The Cape of Good Dope?
A post-apartheid story of gangs and vigilantes

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The event

> Everything lies in the challenge and the duel – that is to say, everything
> still lies in the dual personal relation with the opposing power. It is that
> power which humiliated you, so it must be humiliated. And not merely
> exterminated. It has to be made to lose face ... it must be targeted and
> wounded in a genuinely adversarial relation. (Baudillard 2002:25-26)

Pagad (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) entered the South African political
landscape in dramatic fashion. On the night of the 4th August 1996, Pagad drove in
convoy from the Gatesville Mosque to the house of the head of the Hard Livings gang,
Rashaad Staggie. He was not home, but in an act of bravado, arrived. Already shots
had been fired between Pagad and those inside Staggie's Salt River home. While trying
to alight from his vehicle, he was shot in the head. As he fell out of his bakkie, 'his
inert body, apparently dead, was kicked, jumped on, hit with the butt of a shotgun and
shot several more times before a petrol bomb was hurled at the body. Miraculously,
this revived the mortally wounded man and he rose and tried to run away, only to be
brought down by a volley of gunfire from the crowd'. (*Sunday Tribune* 11 August
1996)

All this happened in the full glare of the media and with the police present. It was one
of the first times a movement in post-apartheid South Africa acted with such impunity
and with such directness in respect of their aims and objectives. Pagad wanted to rid
the flats of gangs and drugs. Participants in its first big mass march had just killed a
leading gangster and known drug-dealer.

Five years later Pagad was involved in another dramatic incident in the city centre:

> Shots were fired and pedestrians scrambled for cover as policemen
> engaged in a shootout with seven men who escaped from court in Cape
> Town . . . The seven members of Pagad's G-Force, faced urban terrorism
> charges. They apparently overpowered a policemen in the high court's
> holding cells during a lunch break and seized his gun . . . scaled a gate to
> reach Queen Victoria Street, and were then involved in a shootout with
> the police in the after-lunch traffic in the city centre. (The Mercury, 5
> October 2001)

What had happened in the five years that turned Pagad from being an organisation
seeking to rid the Cape Flats of druglords into fugitives from the law?

Theoretical excursions

> Our concepts or ideas form the mental housing in which we live . . . the lenses through which we see the world. (Blackburn, S. 1991:2-5)

Given the way Pagad set about its objectives, it is necessary to take a detour into theories of collective violence.

Graumann effectively summarises the various perspectives that have been taken in the literature on 'the crowd': 'Whether the negative attitude against crowds originated in the "rational" defense of one's position, or in the "irrational" fear of the rising masses, or in both, is a matter of interpretation owing to one's perspective. We can take it for granted that in any threatened establishment there is both' (Graumann 1986:222). Following Graumann there are those who see the crowd as irrational, impulsive, and barbaric, while others see the crowd as comprising essentially normal people responding in a violent way against those they see as responsible in some way for their grievances.

Early theorists of the crowd like Le Bon (1895/1960) considered that persons became deindividualised when they became part of a crowd; that is; they experienced a loss of rational control. Further to this, they argued that the person in the crowd underwent a regression to the 'primitive' or 'savage', and this resulted in the individual becoming no more than an 'animal acting by instinct'.

What triggers this situation? For Le Bon, there is a collective excitement produced by crowds. Faced with this situation, people quickly lose the critical reasoning faculties characteristic of day-to-day life. In close proximity to each other, people are more prone to the machinations of mob leaders. Stimulated by the crowd 'mentality', individuals regress to more 'primitive' types of reaction. It is the physical proximity of others that triggers, crowd action. Rationality is abandoned, and people can be influenced willy-nilly.

This approach, which holds that for masses of people to act in common or in concert, they have to lose their individual consciousness and rationality, has been found to be without logical or empirical foundation. McPhail (1991) points to a substantial body of evidence that shows, rather than the loss of critical thought and self-control during widespread disruption of routine behaviours and social relationships, human beings 'remain in control of their wits and their behaviours . . . It is characteristic of such problematic situations that individuals' critical thinking and purposive control of behavior are enhanced rather than diminished' (p. 14).

Another group of writers on the crowd, including Hobsbawm (1971) and Tilly (1978), by contrast, emphasise the crowd's behaviour as a response to their subjugated position, rather than in terms of the influence of mass hypnosis. They take issue with the supposed deviant nature of the crowd and argue that legitimate grievances lie behind and informed crowd behaviour. Hobsbawm (1971), for example, argues that the 'historical mob did not merely riot as protest, but because it expected to achieve something by its riots' (p. 111).

Whereas the 'irrationalists' concentrated on the transformation of the individual in crowd situations, the approach that came to be known as 'collective rationalist' has stressed the social purposes of crowd violence. By and large they have analysed crowd phenomena in

terms of the composition of the crowd, the nature of the targets the crowd attacked, the historical context of time, and the specific 'spark' that preceded the onset of crowd violence.

Charles Tilly's early work in the raid-1960s confronted and attempted to debunk the position that violence resulted in 'breakdowns in established moral solidarities' (Rule 1988:173). In his later collaborations with Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow (2001), they distinguished four bases involved in collective action and the development of social movements: political opportunities, mobilising structures, collective action frames and repertoires of contention.

For Le Bon, political actors are the victims of manipulation. For Tilly, collective action sees people acting together in pursuit of their interests. Action is purposeful and calculated. Contenders continuously weigh expected costs against expected benefits.

The approach adopted in this study avoids viewing crowds as rational or irrational. Rather, I follow Dunning, Murphy, Newburn, and Waddington (1987), who suggest that the terms 'rational' and 'irrational' are misleading and argue that 'it might be more fruitful to see crowds not as "rational" or "irrational", but rather to explore the changing balance over time between what one might call the "expressive" and the "instrumental" aspects of different types of disorders' (p. 24), 'expressive' violence being the cathartic release of aggression, and 'instrumental' violence being protest to redress grievances. Rule (1988) makes a similar point when he argues that 'there is much to suggest that crowd action is not always strictly purposeful, if by this we mean oriented only to instrumental ends. Some militant crowd action is clearly consummatory rather than instrumental, and such action often includes the sorts of hair-raising sadistic and destructive acts that inspired the anxiety-ridden visions of the irrationalists. Such actions appear to be ends in themselves, rather than means to some longer-term end' (p. 242).

In the case of Pagad, it will be seen that the violence that became emblematic of the movement had both consummatory and instrumental aspects. In the march to Staggie's house, there was clearly an intention by the majority of marchers to confront him on his home turf. There was planning and symbolism here. Once Staggie broke through the police lines and confronted the marchers, there was a spontaneous reaction.

Pagad developed a particular repertoire of mobilising tactics. The march on Staggie's headquarters became emblematic of how Pagad confronted drug-lords. A meeting would be held outside the mosque. From there marchers, some hidden behind scarves would arrive outside the shop or house of a drug dealer and demonstrate. They would deliver a first and final warning that they had to put an end to their drug dealing or answer to the people. In the demonstration there was a deliberate attempt at shaming. According to Keenan this strategy is mostly successful in an environment where there is 'exposure to others and susceptibility to their gaze…' (Keenan 2004: 437). However, more often than not, the drug dealer was "embedded" in social networks in the community that legitimised his "business" and assuaged any feelings of guilt and shame. In any case the local drug dealer was beholden to a druglord and clearly could not meet the "first and final warning of the people". The answer of "the people" would be a bullet. Some of the leading gangsters and drug-dealers were eliminated, creating fear and pandemonium in the ranks of the underworld.

Those who decided to confess would have to do this in public. On the Cape Flats a home-grown localised version of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was enacted. Archbishop Desmond Tutu's stricture that the process of reconciliation was 'not about being cosy; it is not about pretending that things were other than they were. Reconciliation based on falsehood, on not facing up to reality is not true reconciliation' was taken seriously (quoted in Eze 2004: 765). The drug dealers would be forced to pay their profits into Pagad bank accounts, to be used for Pagad's drug rehabilitation programmes. Pagad here was prefiguring the State's own forfeiture assets unit and bypassing it when it came into existence.

Clearly, we see here the instrumental and rational aspects at work. Pagad's tactics were instrumentally designed to isolate and create fear in the world of the gangsters and drug-lords while also creating opportunities for them to make a "clean break". However, once the bombing campaign started, then one sees the consummatory aspects. In this campaign there was always the potential that 'innocent' bystanders would become victims. Part of this slide, as will be shown, happened as Pagad faced increased repression, so it retreated into smaller secretive cells.

