

REVIEW ARTICLE (Submitted to Politeia, April 2004)

The State of the Post-apartheid State: the poverty of critique on the South African left

Michael Neocosmos, Department of Sociology, University of Pretoria¹

***State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*, edited by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003.**

It is therefore the men of learning that make history, the men who know how to purloin God's [read the state's - MN] secret thoughts. The common people have only to apply their revelations. [Karl Marx, Letter to P.V. Annenkov, Dec 28, 1846]

This book sees itself as the first in a series of volumes which is explicitly designed to recover the critical edge of the South African Review Series which was published in the 1980s as a collection of semi-journalistic, semi-academic essays on political processes and trends in the country during the anti-apartheid struggle. The first volume was published in 1983 and the last in 1994; it thus covered exactly a decade, the decade of the mass popular upsurge against the apartheid state. The pieces in the series were overwhelmingly of left persuasion and overwhelmingly written by White academics². Despite the differences between the theoretical orientations of the chapters, the series was able to sustain a critical perspective of the apartheid state over the whole length of the publication period, apart that is from the celebratory last volume (number seven called "the small miracle") which was totally bereft of critical analysis. The quality of the pieces was often variable, but in the euphoria of the times and the excitement of the struggle, not everyone noticed the relative absence of theory. The main debates, workerism-populism, transformation-liberation, civil society, RDP and so on did not take place within the series but were published elsewhere. The first issue and the last two (6 & 7) evidently concentrated on state institutions, policies, legislation and sectors, the second on the initial popular stirrings against the state, the volumes in between (3, 4 & 5) could not help but give more emphasis to issues raised by the mass popular movement, while number 6 provided some kind of transitional perspective between the decline of the popular struggle and elite-pacting. The series was thus not without its problems. Thus, it could have reasonably been expected that one of the first chapters of the current volume would have provided a review of the Review so to speak. In the absence of a critical review of the past, it is arguably difficult if not impossible to expect anyone to move to a critical understanding of the present, especially if the idea is to open up possibilities for a better future. This however has not happened, and I will suggest here that the consequences of this absence have been overwhelmingly negative for the development of a critical thinking on the Left in this country.

Unfortunately, there has been far too much celebration over the past ten years in South Africa and not enough critical analysis. There have been a number of reasons for this, but one crucial one is arguably the absence of critical theory within the writings of the intelligentsia in the country. The development and use of a critical theoretical perspective is of central importance to identifying and analysing trends, especially if one is concerned to go beyond simple journalistic exercises, and it certainly does not imply lack of accessibility. This lacuna was already apparent in the original Review, but was not seen as such a major issue at the time, given much more pressing concerns among activists. Today, this excuse is no longer tenable. The state and its agents of course would not agree, as after all, this is not the time for theorising but for devising policy for "delivery" to the "previously disadvantaged majority". But then if one listens to the state (whatever its colour) it is never the time for critical thinking, as the latter, if it is any good, always challenges its power. Thus the 'exigencies' of 'activism' and 'governance' can both militate against critical thought. However, intellectuals should know better, they should know that the demands of politicians and bureaucrats (many of them ex-thinkers and ex-activists themselves) can mean the death of intellectual creativity, simply because their managerial concerns to "get things done" cannot easily accept to be "confused by critical thought" as "things would never get done". The editors of the present book seem to have some understanding of this issue, as they note that the intention of the new series is to be "politically

¹ I would like to sincerely thank Lourens Pretorius for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft. Of course I am solely responsible for all errors and indiscretions.

² Although the issue whether it can be seen as expressing the views of the "White Left", a political not a racial category, cannot be established here.

progressive in tone, attempting to judge the condition of South Africa by what is desirable rather than simply by how much it has moved beyond the undesirable" (p.2)³.

This review examines the extent to which this volume has been able to live up to these laudable ideals and in particular, the extent to which it has provided a critical analysis and evaluation of state power in the post-apartheid period as it is, after all, the state which is overwhelmingly responsible for the state of the nation very much as its predecessor was⁴. In order to do this successfully, it seems crucial to write from a political perspective which is not only critical, but which is able to look beyond the "common-sense" assumptions of a discursive consensus which all states build more or less consciously as part of their attempts at securing hegemony. Any critical analysis worth its salt has to attempt to situate itself both within and outside this state hegemonic consensual arena: 'within' in order to be understood, and 'outside' in order to be able to point to a different possible emancipatory future. It also has to move beyond ideas of the past if these have objectively lost their emancipatory potential, and if the intention is to contribute to the making of a society "founded on justice so that the whole of society is transformed in ways that benefit its entire citizenry" (p.5). I will argue here that unfortunately, with a few exceptions, this book is unable to reach beyond the theoretical platitudes of state hegemonic discourse and as a result fails to open new intellectual vistas and exciting possibilities for thinking about the country and its potentially democratic future. It therefore is not in a position to rekindle the much needed debate on the political left in the country.

The most important and intellectually rigorous chapters are the two pieces on unemployment by Natrass and Altman, and the critical article by Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu on South African business on the African continent. Another useful piece but which is unfortunately too carefully measured in its criticisms of the post-apartheid government is the chapter on the TRC by Fullard and Rousseau. All the others to various extents remain at the level of description and are frankly disappointing, providing little in terms of new intellectual or critical insight. Insofar as an analysis is attempted, this operates from within the 'common sense' notions of a state-induced and state-dominated consensus. It should be noted incidentally, that the overwhelming majority of the chapters are directly concerned with various aspects of state institutions and policy and largely eschew analyses of political economy or society. The editors themselves recognise this as a lacuna (p.6).

More important however is the theoretical and political orientation of the discourse governing the book, which provides little in terms of a contribution to critical thinking beyond the post-apartheid state consensus. I will attempt to establish this, not so much by reviewing each chapter consecutively, but by discussing four central interconnected themes, addressed to various extents by several authors, and by critically examining the manner in which these themes are treated. These themes seem to me to be glaring in their importance for an understanding of politics and society in South Africa today, although they are clearly not exhaustive. They include: the changing character of the state, the relationship between state and society, popular empowerment versus popular passivity (or civil society and democracy), and the continued relevance of political economy. Each of these four themes will be commented on in turn.

1. The Changing Character of the South African State

In this section issues regarding the development of the post-apartheid state and continuities/discontinuities with the past are to be addressed. These issues are central simply because they enable a posing of questions regarding the character of democracy in the country.

