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Africa and the rising powers:Bargaining for the ‘marginalized many
Vickers, Brendan (International Affairs )

The world economy is undergoing a relative shift in economic power, with the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) as the new sources of global economic growth, trade and investment.1 The ascendancy of these new powers has been accompanied by vast improvements in Africa’s economic prospects.

Over the past decade, Africa has gone from being the ‘hopeless continent’2 to a ‘rising star’3 and the next major growth pole in the world economy.4 Reflecting Africa’s growing significance in international relations, the rising powers of Brazil, China and India (as well as other emerging economies from Turkey to South Korea5) are vociferously courting the renascent continent. On the one hand, these rising powers hope to gain access to Africa’s abundant resources and growing markets in order to sustain their own rapid growth and economic performance. On the other hand, as Brazil, China and India negotiate with the established powers to gain greater status, power and influence at the high table of global governance,6 they require diplomatic support and backing for their leadership ambitions. As part of the non-western ‘rest’, African countries are able to provide the ‘followership’ that these rising powers seek and legitimize claims to greater power by securing for them the backing of large numbers. In sum, the relationship between Africa and the rising powers appears to be increasingly symbiotic, ‘one in which resource diplomacy, development assistance, seeking new markets and forging consensus around reforming the global order that would be more inclusive, equitable and multilateral in nature are points of interaction’.,28,11,4360

Africa's Futures: from North – South to East – South?
G Martin, William (Third World Quarterly)

This article contests dominant projections of Africa’s future, most notably the Afro-pessimism that permeates almost all Northern analyses. While long-term data do confirm the continent’s developmental impasse, they also dispute the dominant argument that Africa has been isolated and disengaged from the world economy. Indeed, Africa has been increasingly engaged with— and impoverished by—its relationships with Europe and North America.

African scholars, recognising this dilemma, call for a return of the ‘developmental state’. This recommendation, however, like Afro-pessimist projections, fails to take into account fundamental transformations in Africa’s geostrategic and world-economic relationships.

The implications of two key, global transitions are traced for Africa and particularly South Africa: first, the disruptive power of global social movements; second, the rise of Asia and the demise of US and European hegemony over Africa.,28,11,4361

After Neoliberalism? Brazil, India, and China in the Global Economic Crisis
Schmalz, Stefan & Ebenau, Matthias (Globalizations)

Against the backdrop of debates about ‘post-neoliberalism’, we examine the implications of the global economic crisis for three important semi-peripheral states: Brazil, India, and China. Deploying a framework which combines neo-Gramscian theory, radical economic geography, and materialist state theory, we find that all their political-economic models have undergone processes of substantial neoliberalisation, albeit to varying degrees and partly giving way to countervailing trends well before the global turmoil. The crisis has markedly accentuated ongoing developments. In Brazil, it has reinforced a transition to a neo-developmentalist strategy.

In contrast, the Indian elites have quickly returned to the path of gradual neoliberalisation. In China, it is still unclear whether a fundamental socialcorporatist regime change will be accomplished. Our analysis thus suggests a divergence of trajectories, rather than a general rebound of the state, let alone a full-blown post-neoliberal transformation.,28,11,4362,%20Brazil%20India%20China%20in%20the%20Global%20Econom%20crisis.pdf

Beijing’s Perspective on Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization:India, South Asia, and the Spectrum of
Opportunities in China’s Open Approach

Jagannath P. Panda 2012

China has basked for some time in the achievement of having promoted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), now in its eleventh year. Without a doubt, China sees the SCO as a useful foreign-policy instrument. But China cannot afford to rest on its diplomatic laurels. Open to opportunities to protect its stakes in Asia, China is very likely contemplating, albeit cautiously, an expanded role for the SCO that will include membership for India, its archrival.

To Beijing, expanding the SCO beyond Central Asia is a political statement, exploring and helping to define a constituency to which
it can appeal for diplomatic support in a range of regional projects that restrict US participation. KEYWORDS: China’s policies in South
Asia, Sino-Indian relations, Central Asia politics, Shanghai Cooperation

Beyond the BRICs: Alternative Strategies of Influence in the Global Politics of Development.
Matthias vom Haua, James Scott and David Hulme 2012

This introductory essay situates the subsequent special issue within a comparative framework that helps to unpack the new global politics of development. It argues that there is a set of countries beyond Brazil, Russia, India and China – often described as ‘the BRICs’ – that are emerging to a position of increased international prominence and which merit greater attention than they have hitherto received. Recent economic risers such as South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and Mexico are responding to their economic growth and seeking to secure greater influence within regional and global affairs. The analytical framework developed here distinguishes between four distinct strategies of international engagement: issue leading, opportunity seeking, region organising and region mobilising. The framework further suggests the need to focus on new global opportunities and pressures, as well as the specific interests and capacities of states when accounting for the adoption of a particular strategy of engagement.