Against this backdrop an understanding of Pagad would be facilitated by tracking Pagad's changing relationship with the State, the particular and peculiar political context of the Western Cape, the influence and impact of global forces, the form, style and extent of Pagad's embedding in the communities of the Cape Flats, and the different predispositions of the Muslim community in relation to the organisation. In order to develop such an understanding, one has to take cognisance of the challenges to Islamic leadership that 'coincide with the inaugural years of democratic governance having, on the one hand all the attendant uncertainties of transition, and on the other, new spaces for popular protest and action' (Jeppie 2002:221).

Leadership and social composition

> Observers of the drama unfolding in Cape Town would have noticed a myriad of seemingly discordant voices coming from the public PAGAD leadership, even if limited to two or three people. On one day they could be 'willing to die tonight' for the 'One Solution, Islamic Revolution' option and on the next day they could be 'sensible, ordinary community people who are fed up with drugs' and who dismiss the idea of an Islamic state as 'laughable' . . . this reflects the tension between a leadership position being exercised from a safe distance, and the ostensible one which is exposed to the public and incidentally, one which has not had a historical or ideological relationship with Qibla. (Esack, 1996, 24-25)

As it became more powerful as a movement, so Pagad was accused by those within the Muslim community and government of being a front for Qibla. This was heightened when Muhammed Ali 'Phantom' Parker, Pagad's Chief Commander, warned of Qibla trying to take over control of Pagad. Parker was expelled, followed by Farouk Jaffer and Moegamat Nadthime Edries. Jaffer was Chief Coordinator and Edries was Head of Security.

People like Parker claimed that the radicals in Qibla had taken over the organisation. But perusing newspaper articles at the time, while Parker was the main voice of Pagad, he was prone to make the most outlandish statements. Soon after Staggie's killing, he said that Cape Town should prepare for suicide bombings and warned gangs:

> If they are not going to listen then I will pack myself full of explosives and pay somebody a visit. Then they will know. If they dare to burn mosques, if they burn just one mosque, there will be Jihad. Africa will smoulder. (*Mercury*, 6 August 1996)

Things started to change when the police turned on the heat. Edries was arrested for the murder of Staggie (the charges were subsequently withdrawn) and asked Parker and Jaffer to come in for questioning. It was at this time that Parker, et al, took to blaming the radicalisation of Pagad on Qibla, their own statements seemingly forgotten.

Qibla's Achmat Cassiem argued that there was no direct link between Pagad and Qibla:

> I don't have links to Pagad, they have their own administration, but all Muslims I must insist and all genuine leaders around the world are opposed to gangsterism and drugs and to any form of intoxicants. (Derek Watts speaks to Achmat Cassiem, Carte Blanche, 28 September 2001)

A Pagad spokesperson AR holds on the Qibla issue:

> People will work with any organisation which has the same aims and objectives as us. It wasn't because of Qibla's involvement that there was incitement of people. Qibla had no bearing on the decisions of Pagad. (Interview AR, October, 2003)

Christopher Clohessy, a Roman Catholic priest and at the time a member of Pagad, held that 'despite allegations that Pagad has been manipulated by Qibla infiltration, the agenda appears to have remained the same: to confront. I myself know nothing substantial about Qibla: if, as is being claimed, Pagad was from its inception a Qibla initiative, this does not make the initiative any less noble or legitimate' (Clohessy 1996:70).

According to Cassiem, Qibla 'was formed specifically to present an Islamic perspective on the liberation struggle, because most of the parties that were involved did not cater for an Islamic perspective, and as a result most of the Muslims joined the nearest organisation that opposed the regime, but a liberation struggle fights not only against certain things, it also fights for certain things, and what we are fighting for is a just social order' (Derek Watts speaks to Achmat Cassiem, Carte Blanche, 28 September 2001).

While Cassiem might not have had a direct influence on Pagad, his ideas did make inroads into Muslim thinking in the Cape - thinking influenced by the Iranian revolution. Inscribed in Cassiem's position is the *umma*, the global community of believers. 'For a Muslim, the fundamental attachment is not to the *watan* (homeland), but to the *umma*, or community of believers, all made equal in their submission to

Allah. This universal confraternity supersedes the institutions of the nation-state, which is seen as a source of division among believers' (Castells 1997:15). The idea of a global *umma i*s what Pagad's Amir was referring to when he proclaimed that 'the government poses a definite danger to our community and the police are nothing but legal gangsters in uniform . . . this is the same scenario to be found in Bosnia, Algeria, Egypt, and all over the world, where governments are discriminating against Muslims' (Pillay 2003:296). These developments were linked locally into fluidity within the Cape Muslim community. Changing circumstances were making it difficult for the *Imam*, who is traditionally at the centre of the Muslim community, to maintain the dominance he would normally expect. Implicated here is the declining relevance of traditional modes of addressing social problems, as a Pagad representative told Dixon and Johns:

> I don't think that (the traditional, mosque-based system) was working throughout . . . It's based on very small types of societies. You basically have a community, a mosque, the Imam at the head of the mosque and everybody being loyal and obedient or least paying allegiance to the mosque. That model actually goes back to the nineteenth century . . . and I think the problem we . . . faced at the end of the 1980s (was) that the mosque system was not sufficient, partly because of the fact that the community (was) growing very big and we have a much larger society than the small little communities living next door. (Dixon and Johns 2000:11)

Jeppie points to how an *Imam*, a senior member of the *Imam's* association, the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), was set upon by a group of dissident worshippers who were abusive and wanted to physically attack him (Jeppie 2000:217). It was felt that the *Imams* were too forgiving and compromising. Pagad, which led numerous, attacks on *Imams*, draws 'on an alternative Islamic tradition of rebellion, confrontation and defiance. Pagad draws on those elements in Islamic religious sources - the Quran and the practice of the Prophet Muhammad - that emphasise the believers' imperative to oppose indecency, crime, deviance, and injustice . . . But this radical theology grants it religious legitimacy at one level. Its practice is really more pragmatic and tactical. Thus Pagad itself seems to have accumulated a number of "reformed" drug addicts and ex-gang members to its cause. In the course of fighting the drug-pushers in the name of Islam, they have provoked the opposition of a large section of the community including the Imams. Pagad responded by classifying the Imams not merely as "hypocrites" but as "religious gangsters"' (Jeppie 2000:221) *Imams*, who often had a monopoly of leadership in communities, found Pagad difficult to contend with (Tayob 1996:33).

Certainly for Pagad, there was a challenge to the traditional leadership. 'At the time of our formation, there was no proper Islamic leadership. Those who stood on the *mimbar* (pulpit) and preached did not use the opportunity to address the social ills in the community. They felt threatened by us and tried to cut us off from mosques. We had to fight them to fight the gangsters' (Interview AR, October 2003).

This begs the question of the social composition of Pagad. It would appear that the initial impetus of the movement drew on 'sections of the middle-class neighbourhood watches of the Cape Flats, especially the predominantly Muslim residential areas'

(Jeppie 1996:15). Parts of the rationale for this lay in the fact that middle-class youth were increasingly attracted to crack cocaine. However, while the leadership and membership of Pagad were almost exclusively coloured and Muslim, the movement soon transcended class divides. This was because as Jeppie puts it, 'class and locality do not fit together . . . simplistically . . . the middle class drug consumer market and gangster activity are connected and overlap. Peddlers . . . are actually the "contracted" distributors for much bigger drug-lords who are gang bosses. Petty crime such as burglaries and car thefts are often the result of indebtedness to a "merchant" or the result of having to procure substances to satisfy a bad habit' (Jeppie 1996:14).

Both middle- and working-class people were integrally involved in Pagad. Those I met while doing fieldwork ranged from flower-sellers and carpenters to owners of construction companies and medical doctors. In its early days Pagad's leadership was not aligned politically, and included 'an African National Congress (ANC) branch executive member, a carpenter and an alarm fitter . . . ' (Manjra 1996:40). A critical commentator on Pagad from its earliest days, Farid Esack, who saw in Pagad the 'rise of conservative religio-ideological forces seeking to protect the new South Africa from the "scourge of democracy and liberalism"', noted the 'myriad of seemingly discordant voices coming from the public Pagad . . . A number of strands converge . . . without any coherent distinction between them, one can simultaneously belong to more than one stream' (Esack 1996:24-25). Those streams could range from Africanists alienated from the PAC to those 'who believe that the values of the liberal democratic state (are) repugnant to human decency and subversive of all religious values and there are those who believe that there is only one solution for South Africa and the world, an "Islamic" revolution along the lines of the Iranian experience. At all of these levels, the discourse is essentially an anti-state one which feeds on deeply felt community concerns' (Esack 1996:25).

Women were integrally involved in the Pagad upsurge, 'aggrieved and angered by the abuses waged upon them and their families by the men in leather jackets and fast cars who rule the streets of their neighbourhoods' (Dodd 1996:64). The spokesperson of Pagad is a housewife, Abieda Roberts, while at the level of activity, Pagad member, Fatima Zahra, points out that in delegations of ten who confronted drug merchants, there were always three or four women. Yet a another woman member, Fasiegha Arendse, argues that their presence goes unreported by the media because 'women are always conveniently written out of history of these things' (Quoted in Dodd 1996:67).

