suggests that a state's participation in global governance should be shaped by its relative power and its dual drives for survival and independence. In particular, neorealism implies that states should only be interested in participating in global governance when: 1) it is in their national interest to do so; 2) they have the capacity to do so without undermin-

TABLE 1. Participation in global governance 2007–11

Country	Canada	India	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China
Personnel contributions	2.00	2.38	2.88	3.63	4.50	5.63
PKO personnel contributions*	3	1.25	1.75	4.25	5.5	5.25
UN staff*	1	3.5	4	3	3.5	6
Financial contributions	2.17	3.27	3.64	3.47	3.83	5.06
Drugs and crime**	2	3.5	1.5	4	4.17	5.83
Global health**	2.32	3.6	5.85	3.02	2.9	4.67
Poverty and humanitarian relief**	1.29	3.68	4.35	4.60	3.17	4.33
Environmental protection**	2.09	2.75	4.75	4	2.59	5.17
Human rights**	2.08	3.33	2.5	3.17	4.75	5.17
Subscriptions**	2.67	2	4.25	1.75	5	4.75
Labour standards**	2.75	4	2.25	3.75	4.25	5.5
Ideational contributions	2.40	1.75	3.75	4.10	4.80	4.60
NGO meeting participation*	1.20	3.40	2.80	4.60	3.80	5.40
NGO meeting participation***	3.00	1.00	3.60	5.00	5.00	3.60
NGOs associated with ECOSOC and CONGO*	1.80	1.60	4.40	3.20	4.60	6.00
NGOs associated with ECOSOC and CONGO***	3.60	1.00	4.20	3.60	5.80	3.40
Overall contribution	2.19	2.46	3.42	3.73	4.38	5.09

Notes: * relative to population size; ** relative to GNI and GNI per capita; *** relative to GNI per capita

ing their security; and 3) they do not have the capacity to act autonomously to pursue their interests with regard to global governance.

This has implications for which states are more involved in global governance. A weak state may wish to participate but may lack the capabilities to do so. A strong state, particularly when it is a hegemon, may simply prefer to act unilaterally to set up and maintain an international order addressing global governance.¹⁶ Middle range powers, by their nature, are powerful enough to secure their survival and able to influence development elsewhere in the world. But they are not so powerful as to be able to shape the direction of critical developments on their own. Therefore they are more likely to be involved in cooperative efforts to address global governance issues.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the material capabilities of these middle range powers may cause variation in their participation. Stronger middle range powers are more likely to want to increase their autonomy in handling their international relations and depend less on cooperation to do so. Therefore, we can hypothesise that

H1: among middle range powers, the material power of a country has a negative impact on its participation in global governance. This is because the more powerful a country is, the more it believes it is able to solve certain international problems unilaterally or bilaterally. It is thus less inclined to seek multilateral solutions.

For the liberal theorists of international relations economic interdependence has a strong influence on state behaviour. Countries that are deeply entangled with others economically will be concerned about preserving a peaceful environment to ensure that their profitable economic exchanges can continue. In essence, war becomes more costly for interdependent states. They are thus motivated to seek peaceful solutions to international problems.¹⁸ Trade interdependence not only encourages states to cooperate peacefully with their trade partners, it may also encourage them to take on a role in global governance to help maintain the stability of the international order to ensure that they can continue to profit from international transactions. On these premises, one might hypothesise that

H2: the degree of a country's dependence on the global economy has a positive impact on its involvement in global governance. This is because the more a country depends on international trade and investment the more it is eager to find ways—often through multilateral cooperation—to address the pressing challenges in the world without serious disruption.

While neorealist and liberal theories both view the state as a unitary, materially oriented rational actor, critical theorists argue that the behaviour of a country is shaped by elite interest and mentality. Most middle range powers are in privileged positions in the existing international order, and have no interest in overthrowing the existing system. Instead, they are interested in preserving the system for the long run and are thus keen to improve the existing order, so that it can confront challenges without causing major conflicts and turmoil.¹⁹ This leads to our third hypothesis:

H3: the attitude of a country's leadership toward the existing international order affects its involvement in global governance. The more it identifies with the international order and aspires to improve its legitimacy and effectiveness,

the more likely it is that it will participate in institutions and initiatives seeking peaceful and gradual solutions to global problems.