³One could have also noted the extent to which, after ten years, the country has moved towards the ideals espoused by the ANC itself in its various programmatic statements such as in the Freedom Charter if not the radical statements of the Morogoro Conference of 1969. While the ANC never adhered to a socialist programme it didn't adhere to a neo-liberal one either. In fact it did have a vision - however vague - of the emancipation of the people of the country and of the continent which was **not** (neo-) liberal in content.

⁴The state of course has its own view of how society is to be transformed and it does so bureaucratically and managerially (both in South Africa and elsewhere). In addition, in this country the state has its own ideas as to what Social Science should look like; in particular it seems (according to a recent NRF document) that this should be one in which "usefulness" and "relevance" as well as "marketability" are placed high on the agenda. Usefulness of course means useful to a state and market agenda as the "trickle down" ideology of global liberalism is said to have no viable alternative.

Unfortunately however, these are only broached tangentially in the book under review because of the general absence of critical political theory to frame the discussion.

In his opening chapter, Maré begins his account of the post-apartheid state with an account of the theories and debates of the 1980s on the South African state founded on race and class, but he restricts himself to a simple description of these perspectives and debates the importance of which has now diminished he suggests, *inter alia* because they are out of favour by the ruling party. He seems encouraged by the fact they “are slowly coming to the fore once again”(p29) but bemoans the lack of consensus in the relative weight which had been attributed to these two factors of race and class in explaining the state. He asserts that if the “dominant perception” in the anti-apartheid struggle stressed the predominance of racial oppression over class exploitation (which it did), then this would “enable a new aspirant and racialised bourgeoisie to emerge as the prime beneficiaries (sic) of new state policy”(p.33). Presumably this is meant to suggest that had the class nature of the state been stressed instead, then the outcome of the formation of a Black bourgeoisie could have been avoided under some form of ‘socialism’.

This kind of statement simply replicates the flaws of the analyses of the state which were popular in the 1980s and reverts us back to a crude ‘classist’ (or what in the 1980s was referred to as ‘workerist’) position. It glows in its ignorance of political processes in particular. Are we seriously meant to believe that a state committed to a ‘socialist road’ in South Africa would have avoided the formation of an accumulating elite, or that a state under the leadership of Chris Hani, Blade Nzimande or Neville Alexander not to mention Harry Gwala would have been any less of a ‘bourgeois state’? We would need to be most naive to believe such a thing especially as the history of liberation in Africa and the World is replete with such instances of so-called ‘socialist’ states not least in Zimbabwe. Maré unfortunately only outlines the arguments of the political economy of the 1970s and 1980s and fails to analyse these critically, merely reverting to a dogmatic ‘I told you so, class was ignored in favour of race’. There is no attempt to think critically about these debates which because of their reductionist assumptions failed, for example, to distinguish between different forms of nationalism or Marxism (eg popular-democratic vs elitist-authoritarian)⁵. Although political economy is of crucial importance in helping us understand the characteristics of the mode of production, it is less than helpful in explaining the mode of rule and especially modes of politics.

Throughout, his account rarely ventures beyond the descriptive when it talks about the post-apartheid period, while the theoretically inventive (through its practice) popular social movement of the 1980s which attempted to develop a conception of genuinely popular democracy is quite simply ignored. The nationalism (or race) (bad) versus socialism (or class) (good) of the “workerism” of the 1980s is simply re-iterated, while taking at face value the liberal belief that the post-apartheid state reflects “the victory of the majority for inclusion in democratic practices” (p38). One wonders which democratic state practices Maré is referring to. Those which make it impossible for pensioners in Soweto to get past the corrupt officials and the *tsotsis* to access their pensions? Those of the bureaucrats at Home Affairs who extort money from vulnerable foreigners or fail to provide permanent residence to doctors simply because they happen to be from Africa? Those of the bureaucrats who award tenders to their relatives, or those of the state officials who outsource manual work to private contractors in order to casualise labour?

On top of all this it seems to be suggested that these practices were already democratic under apartheid and it was just a matter of “including” the majority into what was already a democracy for Whites. But perhaps the author does not really mean practices at all, but rather electoral procedures, so that democracy is reduced to such procedures. How else is such a notion of “inclusion into democratic practices” to be understood? The result of this reasoning is that the break with apartheid is seen as complete at the level of politics (as the electoral procedures are now all inclusive), and only at the level of the economy is there continuity “as the state continues to ensure the relations of private property” (p 39) and to fulfill related state functions. One is simply staggered by the absence of an understanding of state authoritarian-bureaucratic practices (inherited from an oppressive apartheid state structure) and how these today continue to be directed against the weak and marginalised as indeed they were before (only that now the weakest are slightly different sectors of the population). This includes the total lack of an awareness of the continuation of forms of rule inspired by ‘Indirect

⁵ I have discussed these at length elsewhere, see Neocosmos (1999)

Rule' in rural areas as Mamdani has argued at length (Mamdani, 1996). A conception which reduces an analysis of the state to its fulfilling functions for capital (which it does indeed do), makes it unable to ask questions regarding the different ways in which the state secures its rule over the population, with the result that all forms of politics are seen as basically the same and fundamentally derivative of economic forces/interests. The corollary is that "democracy" cannot be critically analysed and seems ultimately to be reduced to electoralism and the existence of universal suffrage. The absence of theory leads to the poverty of analysis.

As has been argued elsewhere by Neville Alexander, many of the authors of this book seem to visualise South Africa as having now become a "normal" or "ordinary" bourgeois-democratic state like any other (Alexander, 2002). One is indeed balled over by the audacity of the analysis; presumably, continuity with apartheid is assured by the discovery of the fact that the economy is still ruled by capitalist production relations. The failure of thinking is here just amazing, as anyone who has the slightest knowledge of the literature on Africa (not to mention of what used to be called the "Third World") would be aware that it is at the level of politics and not solely at that of the economy that structural continuity with colonial and authoritarian modes of rule is clearly the most salient. Further, they would also know from this now extensive literature, that this continuity is to be found at the level of bureaucratic practices, the absence of independent voice by the organised people and the continuity in institutions of power (the 'traditional' authoritarian chieftaincy, xenophobic conceptions of the nation, authoritarian bureaucracies, top down notions of delivery, a culture of political impunity, etc etc) all of which contribute to the false conception that "politics is the state and the state is politics" (Wamba-dia-Wamba: 1994: 250). None of these are absent from South Africa and it seems not be thought sufficiently important to ask the extent to which the South African state differs from this more general state of affairs on the continent. Presumably it could be surmised, this is because South Africa is said to constitute some kind of exceptional case in Africa, being an industrialised economy. Economism is singularly unhelpful in attempting to understand politics in its complex specificity.