Cet essai d’introduction inscrit ce nume´ro spe´ cial dans un cadre comparatif nous permettant d’analyser la nouvelle politique globale de de´ veloppement. Il soutient qu’il existe un ensemble de pays au dela` du Bre´ sil, de la Russie, de l’Inde et de la Chine – souvent de´nomme´ les pays ‘BRICs’- qui sont en train de gagner en importance sur la sce`ne internationale et qui me´ ritent plus d’attention qu’ils n’ont rec¸u jusqu’a` pre´ sent. Les pays en ascension e´conomique re´cente tels que l’Afrique du Sud, la Core´ e du Sud, la Turquie, et le Mexique re´ agissent a`leur croissance e´conomique en s’efforc¸ant d’accroýˆtre leur influence tant au niveau re´ gional qu’international. Le cadre analytique de´veloppe´ dans cet essai distingue quatre strate´ gies d’engagement: Le leadership the´matique, la recherche d’opportunite´ s, l’organisation re´gionale et la mobilisation re´ gionale. Ce cadre met e´ galement en avant le besoin de se pencher sur les nouvelles opportunite´ s et contraintes se pre´ sentant au niveau mondial, ainsi que sur les inte´ reˆ ts et capacite´s spe´ cifiques des E´ tats, pour comprendre et expliquer l’adoption de telle ou telle strate´gie d’engagement.,28,11,4364

Brazil as ‘Southern donor’: beyond hierarchy and national interests in development cooperation?
Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue & Alcides Costa Vaz 2012

This article analyses Brazil’s growing role in external development assistance. During Lula da Silva’s presidency, cooperation with developing countries grew dramatically. While the official position is that Brazilian development assistance is moved not by national economic or political interests, but by international ‘solidarity’, and does not reproduce the North–South traditional aid relations, we suggest that it is not completely divorced from national, sub-national or sectoral interests and cannot be viewed apart from Brazil’s broader foreign policy objectives. Brazil does pursue political, economic and commercial interests and, concomitantly, has made a positive difference in the recipient countries. However, more empirical research and field investigation are needed to better gauge the impact of Brazil’s assistance initiatives and their contributions to South–South cooperation more broadly. During Lula’s terms (2003–2010), Brazil could be classified as a ‘Southern donor’, which expresses the country’s own novelties, and tensions, of simultaneously being a donor and a developing country.,28,11,4365

Brazil in Africa: Another Emerging Power in the Continent?
Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa , Thais Narciso & Marina Biancalana 2009

This paper develops three basic arguments. First, it presents the basic underpinnings of Brazilian diplomacy in the past half century, concentrating on the changes adopted in the 1980s and the 1990s up to the foreign policy put forward by Lula’s government (2003–2009). It recognises that Lula’s foreign policy represents a step forward, especially where Africa is concerned.

However, it does not seem to be clear whether the Brazilian economy has enough strength to sustain such a foreign policy, as is shown in the second part of the paper. This is indeed the case if comparisons are made with India, China and even South Africa, when the latter’s regional role is considered. Finally, an effort is made to summarise the recent political cooperation established between Brazil and African countries as well as to present an overview of Brazil’s trade and investment relations both with the region as a whole and with some important individual partners. Once this picture is established, we investigate whether these realms—diplomatic/political and economic—take independent tracks, or if they do interact in a coherent manner.

Africa remained deep inside Brazil and Brazilians, not as something external to ourselves. But as a mythic space; neither geographical, nor historical.,28,11,4366

Brazil’s Rising Ambition in a Shifting Global Balance of Power
Paulo Sotero (2010)

Paulo Sotero and Leslie Elliott Armijo (2007)

Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities
Steen Fryba Christensen 2013

As Brazil has risen to become an increasingly significant regional and global player in a world undergoing significant transformations in terms of power balance, the subject of its aims, world-view and foreign policy strategies is becoming increasingly relevant. This article focuses on the most important themes and priorities in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation between 2003 and 2012 and connects these to the Brazilian government’s world-view, its view of Brazil’s role in the world, and to the main aims pursued by Brazil in its overall development strategy. I discuss how Brazil’s view of the world and its foreign policy priorities relate to the USA’s view and preferences, arguing that Brazil’s foreign policy priorities reflect the fact that the USA and the West in general are often seen as barriers to Brazil’s main aims. These are to achieve economic strengthening, a growing influence on the international political scene and a leadership position in South America, and through this to contribute to major changes in the global order.,28,11,4369

Brazil's liberal neodevelopmentalism: New paradigm or edited orthodoxy
Cornel Ban (2012)

Is Brazil’s economic policy regime a mere tinkering of the Washington Consensus? The evidence suggests that Brazilian governments institutionalized a hybrid policy regime that layers economically liberal priorities originating in the Washington Consensus and more interventionist ones associated with neo-developmentalist thinking. To capture this hybridity, the study calls this regime ‘liberal neo-developmentalism’. While defending the goal of macroeconomic stability and sidelining full employment, Brazilian governments also reduced reliance on foreign savings and employed a largely off-the-books stimulus package during the crisis. Brazil experienced important privatization, liberalization and deregulation reforms, but at the same time the state consolidated its role as owner and investor in industry and banking while using an open economy industrial policy and a cautious approach to the free movement of capital. Finally, while conditional cash transfers fit the Washington Consensus, Brazil’s steady increases in the minimum wage, industrial policies targeted at high employment sectors and the use of state-owned firms to expand welfare and employment programs better fit a neo-developmentalist policy regime. In sum, while the main goals of the Washington Consensus were not replaced with neo-developmentalist ones, Brazil’s policy regime saw an extensive transformation of policy orthodoxy that reflects Brazil’s status as an emerging power.,28,11,4370's%20neodevelopmentalism.pdf