For constructivist theorists the role of norms and socialisation is important in fostering cooperative behaviour.²⁰ Extrapolating from this perspective, we might infer that countries that share the prevailing international norms are more likely to take part in global governance. In particular, regulative norms (which limit states' actions) and prescriptive norms (which suggest appropriate behaviour for states) may encourage contribution to global governance and participation in the international order.²¹ The extent to which states have been socialised into prevailing norms about global governance is difficult to evaluate. Several theorists, however, have argued that international institutions often play a critical role in socialising their members into certain norms about proper behaviour.²² We use institutional membership as an indirect indicator of norm socialisation, and hypothesise that

H4: the length of a country's membership in major international organisations has a positive impact on its participation in global governance. The longer a country has been a member of the international community, the more it is likely to abide by the collective rules of the community and contribute to the community's collective effort to address the world's problems.

Post-internationalists believe that global governance is not only a matter for states but also for non-state actors. While neorealism and liberal theories focus on state actors, critical theory examines elites, and constructivism stresses norms and international institutions, post-internationalists emphasize non-state actors, arguing that, increasingly, world politics unfold without the direct involvement of states.²³ Previous work has indicated that the strength of civil society seems to be important in providing solutions to global problems. Indeed, our earlier empirical study of China's involvement in global governance suggests that a key weakness in its ability to contribute ideas and norms is the underdevelopment of civil society in that country.²⁴ On that basis, we hypothesise that

H5: the strength of a country's civil society has a positive impact on its participation in global governance. A society with lively civil organisations is likely to produce innovative ideas about governance, and is able to effectively participate in the non-state realm of global governance.

Here we attempt to test these different approaches and synthesise the insights of the most successful theories in order to explain why some middle range powers take a more active role in global governance than others. Rather than arguing that one theory is superior to the rest, we find support for hypotheses derived from neorealism, critical theory, constructivism and post-internationalism, and argue that each of these perspectives can offer some insight into middle range powers' participation in global governance. This allows for an eclectic explanation that does not fit neatly within a single theoretical paradigm.²⁵

Our preliminary test of these hypotheses is based on examining evidence from the six countries discussed in the previous section.

First, we examine the material power of these countries, measured by their GDP and their military spending. As Table 2 shows, in terms of size of the economy China and Japan rank high, while Russia, India and Canada rank low,

with Brazil in the middle. In terms of military spending China, Russia and Japan occupy the high end, while India, Brazil and Canada are at the low end.

Second, we examine the external economic dependence of each country. Table 3 displays the data for the six countries in the first decade of the 21st century. It is clear that Canada has the highest trade dependence, followed by China and Russia. India, Japan and Brazil have a relatively low level of trade dependence. It is important to note that Canada's trade dependence is primarily

TABLE 2. GDP and military power

	Canada	India	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China
Average 2007–11 GDP in current US\$ million	1 515 482	1 471 229	1 852 030	1 505 697	5 119 259	5 251 233
Average 2007–11 Military spending in US\$ million	22 227	41 926	30 679	58 099	54 110	110 279

Sources: GDP figures from World Bank, "GDP (current US\$)," 2007–2011, at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>, accessed 2013; military spending figures from SIPRI, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database," 2007–2011, at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database, accessed 2013.

with one country—the USA. If we take the USA away from the equation, Canada's dependence drops significantly. Without US trade, Canada's average trade as a percentage of GDP in 2000–2010 falls to 27.7 per cent, or ranked fourth among the six countries.

Third, we examine the attitudes of the countries toward the international system. We analysed the content of each government's speeches in the UN General Assembly over the past 11 years for information about their views both on the international order and on their role in it. Using a coding scheme and paragraph as our unit of analysis, we classified self-references as indicating a

TABLE 3. Trade dependence 2000–10

Trade (% of GDP)	Canada	India	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China
2007	68	44.9	25.2	51.7	33.6	68
2008	68.7	52.3	27.1	53.4	34.9	62.2
2009	59.2	45.6	22.3	48.6	25	49
2010	60.7	49.7	23.3	51.5	29.3	55
2011	64	54	25	53	31	59
Average	64.1	49.3	24.58	51.64	30.76	58.64

Sources: World Bank, *World Bank Database: Trade (% of GDP)*, at http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/editReport?REQUEST_SOURCE=search&CNO=2&country=&series=NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS&period=, accessed 2012.

participant's role or a bystander's role. Similarly we coded states' opinions on key global governance institutions like the UN, UN Security Council (UNSC), IMF and other critical elements of the international order, classifying them as reformist or not.²⁶ Our assumption is that countries that see themselves as part of these institutions and that aspire to improve these institutions are more likely to devote attention and resources to global governance. The findings are

summarised in Table 4. Each country is ranked based on the number of paragraphs in which it displayed a certain role or attitude. China, Japan and Russia all tend to conceive of themselves more in bystander roles than do Canada, India and Brazil. Similarly China, Japan and Russia mention reform of global governance institutions less frequently than Canada, India and Brazil.