In actual fact, it could indeed be argued that the dominance of the crude discursive opposition between nationalism/capitalism and socialism dominant in the 1970s and 1980s actually contributed to the failure of a more radical transformation in the 1990s favoured by Maré and others, precisely because it failed to address and analyse the character of the *politics* at play at the time and reduced politics to the state and to 'capturing' state power. After all, there is little difference between national capitalism and socialism if they are both oppressive of the working people and the poor as has regularly been the case in practice (or is this statement contentious?). It is the failure to address different forms of politics and particularly different forms of democracy which is the main deficiency in Maré's argument and indeed in the political economic arguments of the 1970s and 1980s which he marshals in favour of his approach.

The social movement of the 1980s which precisely put a critique of such conceptions (however partially) on the agenda in its notion of 'people's power', is quite simply ignored by Maré as I have already noted. Rather we are given formulations such as "unless the capitalist route was to be abandoned in the short or medium term, the post-apartheid state was required to liberalise the boundaries of capitalist control and ownership by de-racialising it" (p.44). So presumably the new (vanguard?) state is expected to be in a position to decide which route is to be taken, to "socialism" or to "capitalism", the consequences for the people are something else, and one can only hope that they would ultimately be informed of the state's decision.

To argue in this way is quite simply empty and dangerous rhetoric. Empty because the reality of **actually existing socialism**, and not the romantic utopian conception denoting the end of history and struggle (was already in the 1980s and) is no longer on the agenda in World history; rather other alternatives to capitalism have to be thought and developed from concrete popular-democratic practices. Moreover, it is important to ask in any case how it is possible to mobilise people around a demand for a system which combined state-authoritarianism with the administration of scarcity, not only in 'backward' agrarian economies but in apparently industrialised ones such as the then DDR and Tchechoslovakia. It is dangerous because, in the absence of a detailed specification of popular-democratic modes of politics, the imposition of a 'socialist road' from above can only lead to more authoritarianism and even more entrenched statist conceptions than already exist. There is therefore nothing whatsoever which can be appealing to the working people about an abstract vision of South

Africa as Africa's "first industrialised socialist economy" (p49)⁶. Without an accompanying conception of democratic politics, such a notion is indeed to be relegated to the dustbin of history, and of course, any assessment of popular democracy, especially that concretely practised in parts of the country in the 1980s, is as already noted, absent from Maré's account. Economic reductionism of this kind is simply intellectually perished and totally unhelpful. Additionally, it should be clear that such economic reductionism and political statism are intimate bedfellows, for in the absence of popular control through democracy, who else but the state and its bureaucracies staffed by ex-intellectuals is to lead us to the promised land?

Maré, because of the politically and intellectually sterile opposition between nationalism and socialism which he espouses, remains by default within the confines of the state liberal discourse which unavoidably comes along with a whole number of undemocratic conceptions including 'service delivery' from above, liberal democracy as the generic form of democracy, and state politics reduced to (private sector) managerialism. Politics is then unwittingly reduced to these forms as if there were no alternative ways of engaging in political activity. Profoundly political issues such as the specific manner in which a national consensus has been achieved since 1994, the authoritarian character of state nationalism, the democratic character of popular nationalism as a possible alternative, the outsourcing of state functions to NGOs, the dis-empowering of popular organisations and the recourse to authoritarian methods of 'governance' and so on and so forth, are quite simply overlooked in his account of the post-apartheid state. The only sensible observations are predictably those relating to economic class issues, although the redressing of inequality is simply thought of in terms of state delivery (in typical liberal fashion), not in terms of popular democracy (p. 43). We are left with little in terms of a way forward either in terms of understanding or in terms of political alternatives, only with a hankering for perished 'classist' conceptions. With left analyses such as these, the new ruling class has very little to be concerned about.

Maré's chapter sets the tone for the whole volume and a similar perspective is to be found in the second chapter by Southall, although here there is even less evidence of theory. Democracy is here even more markedly conflated with its liberal version and counterposed to nationalism and the "political habits of exile" (p59), while the whole discussion of politics takes place at the level of the state. Why should the "political habits of exile" be any more or less authoritarian than the liberal democracy dominant today? Does the mere existence of an opposition party guarantee the absence of authoritarianism in a so-called dominant-party system? Or is it nationalism which is said to be authoritarian? Maybe there is some truth in this but as it stands this remark is simply too glib and eschews analysis⁷.

Southall's argument follows and accepts Jeremy Cronin's view that there is indeed a site of struggle within the ANC between a right wing - currently in power - and a left wing closely associated with COSATU and the SACP (couldn't this have also been the case in exile?) so that the organisation must not be understood as moving unambiguously to the right as it seems to be doing (p75). But what are the views of this left within the ANC that is contesting the terrain of politics from the dominance of neo-liberalism? What alternative positions is this struggle between? Is it a struggle where greater democracy or more popularly-rooted forms of democracy are at issue so that the people can resist the creeping state authoritarianism (which Southall rightly recognises) and so that they have a greater say in their day to day lives as they explicitly fought for in the 1980s? Southall

⁶ It should be noted that with the exception of Stalin himself, all the main theorists of Marxism saw socialism as a transitional social formation and not as an end to be achieved, let alone consolidated. This understanding has been simply absent from South African Marxist discourse which has, on this point, followed Stalinist orthodoxy, and has been overwhelmingly millenarian in its futurology. The intimate connections between authoritarianism and state enforced utopianism are all too obvious to be repeated here.