BRICS: Sovereignty power and weakness
Zaki Laý¨di (2012)

The BRICS’ impact can be evaluated based on the degree of political coherence among them, as well as their capacity to influence the international system. This article will from the outset assume that the BRICS form a heterogeneous coalition of often competing powers that share a common fundamental political objective: to erode Western hegemonic claims by protecting the principle which these claims are deemed to most threaten, namely the political sovereignty of states. The BRICS form a coalition of sovereign state defenders. While they do not seek to form an anti-Western political coalition based on a counter-proposal or radically different vision of the world, they are concerned with maintaining their independence of judgment and national action in a world that is increasingly economically and socially interdependent. They consider that state sovereignty trumps all, including, of course, the political nature of its underpinning regimes. Thus, the BRICS – even the democratic ones – fundamentally diverge from the liberal vision of Western countries.,28,11,4371

Vadim Lukov (2013)

As the world continues to struggle with the aftermath of the 20082009 economic crisis it becomes increasingly reliant on traditional and new formats of economic policy coordination and cooperative approaches to reforming the international system. What is the role of such formats as the G8, the G20, and BRICS? What are the Russian interests in each of these formats? And which one looks the more promising?

We have put these questions to Amb. Vadim Lukov, Deputy Representative of the President of Russia in the G8, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Coordinator for G20 and BRICS Affairs,28,11,4372

Brics in the Contemporary World: changing identities, converging interests
Fabiano Mielniczuk (2013)

This paper aims to address the reasons why the acronym BRICS is moving from being an easy marker to guide foreign investors interested in emerging markets to denoting an important political group of countries determined to promote major changes in international relations. Theoretically the paper draws on social constructivism to demonstrate that the changing identities of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) can be treated as the main cause of the convergence of their interests in the international arena. Through a detailed analysis of these countries’ statements at the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly from 1991 to 2011, their social claims about themselves are retraced and the way they have judged the international sphere in which they engage is captured, in order to demonstrate the changing character of their identities. These new identities, it is argued, created the opportunity for converging interests, which explains the emerging political structure of BRICS. The paper concludes that, after four major summits and a significant number of wide-ranging low-level meetings, BRICS might be considered one of the major long-lasting forces shaping the new architecture of international relations in the 21st century.,28,11,4373

Mark R. Brawley (2007)

The U.S. confronts the difficult task of managing change peacefully as the BRICs’ economic rise redistributes power in the international system. I consider the insights from four approaches within international relations—Realism, Institutionalism, Constructivism and Liberalism—to draw out possible policy advice. While the first two offer useful thinking, their policies are in fact quite risky and difficult to implement. Constructivism, too, offers insights, but theories from this approach do not articulate practical policy guidance. Liberals direct our attention to the domestic sources of state preferences, suggesting not only how to influence future systemic change, but also identifying ways to make Realist or Institutionalist policies towards the BRICs more applicable and effective.,28,11,4374

Can China Lead?
Mark Beeson (2013)

The ‘rise of China’ is proving to be one of the most consequential developments of the early 21 century One of the key questions it raises is about the impact this historically unprecedented process will have on the East Asian region in particular and the world more generally. Will Chinese policy makers will be able to translate the country’s growing material importance into other forms of political power and influence? Equally importantly, will Chinese elites be ‘socialised’ into the practices and norms of extant institutions, or will they attempt to redefine them to further Chinese foreign policy goals? This paper explores these questions by initially looking at the overall historical context in which East Asian regionalisation has occurred, before considering the operation of some of the more important regional institutions. It is suggested that China’s ability to offer regional leadership is constrained both by its own security policies¯which are seen as increasingly threatening by many of its neighbours¯
and by the actions of the USA, which is trying to reassert its own claims to regional leadership. While the outcome of this process is inconclusive, it helps us to understand the more general dynamics reshaping the international system as a result of the emergence of new centres of international power.,28,11,4375

Capitalist Globalisation and the Problem of Stability: enter the new quintet and other emerging powers.
Achin Vanaik (2013)

Ever-expanding capital accumulation cannot be stable or cumulative without coordination and regulation provided by the state and the system of states, wherein the subset of the most powerful states is vital for establishing stability. There is a hegemonic transition of sorts towards a new quintet of powers in which the USA will remain indispensable as the key coordinator. Pretensions regarding China as the new hegemon are exposed as also are Indian claims. Moreover, it is argued that the BRICS grouping cannot provide an effective alternative to the quintet. However, the likely failure of the quintet to guarantee future stability raises the issue of the viability of capitalism itself.