Fourth, we examine the length of membership of each country in major international organisations. As Table 5 shows, Canada, India and Brazil have long been members of the most influential international organisations in the world. Japan's history in these organisations is somewhat shorter, and Russia's and China's tenure has been significantly shorter. If the length of a country's

TABLE 4. Attitude towards the international system

Role/attitude	Canada	India	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China
Bystander	4	5	6	3	2	1
Reformist	2	1	3	5	4	6

membership in these organisations can serve as a proxy of its socialisation in the cultures and values of these organisations and the international community they represent, Canada, India and Brazil should be more acculturated than Japan, and all four of these countries should be more so than Russia and China.

Fifth, we examine the strength of civil society in these six countries. While there is no consensus as to how best to measure the strength of civil society, we believe one way to do so is to examine the level of participation in various voluntary organisations in different countries. The World Values Survey asks respondents if they are members of various social groups, including religious, sports, arts/music/education groups, labour unions, political parties, environmen-

TABLE 5. Length of IO memberships

Institution	Canada	India	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China
UN	67	67	67	67	56	41
WTO	17	17	17	0	17	11
WHO	66	64	64	64	61	40
IMF	67	67	66	20	60	32
World Bank	67	67	66	20	60	32
Average	56.8	56.4	56	34.2	50.8	31.2

Sources: United Nations, *Member States of the United Nations*, at <http://www.un.org/en/members>, accessed 2012; 'Oct 1971: PRC becomes UN member', *ChinaDaily*, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-09/01/content_8643020.htm, accessed 2012; World Trade Organization, *Members and Observers*, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, accessed 2012; Mission of the PRC to the UN Office at Geneva and Other International Organisations in Switzerland, *China's Relationship with the World Health Organisation*, at <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgjbic/t85563.htm>, accessed 2012; JC Pevehouse, T Nordstrom & K Warnke, 'The COW-2 International Organisations Dataset Version 2.0', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 21, 2004, pp 101–119; IMF Fund, *List of Members*, at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm>, accessed 2012; H Jacobson & M Oksenberg, *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990, p 1; and World Bank, *Member Countries*, at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:22427666~menuPK:8336899~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html>, accessed 2012.

tal groups, professional organisations, and other groups. Table 6 presents the data for the 2005–08 period.²⁷ This survey was conducted by a group of social scientists under the non-profit World Values Survey Association and is designed to track sociocultural and political change. The organisation interviews a representative sample of each country of interest using a standardised questionnaire in order to assess the prevailing beliefs and values in the society. Our data are taken from the ‘fifth wave’ of the survey, which was conducted between 2005 and 2008 and included 77 000 respondents from 97 countries.

As can be seen in Table 6, active participation in civic organisations is highest in India, followed by Brazil and Canada. Japan falls significantly behind these countries in this regard, but is well ahead of China and Russia. If we take into consideration inactive memberships, the overall participation level is highest in India, followed by Canada and Brazil. Japan, China and Russia are far behind, showing roughly the same level of participation.

In Table 7 we summarise our findings thus far. We group the six countries into two categories—the ‘good citizens’ of Canada, India and Brazil and the ‘free-riders’ of Russia, Japan and China. Most of the independent variables fall into places consistent with our hypotheses, but some do not (see entries in bold type). We discuss the findings in turn.

With regard to H1—that the material power of a country, measured by the size of its economy and its military spending, has a negative impact on its participation in global governance, our findings are largely consistent with the hypothesis. The only exception is the relative economic position of Russia and Brazil. Brazil’s GDP is larger than Russia’s, but it has been more actively involved in global governance than Russia. But the gap between the expected and actual placement of the two countries is minor.

With regard to H2—that trade dependence has a positive impact on a country’s involvement in global governance, our findings do not provide support for this hypothesis. Apart from India and Japan, all the countries are in the wrong place, so to speak. On this basis we are highly sceptical about the argument that greater economic interdependence leads to more contribution to global governance. We can think of two reasons why this is the case. First, this hypothesis is derived from the more general finding that interdependence discourages conflict and encourages cooperation. But cooperation can take many forms and does not necessarily involve playing a prominent role in global governance. The other hypotheses are more directly relevant to countries’ participation in global governance. Second, interdependence may not be accurately captured by trade dependence data alone.²⁸ It is possible that a focus on capital interdependence, the convergence of factor prices or other elements of interdependence might be more closely linked to participation in global governance.