⁷ The seemingly regular dismissal of nationalism as necessarily authoritarian by many White intellectuals in South Africa has patronising consequences, for if nationalism is intrinsically authoritarian, what does this tell us about all the sacrifices made for national liberation? Were these simply in vain, undertaken by simple-minded idiots who believed in the perished idea of national freedom? The dismissal of nationalism by South African White left intellectuals is arguably the root cause of their marginalisation from politics in the country. I have argued elsewhere that the foundation of a popular-democratic alternative on the African continent (including in South Africa) can only be built on the basis of popular form of nationalism as an alternative to both state nationalism and neo-liberalism. See Neocosmos (1994).

does not tell us, but the alternative proposed by COSATU (and to a lesser extent the SACP) seems to be at best Keynesian in its conception and undoubtedly statist in its orientation. At this stage very few openings to popular politics or alternative forms of democracy seem to exist. To repeat then: to what extent is the 'left alternative' a popular-democratic one capable of providing a challenge to currently hegemonic politically sterile statist liberalism? If this looks doubtful then in what ways can the ANC be steered on a progressive course? Has the left not given up on an attempt to think critically about an emancipatory future as the liberation struggle had attempted to do? Isn't the idea therefore to think a principled emancipatory alternative (which would place social justice at the core of its programme) to the right-wing nationalism of the current ANC leadership in order to attempt to move beyond the state-focussed politics of liberal democracy? On these issues the author remains silent.

On the question of the context of public debate, rather than dismissing the notion of the National Democratic Revolution as Southall does, it is arguable that this idea was, pace both Southall and his account of Slovo (p75), a useful name insofar as it made it possible to *debate* the specific form democracy should take. Thus the prevalence of this name was a victory for the working-people and not a defeat. But if democracy is simply equated with its narrow, elitist (and regularly frankly authoritarian) version of liberal-democracy and taken as already given, as Southall and most of the authors of this book in fact do, then a political debate regarding the character of democracy is simply foreclosed. In addition, there seems to be little political difference between such left critics, and those within the ANC who argue that political emancipation has been achieved as a result of the acquiring of universal suffrage, and what remains is only a matter of 'consolidating' the already achieved in the face of a few recalcitrant racist die-hards. State personnel and left critics seem to have all happily agreed with the liberal consensus. In the meantime the level of poverty is estimated at anything between 42 and 48 percent (just under half!!!) of the population, the fact that this may be the effect of the absence of popular democracy *inter alia* is not addressed; as is apparently evident to all, democracy is already here, so that the eradication of poverty becomes not a popular political issue but simply a matter of applying the "correct" public policy. The fact that poverty may have actually increased during the post-apartheid period, partly as a result of state policy itself, seems unfortunately too thorny an issue to debate for most authors of this volume⁸.

2. The Relationship between State and Society

Central to the transition from apartheid and to the development of a hegemonic liberal understanding of democracy and rights were a number of important moments among which the Truth and Reconciliation Commission held a central place. In general the TRC has been celebrated as successful throughout the country, but the chapter by Fullard and Rousseau provides a less than sanguine review of a process which was not only a manner of "dealing with the legacies of authoritarianism" (p 79, what does "dealing" actually mean?) but also fundamentally one of providing the basis for the construction of a new democratic state (Wilson, 2001). The latter of course would be a function of the former, as a total and frank acknowledgment of state wrongs would provide the conditions for the construction of a new state which would consciously be able to transform the fundamentally authoritarian features of its predecessor (rather than simply grafting multi-partyism onto authoritarian state structures as has in fact been done⁹) and in the process, undermine a culture of impunity *inter alia*. This has been one of the most important areas of continuity between colonial and post-colonial states in Africa, and the TRC was in a unique position to undermine the authoritarian practices of the past. Fullard and Rousseau clearly show that the TRC process failed to transform the "habits" (ie. state practices) of the past, by simply relating the contempt with which power treated the powerless during the process itself (an evident continuity from the past if there ever was one).

⁸ Perhaps the disagreement between David McDonald from Queens University, Canada and the HSRC regarding numbers affected by cut offs had a role to play here but if it did, this disagreement should have been discussed openly and analysed in this volume. Researchers cannot be taken seriously if they prefer to brush such issues under the carpet for fear of alienating the powerful. In his work, actually published by the HSRC, McDonald says: "It is estimated that close to 10 million South Africans have had their water cut off for non-payment of service bills, with the same number having experienced an electricity cutoff. Approximately two million people have been evicted from their homes for the same reason" (2002: 162). This is a disgraceful statistic in post-apartheid South Africa of course and it is perhaps not surprising that a state institution like the HSRC would be pressurised to or feel the need to contest it.

⁹ The analogy of the "grafting" of a post-colonial state on a colonial one is taken from Wamba-dia-Wamba (1994).

But they are less able to show *why* this was so. This is largely because of the absence of theoretical context, particularly of a theory of power and the state. So even though their descriptions are extremely telling, the reader is left hanging. For example, they note that “the most lasting ... voices from this period remain those of the victims ... ordinary citizens who formed the overwhelming bulk of those who came to the TRC and who paid the price of political violence” (p83). They rightly note that having their experience officially recognised was a major achievement for the commission, but then these experiences were apprehended ultimately as excesses by individual perpetrators so that “undoubtedly, the TRC failed to adequately situate the gross human rights violations that it addressed in the wider context of apartheid” (ibid).

It is understood then that “those who came to the TRC were not organised political activists...but were most often very poor township residents swept up in the conflicts” (p. 90), they got little or nothing from the process, either in terms of compensation but more importantly neither in terms of a small victory over power, because of a number of factors including the absence of effective prosecution of perpetrators. They were simply recognised for a while and then cynically discarded. The impression one gets from the authors is that it has been “a Government choice to keep the TRC on the backburner” (p97). Of course the legitimacy of the apartheid state was never challenged by the ANC after 1990, and one would be forgiven for believing in the congruence of interests between apartheid and post-apartheid elites in the maintenance of the system of power. As the authors politely and gently understate, this failure could have something to do with “a more general muting of ... transformative impulses” (p97). How is one to interpret this “muting” other than as a restriction on democracy?

The process initiated by the TRC was fundamentally a state process, in particular a process which came completely under the responsibility of the new government. Being a government commission the TRC could not be an alternative source of power, such as for example a committee of a “sovereign national assembly” could have been. It had no independent ability to acquire funds and was totally dependent on the good offices of the government which in its guise as the ruling party had objected to the TRCs findings anyway. Under such conditions then, the TRC was arguably hamstrung by a certain absence not presence of democracy, a certain absence not presence of politics, while social justice was sacrificed in favour of the reconciliation of elite interests. No wonder then that the government could dismiss the call for reparations with a paltry sum of R30 000 to the victims designated by the TRC, a quarter of the sum the commission had recommended. Moreover as the authors note “the TRC victims by no means constitute the entire victim pool”(p99). End of story.