Transiting towards a post-capitalist order requires as a necessary if insufficient condition confronting the informal empire project of the USA that underpins capitalist globalisation.,28,11,4376

Case Study on South–South Cooperation.
Asian Development Bank (2012)

China and IBSA: Possible BRICS Overreach?
Jagannath P. Panda (2013)

The Chinese Government's Role in Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Montreal

Jimin Zhao and Leonard Ortolano (2003)

The Multilateral Fund created by amendments to the Montreal Protocol played a key role in motivating the Chinese government to ratify and comply with the Protocol. Two other factors have affected China’s actions in meeting the Protocol’s requirements: the nation’s desire to appear as a responsible and co-operative actor in solving global environmental problems, and the interest of China’s principal implementing agency in expanding its responsibilities and authorities. Three factors have had significant roles in enhancing the national government’s ability to implement the Protocol: expanded administrative capacity, participation of local government units with capability to enforce regulations, and the employment of market-based environmental policy instruments.,28,11,4379

China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World.
Michael A. Glosny (2010)

Although Chinese leaders and analysts believe it is too early to judge the U.S. to be in fundamental decline, they do recognize that ‘‘newly emerging powers’’ (xinxing daguo) are an increasingly important force in international politics. In the past couple of years, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have transformed themselves from an abstract notion into a more formal political grouping. For China, besides helping to minimize dependence on the U.S. and possibly to constrain American unilateralism, BRIC cooperation serves several other functions. China also benefits from this cooperation by stabilizing its international environment, helping other developing countries, strengthening its identity as a developing country, coordinating its position with other BRICs to maximize leverage, and hiding in a group to avoid negative attention. This recent cooperation and interaction with the BRICs has been important, but the space for future BRIC cooperation is limited by fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued importance of the U.S. for each of the BRICs, and intra-BRIC competition. To date, there is little evidence that China and the BRICs are trying to overthrow the existing international order. Instead, China has accepted and joined the existing order, and has been working together with other powers to reform its shortcomings. Although this negotiation is in its early stages and will likely be difficult, the willingness of China and the BRICs to work within the system and the openness of western countries to meet some of their demands makes it much less likely that China and other rising powers will try to overthrow the order.,28,11,4380

China as a ‘net donor’: tracking dollars and sense
Gregory T Chin (2013)

The article examines China’s emergence over the past decade as a net donor, and the implications of this status in global development. The analysis begins by outlining China’s rise as a net donor, drawing comparisons in two-way aid flows with the other rising states, specifically Brazil, South Africa and India, and then turns to the implications of China’s rise as an aid sender. The central argument is that conceptualizing China’s rise as a ‘net donor’ is crucial for understanding the hybrid position that China has come to occupy in the global aid system, and the consequences of this positioning. Although China has achieved remarkable success with its own development, rather than join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) regime of traditional donors, the Chinese Communist Party and government leadership has chosen instead to continue to self-identify with the countries of the South, and to construct ties of South–South cooperation outside of DAC arrangements. The Chinese leadership is trying to stake out an unprecedented position in the global aid system, traversing the North–South divide, despite the fact that China has already joined the ranks of world economic powers.,28,11,4381

Wei Liang (2007)

The remarkable economic growth of China in the past two decades has generated both admiration and concern. As an “undemocratic capitalist” country, Beijing’s grand strategy and true intentions once it becomes stronger are under scrutiny by the rest of the world. This article examines how economic globalization has transformed China’s national policy preferences. It explores China’s foreign economic policy and recent activism in regional and multilateral settings, and within geographic regions that China had minimal contact with as recently as ten years ago. China’s resource endowments combined with its rapid and highly globalized growth have shaped its trade profile. The article suggests that, regardless of China’s grand strategy or future intentions, its policy options have been deeply constrained by its highly globalized economy.,28,11,4382

China’s International Education Initiatives and View of Its Role in Global Governance
Sharon X. LI (2012)

China is becoming an increasingly important actor in global governance. This paper contends that China participates by promoting its own global governance concepts on the one hand and by complying with the established global norms on the other. The paper introduces several key global governance concepts of the Chinese government and argues that they are likely to persist due to their roots in traditional Chinese Daoist and Confucian philosophies. It then focuses on China’s initiatives in education—the creation of Confucius Institutes and China’s involvement in United Nations (UN) educational initiatives—as examples of the Chinese approach. Finally, the paper discusses China’s educational profile in relation to its broader role in global governance.,28,11,4383

China's (Re)-Emerging Relations with Africa: Forging a New Consensus?
Sanusha Naidu, Lucy Corkin & Hayley Herman (2009)

This article explores China’s current engagements in Africa. It does not intend to reproduce the historical literature already evident in the discourse but rather seeks to place the current relationship in context and provide a more balanced view of where the points of convergence and divergence lie which may impinge positively or negatively on these relations. The articles seeks to treat emerging issues such as the possible impact of the economic crisis on China’s relations with Africa and the extent to which China’s foreign policy has adapted to African political realities. Moreover it assesses the scope to which such developments may advance or arrest the continent’s fundamental project of pursuing a sustainable developmental agenda as African governments push for greater integration into the global economy. Finally the article will explore whether China, is indeed, disrupting Africa’s relations with its Northern partners and what side effects this may have for the continent’s emerging relations with other new actors from the South. In short this article asks one simple question: How should China’s contemporary relations with Africa be interpreted as new international and domestic impulses begin to emerge across the continent?,28,11,4384

“Chindia” or Rivalry? Rising China, Rising India, and Contending Perspectives on India-China Relations.
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang (2011)