With regard to H3—that a country’s identity with the international order and its concern with its improvement encourage participation in global governance, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis. Compared with Russia, Japan and China, Brazil, India and Canada see themselves less as bystanders *vis-à-vis* the global governance system. They also express more interest in reforming the international institutions. As expected, they are more active in participating in global governance.

TABLE 6. Participation in civic organisations 2005–08

Civil society	Canada	India	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China
Religious organisation						
Not a member	49.50%	31.80%	24.20%	88.80%	87.90%	90%
Inactive member	22.60%	46.30%	25.30%	8.60%	7.60%	7.30%
Active member	27.90%	21.90%	50.50%	2.60%	4.40%	2.50%
Sports/recreation						
Not a member	56.70%	35.60%	80.50%	87.10%	72.70%	83.30%
Inactive member	14.20%	48.50%	6.60%	7%	9%	10.50%
Active member	29.10%	15.90%	12.90%	5.90%	18.30%	6.20%
Arts, music, educational group						
Not a member	64.20%	36.30%	85.70%	90%	84.40%	85.80%
Inactive member	12.60%	50.40%	4.30%	5.90%	5.60%	8.40%
Active member	23.20%	13.30%	10%	4.20%	10%	5.80%
Labour union						
Not a member	73.90%	36.90%	80.90%	82.90%	90%	87.20%
Inactive member	12.50%	47.30%	10.30%	13.80%	7.50%	8%
Active member	13.60%	15.70%	8.90%	3.40%	2.50%	4.50%
Environmental organisation						
Not a member	83.50%	40.50%	92.80%	95.40%	95.30%	89.80%
Inactive member	9.90%	48.90%	3.50%	4.20%	2.30%	5.80%
Active member	6.60%	10.50%	3.60%	0.40%	2.40%	4.40%
Professional organisation						
Not a member	71.20%	40.20%	85.70%	92.70%	86.20%	93.20%
Inactive member	10.10%	47.30%	5.50%	5.70%	8.30%	5.00%
Active member	18.70%	12.40%	8.80%	1.60%	5.40%	1.80%
Any other organisation						
Not a member	88.30%	60.00%	0%	100.00%	82.90%	98.40%
Inactive member	6.90%	32.80%	25.30%	0.00%	6%	1.30%
Active member	4.80%	7.20%	74.70%	0.00%	11.00%	0.30%
Averages						
Non-member	69.61%	40.19%	64.26%	90.99%	85.63%	89.71%
Inactive member of a group	12.69%	45.93%	11.54%	6.46%	6.61%	6.66%
Active member of a group	17.70%	13.84%	24.20%	2.59%	7.71%	3.64%

Sources: *World Values Survey 2005–2008*, at <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAanalyze.jsp?Idioma=I>, accessed 2012.

With regard to H4—that membership in major international organisations has a positive effect on a country's involvement in global governance, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis. The ranking of this independent variable fully corresponds with the ranking of the dependent variable.

With regard to H5—that the strength of civil society has a positive impact on a country's involvement in global governance, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis. All the countries fall into the expected categories.

TABLE 7. Summary

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Contribution	Canada	India	Brazil	Russia	Japan	China
Economy	China	Japan	Brazil	Russia	India	Canada
Military	Canada	Brazil	India	Japan	Russia	China
Trade/gdp	China	Russia	India	Canada*	Japan	<i>Brazil</i>
Identity	Brazil	India	Canada	Russia	Japan	China
Reform	India	Canada	Brazil	Japan	Russia	China
Civil soc	India	Brazil	Canada	Japan	China	Russia

Note: *Canada's figure does not include trade with the USA.

To summarise, middle range powers vary from each other in their involvement in global governance. Drawing theoretical insights from neorealism, critical theory, liberalism, constructivism, and post-internationalism, we have proposed several hypotheses as to what might explain the variation. Our comparison of six countries with various economic and political backgrounds has yielded findings that are consistent with most of our hypotheses. The main exception is the economic interdependence hypothesis derived from the liberal perspective. Further research is required to explore why this is the case and whether the hypotheses need to be revised or further specified.