Chapter four by Mangcu looks at how race relations fared in the post-Mandela period during what has been said to be a period characterised by a much more nationalistic perspective pursued by Mbeki. The author suggests that reconciliation between races has not been sufficiently achieved, but unfortunately he restricts his discussion to the power games of politicians and thus limits his ability to understand and explain the problem. To see Mbeki as unproblematically a nationalist and Whites as liberals (p111) seems far too simplistic¹⁰ as Mbeki is one of the major champions of liberalism in Africa, not least through NEPAD. Rather, the problem has a far more complex basis. This is arguably to be found in a structural contradiction within the state itself between nationalism and liberalism, brought on by the fact that the national consensus has been founded on a liberalism which cannot resolve the national question. It should be apparent that a new national elite consensus could only have been founded on liberalism in all its forms (political as well as economic), as the typical state nationalism common in Africa after independence was not on the agenda for a whole number of reasons. The ANC seems to have rapidly and easily swallowed the World Bank view of the market as the great social leveller; after all had not Afrikaner nationalism under apartheid used the state to coerce the majority and to distort the market? Reconciliation among elites had to sacrifice the fully blown African nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s which purported to be capable of resolving the national question (full citizenship rights and social justice for all including jobs, land, housing, a life of dignity for the oppressed etc), in favour of a liberal consensus only marginally modified by affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment designed to create a Black middle class (and hence in tune with liberalism anyway).

¹⁰ Not to say essentialist - are all Blacks nationalists? and all Whites liberals? so that these words must always necessarily be used conjointly?

Unfortunately however, the self-same liberalism is totally unable to resolve the national question (ie. to resolve the problem of social justice around which the liberation struggle was fought), not only because it cannot provide land and jobs to the majority, but because it systematically increases the numbers of the excluded and dis-empowered through the reproduction of poverty and alienation from the nation itself (the 48 percent of poor mentioned above who hence cannot be full citizens). This is becoming more obvious every day. Thus the question to be asked is how is the national question being addressed and why is its resolution so abysmally failing in the post-apartheid era? It is the failure to resolve this issue which makes possible the use of race in the petty power games of elites, and which enables the irresponsible 'rabble rousing' of the likes of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. This fundamental problem is simply not raised by Mangcu hence again theory is glaringly absent.

Chapters twelve and thirteen on education predictably describe the vagaries of policy decisions for the educational sector with great expertise, yet one wonders how it is possible to do so while ignoring the implications of wider changes on the educational sector. To take the chapter on the higher education sector by Jansen for example, the author completely ignores the major trend since liberation of the commercialisation of higher education which forms the backdrop to both the policies of 'massification' and 'mergers' which he discusses. It is this disastrous trend of the glorification and celebration of the market (in so many different guises from PMS to 'relevance', to viewing students as 'clients' etc.) which lies at the root of the failure to increase the standards of South African higher education and to make it relevant to the problems of the country and of the African continent. At the same time, the deserting of higher education by Black intellectuals in favour of jobs in government, is bound to contribute, along with commercialization, to the creeping absence of a cadre of critically thinking intellectuals in the country. The emphasis on assessing public policy by Jansen again bypasses the necessary analysis of social process which requires an understanding of theory.

3. Popular Empowerment vs popular passivity (civil society and democracy)

The state-centred focus of the book's perspective is illustrated even more clearly by all three chapters discussed in this section, although each does so in different ways. All deal with organisations of civil society, and all unwittingly illustrate the distortions and dis-empowerment which liberal democracy has introduced to the emancipatory project of the mass movement (usually said to be of civil society) of the 1980s, ending up as a vulgar caricature of that project.

The trade union movement was central to the popular mobilisation process which brought down the apartheid regime and simultaneously at the core of the development of popular democratic political practices during the 1980s. The chapter by Buhlungu is an excellent account of how these "democratic union traditions that were developed in the 1970s and 1980s" (p189) have been dismantled. A "de-politicization process" has intensified, a process of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation has set in which "has resulted in a shift of power from workers ... to full-time officials and national leadership" (ibid.). Surprisingly (the author says "ironically") this is put down to the process of "political democratisation of South Africa" (p 188). We then have the paradoxical situation of a process of democratisation leading to one of the dismantling of democracy! How are we to make sense of this? The author simply remains at the level of noting the irony. Moreover, what does this suggest for the expression "the democratic state" which the authors of this book, including Buhlungu, all use completely uncritically to refer to post-1994 South Africa - and without irony?

There is only one answer to this question and this is to problematise the notion of democracy. It is about time that an analysis of both the character and limitations of liberal democracy in South Africa is undertaken, rather than simply the routine singing of its praises. At least then the left may be able to begin to have some influence. The COSATU leadership seems to have failed in this as Buhlungu notes how it has taken over uncritically the managerialist ethic of the state and capital while he also remarks how its relationship with other civil society organisations is vanguardist and arrogant (p 197). Is COSATU then a simple state institution or a member of civil society? Do its leaders all aspire to join the likes of Marcel Golding in becoming millionaire businessmen? We can only surmise the effects of such questions on understanding our new 'democracy'.

Any discussion on the character of 'democracy' would have surely to start by noting that there are different forms of democracy and that the mass movement of the 1980s - including COSATU -

attempted to build a popular form of democracy, while the current liberal type limits democracy in the interests of a small elite¹¹. This is the case irrespective of whether universal suffrage is used to elect the government or not. It is not a matter of 'ultra-leftism' here, as Max Weber for example, the archetype of liberal sociologists was fully aware of the elite and hence limited character of liberal democracy of which he fully approved (see Beetham, 1985). Liberal democracy is a form of democracy which politically disempowers (de-politicizes) the people for a whole range of reasons including because of the fact that they are only entitled to engage in politics once every five years or so. The insurgent movement of the 1980s had demanded much more than this including "direct control over where and how they live, eat, sleep, work...and that these things are not done for them by the government of the day but [by] the people themselves" (Morobe, cited Neocosmos, 1996: 207). If this perspective is correct, then it is not very surprising that the workers in unions have less power after 'democratisation' than they did before.