S is a Woodstock mother. She became involved with Pagad, by default, when her brother R, who was involved in the organisation, got arrested. She works at Independent Newspapers and is not shy or quiet about her Pagad association. This, she holds, has resulted in her being marginalised in the workplace and she has faced the effects of subtle threats from management. She says, 'Drug dealers felt safe because their neighbours didn't do anything about them. People were cowered into a space of apathy. I suppose that's how I initially reacted until my parents' home was bombed'. This happened, S says, because her brother was active in Pagad's operations and became a headache for the gangsters. Her parents lived in Athlone at the time, and have since moved to a safer area. S's brother was 29 at the time, and she says his arrest followed a shooting at a gangster's home.

S continues: 'Pagad empowered me in a way. I was able to make a meaningful contribution to my community. My brother was fired from his job and my parents lived in virtual fear of their lives. We could either sit back and allow the drug dealers and gangsters to take over our lives, or do something about it. All we did was pass on the message. People had to know that there were others in the same predicament as them. Working in a newspaper environment and having had the opportunity of seeing things from both sides, it became clear to me that the media were lazy to write the real stories about Pagad and their activities. I would call the journalists and give them information about Pagad's activities, but they would simply sit on their telephones and take down a police report.'

S was initially sceptical of organisations involved in the community. She never wanted to get involved with Pagad from its inception in 1995. 'I wanted to make a meaningful contribution. I hated organisations. Most of the organisations which sprung up from the 80s and 90s were playing power games and I was not prepared to subscribe to that mentality.'

Then, when S was 21 years old, her life changed, when she came face to face with the harshest and most violent brush with gangsterism: 'On my way from home, I was raped. In a train by seven men. I was helpless. Each of these dirty, angry but young men raped me one by one. I was on my way home'. But S was not prepared to be a victim. She fought back. 'I joined a trauma centre and started giving voluntary counselling to people. I realised there were other women like myself who kept quiet. Cape Town is such a dangerous place. Some parents don't give a damn about their children. My community activism was all the power I had. I was walking the streets to tell the youth not to permit the gangster culture to take over their lives. Then came Pagad. At first I watched and waited. And then when R got arrested, I had to do something.'

S was cautious about what she accepted from her Pagad leaders and stood up and questioned at every opportunity when she found something was not appropriate to her: 'There was a faction among the leadership which became too militant. It was "Phantom" Parker and his group and I repeatedly asked about the significance of all the violence associated with our marches. Personally I feel we could have solely mobilised around local issues instead of bringing the Palestine and Afghanistan problems to our struggle. There was too much emotion put into fighting than common sense. We should have moved away from the fundamentalist tag that was given to us'.

Asked if her mind had been changed towards the organisation, she said: 'I have not forsaken Pagad. I don't want to stop marching and this is the view of many people. It's a pity that the organisation has been stereotyped as Muslim. I live alongside white neighbours and they believe in Pagad' (Interview, October 2003).

The framing

> ' . . . framing refers to the interactive, collective ways that movement actors assign meanings to their activities in the conduct of social movement activism . . . successful framing translates vaguely felt dissatisfactions into well-defined grievances and compels people to join

the movement to do something about those grievances. (Buechler 2000:41)

Pagad describes itself as a 'broadly based multi-faith movement', that is 'non-aligned, non-affiliated to any political movement' (Interview AR, October 2003). Despite this, the label, 'Muslim movement' has stuck. Part of this lay in the fact that 'its rhetoric and grassroots support expressed unmistakable Islamic characteristics. Its marches, scarves and slogans evoked scenes from international Islamic movements' (Tayob 1996:30). As Jeppie points out 'Pagad members would march - for the occasion, men in *kaffiyehs*, women in black *hijab* - through the main streets to the homes of alleged drug dealers. They marched after late night mass meetings at mosques, followed by prayers and *dhikirs*, so that the marches could be physically and collectively prepared to "confront the enemy"' (Jeppie 2000:227).

The fact that the meeting place was outside the mosque (most often the Gatesville Mosque), reinforced the label, 'Muslim movement'. Some have taken on this issue of Muslim as a positive. Na'eem Jeenah saw Pagad continuing past traditions: 'From the arrival of Muslims on these shores, Muslims have been engaged in a struggle against oppression and dictatorship . . . Muslims have striven with might to achieve justice here… the Pagad phenomenon is just a continuation of this heritage' (Jeenah 1996:18).

The language of the meetings was dominated by an Islamic discourse. 'Quranic verses of struggle and slogans, introduced first by the Muslim Youth Movement from Egypt and Pakistan, reverberated at the end of Pagad meetings. More directly, reflecting the founder of Qibla, Achmat Cassiem's, Islamist version, the Quranic verse appealing for unity, "Hold on fast to the rope of God and be not divided" (3:103), was recited at the end of every meeting with members holding hands over their heads . . . Unity, togetherness and standing up for truth and justice charged and overwhelmed Pagad meetings. The atmosphere and motivation was certainly and unmistakably Islamist' (Tayob 1996:32).

Initially, the slogans at meetings were drawn from the days of the liberation struggle: 'Kill the drug merchant, kill!' drew on the ANC Youth League president, Peter Mokaba's, 'Kill the Boer, kill the farmer', and the PAC slogan, 'One Settler, One Bullet!' But this also in time got an Islamic inflection captured in the slogan 'One Solution, Islamic Revolution'. Statements by leadership also reflected Islamic orientation. Witness the words of Salie Abader, the Pagad security chief who faced charges of killing Rashaad Staggie: 'Whether you have a legal or illegal firearm, they (the gangsters and drug dealers) must be removed. If you take a firearm and see a merchant, don't tell them they are rubbish or criminals. Call out the name of God and let Allah guide the bullet' (*Cape Argus*, 14/12/2000).

The "global" also impacted on identity. One of the ways of understanding this impact is through images portrayed in the media.

Gabeba Baderoon provides some interesting insights in analysing stories on Pagad in South African newspapers in the week 5-12 August 1996. One image was particularly striking. On 5 August 1996, the *Argus* story on Pagad was accompanied in the right hand corner of the page by 'a small picture of an unidentified man whose face is masked by a scarf, known in Cape Town as a "Palestinian" or "Arafat" scarf. In

subsequent coverage of the story, this masked figure, and others like it, would move from the side of the page to the centre, and would become ubiquitous. Even in coverage of protests by people unrelated to Pagad and an analytical article . . . the image of the masked figure appeared. Wherever Muslims appeared in the public sphere, so did the masked figure' (Baderoon 2003:323).

Baderoon argues that the South African media, unable to make sense of the Pagad phenomenon and without an understanding of Islamic iconography, came to rely on an Orientalist discourse, readymade with the backing of international precedent. So the *Argus* and *Cape Times* of 'that week referred to "holy war", "suicide bombers", "militant", "extremist", "jihad", "death threats", and "vigilante group" in potent combination with images associated not only with Pagad, but with Islam . . . In a reduced vocabulary, the connection of Pagad to Islam, Islam to violence, and violence, therefore to all Muslims was made' (Baderoon 2003:333).

Baderoon also points out Pagad's own culpability. While suspicious of the media and sometimes hostile, they also fed the media certain images 'because it learned the advantages of playing to the stereotypes which drew the most attention' (Baderoon 2003:333).

Identity and organisation reinforced each other. Charles Tilly has commented on how important organisational factors are in explaining 'the differences between situations in which participants feel grieved but act collectively and similar situations in which they do not . . . especially the resources participants are able to collectively mobilise to engage in collective action'. Tilly called these primitive solidarities 'catnets', a term derived from a combination of 'category' and 'network'. For Tilly, catnets were basic building blocks for mobilisation in collective action. Whatever the nomenclature, pre-existing networks were seen as providing the core resources for social movements, and they did so because movements represented the interests of these groups' (Tilly in Hanagan, et al 1998:xi). While there is much to take from Tilly, what he does not explore is how these pre-existing solidarities can constrain a movement and provide barriers to it broadening its appeal. Pagad's strength lay in its ability to call on pre-existing networks. These centred around the Muslim community. But this strength was also to prove to be Pagad's Achilles heel, for by not breaking out of the mould of 'Muslim', Pagad could not reach the majority of Coloureds who were not Muslim. This 'narrowness' impacted on the two ways social scientists have distinguished vigilantism, viz. social control and crime control (Johnston 1996:228). In Pagad, social (e.g. raging against homosexuality) and crime control tended to overlap, which limited a broader appeal. In response, non-Muslims could be mobilised against Pagad on the basis of pre-existing religious, ethnic and class divides.