Whether and how India and China manage their futures as rising
powers will critically shape international relations in the twenty-first
century. These two countries demonstrate sharp contrasts in terms
of their political systems, economic models, and social structures,
despite their common aspirations for greater stature on the world
stage. They have also maintained a very complex relationship that
is weighed down by history but also offers promising opportunities
in an era of globalization. While the implications for the rise of
China have been widely debated, scant scholarly attention has been
devoted to the rise of India or to how these two Asian great powers
perceive each other’s ascendancy. This article examines the key
factors influencing India-China relations, including territorial disputes,
mutual threat perception and alignment patterns, and economic
partnership and competition. It categorizes Indian elites’
perspectives on the rise of China in three paradigms: geopolitical,
geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. It ends with a discussion of the
possible scenarios of future India-China relations.,28,11,4385>,28,11,4385

Crisis and Global Governance: Money, Discourses, and Institutions
James H. Mittelman (2010)

In our troubled times, dominant discourses about crisis have muddled its underlying dynamics. To refocus, analysis explicates the ideological effects of the narratives that accompany surges in militarization and financial securitization. It is argued that money in the form of military spending and finance, prevailing storylines about them, and international institutions entrench the structures. Whereas the task of global governance is to forge collective responses and make rules for addressing these evolving processes, their mechanisms as evidenced in topdown summitry such as Group of 20 forums have silenced many key issues. Prominent among the failings is the insubstantial agenda for development, especially in regard to the world’s most vulnerable populations. The old catchphrases among developmentalists will not suffice. Rather, this inquiry touches on implications for a transformation in global governance.

En tiempos difý´ciles, los debates sobre la crisis han confundido las dina´micas subyacentes. Para reenfocar, el ana´lisis explica los efectos ideolo´gicos de las narrativas que acompan˜an los incrementos en la militarizacio´n y la bursatilizacio´n financiera. Se sostiene que el dinero en la forma de gasto y finanza militar, prevaleciendo la trama sobre ellos, e instituciones internacionales afianzan las estructuras. Mientras que la tarea de la autoridad global es la de establecer respuestas colectivas y crear normas para tratar estos procesos en desarrollo, sus mecanismos como se hizo constar en la conferencia cumbre de arriba abajo en los fo´rums del Grupo de los 20, han silenciado muchos asuntos claves. El plan insustancial para el desarrollo se destaca dentro de las fallas, especialmente en relacio´n a la poblacio´n ma´s vulnerable del mundo. La vieja frase de consigna entre los desarrollistas no sera´ suficiente. En cambio, esta investigacio´n afecta las implicaciones de una transformacio´n en la autoridad global.,28,11,4386

Ideas, interests, and the tipping point: Economic change in India.
Rahul Mukherji (2012)

This paper makes the case for a ‘tipping point’ model for understanding economic change in India. This gradual and largely endogenously driven path calls for the simultaneous consideration of ideas and politics. Exogenous shocks affected economic policy, but did not determine the course of economic history in India. India’s developmental model evolved out of new ideas Indian technocrats developed based on events they observed in India and other parts of the world. A historical case for the ‘tipping point’ model is made by comparing two severe balance of payments crises India faced in 1966 and 1991. In 1966, when the weight of ideas and politics in India favored state-led import substitution, Washington could not coerce New Delhi to accept deregulation and globalization. In 1991, on the other hand, when Indian technocrats’ ideas favoured deregulation and globalization, the executive–technocratic team engineered a silent revolution in the policy paradigm. New Delhi engaged constructively with Washington, making a virtue of the necessity of IMF conditions, and implemented a home-grown reform program that laid the foundations for rapid economic growth in world’s most populous and tumultuous democracy.,28,11,4387

Transatlantic Economic Relations in a Changing Global Political Economy: Achieving Togetherness but Missing the Bus?
Michael Smith (2009)

This article focuses on the changing context for transatlantic relations within the global political economy. The first part of the article identifies key areas of structural change in the GPE and in particular the potentially revolutionary shifts caused by global instability and the emergence of new economic powers. The argument then explores changing patterns of economic relations between the EU and the US, within a general framework of continuity created by the coexistence of competition and convergence. These contextual factors are then related to patterns of Atlanticism and transatlanticism, to questions of values and identities in the GPE and to the possibility of an EU–US ‘grand strategy’ for the changing GPE. The conclusion argues that although there is perhaps more secure ground for a sustainable EU– S ‘compact’ than previously, the EU and the US may have ‘missed the bus’ in terms of jointly shaping the future of the global economy.,28,11,4388

Emerging Powers and Africa: Implications for/from Global Governance?
Timothy M. Shaw, Andrew F. Cooper & Gregory T. Chin (2009)

This article examines the increasing engagement between the ‘emerging powers’ and African countries, and the implications for international governance. The global power dynamic is undergoing a cumulative reordering process, where countries including China, India, Brazil and Russia are occupying increasingly prominent roles in the international system. In their approach to Africa, the ‘BRIC’ countries have employed a mix of soft power, public diplomacy, direct investment and private sector partnerships to deepen relations. This article suggests that strict macro-economic explanations do not allow for the myriad political, strategic and social matters that are arising in this engagement. The analytical complexities of these emerging modes of South–South cooperation are examined at state and societal levels from a political economy perspective. Despite their differing intentions, Africa and the emerging powers appear to share common goals of advancing their respective national economies and enhancing their diplomatic status. These shifts are further giving rise to a new ‘global middle’. The emergence of this multilayered international order challenges scholars to stretch conceptions of world order, multipolarity and interdependence. The article concludes by surveying the relevance of BRIC interests in Africa for various subfields in international relations and points to areas for further research.,28,11,4389