How possible is it to say that a state, any state, is democratic? If the state refers to a number of institutions or apparatuses of power in society, then it is simply absurd to suggest that a state can be democratic. A state can be legitimate certainly, but it cannot be democratic. To say so would mean that bureaucracies are democratic institutions (although some are indeed meant to have democratic functions, which is a different matter). To refer to a democratic state amounts to equating government and state. A government is elected and thereby more or less represents the general will or the nation and is thereby more or less democratic. But the notion of a "democratic state" is an absurdity. Does having a "democratic police force" mean that the police now beats up suspects democratically (whether they happen to be suspected illegal immigrants or not)¹²? Is the new "anti-terrorism bill" meant to protect democracy as its drafters maintain¹³ or to undermine it as similar pieces of legislation have done in the US, in the UK and elsewhere? Civil rights are currently being systematically eroded by so-called democratic states all over the world, what does democracy thereby mean? In the context of South Africa, presumably, what the expression "democratic state" is meant to denote is the legitimacy of the post-apartheid state. There is little doubt about this, but then one should be clear, for the consequence of such an expression entering uncontested the realm of the consensus of 'common sense', could easily be that any criticism of the state can be seen as a criticism of democracy itself, and that democracy gradually becomes irrevocably devalued in the eyes of the people, given the bureaucratic and oppressive nature of many state practices as noted above.

One of the features of a democracy for the neo-liberal perspective is a 'vibrant' civil society. Clearly, the argument outlined by Buhlungu is that the trade union movement has lost much of its 'vibrancy' with the de-politicization engendered by liberal democratization, but what about other organisations of 'civil society'? This question is dealt with by Habib in chapter ten. Here the argument is straightforward. We are told that relations between state and civil society have taken three distinct forms in post apartheid South Africa (marginalisation, engagement and adversarialism) and that this plurality of relations is good for democracy and governance (p 239). So the liberal notion of pluralism is extended from referring to a plurality of organisations to a plurality of relations with the state. But because of its theoretical superficiality, this argument fails to go beyond its liberal assumptions to show the possibility of alternatives. Political liberalism is the best of all possible worlds because of a plurality of state civil society relations. In his own words Habib's concern is to "celebrate(s)" (p 228) pluralism, and he concentrates on this rather than on analysing it.

Let me briefly subject this celebration to critical scrutiny. The problems begin with the manner Habib understands civil society. This he sees as "the organized expression of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family state and market" (p 228)¹⁴. This is not a

¹¹ Hence the term "elite democracy" used by Ken Good (2002). For an initial critique of democracy in South Africa see my 2003.

¹² See the latest US State Department Human Rights Report for 2003. The Johannesburg Star (27/02/2004) reported that according to this publication during 2003 there had been 217 deaths in police custody and 311 deaths as a result of police action in South Africa.

¹³ The full title of this disgraceful bill is the Protection of Constitutional Democracy and Related Activities Bill, it has been roundly condemned by human rights organisations but has not elicited the mass protests which it deserves. See *This Day*, Feb 12th 2004.

¹⁴ This quotation comes from another of Habib's works; throughout his chapter Habib regularly cites himself a procedure which is quite irritating. Additionally he says he is convinced about leaving out economic enterprises from civil society (p. 229), but not all of us are so convinced given the political power

definition which corresponds to that of Hegel (or indeed to that of any of his predecessors), to which it only bears a superficial resemblance, although it is in tune with current neo-liberal thinking. For Hegel and the classics of political philosophy the term “civil society” referred to a *realm of activity* (hence the term “society”) in which such organisations operate, rather than to organised interests themselves. Of course, to provide a definition which does not conform to that of the classics is not a sin, however there is an important theoretical reason for referring to civil society as a realm of social and political activity, and this is simply because many organisations in society are regularly excluded from it. Those outside civil society are not legitimate state interlocutors, those within are. The crude neo-liberal position espoused by Habib fails to recognise this, as it understands civil society as the organisations themselves, organisations which are simply legally defined as outside the state and business (“non-profit” in the case of South Africa, see Swilling: 2002). This makes it difficult if not impossible to understand the relations between organisations of society and the state. Is the Boeremag part of civil society? Obviously not because it is not a recognised organisation whose politics are legitimate in the eyes of the state. In sum, the sphere of activity known as ‘civil’ society must be understood as limited by what the state sees as legitimate activity and legitimate organising. This is why for neo-liberal theory there can be no civil society outside liberal democracy (eg. under authoritarian state systems such as colonialism or indeed apartheid). Of course no “revolutionary” organisation (rightly or wrongly qualified) could possibly form part of civil society. Civil society therefore regularly excludes many popular organisations from its sphere of activity¹⁵. The ANC itself distinguishes between “genuinely representative organisations” and those which are not (ANC, 1996). The latter are not legitimate in its eyes.

Habib’s classification of civil society types is governed by their relationship to the state, from accommodationist to adversarial. The first group is as he accurately observes “sub-contracted” by the state to fulfill various of its functions. Unlike Buhlungu, however he is not sensitive to the irony of calling such organisations NGOs when they are not only funded by government, but operate on the basis of the same subjectivity and undertake state functions. Should not an analysis of these be undertaken in order to determine whether the ‘N’ should simply be dropped so that they be referred to as GOs or even as parastatals? What does a ‘civil society’ distinct from the state mean under these circumstances? Isn’t the distinction then a purely legal one? And what is a legal distinction if not a state one? Moreover, the parallels between this subcontracting and that taking place in the realm of the economy is not noted. This is surely also worthy of comment and analysis.

The second group referred to as ‘adversarialists’, is also defined in relation to the state, but couldn’t this nomenclature suggest a problem with state-civil society relations, as there is no intermediate category in debate with the state outside either being in bed with it or contesting it? Couldn’t this tell us something regarding the nature of the state itself and its attitude to criticism which seems to preclude disagreement? Of course Habib points to an important aspect of the state by noting that the third group consists of “survivalist responses of poor and marginalized people who have no alternative in the face of a retreating state that refuses to meet its socio-economic obligations to its citizenry” (p.236-7). Yet one wonders the extent to which these are not systematically excluded from civil society by their very political marginalisation (and also by Habib’s own definitions as many engage in economic activities) let alone by their ‘informal’ character.

More important however is the absence of any alternative classification of civil society organisations, for example one which would not use the state as its reference point. If we admit that liberal democracy is not the only form of democracy and that many popular organisations practice alternative popular forms of democracy, then why not classify such organisations in terms of the extent to which their vision of society, forms of operation and concrete demands are democratic in ways which go beyond the limits of liberalism. A much more useful typology for the left would be between statist/managerialist organisations and popular-democratic ones, as it would enable the recognition and analysis of popular-democratic sites of politics beyond the state. Perhaps the ANC is right in maintaining that confrontational organisations are indeed often unrepresentative and ‘ultra-leftist’, maybe their politics are indeed authoritarian, but maybe they are not. If a genuine left-democratic

of these economic enterprises as expressed inter alia for example in their direct and regular access to the presidency.