Tilly also does not factor in how, in order to reinforce 'commonality', an organisation turns on those who question or refuse to join, (re)creating divisions and forcing the organisation to look inwards as it attempts to police boundaries. This point is made brilliantly by Bauman: 'It will not be just an explicit refusal to assume the communal duty that will be branded as treason, but a less than full dedication to the communal cause. A sinister "fifth column" conspiracy is spied in every sceptical gesture and every question addressed to the wisdom of communal ways. The half-hearted, the lukewarm, the indifferent, become the community's prime enemies; the main battles

are fought on the domestic front rather than on the ramparts of the fortress. The declared fraternity reveals its fratricidal face' (Bauman 2002:97).

The State

> Among their most notable accomplishments, the criminological positivists succeeded in what seemed impossible. They separated the workings of crime from the workings and theory of the state. (Matza 1969:143)

Inscribed in Pagad's repertoire was the public indictment of police collaborating with gangsters. This earned it the wrath of the police attached to 'local' police stations. Pagad clearly was not a 'neighbourhood watch' working in tandem with the police. Both began to work against each other. The police accused Pagad of undermining their credibility and 'taking the law into their own hands'; Pagad countered that the police were infested with rogue policemen and were intent on 'criminalising' Pagad. This 'distance' was exacerbated by Pagad's refusal to work through Community Policing Forums (CPFs). The CPFs were an offshoot of the neighbourhood watches, given statutory recognition but no real power. They consisted of community members and police. The CPFs were 'corporatist' structures at a local community level, and while creating an interface between the police and community, seemed to work against mass participation and mobilisation because all issues had to be 'mediated'. The issue of CPFs could not be separated from a perception that many of the police were implicated in having relationships with the gangsters and were generally seen as often acting like gangsters on the Flats.

Community members faced intimidation if they spoke out, with gangsters often being fed information on what was said at meetings. An investigation by the Public Protector's office headed by Selby Baqwa in 1998 'found that senior Cape Town police effectively shielded members of the notorious Hard Livings gang from the rule of law for years . . . Advocate Stoffel Fourie, who worked on the investigation for Baqwa, says the police work was generally "of very poor standard . . . Most of the residents live in fear and would not dare lodge any complaints . . . People who have lodged complaints with the police are mostly intimidated, and in some cases even assaulted or murdered"' (*Mail & Guardian*, 6 March 1998).

Evidence kept piling up of police complicity in making dockets disappear: 'For example, in May 1999, 28s gang boss and member of the drug cartel The Firm, Ernest "Lastig" Solomons, walked free on murder and kidnap charges. The Cape High Court heard how the investigating officer, Superintendent Gert Ellis, carried the Solomons docket, which was tampered with, in his briefcase for eight years. The investigator was suspended months after Judge Jeanette Traverso described him as "the least credible witness I have come across in my 30-year career"' (*Cape Argus*, 8 June 2001).

As Kinnes has indicated, in some cases gangsters and drug dealers joined the CPFs!

> The abuse of power within legitimate structures by illegitimate actors was nowhere more obvious than in the Bishop Lavis CPF. During the late 1990s, gangsters infiltrated the CPF and set themselves up as community workers, thereby gaining access to police strategies. After it

was discovered that one of the 'community workers' was the brother of a prominent drug dealer, a new executive was elected. In a follow-up of the case, it was discovered that a person belonging to the CPF had approached the Goodwood magistrate's court with the view of becoming a lay assessor. The same person later interfered with the case, and a charge of attempting to defeat the ends of justice was laid against him. (Kinnes 2000:7)

While some theologians, like Farid Esack, called for 'a quiet, ongoing and determined involvement in community-based anti-crime forums, neighbourhood watches and police forums' (Esack 2002:180), Pagad's approach was certainly not to be 'quiet' or submerge themselves in state sponsored structures. Pagad's policy of not only boycotting the institutions of the State but also 'delegitimising' them was to earn Pagad the wrath of the State and the police. This approach, though, could only be sustained if one could sustain mass mobilisation. Increasingly the State was to make this more difficult, both in the way it policed Pagad marches and the tying up of Pagad members in court cases.

The relationship between Pagad and the State changed over the years. At the beginning, the ANC saw possibilities for itself in the movement. It had lost the Western Cape to the NNP and was on the lookout for opportunities to make inroads into the Coloured constituency. In the immediate aftermath of the Staggie killing, the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, effused that Pagad had 'wakened the soul of the community' (Quoted in Jeenah 1996:17).

On the other hand, local police were virulently against Pagad. In the aftermath of the killing of Staggie, police spokesperson, Superintendent John Sterrenberg, said that Pagad 'members can no longer be considered victims of crime, but as criminals themselves . . . We are combating a gang war here. This is a war between two gangs. The actions of Pagad are exacerbating the problem, as we now have to take action against them as well as trying to stamp out criminality in all its forms' (*Natal Witness*, 6 August 1996).

The Safety and Security Minister, Sydney Mafumadi, was equally condemnatory of Pagad. However, at a national level, the police took a more conciliatory stance. The National Police Commissioner, George Fivaz, met with Pagad and called for Pagad to work with the police (Shaw 2002:35). Pagad, it seemed, was also open to talking to politicians. It marched onto parliament on 11 May 1996 and presented Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, with a list of demands. But attitudes started to harden.

According to Pagad's website, the 'government's failure to respond to Pagad's plea to bring an end to the disease that the society was plagued by, made the people lose whatever little hope they had in the system . . . The government's inability to act, forced the people to take action themselves'. This position was reinforced by AR: 'Pagad was eager to work with the justice and safety and security departments. However, over time we were labelled an illegitimate, vigilante organisation by the State. We were demonised. At the same time there was disillusionment with the State's inability or unwillingness to respond to repeated demands for action against the gangsters' (Interview AR, October 2003).

As Pagad got more militant in its attacks on gangsters and its criticism of government, so the State began to attack Pagad. Gangs also started to fight back. Pagad member, Faizel Ryklief, was shot after a march on the American's gang in Bridgetown. According to Pagad, the police enforcement that marches could not cover their faces (invoking the 1969 Prohibition of Disguises Act) made their members vulnerable. The open carrying of firearms was also seized upon by police and banned. With echoes of Fanon (1959), some women turned to veils, which they did not normally wear, to disguise themselves from gangsters, the veils ensuring they remained visible and noticed (Fatima Zahra, in Dodd 1996:66).

The attacks facilitated Pagad's drift into small, secretive cells that came to be known as the G-Force. 'Their task was to protect - the "G", purportedly standing for guard - the leadership, but they became the only way that Pagad could operate' (Jeppie 2000:228).

This was a different Pagad from that described by Father Christopher Clohessy who 'always perceived the leadership to be in tune with the people. And at times when the leadership appeared to be losing focus, the response of the people appeared sufficient to bring them back' (Clohessy 1996:74) Despite Clohessy's belief that it was "inconceivable" that there could be two Pagads, this was to become a reality. An above- and underground Pagad were born.

Mansoer Manuel, a member of Pagad's Grassy Park G-Force cell, who became a NIA informer, gave some insights into G-Force operations when giving evidence in court.
He told the court that Abdul-Salaam Ebrahim (Pagad's Chief Coordinator) referred to G-Force as *Hizbollah*, the Army of Allah. The *amier* (spiritual leader) of his G-Force cell was Hendricks. Those who disobeyed the *amier* faced certain death. The G-Force of Grassy Park had 20 members. Orders would come after a 'masoera', a strategic planning meeting. Words from the *Quran* were often used as a code. For example, when they spoke of the *azaan* (call to prayer) starting, it meant there had to be a pipe-bomb attack.

Manuel spoke about an attack on the Wynberg Synagogue: 'In December 1998, Mr Ebrahim sent word that the Grassy Park cell needed to work as they were very quiet. At first, we were ordered to bomb the Sea Point Synagogue. But the cell felt it was too dangerous and decided instead to bomb the Wynberg Synagogue'. He described the unfolding of the operation: 'We referred to the making of a pipe bomb as "baking a cake". The bomb used in the synagogue attack was rectangular and the smallest bomb we ever made. They prayed on their way to their target. Faried Mohammed (40) detonated the bomb after struggling to light the cracker fuse . . . The first three months after the NIA agents had recruited me, they telephoned me at least once a week for information. I eventually gave them information and was paid R3 000 every month' (*Cape Argus*, 10/10/2000).