Emerging powers in Africa: Is Brazil any different?
Lyal White (2013)

Africa’s economic rise and growing prosperity over the past decade has attracted the attention of investors, development agencies and governments from across the globe. Brazil has joined this charge of established and emerging powers in Africa. Recent activities across the continent and the development of certain bilateral agreements suggest an alternative approach from other emerging powers in Africa, underpinned by development cooperation between Brazilian and African partners in key sectors. The ‘Brazilian way’, building on its positive image in Africa  primarily through development cooperation  while accumulating core commercial and strategic assets, appears to be aiming at sustainable engagement with long-term objectives. The explicit role of business in Brazil’s development agenda in Africa sets it apart from traditional European and US counterparts, which have typically relied on donor-led aid and development. However, criticism has also crept in around Brazil’s general reluctance to use its influence and commercial leverage to push for greater democratic freedoms in some of the African countries where it operates. While Brazil’s commercial interests on the African continent are slightly different from commodity-starved players like India and China, which are explicitly reliant on extractive motives linked to price and efficiency, the question remains, ‘Is Brazil’s interest and engagement with Africa any different from the rest?’,28,11,4393

Engaging Emerging Powers: Africa's Search for a ‘Common Position
Francis A. Kornegay & Chris Landsberg (2009)

Africa, viewed here as the world’s ‘swing continent’, has in the past decade started to interact with emerging market economies in more intense fashion. This represents an advancing of the continent’s integration into the global economy on terms more beneficial to the continent’s development. However, this phenomenon also represents one of Africa’s central strategic challenges; one located within what is widely considered a new ‘scramble for Africa’. In emphasising South–South cooperation and linkages of interdependence between Africa, Asia and the Americas, who is managing whom? Is Africa effectively guiding these new partnering relationships? Or is the continent, in its fragmented disunity, being strategically manipulated by emerging powers, which have well thought-through national interest agendas as they build on their unique comparative advantages in facilitating access to Africa’s resources? In answering these questions, emphasis is placed more on challenges than opportunities since the manner in which Africa comes to grips with the challenges will, in many respects, determine and define the opportunities. The problem of Africa arriving at a disciplined and consistent ‘common position’ strategy is not simply one of colonially inherited fragmentation. It is also a problem of how the strategic space of other continents interacts with that fragmentation in a manner that intrudes on Africa’s geopolitical and strategic integrity.,28,11,4394

Explaining global governance—a complexity perspective
Christine Brachthäuser(2011)

As patterns of global governance have undergone significant changes over time, there is a need for new theoretical concepts that are less oriented towards formal hierarchies and give more emphasis to social processes. A framework, however, that takes account of complex interactions and tangling relations bears the danger of losing analytical power. The article addresses the question of the extent to which complexity theory can overcome this problem by combining scientific rigour with contextual sensitivity. A dynamic mechanistic approach is explored that addresses the underlying processes that generate new collective patterns based on changed actor constellations and relational orders. An activator–inhibitor interaction model is introduced as a framework for analysing the multi-level processes that drive international change, using the example of climate protection. Global governance is theorized as it grows within the system fleshing out a new logic of collective action based on decentralization and clustering.,28,11,4395

Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: an introductory review.

This Introductory Review examines the major debates concerning the rise of emerging powers in the global system. It points to the fundamental difference between the contours of ascendancy in the first quarter of the twenty-first century from previous historical eras with reference to the number of countries placed in this category, the privileging of economic dimensions of power, and the much more elaborate and open levels with regard to institutionalization.

Ample attention is paid to the BRICS, but consistent with the image of multipolarity, it also gives some emphasis to the question of whether the changing global system provides enhanced space for middle powers. After highlighting these highly relevant contextual considerations, the core of the Review moves to an analysis centred on more specific puzzles about the foreign policy strategies of emerging powers. One major puzzle is whether the preference of rising states is to work through established institutions or to utilize parallel and/or competitive mechanisms. Another concerns the balance between material interests, status-enhancement, and identity issues as motivators for policy preferences. Still another focuses on the degree to which China should be differentiated from the other BRICS, or indeed whether the BRICS share values such as a common politics of resentment or want to differentiate themselves on a normative-oriented basis in alterative groupings such as IBSA. A more sophisticated awareness of the limitations as well as of the capacities of the BRICS - with an appreciation of the intricate mix of concerns about solidarity and sovereignty, as well as conceptual tensions between realism and complex interdependence – is not only important for assessing the future trajectory of the BRICS role in the world, but in locating space for categories of countries such as middle powers.