¹⁵ If the state does not recognise the existence of an organisation then it cannot be part of civil society, this is what registration entails after all.

alternative is to be developed, it is surely here in sites of popular politics that it is likely to be found, whether in civil society or indeed outside of it. These sites need to be investigated critically. Ashwin Desai's and others' enthusiasm for so-called "social movements" of "the poor" should not be taken at face value, without a critical investigation into the extent and character of the democratic political alternatives propose (see Desai, 2002). After all just because an organisation or movement is opposed to the state, does not make it either democratic or progressive (despite the possible justice of its demands), and its politics may simply be concerned with incorporation into the existing system, and not with its transformation in a popular-democratic direction. Unfortunately however, Habib's liberalism forecloses the asking of such questions, his ends up being a highly conservative perspective. Civil society must be understood as a realm of socio-political activity in which contestation takes place between different political positions, but which ultimately constitutes the limits, along with the state, of a consensual state domain of politics. Politics can and does exist also beyond the limits of civil society, beyond the confines of the state consensus.

Another example of the shortcomings of Habib's typology is to be found in the trajectory of the debate over the HIV-AIDS issue. Whenever this is mentioned in this book, it is in order to criticise the government and to unreservedly support the Treatment Action Campaign (a so-called adversarial 'social movement') in the manner of the mass media in the country (although in more tempered language). This is the case with Mbali's discussion of HIV/AIDS policy making. The author, herself a TAC member, seems unable to make an attempt to explain the government's perspective on this controversial issue without having recourse to psychological notions of "denialism" which explain absolutely nothing. The sorry saga is well known and need not be repeated. But in addition to the "denialism" of the government it would be important to mention the arrogance and stupidity of the media who, without exception, fell behind the medical establishment, qualifying anyone who disagreed with it (including eminent scientists from Berkeley, California) as 'quacks' and setting themselves up as experts on causality. Of course there was a major mistake made by government in basing its policy on an intellectual debate rather than basing it on existing knowledge, however problematic, while simultaneously encouraging intellectual debate within a separate arena.

Yet anyone even vaguely on the left should know better than to refer to "accepted scientific expertise" (p326). Accepted by whom? Since when has science been a-political? Or the medical establishment without its own interests in alliance with multinational drug companies? Surely anyone with the slightest political understanding knows about Western medicine's bias towards technology and its rejection of alternative popular forms of medicine as 'unscientific' and of popular social interventions as irrelevant. So why the uncritical and moralistic support for the medical establishment by the left in this case? Arguably the government was to the left of civil society in this case! Of course a reading of Canguilhem (1991) or Foucault (1980) on medical science and power should not lead us to reject its methods wholesale, yet surely one is entitled to look into alternatives and to be suspicious of Western medicine's exclusive reliance on technology. This is even more so when AIDS treatment has to be provided to a population living in poverty which refuses to be tested for the disease, and does not have the levels of knowledge or indeed standards of life of high court judges. Surely the government was not wrong to question the appropriateness of Western technology in tackling the disease. An African nationalist perspective is, pace radio presenters, crucial in this respect as Western medicine has been found wanting on numerous occasions (witness the multinational Nestle's advocacy of bottle feeding in the 1960s for example; was this not also "accepted scientific expertise" at the time?).

The problem with the state nationalism on which the government based its discourse was/is its authoritarianism and arrogance, evidenced by the manner it went about imposing its views. But neither for that matter can the state's authoritarianism be explained by glib reference to the "political habits of exile" (p. 59) as I have already noted. The idea of insisting on the provision of vitamin cocktails is not itself 'quackery' but sound medical practice, as is the encouragement of the setting up of community vegetable gardens in poor areas. The taking of anti-retrovirals is not like taking aspirin, they can only be taken at a certain level of development of the virus¹⁶ and also presuppose a regular and substantial food diet. Moreover, they must be taken on a very strictly observed regular basis which also requires systematic and regular counselling. Patients cannot be put on alternative

¹⁶ A debate exists among experts as to whether treatment should be provided at a CD4 count of below 200 or not. The "CD4 count" measures the antibodies produced against the viral load.

medication if they do not respond to treatment. General practitioners have to go through training to prescribe such medication, as the medical profession is socialised to test medication and if the response is not appropriate to move to an alternative.

Mbali's liberal prejudices are unhelpful to say the least, as she uncritically accepts the political neutrality of science. Of even greater concern is the position of the TAC itself which has concentrated its campaigns on the provision of free 'treatment' and the provision of drugs for AIDS sufferers. The consequences for popular democratic politics of its apparent victory over the government have arguably been twofold: first the public debate has been restricted to the provision of drugs or not; in other words the public debate has exclusively revolved around technology as the only solution to the pandemic of HIV-AIDS. Second the politics of agency for the people have been replaced by passivity as they are now expected to wait for the 'rolling out' (ie delivery) of drugs by government. This could not be in greater conformity with political liberalism which fetishises expertise and science and which systematically disempowers the people (Neocosmos, 2003). The politics of sexuality, control over one's body, the organising of community gardens and so on, all of which may enable popular political self-activity are to be marginalised in favour of passively waiting for the cure to be delivered. How is this supposed to help a left-democratic project? Mbali seems blissfully unaware of all this, and Habib's typology cannot begin to make sense of it.

In sum, the accounts in this book of the relations between state and society operate within an uncritically accepted liberal framework. As such they are unable to address a whole series of issues which would place popular politics and democracy at the centre of the analysis and perspective. They fail therefore to propose not only a critical analysis of the present, but an alternative vision for the future.