Conclusion

As the world moves toward a post-*Pax Americana* era, global governance increasingly depends on multilateral cooperation among states and non-state actors. Middle range countries have an important role to play in the management of worldwide problems. The current literature lacks systematic comparisons and explanations of the variation among middle range powers in terms of their contribution to global governance. In this article we have taken a preliminary step towards filling this gap in our knowledge.

We hope that the framework we have developed here can help improve the study of global governance. For instance, as a region on the rise, Asia is attracting a great deal of attention in the world. Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen, asked if Asia has been doing enough in managing global challenges.²⁹ Amitav Acharya argues that it is not doing enough, attributing the weak Asian contribution to global governance to the nationalist outlook of the major powers in the region and to the lack of regional cohesion.³⁰ While the general gist of the argument is quite plausible, we believe our framework could strengthen analyses of this kind in two ways.

First, systematic comparative data can provide a more convincing picture of whether Asia has been 'under-performing' in global governance. Such data may present findings that are quite different from the general impression. For instance, many believe that India has been lagging behind in participating in global governance. Some even argue that India 'gives global governance the biggest headache'.³¹ But our comparative study in this article suggests other-

wise. How well or poorly India or Asia has contributed to global governance is an empirical question that requires more systematic comparisons.

Second, our framework can build bridges between case studies and theories. Acharya's analysis of Asia's role in global governance is based on the history and national ideology of the major powers in Asia as well as details of the regional dynamics. Using our framework, one can connect these observations with more generalisable propositions, such as the relationship between national role conception and foreign policy behaviour, and the relationship between economic competitiveness in a region and its weight in global governance. Such connections have the potential to enrich theories of international relations and global governance.

Notes

- 1 W Wohlforth, 'The stability of a unipolar world', *International Security*, 24(1), 1999, pp 5–41.
- 2 C Brown, 'Do great powers have great responsibilities? Great powers and moral agency', *Global Society*, 18(1), 2004, pp 5–19.
- 3 C Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1984.
- 4 R Cox, 'Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order', *International Journal*, 44, 1988, pp 823–862; and A Cooper, R Higgot & K Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993.
- 5 K Waltz, 'Structural realism after the Cold War', *International Security*, 25(1), 2000, pp 5–41; and J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, 2001.
- 6 R Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- 7 J Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990; and H Hobbs, 'Beyond Postinternationalism', in Hobbs (ed), *Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-first Century?*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002.
- 8 H Wang & E French, 'China's participation in global governance from a comparative perspective', *Asia Policy*, 15, 2013, pp 89–114.
- 9 Staff figures are taken from United Nations, 'Gender Distribution of All Staff (P1 to USG and GS) by Nationality and Level at Headquarters, Other Established Offices and Project Posts, with Appointment of One Year or More, as at 31 December 2009', 2010, at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/Nationalities2010/ITCLO1.pdf>, accessed 2013; and 'Gender Distribution of Staff by Nationality at the P-1 to UG Levels of the United Nations Systems, on contracts of one year or more at all locations, as at 31 December 2011', United Nations, Office of the Secretary-General, at <http://www.unwomen.org/publications/improvement-of-the-status-of-women-in-the-united-nations-system-report-of-the-secretary-general-2012/>, accessed 2013.
- 10 Manpower figures are taken from UN, 'Peacekeeping Statistics: Troop and Police Contributors', 2007–11 at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>, accessed 2013.
- 11 Funds include contributions to the UN International Drug Control Programme (2007–08), UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund (2007–08), Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (2001–12), World Health Organisation (2008–10), UN Population Fund (2007–09), UNDP multi-donor trust funds and joint programmes (2007–11), UN World Food Programme (2008–11), UN Environment Programme (2009–11), UN Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund (2007) UN Refugee Agency Contributions (2009), International Committee of the Red Cross (2009–11), UNICEF participation (2009–11), International Fund for Agricultural Development (2011), UN Development Fund for Women (2009), UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2009–11), and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2006–10).
- 12 Integrated Civil Society Organisations (ICSO) System Database (NGO Branch of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs), at <http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do>, accessed 2012. We used this database to determine the number of NGOs headquartered in each state with General, Special, and Roster consultative status with ECOSOC, as well as NGOs with Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) accreditation. We also used the Conference on NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the UN (CONGO), 'Membership List', 2007, at http://www.ngocongo.org/congo/files/congo_membership_directory_2007.pdf, accessed 2012. NGOs can apply to receive consultative status with ECOSOC if they are involved in some or all the issues handled by it, meet certain standards, and are approved by the Committee of NGOs and ECO-

SOC itself. ECOSOC facilitates the participation of these NGOs in UN conferences, provides resources to enable them to better fulfil their objectives, and collects quadrennial reports on these NGOs' activities. CONGO is another forum for NGO participation in the UN. It is composed primarily of NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status and encourages the discussion of substantive issues related to global governance in various NGO committees. Tallying up the number of NGOs from each state involved in these various forums provides a general picture of the extent of each state's ideational commitment to global governance via civil society.