Even more startling were the revelations of the trial of the 'Pagad Four' who appeared in the Oudtshoorn Regional Court on explosives, theft and weapons charges in February 1999. One of the four, Ayob Mungalee, revealed himself to be an NIA agent. This claim was verified by Superintendent Henry Beukes. A NIA spokesman, Helmut Schlenter, revealed that Mungalee was an informant not an agent. Police maintained that Mungalee was an acting NIA member who had been instructed to courier explosives to Cape Town (*Mercury*, 10 March 1999).

Pagad spokesman, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, responding to the expose of Mungalee, held that the explosives belonged to the NIA: 'They did not belong to Pagad. They will try to frame people now. They want to cover their backs' (*Natal Witness*, 25 February 1999)

The Mungalee affair led to a revealing address by Deputy Intelligence Minister Joe Nhlanhla to a special sitting of parliament on 9 March 1999. Nhlanhla dismissed claims that there were tensions between the NIA and SAPS as 'a figment of some people's minds'. He pointed to both corruption and collusion in the SAPS who leaked information to gangs before important operations. This was made worse by elements of the 'Third Force who continue to use their old networks, including people in the security forces. To be able to succeed we need the security services to rid themselves of these elements through arrests that lead to their puppet-masters' (*Mercury*, 10 March 1999).

The State not only recruited informers, but also took to arming Pagad operatives. In one case, made public in 1997 (before the spate of bombings), the Western Cape attorney general, Frank Kahn, was reported to want to charge two police officers. These charges were a response to 'a sting operation last year in which police handed back a dud hand grenade to People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad), who used it in an attack on an alleged drug dealer. Both sides in the conflict used grenades from the same batch in attacks on the Cape Flats earlier this year . . . Intelligence operatives say such sting operations are common in attempts to infiltrate the ranks of vigilantes and gangsters . . . The dud grenade failed to explode when it was used to attack an alleged drug dealer in Crawford. But a pregnant woman was killed in another attack where a grenade from the same batch was used . . .' (Andy Duffy, *Mail & Guardian*, 21 November 1997).

Alongside this, the provincial ANC also entered the fray and attempted both to get *Imams* to condemn Pagad, while trying to delegitimise the movement in the media and with potential funders, like the Iranian government.

Just as suddenly, a different kind of violence was laid at the door of Pagad - a series of bomb-attacks between August 1998 and August 2000. The State pointed the finger at Pagad. Pagad denied culpability.

The State's attacks got more brazen. Mandela entered the fray. In the final speech to the first democratically elected parliament on 5 February 1999, Mandela, without expressly naming Pagad, fumed: ' . . . what started off as a campaign against gangsterism has now become a violent and murderous offensive against ordinary citizens . . . what is portrayed as moral and god-inspired oppression, exploitation and imperialism, has assumed the form of terrorism . . . This campaign is rotten to the core; it is misguided; and its attempts to invoke religion (are) blasphemous . . . What fighter against crime would engage in a campaign that diverts resources of the police from dealing with criminals!' Safety and Security Minister, Steve Tshwete, and Justice Minister, Penuell Maduna, pronounced that Pagad was responsible for the spate of bombings. Minister Tshwete declared war on Pagad (Media briefing hosted by the Justice and Constitutional Development Ministry on 13 September 2000).

Clearly the State's position had changed from Dullah Omar's promise to look into Pagad's demands in May 1996 outside Parliament and Police Commissioner Fivaz wanting Pagad and the police to work together, to Pagad's criminalisation and repression.

State attention was turning the spotlight on Pagad. The organisation was labelled as 'gangsters' and 'terrorists'. This allowed the police to impact on the organisation's mass mobilisation against gangsters and druglords, forcing Pagad to fight 'defensive battles' in the courts and to go through formal processes to march. This meant that the element of surprise and spontaneity was removed, crucial weapons in Pagad's armoury. Clearly, Pagad had underestimated 'the power of the state to criminalise' (Cohen 1996:3).

Pagad tried to point to other suspects. Pagad leader, Abdul Salaam Ebrahim made allegations that former Vlakplaas commander and National Intelligence Agency (NIA) agent, Dirk Coetzee, and a notorious company boss, Cyril Beeka (who was on trial for the murder of a Chinese national), were behind the bombing at the Waterfront as part of a move to control the security network in the area (*Daily News*, 2 October 2000).

But the State persisted in laying the blame on Pagad. For Percy Sonn, who headed the Scorpions Task Team in Western Cape at that time, Pagad was involved in 'clear acts of treason' but admitted there was no 'conclusive evidence' to convict the leadership. As to Pagad's allegations of police corruption and Third Force involvement, Sonn retorted: 'If Pagad has information on these attacks, then let it bring evidence before the court of law. If it chooses not to, then all the talk amounts to is rumour-mongering by an organisation hellbent on discrediting the criminal justice system' (*Sunday Tribune*, 30 January 2000).

It had become 'common sense' that Pagad was behind the 'urban terror' campaign. This was despite the fact that the Minister in charge of intelligence had pointed to corruption and Third Force elements in the justice system. And if Sonn accused Pagad of treason but admitted no evidence, then was he not involved in rumour-mongering?

If the spate of bombings was directed by Pagad, then why the change of tactics from confronting gangsters and those with political power to anonymous bomb attacks? Mark Shaw, in similar vein to a number of other commentators, holds that, 'from mid-1998, the targets chosen reflected a combination of State institutions, such as police stations or magistrates courts, tourist locations like the city's popular waterfront, a series of restaurants in crowded nightspots, and, targets with their particular symbolic connotations such as a gay bar and a synagogue . . . The Pagad case illustrates how initially vigilante responses to crime can assume a much more anti-government stance. In fact Pagad could now be defined less as a vigilante organisation than a terror group with particular motives, although these are difficult to discern' (Shaw 2002:98-99). Was Pagad responding to the increasing attacks on 'Muslim' targets by the United States? Was this the work of State agents, trying to draw Pagad out? Was it the result of a cell of the G-force acting independently, given the arrest and/or surveillance of the leadership of Pagad?

Interviews with G-Force members like MB, while providing valuable insights, provide no answers in this regard. MB was imprisoned for more than four years for charges

including car theft, possession of pipe bombs, attempted murder. He was acquitted when the State case fell apart. He will not comment on whether the accusation that Pagad is responsible for the Cape urban terror is true, or whether the organisation is responsible for the assassination of more than a dozen leading gangsters in 1998. He does, though, talk of his work as a G-Force member. The members of the security department operate in cell structures. The cells are responsible for protecting the areas where Pagad members live. Every cell has a commander who is accountable to the security department. Each geographic area thus has its own structure and co-ordinator. This is where MB fitted in.

MB said that none of the members in G-Force knew each other. 'When we attended meetings at Gatesville or any other mosques, we would meet, not knowing what our backgrounds were'. He is from Grassy Park, a mixed Coloured and Indian area in Cape Town. He worked as a builder and ran a fairly successful company until his arrest. He has a wife and four children and while working as a builder supplements his income by fixing cellphones. He has spent over R200 000 of his savings on his appeal. Pagad does not pay for appeal matters.

Clearly MB is streetwise, and knows who the gangsters are and where they operate from. 'Policemen stand with the gangsters. They are corrupt. Before I joined Pagad we would complain to the police only to be told that they need evidence before they can take action. As a cell we would meet in the mosque, separate from the Gatesville congregation, and talk about issues. I studied Arabic and would lead the meetings. If I had to say something people believed in me and would not question it.' He and his cell members were confident and strong and were able to defend themselves: 'We would not tolerate the gangsters' nonsense. We met them with force head on'. In 1998 MB was arrested, then released, arrested again in 1999 and was finally released and acquitted in 2002.

Would he still want to be involved with Pagad after the long period in jail and the money he had to pay to defend himself? 'Pagad as an organisation still operates. But people who were part of my cell don't want to come to the fore any longer. They fear for their lives and those of their families. Even some Pagad ex-prisoners don't want to get involved. Actually, my personal view, even though I am a member of Pagad's working committee, is that the organisation is only surviving because it has to. Once all the court cases are finalised, there will no longer be a Pagad.'

MB dismisses all claims that Pagad's security department has an agenda to overthrow the government or any other political agendas: 'Pagad stands for a good cause. We never wanted to engage in an armed struggle. All we wanted to do was to stop the drug dealers. We had to deal with the root of crime'. For him these were the dealers in drugs.

MB is critical about the role of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), which controls almost all the mosques around the country. He suggests political aspirations of the MJC leaders who are close allies to the ANC, is the same organisation, which called for a clampdown on Pagad 'because we had shown up ANC leaders for their inefficiencies as government ministers' (Interview MB, October 2003).