The major puzzle for middle powers is whether or not they will be able to mobilize attributes, notably the leveraging of ‘network power’, that provide them with comparative advantage. Although in overall terms the global system has not progressed towards multipolarity in a linear fashion underwritten by alternative actors, it is precisely due to this imprecision – and level of academic and operational contestation – that the articles assembled in this Special Issue have such salience.,28,11,4396

Global Bricolage: emerging market powers and polycentric governance.
James H. Mittelman (2013)

Contemporary globalisation is characterised by an explosion of organisational pluralism. Acronyms such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) abound. This proliferation of groupings signals a repositioning within global governance and their names serve as metaphors for adjustments among formal and informal modes of global governance. They may be understood in terms of global bricolage: a framework for analysing incipient assemblages in global governance. Rooted in cultural political economy, this notion offers a language for grasping a loose meshwork of groupings based on certain large countries in the global South. The concept of global bricolage deepens analysis of polycentric governance and enables observers to identify three major tensions that mark contemporary global order. The antinomies are between old and new narratives that represent actual or potential shifts in prevailing forms of global governance, between an emancipatory spirit and contested neoliberal norms, and between interregional coalitions and intraregional differences. Quite clearly, the manner of addressing them will bear greatly on the shape of future world order.,28,11,4397

Forum: Global Governance: Decline or Maturation of an Academic Concept?.
Henk Overbeek (2010)

Global Governance and Systemic Risk in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Financial Crisis
Ian Goldin and Tiffany Vogel (2010)

Recent decades of globalisation have created a more interconnected, interdependent and complex world than ever witnessed before. While global policy has focused on facilitating integration, the implications of growing interdependence have been largely ignored. The acceleration in global integration has brought many benefits, but it also has created fragility through the production of new kinds of systemic risks. This article provides a framework for understanding these new 21st-century systemic risks and examines the challenges they pose to global governance. The 2008–2009 financial crisis will be used to illustrate the failure of even sophisticated global institutions to manage the underlying forces of systemic risk. We show this is symptomatic of institutional failure to keep pace with globalisation. The failure of the most developed and best equipped global governance system, finance, to recognise or manage the new vulnerabilities associated with globalisation in the 21st century highlights the scale and urgency of the global governance challenge.,28,11,4399

Globalisation and Power in Weak States
Mick Moore (2011)

Both academic literature and popular ideas focus on the ways in which globalisation might be leading to convergence in the ways in which societies are governed. This is misleading. There are marked differentiation processes. Patterns of governance are diverging. These divergences are concentrated in smaller, poorer countries outside the ranks of the OECD and BRIC/emerging economies category. This article focuses on the ways in which these divergences are driven by changes in sources of government and elite revenues (‘political revenues’). As a result of late 20th century globalisation, fewer governments are funded by broad general taxation, and elites in poor countries face increased incentives to use their power for personal profit rather than the collective good. The emergence of ‘failing’ or ‘weak’ states is not an isolated or random phenomenon, but an aspect of a broader shift in the character of public authority. That understanding has direct implications for the policies employed to combat the problem.,28,11,4401

Globalization, Crisis and Social Transformation: A View from the South
Ronaldo Munck (2010)

The dominant narrative around the unfolding capitalist crisis is firmly focused on the dominant economies, and in particular the US. This is understandable given that the proximate causes of the crisis lie in the imperial heartlands and crisis resolution measures taken there will have a global impact. But a ‘view from the South’ is needed to redress the balance and prevent the decimation of global majority likelihoods being presented as mere collateral damage. The first section below tackles the crisis from a global (globalization) perspective emphasizing its impact in the South and what that it might mean in terms of political prospects. I then go on to develop a hybrid Karl Polanyi/Antonio Gramsci theoretical lens on counter-movements based on their writings responding to the last systemic capitalist crisis in the 1930s. Finally, I turn to the ways in which the international labour movement and the subaltern or post-colonial worlds are contesting the terrain vacated by unregulated market capitalism. As Gramsci would say the old is dying but the new has not yet been born.

La narrativa dominante alrededor de la crisis capitalista revelada, esta´ firmemente enfocada a las economý´as dominantes, y particularmente E.E.U.U. Esto es comprensible, dado que las pro´ximas causas de la crisis yacen en la regio´n central imperial y las medidas de resolucio´n de la crisis que se tomaron allý´ tendra´n un impacto global. Pero se necesita un ‘punto de vista desde el sur’ para compensar el equilibrio y prevenir la devastacio´n de las posibilidades de las mayorý´as globales presentadas como simple dan˜o colateral. La primera seccio´n abajo trata la crisis desde una perspectiva global (globalizacio´n), enfatizando su impacto en el sur y lo que eso puede significar en te´rminos de prospectos polý´ticos. Luego procedo con el desarrollo de una lente teo´rica hý´brida de Karl Polanyi/Antonio Gramsci sobre movimientos opuestos en base a sus escritos que responden a la u´ltima crisis capitalista siste´mica en la de´cada de 1930. Finalmente, vuelvo a las maneras en las cuales el movimiento laboral internacional y los mundos subalternos o postcoloniales esta´n disputando el terreno vacý´o por el mercado capitalista sin regulacio´n. Como Gramsci dirý´a, lo viejo se esta´ muriendo, pero lo nuevo no esta´ au´n por nacer.,28,11,4402,%20crisis%20and%20social%20transformation.pdf

Globalisation, Crisis and the Political Economy of the International Monetary

Ankie Hoogvelt (2010)

This article argues that the origins of the financial crisis of 2008 reside in the conditions of economic globalisation in the context of an imperfect world monetary order. It first describes the emergence of globalisation, after the demise of the Bretton Woods Monetary System, as a ‘historical structure’ in which financialisation has become the dominant mode of capital accumulation. It next outlines the interregnum period of a petrolbacked dollar reserve currency that underpinned, for a time, US hegemony. The concluding sections explore the consequences of the present crisis, the decline of the US dollar and alternative scenarios of world monetary order.