- 13 ICSO SystemDatabase. We examined the number of NGOs (both with and without ECOSOC consultative status) involved in each meeting of the following commissions and forums between 2007 and 2011: the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Commission for Social Development, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the UN Forum on Forests. We then averaged the number of NGOs from each state involved in each meeting for each issue area (sustainable development, social development, advancement of women and forest preservation). These data (as well as the data on ECOSOC and CONGO membership) were assessed relative to state population size and GNI per capita. These factors are controlled for because countries with larger populations are likely to have more NGOs, while countries that are more prosperous are likely to have more capable and active NGOs.
- 14 The division of the six countries into two groups is largely heuristic. The scores for each country represent its ranking in this group of countries. The distance between each country's score does not measure the actual gap between its actual contributions to global governance.
- 15 K Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.
- 16 R Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- 17 E Jordaan, 'The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers', *Politikon*, 30(1), 2003, pp 165–181.
- 18 I Kant, 'Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch', in HS Reiss (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp 93–130; and J Nye & R Keohane, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977.
- 19 R Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- 20 M Finnemore, 'Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism', *International Organization*, 50(2), 1996, pp 325–347; and A Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- 21 The different types of norms (regulative, constitutive and prescriptive) are discussed in M Finnemore & L Sikkink, 'International norm dynamics and political change', *International Organization*, 52(1), 1998, pp 887–917.
- 22 See, for example, R Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (4), 1988, pp 379–396.; and Johnston, *Social States*.
- 23 Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*.
- 24 Wang & French, 'China's participation in global governance from a comparative perspective'.
- 25 See R Sil & P Katzenstein, 'Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics', *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(2), 2010, pp 411–431. Sil and Katzenstein have advocated 'analytic eclecticism' in social science, which focuses on pragmatic and eclectic answers to key policy-relevant problems, rather than on inter-paradigmatic divisions.
- 26 Statements indicative of a bystander role included speakers asserting that their country needed to prioritise internal development before assisting with global governance, arguing that their country's internal development constituted its primary contribution to global governance, referring to their country's policy as independent or autonomous, emphasising sovereignty in opposition to global governance efforts or initiatives, welcoming a development that their country was uninvolved in, expressing hope that countries would make progress on a global governance issue while not providing assistance or getting involved, or expressing current or past hesitancy to take on a major role in global or regional governance. Statements indicative of a reformist attitude involved the speaker advocating reform or substantial change, reorganisation or improvement of a global governance institution, including the UN, UNSC, G8, G20, WTO, IMF, World Bank, ILO, UNESCO, NPT, UNFCCC, Millennium Summit, and similar conferences, institutions, regimes, or organisations.
- 27 We have not included data on participation in political parties because in some authoritarian countries, including China, the ruling political party is the state rather than a civic organisation.
- 28 R Rosencrance, A Alexandroff, W Koehler, J Kroll, S Laquer & J Stocker, 'Whither interdependence', *International Organization*, 31(3), 1977, pp 425–471.
- 29 Sen, cited in A Acharya, 'Can Asia lead? Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty-first century', *International Affairs*, 87(4), 2011, pp 851–869.
- 30 Acharya, 'Can Asia lead?'
- 31 B Crosette, 'The elephant in the room: the biggest pain in Asia today isn't the country you'd think', *Foreign Policy*, January–February 2010.

Notes on Contributors

Hongying Wang is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, Canada. Her research focuses on global governance, Chinese politics, political economy, and foreign policy. She is the author of *Weak State, Strong Networks: The Institutional Dynamics of Foreign Direct Investment in China* (Oxford University Press). Her articles have appeared in journals such as *Global Governance*, *International Studies Review*, *Review of International Political Economy*, *Asian Survey*, *The China Quarterly*, *The Journal of Asian Business* and *The Journal of Contemporary China*. Professor Wang holds a BA from Peking University and a Ph. D. from Princeton University.

Erik French is a PhD candidate in political science at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. His research interests include security studies, deterrence theory and crisis bargaining, civil-military relations, and foreign policy decision-making. In particular, he is interested in US-China relations and East Asian politics and international relations.