The "Crack"

> Many thousands of street kids (have) little alternative but to enlist in the cryto-Keynesian youth employment programme operated by the cocaine czars . . . the only rational option open to youth – at least in the neoclassical sense of individual economic choice – was to sell drugs. Indeed as power resources in the community have generally declined, ghetto youth, refusing simply to become 'expendable', have regrouped around one social organisation that seems to give them clout: the street gang.' (Davis 1988:51-52)

In Soweto students took on the gangs and routed many of them in 1976, forcing a decline in gang activity and fostering a politicised 'alternative youth culture' (Glaser 2000:179). But the challenge did not happen on the Cape Flats, allowing gangs to keep growing in their attraction to young people and increasing their power in communities. In fact, there are stories that MK units had to negotiate with the Cape Flats gangs for safe passage in the 1980s.

The proliferation of gangs and crime was facilitated by apartheid policing: 'Black people were policed for control and not crime prevention, the police aimed to prevent crime in white areas not by reducing it in black areas but by preventing the uncontrolled movement of black people, who were considered to be its perpetrators. Thus the police spent an inordinate amount of resources on arresting people for apartheid administrative offences… but seldom confronted criminal violence in the township themselves' (Shaw 2002:1).

By 1994, the two most influential gangs were the Hard Livings and the Americans spread out across the Cape Flats into cells of 15-20 members. The Americans had a loose alliance with the Sexy Boys while the Hard Livings were allied to a myriad of smaller gangs (Schärf and Vale 1996:31).

In the 1980s, gangs like the Hard Livings were still limited to their neighbourhood. Money, in addition to drugs, came from gambling and extortion. The gangs did not only rely on naked force and fear to embed themselves in communities. Often they would distribute food parcels to the needy and give assistance at funerals. Many in the community would also rely on the gangs to buy 'cheap' television sets, VCRs and the like. There were cruder tactics too. Rashaad Staggie, for example, would drive through the streets and throw money from his car (Kinnes 2000:7).

The fall of apartheid met neo-liberal globalisation, with its accompanying paradigm of deregulation, dropping of exchange controls and privatisation, facilitating the porousness of borders. And so the flow of illegal substances was facilitated in South Africa.

There were also other factors at play. The transition saw the coming together of 11 former police forces into the SAPS, providing all kinds of co-ordination problems. This was exacerbated in the Western Cape by the fact that the police were controlled by the New National Party (NNP) and the Department of Justice by the ANC; the lack of co-ordination was compounded by politicking. So for example after a doctor was killed on the Cape Flats, the ANC Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, commented that

the inability to deal with the violence was because 'the provincial government has totally ignored the problem' (*Mail & Guardian* 26 September 1997).

At the same time, 'international syndicates saw South Africa as an accessible new market. The drug markets in the western world were levelling off and South Africa was not only a potentially large market in its own right, but its transport and communications infrastructure, together with the weakness of the State and the venality of its officials, made it ideal for new trans-shipment routes to other destinations, at least in the short term. Drugs poured into the country and the criminal justice system offered little resistance' (Schärf and Vale 1996:33).

Crack made its appearance: 'the poor man's cocaine'. Crack was soon to replace mandrax as the drug of choice on the Cape Flats. To this must be added cheaper forms of alcohol. Illegal distillers were starting to put on the market alcohol at cheap prices. The alcohol would have a familiar tinge of Smirnoff vodka for example. Like crack, its effects on the body were devastating. As a social worker put it, it 'slowly eats up the body, picking bits off like a vulture' (Interview, December 2003).

This changing environment cannot be decontextualised from the apartheid state's willingness in the 1970s and 80s to sanction covert groups who bypassed South African laws. Inscribed in the state operations were widespread smuggling and the undermining of international sanctions. One outcome of this was the fact that operations of covert state activities became adept at running 'illegal businesses'. Some in post-apartheid South Africa made the transition to using this knowledge and old networks to facilitate the emergence of South Africa as a trans-shipment point for illegal goods. Alongside illegal smuggling rackets, the apartheid state co-opted vigilante groups and street gangs into dealing with anti-apartheid mobilisation. With the changing political environment, the druglords of the Cape Flats 'that developed criminal ties with key members of the apartheid security forces have been in prime position to profit from illicit enterprise . . . ' (Standing 2004:38). Gang structures responded to the new opportunities:

> . . . with the opening up of South Africa's borders after the 1994 election, and with the realization that foreign crime syndicates were likely to exploit the new situation, most of the Western Cape syndicates decided to establish a cartel. Their aim was to reduce turf battles, to order bulk shipments, to distribute the drugs in pre-arranged proportions at agreed prices, and to allocate distribution areas in terms of a set of agreed principles. In many senses of course this reflected the monopolies of South African capitalism. Called 'The Firm', the cartel substantially changed the nature of organised crime in the Western Cape after 1994 . . . Most of the local leaders of Hard Livings were provided with seed capital and cars to run their own drug trade. The role of the leadership of Hard Livings became one of merely collecting the money and co-ordinating activities. The developments . . . reflect a progression of a common criminal gang moving up the ladder of sophistication on its way to become a well-organised criminal group. (Shaw 2002:75-76)

Gangs were responding to the changing circumstance in a way that Schumpeter (1961) linked to economic innovation: ' . . .the exploitation of new economic opportunities

and new commercial networks, the creation of new needs for commodities and services, and/or the rearrangement of productive processes and labour organisation' (Ruggiero, et al 1998:6).

What is clear is that criminal elite has emerged. Many have moved into the formerly white suburbs and rely on local 'strong-men' to maintain their 'business interests'. By 1996, for example, police could reveal that Colin Stanfield had assets worth R 30 million (Schärf 1996:60).

Andre Standing cogently explains the way the druglords' money is accumulated: '(T)he sad truth is that the predatory nature of capitalist development on the Cape Flats has allowed a handful of individuals to carve out what amounts to private domains . . . They are able to monopolise power within these domains and gain control of a significant proportion of economic activity . . . the wealth of the leading gangster on the Cape Flats shows little sign of enriching the rest of their communities. Notwithstanding the activities of gangster-philanthropists . . . the profits of illegal enterprise do not trickle down to the inhabitants of the Flats, but are piped out as expenditure on luxury goods and investment in suburban real estate. Nor is there any evidence that crime bosses pre-occupied with rent-seeking activities will nurture socially responsible companies that will help to build a prosperous local economy . . . the future of the Cape Flats seems bleak unless something can be done to redistribute power and wealth currently monopolised by leading organised crime figures' (Standing 2004:49-50).

Standing fails to make a connection between the rapidly-made fabulous wealth of the Cape Flats 'businessmen' and that of a small black elite that were a short time ago pristine political icons. The way black economic empowerment (BEE) has come to be is along similar lines to Cape Flats organised crime, and in a way legitimates this form of capital accumulation. Some of the leading anti-apartheid figures are becoming wealthy very quickly, feeding off 'gifts' from white capital and government contacts. One deputy government minister put it as a time to get 'filthy rich' (Quoted in Adam, Slabbert and Moodley 1997:201). The Ramaphosa's, Sexwale's and Motsepe's are the new role models and so a belief in a 'millennial capitalism . . . invested with salvific force . . . epitomised by forms of money magic, ranging from pyramid schemes to prosperity cults, that pledge to deliver immense, immense wealth by largely inscrutable means . . .' is let loose (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003:785).

And the trend is set to continue. Leading members of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), all dressed up in designer suits and wielding attaché cases, have linked with white mining magnates in a 'get rich' scam. (March 26 to April 1, 2004). In Cape Town the feared Junior Mafia have ditched gangster dress and tattoos for designer outfits, gelled hair and latest model BMWs.

But it is important not to paint the gangs on the Cape Flats with one brush. There are the bigger, better-organised gangs, as well a myriad of smaller gangs. While many are involved in drug-peddling, they are not the conduits for bringing drugs into the community. Gangs are a 'way of life'. This has been variously labelled as 'defiant individualism', 'carnalismo' (brotherhood) and 'machismo' (masculinity) (Valdez 2003:17).

"The Man"

> The alleged absence of role models . . . came not from the absence of men and masculinity in their lives – the lads were surrounded by a macho propaganda more potent in its penetration of young men's hearts and minds than any other time in history – they were soaked in globally transmitted images and ideologies of butch and brutal solutions to life's difficulties. (Campbell 1993:323)

On almost every street corner, at the bottom of the stairs of flats, boys and young men congregate. Often talk is of violent escapades, not only of fighting other gangsters, but also of violence perpetrated against sexual partners and rape. Imbricated in this talk is the showing off of 'sexual conquest'. Of the eleven top gangster arrests highlighted in the *Cape Argus* (22 October 2003), four of the eleven were charged or convicted of rape, and eight were charged with assault, attempted murder or murder.