4. The Continued Relevance of Political Economy

Chapter six by Natrass provides an extremely well argued assessment of non-agricultural formal employment, (ie. urban based jobs) which "between 1990 and 2001 ... declined by over 20 percent" (p 141). As the author rightly comments: "in this respect, South Africa's performance has been nothing short of dire" (ibid.). She continues: "according to the government household and labour force surveys conducted from the mid-1990s onwards, over one third of those who stated that they wanted jobs reported that they were out of work. This is a socio-economic crisis of major proportions" (p. 142) indeed. This is not all, "gross national product per capita is lower in real terms in 2001 than it was in 1973" (p 143) and "investment has not responded as quickly or as hoped for by the Gear macro-modellers" (p. 149) and finally "by continuing with trade liberalisation in the absence of labour market reforms, the government probably contributed to employment losses" (p. 150). A serious indictment of the government if ever there was one, yet the celebrations continue. Natrass' solutions, as is well known, are classic social democratic ones. However, it is imperative to assess the extent of the economic and political conditions for these solutions in South Africa, as social democracy has traditionally required a large economic surplus based on surplus profits by transnationals (within imperialist relations with exploited economies) and small populations, along with corporatist states within Fordist accumulation regimes. *Inter alia*, it is doubtful whether this is achievable in a situation of 'flexible accumulation' illustrated for example by the demand by capital for a two-tier labour market (p 195) and the seeming enthusiasm of some state institutions for the construction of export processing zones.

Altman's chapter seven also looks at the issue of unemployment but in a wider way not concentrating on formal employment alone. She notes that according to the "broad" definition, unemployment rose from 28.6 to 41.5 percent between 1994 and 2001, and comments that "the recorded unemployment rate would have grown much faster if not for the massive growth in the informal sector" (p. 160). After losing almost a million jobs between 1994 and 1997 the economy "turned the corner" but it turns out that "the only net gains arose in the informal sector, where measurement is difficult"(p169). In sum, and in broad strokes, the picture is one of "stagnant formal employment and growing informal employment" (p. 171). A dismal picture indeed, and the unavoidable conclusion is that "the South African economy has experienced 'jobless growth'" (p.173). The author comments that "there is a vicious downward cycle... this is not a sustainable growth path in a middle income economy" (p. 174). A dismal commentary.

One problem however is that the author acknowledges a difficulty in measuring the extent of informal sector employment and this is indeed quite apparent in those measurements used by neo-classical economics (as practised by the apparently not too trustworthy Statistics SA). There is also the assumption in this text that a possibility may exist for the formal and informal sectors to both expand employment opportunities simultaneously, rather than the latter expanding and the formal contracting as in South Africa. It is not thought important to note that it is poverty which regularly forces people into the informal sector (as incidentally Habib recognises in his chapter), so that the expansion of 'informality' could in fact be a direct effect of the contraction of formal jobs, something which Altman's economics fail to recognise.

Another point worth mentioning is that, in the recent past, political economy has been extremely successful at elucidating the character of the informal 'sector' both by showing that it is not in fact a distinct sector at all, but intimately related to the 'formal' one, and also by understanding the social differentiation among such activities through the use of a concept of "petty-commodity production"¹⁷. This was recognized long ago in the work undertaken for the ILO by Bromley and Gerry (eg. 1979) on poverty in Third World cities. Perhaps it is time we seriously re-consider such analytical conceptions, rather than adhering to descriptive notions, such as so-called SMMEs, which fail to elucidate and enable a critical understanding of structural differences.

The chapter on the land question (fifteen) would have also benefited from some understanding of the political economy of rural areas, and from an analysis of those likely to benefit or not from a land reform programme. This would help us to begin to explain the dismal progress by the state on this score and why the rural poorest have yet again been ignored. The state seems content to allow unregulated rural-urban migration to take place by refusing to invest in small scale production in the rural areas, and then to relocate the poor to peripheral locations in order to 'clean up' city centres when the consequent unemployment leads to criminal lumpen activity. This process is in dire need of critical political-economic analysis.

On the other hand, elements of political economy are present in the last chapter by Daniel Naidoo and Naidu (seventeen) which shows how South African corporates "are on the whole doing well from their business ventures in Africa" (p385), while the reverse is not always the case as a UN report "named 12 South African companies in a list of firms accused of looting mineral resources in the DRC during its recent civil war" (p 386). In addition a few courageous statements (eg. on the fiasco of the South African military intervention in Lesotho in 1998) give this chapter something of a critical edge. More of this kind of analysis is necessary. However, a more detailed critical assessment of South African corporate involvement would have easily undermined the often patronising conception of 'leadership' which both our state and our 'captains of industry' or BEE consortia regularly take towards the rest of the continent. This is important as it is not always the case, as the authors show, that South African investment on the continent is in the people's interest.

Chapter sixteen by Schoeman, is an interesting account of how South Africa is promoting the interests of the global South, but it fails to assess the obverse, namely how South Africa is also propagating the liberalism of the West on the African continent, not only economically through NEPAD, but also culturally as students from all over Africa come to study liberal and managerialist ideologies in the country. NEPAD was justifiably and mercilessly critiqued in 2003 by African intellectuals assembled at great expense by the Africa Institute of South Africa in Pretoria. This was an embarrassing moment for the government, particularly as the president had graced the assembly with his presence. It was evident at this gathering how much the liberalism in the thinking of the South African government and state was at variance with that of intellectuals on the continent.

Concluding Remarks

The contradictions and questions which I have pointed to need to be analysed at a greater depth than the authors of this book have done. I have in this review taken a critical approach to these writings, and have argued that they are limited by their superficial theoretical position which operates uncritically within a liberal-statist discourse. The fact that the editors may all be working for a state institution, namely the HSRC, may have had something to do with this of course. As far back as

¹⁷ An attempt to expand this concept for use in both agricultural and urban settings was made by Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985) and by the debate which ensued.

1968, Jitendra Mohan in reviewing the writings of Ali Mazrui, had this to say about the African intelligentsia and the state:

The African intelligentsia as a whole is far too deeply imbedded in the post-colonial structures of power and privilege - or, to put it another way, is as yet not sufficiently detached or alienated from the whole system - to be able to undertake social analysis, which would prove uncannily and uncomfortably like self analysis (cited Mamdani et al., 1988: 104).

This remark seems particularly apt for South African intellectuals today such as those represented in this book. I have tried to suggest that an alternative left analysis of ten years of post-apartheid liberal democracy, if it is to begin to have a critical perspective, should start by problematising the notion of democracy prevalent in South Africa itself, which was after all what the mass movement of the 1980s had begun to do. It remains to be seen whether left intellectuals in South Africa ten years after liberation are up to the challenge of being faithful to the lessons of that event, or whether we shall have to wait for yet another ten for critical analyses to become commonplace.

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