Este artý´culo sostiene que los orý´genes de la crisis financiera de 2008 residen en las condiciones de la globalizacio´n econo´mica dentro del contexto de un orden monetario imperfecto. Primero describe el surgimiento de la globalizacio´n, despue´s de la extincio´n del Sistema Monetario Bretton Woods, como una ‘estructura histo´rica’, en la cual la financiacio´n ha pasado a ser el me´todo dominante de la acumulacio´n de capital. Luego subraya el perý´odo interregno de una reserva de divisa respaldada por el petrodo´lar que sustento´, por un tiempo, la hegemoný´a de los E.E.U.U. Las secciones conclusivas exploran las consecuencias de la actual crisis, la decadencia del do´lar estadounidense y los diferentes escenarios del orden monetario mundial.,28,11,4403,%20crisis%20and%20the%20Political%20economy%20of%20the%20Intl%20Monetary%20dis-order.pdf

Globalization, Crisis and Transformation: World Systemic Crisis and the Historical Dialectics of

Governance and Institutional Quality and the Links with Economic Growth and Income Inequality: With Special Reference to Developing Asia,28,11,4406

Great Powers in the Changing International Order.

Of BRICs and Mortar: The Growing Relations between Africa and the Global South.

From the New International Economic Order to the G20: how the ‘global South’ is restructuring world capitalism from within,28,11,4409

Bugger thy Neighbour? ibsa and South–South Solidarity,28,11,4410

India and Africa: From Political Alliance to Economic Partnership.,28,11,4413


India's development partnership: key policy shifts and institutional evolution.,28,11,4415

Individual BRICS or a collective bloc? Convergence and divergence amongst ‘emerging donor’ nations.,28,11,4416

Introduction: rising powers and the future of global governance,28,11,4417



Middle Range Powers in Global Governance,28,11,4422

Neoliberalism and the Russian transition,28,11,4423

Network Powers: strategies of change in the multipolar system,28,11,4424

New Protagonists in Global Economic Governance: Brazilian Agribusiness at the WTO.,28,11,4425


The Shape of Capitalism to Come,28,11,4427

Quo vadis neoliberalism? The remaking of global capitalist governance after the Washington Consensus.,28,11,4429

Realising Justice.,28,11,4430

A whole new world: reinventing international studies for the post- Western world,28,11,4431

Recasting the Power Politics of Debt: structural power, hegemonic stabilisers and change.,28,11,4432

Renewing Global Governance: demanding rights and justice in the global South.,28,11,4433

Reshaping Global Economic Governance and the Role of Asia in the Group of Twenty (G20)

The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power,28,11,4435

Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy Promotion: the case of Brazil and India.,28,11,4436

Rising Donors and the New Narrative of ‘South–South’ Cooperation: what prospects for changing the landscape of development assistance programmes?,28,11,4437

Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo.

Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa.,28,11,4439

Introduction: rising states, rising donors and the global aid regime.,28,11,4440,%20rising%20donors%20and%20the%20global%20aid%20regime.pdf


‘The South Will Rise Again’? New Alliances and Global Governance: The India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum.,28,11,4442

Squeezed or revitalised? Middle powers, the G20 and the evolution of global governance.,28,11,4443

Sub-imperialism as Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African ‘deputy sheriff’ duty within brics,28,11,4444

The ‘Ankara Moment’: the politics of Turkey’s regional power in the Middle East,28,11,4445

The BRICs and the Washington Consensus: An introduction.,28,11,4446


Will they have table manners? The G20, emerging powers and global responsibility.,28,11,4448,%20emerging%20powers%20and%20global%20responsibility.pdf

The material and symbolic construction of the BRICs: Reflections inspired by the RIPE Special Issue.,28,11,4449

Responding to the Global Credit Crisis: The Politics of Financial Reform.,28,11,4450

The politics of legitimate global governance.,28,11,4451

The 'R' in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?

The Return of Crisis in the Era of Globalization: One Crisis, or Many?

The Washington Consensus as transnational policy paradigm: Its origins, trajectory and likely successor.,28,11,4454

Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner.,28,11,4455

Trilateral Development Cooperation: Power and Politics in Emerging Aid Relationships,28,11,4456

World Turned Upside Down? Rise of the globalSouth and the contemporary global financial turbulence.,28,11,4457

What do Asian Countries Want the Seat at the High Table for? G20 as a New Global Economic Governance Forum and the Role of Asia.

Asia’s Strategic Participation in the Group of 20 for Global Economic Governance Reform:
From the Perspective of International Trade's-Strategic-Participation.pdf

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