Permeating the language of street-level gangsters is the idea of respect. But respect cannot come from having a job and providing economically for one's family. It is not a weapon that can be used to demand control over wives and children. In fact, women on the Cape Flats have taken jobs in the service sector, in supermarkets as packers and cashiers, and as office support staff. For most men these are 'sissies'' jobs, and most balk at working under the supervision of women or pushing carts around offices delivering tea and coffee. Many of the men live off the earnings of their lovers and wives. Are tales of sexual conquest one way of retrieving masculine dignity in the face of economic dependence? And is rape part of this pursuit too?

To get to the heart of this requires 'deep' ethnographic work that can enter the shaping of family organisation, intimacy, gender power relationships and so on. That is beyond the scope of this study. Phillipe Bourgois' ethnographic accounts of inner-city Puerto Rican men in New York points in one direction. He holds that the men 'confined to the margins of the nation . . . that no longer requires their labour power, reconstruct their notions of masculine dignity around interpersonal violence, economic parasitism, and sexual domination. Increasingly large proportions of frustrated, desperate men have taken refuge in a street culture of resistance that roots its material base and its ideological appeal in the growing drug economy, which offers a concrete alternative to exclusion from the legal economy . . . rather than being mere pawns of larger social structural and ideological forces, drug dealers who participate in street culture are active agents seeking dignity – even if violently and self-destructively' (Bourgois 1994:414). Bourgois is careful not to legitimate violence, by also holding that the drug dealers, while 'victims from a social structural perspective, . . . are also agents of destruction in their daily lives. They wreak havoc on their loved ones and on the larger community'. But he keeps reminding that behind this in the United States lies 'the *de facto* apartheid ideology that legitimates a public "common sense" tolerating rising levels of immiseration among the working poor' (Bourgois 1996:425).

There prevails also a masculine identity that emphasises money, designer clothes, jewellery and flashy cars. Part of this 'conspicuous consumption' is related to the emergence of a new Black elite both of the 'underworld variety' and those operating in the 'open economy' under the prerequisites of black economic empowerment. This new elite with its extravagant lifestyle has unleashed a form of what Veblen has called 'pecuniary emulation'. Through the concept of emulation Veblen argued that those

lower down the class hierarchy will try and emulate those of higher income, status and power rather than struggling and organising to create a different society predicated on the elimination of the 'leisure class'. In looking at the actual and aspiring consumption patterns of gang members on the Cape Flats one can see the veracity of Veblen's theory (Veblen 1953; Dowd 2002).

A belonging

> Men and women look for groups to which they can belong, certainly and forever, in a world in which all else is moving and shifting, in which nothing else is certain. (Hobsbawm 1996:40)

The Muslims finding a place in Pagad and Coloured youth finding a place in gangs, both relate to the issue of uncertainty, of a sense of community under threat. Echoing Jock Young's summation: 'Just as community collapses, identity is invented' (Young 1999:164).

While researching on the Cape Flats, the *Cape Argus*, under the banner headline, 'Gangsters will fall – and they'll fall hard', revealed the arrest of the 'high-flyers' of the criminal underworld. Provincial Commissioner, Mzwandile Petros, is quoted in the article: 'We have set the goal for police stations that they arrest at least one "high-flyer" in their areas each month' (*Cape Argus*, 22 October 2003). All the names revealed to the media were Coloured. When I questioned people on the Cape Flats, the majority of responses to the arrests went like the following one: 'Why are the Coloureds victimised? Gangs are not only brown people. All those guys in government, they are gangsters' (Interview, October 2003). In this context, it is worth noting that the latest figures of South Africa's prison population reveal that about 78.6% are African, 2.1% white, 0.4% Indian and 18.9% Coloured. The figure for Coloureds is some three times the percentage of the general percentage of the population (*Business Day*, 11 November 2003)

A feeling of marginalisation always looms. Ernie 'Lastig' Solomons, a high ranking boss of the 28s, complains that no-one is looking out for the 'bruinmense': 'The people in the informal settlements get water for nothing, electricity for nothing. They are not even from here. We, who suffered through the years, are not being helped' (*Mail & Guardian*, 2 August 2002).

Issues of identity, belonging, survival, are all part of the attraction of the gang, as teacher turned hip-hop artist Emile points out:

> Being so-called Coloured is the most confusing and mind-boggling thing there is. Although people brush it aside, the sense of belonging is important – especially now in this country. Kids wonder where they fit in. Before, when people spoke of 'black', it included us – now it doesn't. A gang can give you a sense of family and security and finance – possibly many of the things a group identity would give. That is what makes it a bit easier for kids living in Khayelitsha and Gugulethu – their sense of family heritage and ancestry. (Emile, Black Noise, 1998, quoted in Battersby 2003:123)

The repression of Pagad has allowed the gangs a greater space. But with most of the senior gang leaders dead, the Firm started to splinter as new leaders vied for control. Up till July 2002, eight people died in gang-related violence every month from the beginning of the year in Hanover Park. In Mannenberg and Tafelsig gang-related violence also continued unabated. In Hanover Park the Americans were ranged against the Taliban, a loose agglomeration of the Laughing Boys, Ghetto Kids, School Boys, Fancy Boys and Mongrels. In the two square kilometres that make up Mannenberg, five gangs vie for turf, while in Tafelsig fourteen gangs jostle for dominance. Community-based organisations have started negotiations to have a ceasefire and this has brought down overt killings and violence. The police have started to talk to gangsters. Gangsters have become involved in development projects. In Tafelsig the construction of basketball courts 'will include a gangster: in Baviaanskloof it will be a Hard Livings member, in Piketberg a Wonder Boy and in Leeuwenkop a Dixie Boy' (*Mail & Guardian*, 2 August 2002). This is serving to entrench gangs into the very fabric of community life. In some areas this is so advanced that 'they have largely replaced council authority and filled the vacuum left by the lack of jobs, social services and recreation facilities. They organise everything from cash for school uniforms, a free taxi ride to hospital, rent money and soccer tournaments' (*Mail & Guardian*, 2 August 2002).

Traditionally one could only 'pick up' a gang number while in prison. But, now one can now 'be taught' the number outside jail (Steinberg 2004). This has enabled the 26s and 28s to grow considerably.

The denouement?

> . . . places of resistance . . . ambiguous spaces where the marginalized are (momentarily) located at the centre of power, where certain power relations are confronted, while others are (re)inscribed. (Routledge 1997:85)

As during apartheid, gangs on the Cape Flats generally play the role of social control. They avoid confrontations with the State/police and remain largely within the townships. Any organisations that took up issues of poverty, crime and violence would first have to come up against gangs who did not want competing influences in the community and did not want the attentions of the State. Those organisations/movements that were able to successfully turn private troubles into public issues (Wright-Mills 1959), like community movements that are involved in reconnections of basic services and militant marches in the city centre, are criminalised by the State and labelled hooligans, thugs and so forth.

Pagad, too, once it brought to public attention the State's inability or reticence to act on gangsterism and drugs, was criminalised. Initially 'while bombing criminals was in itself a criminal act, this could be accepted for the sake of community safety' (Shaw 2002:98). But once they began an open critique of the State, labelling it 'illegitimate', they were in turn labelled as 'terrorists'. 'When the government launched Operation Good Hope to smash "urban terrorism" in the Western Cape, Pagad was clearly the prime target of this operation' (Kynoch 1999:56).

How much of the criminalisation of Pagad and its labelling as 'terrorist' was a political act by the State? If Pagad tuned to smaller, secretive cells that took to isolated acts of terror, it was precisely the State's infiltration, repression and sowing of divisions that forced it into that route.

The State adopted a range of measures to weaken Pagad. Firstly, it used existing legislation to stop Pagad members wearing any scarves to disguise their identity, refused the public display of firearms and insisted on the long bureaucratic mechanisms for marches to be allowed. This of course negated the surprise element in confronting druglords.

Secondly, it used State agents to infiltrate the organisation, or turned Pagad members into State agents. This created paranoia and facilitated Pagad drifting into smaller cells. At the same time, Pagad was openly labelled 'criminal' and 'terrorist' by the State. The ANC co-ordinated a programme to 'squeeze' Pagad from meeting spaces in mosques and encourage leading Muslims to denounce Pagad. In the words of the State 'war had been declared on Pagad'.

Thirdly, it tied the Pagad members into a number of cases. In many instances the members walked free, but it consumed resources and time and scared away potential supporters. Crucially, the state then went after the Pagad leadership. 'The state relentlessly pursued the Pagad leadership through the legal channels. Pagad was exhausted through the lengthy and expensive court cases. Key figures were apprehended, and eventually a number of them were found guilty and incarcerated. The movement was neutered in this way' (Vahed and Jeppie 2004: 259).

It is interesting to note in this regard how the State responded to South Africa's largest vigilante organisation, Mapogo a Mathamaga, founded by Monhle John Magolego on 27 August 1996 in Limpopo province. With a membership around 50 000, it took to brutally and publically sjambokking alleged criminals. As Magolego put it, flogging 'is the African way of stopping crime. The criminal must lie on the ground, and we must work on his buttocks and put him right' (Knox and Monaghan 2003:190). From the date of its formation 'at least twenty people are thought to have been killed by Mapogo, although none of those initially charged have been convicted. Although 607 members of the group were arrested between 1996 and 2000 and charged with a range of offences, including kidnapping, assault and attempted murder, only fourteen have been convicted of any offence. In August 2000, Mapogo's leader, John Magolego, and eleven other members were cleared of murder and assault charges because witnesses were too frightened to testify against them' (Knox and Monaghan 2003:193).

Regional government offices had also turned to Mapogo. When British journalist, Decca Aitkenhead, asked Magolego about the charges of murder and assault he 'did not deny that some deaths might have occurred. "Yes, yes, . . . when people are angry, at times they can overdo it . . . But the *main* aim is not to kill. Why, even a doctor can take a patient to the operating table and try to cure him. There will always be casualties, you see, but we are like the doctor . . . Yes, we are only trying to cure the criminal"' (Aitkenhead 2002:169). It was only when Magopelo nailed his colours to the United Democratic Movement (UDM) that the ANC called on its members to resign from Mapogo and form a splinter group. If Pagad is less than one-hundredth the number claimed by Mapogo a Mathamaga, and Pagad's G-force has killed less than

one-tenth of those killed by the Transkei-based Mfelandawonye, then why the focus on repressing Pagad? It has been argued that the reason for this is Pagad's turn to a bombing campaign. But this still begs the question of the State's repression of Pagad before the bombs went off.

Part of understanding this heightened repression is that, unlike other movements with the label vigilante, Pagad was making direct attacks on the ANC and publicly labelling ANC leaders as 'gangsters' and political criminals. Pagad members, for example, invaded the home of then Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar. In a province where it was vital that the ANC broaden its support base on the Cape Flats, Pagad was a threat and, unlike other 'vigilante' groups who act as a form of social control, Pagad was questioning the State's willingness to fight crime, bypassing the corporatist structures set-up by the State, managing at the same time to sustain mass mobilisation, embarrassing Muslims who were ANC leaders and questioning the very legitimacy of the State.

If Pagad tuned to smaller, secretive cells that took to isolated acts of terror, it was precisely the State's infiltration, repression and sowing of divisions that forced it into that route.

Fourthly, the identity that made Pagad strong also made it weak, and the State was able to play on this. Pagad's mainly Muslim base and its organising around the precincts of mosques gave it an existing network, but in order to establish hegemony or at least appear to, it had to either subsume existing organisations or, if the voices were critical, to turn on them. As *Imams* and the MJC expressed criticism of Pagad, Pagad was tempted into battles that created tensions in its primary base. And once the bombing started and the focus shifted to Pagad and Muslims, many saw the need to overtly create a distance from Pagad.

The State, by labelling Pagad as criminals and terrorists and hounding them through arrests, was able to isolate Pagad, and when Pagad turned to the *Imams* for support, the doors of the mosque were closed to them as Pagad but open to them as individual worshippers beholden to the *Imam* and, if not beholden, at least silent about the re-assertion of the leadership and legitimacy of the MJC.

Pagad, by conflating the gangsters and the government as a common enemy, cut itself off from any engagement with the State. Whatever success it had in pushing back the stranglehold of the gangs, it was not able to consolidate those gains. In the absence of engagement with the State it needed to maintain hegemony over the space it had de-territorialised from the gangs. This Pagad was not able to achieve. The State was able to undermine Pagad by using its repressive arsenal, allowing the gangs to re-territorialise some areas. Earlier in Pagad's history Jeenah argued that 'partnerships are now possible between the community and the State to together combat the threats to peace and stability. It is true that peace cannot exist without justice, but the struggle for justice does not have to be a struggle for the overthrow of the state' (Jeenah 1996:21). As shown, Pagad was not able to develop a working relationship with the State, let alone any kind of partnership.

People count costs in joining an organisation. And the costs for those involved kept mounting. Families of those jailed are a reminder of this. This militates against a

revival of Pagad. In addition there is a growing turn to the creation of what Vahed and Jeppie call 'liberated zones'. This 'does not imply animosity to the state nor is there a serious proselytising to it' (Vahed and Jeppie 2004, 268). Examples of 'liberated zones' include shariah-based law, finance and investment, education and media. The use of the term 'liberated zone' is somewhat of a misnomer because in these zones there is an attempt to create islands of a "Muslim world" that is tightly policed often by reference to a conservative and non-debateable reading of Islamic texts. This is an inward looking Islam that is the anti-thesis of the way Pagad conducts itself.

The gangs seem to have done much better than Pagad. For Shaw gang formation in Cape Town 'has been the survival strategy of the poor. A result of grinding poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and dislocation caused by apartheid forced removals, gangs have been a powerful organising principle for the communities of the Cape Flats. Under apartheid, gangs were often harshly and indiscriminately policed, while at the same time being used to target political opponents of the state' (Shaw 2002:74). Disillusioned by political parties, abandoned by activists that run civic associations, are people returning to gangs as a strategy of survival in an environment of grinding poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and threats of dislocation through evictions?

On the Cape Flats, jobs in the formal sector get lost. Casualised jobs get created. Political parties up the ante on race and ethnicity as they attempt to bank votes. Muslims, while dreaming of a global *umma* take refuge behind the veil and the *moulana*. The veil for a brief moment in Pagad's trajectory used to ensure participation without fear, is now a means to ensure women are '(in)visible and (un)noticed' (Steven Pile 1997). Gangs prey on the poor in their own communities. A new drug is on the market called 'tik-tik'. It is a mutation of LSD. It is filled into straws and cut up to be sold and is taking over from other drugs. The gangs have not only remained on the 'Flats' but have moved into Woodstock and Sea Point. While Pagad, if the allegations are true, tried to bomb its way into the city centre, the gangs moved quietly and with more success.

Vigilantes mete out instant justice, feeding into the spiral of injustice. The State channels money into policing and prisons as it tries to placate credit rating agencies and currency speculators and protect its own class interests, all the time hurting development and redistributive projects. The new black bourgeoisie links up with apartheid capital feeding off the trough of privatisation and getting yanked into the circuits of global capital. Integration and marginalisation are the contradictory impulses of globalisation. NGOs, CBOs and religious organisations all try to mitigate the excesses and sometimes mount challenges to the State.

There are pointers that foreign syndicates, the Chinese Triads (perlemoen and shark fin), the Nigerians (heroin and cocaine) and the Pakistani mafia (mandrax and crack) are becoming more visible.

Are the social forces discussed here - vigilantes, gangs - not manifestations of the effects of the commodification of more and more aspects of life? A response to deepening marginalisation and poverty? A process of what Castells calls '*perverse integration',* where sections 'of the socially excluded population, along with individuals who choose far more profitable, if risky ways to make a living, constitute an increasingly populated underworld . . . ' (Castells 2000:73). This, of course, is

happening exactly at the time that the traditional organisations that defend the poor, trade unions and the State, find themselves unable or unwilling to provide a safety net for those without defence.

Pagad was an organisation that in its initial orientation set out to fill this vacuum, and in the process came to be defined as a vigilante movement (Ero2000; Shaw 2002). Johnston has defined vigilantism as 'a social movement giving rise to premeditated acts of force - or threatened force - by autonomous citizens. It arises as a reaction to the transgression of institutionalised norms by individuals or groups - or to their potential or imputed transgression. Such acts are focussed upon crime control and/or social control and aim to offer assurances (or "guarantees") of security both to its participants and to other members of a given established order' (Johnston 1996:232). Autonomous citizens are those engaged in voluntary activity 'without the state's authority or support' (Johnston 1996:226).

Keeping within this framework, there is verity to defining Pagad as a 'vigilante movement'. However, what we also see is that a vigilante movement which is born pressing a very narrow grievance or demand can rapidly radicalise and grow into a movement that questions the legitimacy of the entire social and political order, should it, in pursuing its original demand, come to the view that the social and political order has an interest in denying it its narrow and, at first glance, reasonable demand. Some have argued that Pagad was predisposed to be anti-systemic in its methods and rhetoric because it was the brainchild of Islamic radicals (housed within Qibla) to exploit perceptions of the ANC's being soft on crime as a basis for a wider push towards Islamic revolution. While this charge is given some credence by Pagad's later trajectory where a series of expulsions and 'defections' took place blamed on the growing influence of Qibla on Pagad, this is too narrow a view. It neglects the very powerful, if latent, desires in communities where Pagad came to operate that are, literally, infested with gangsterism, to which Pagad gave expression. As Shuaib Manjra put it, 'Pagad gave hope to these people where they saw none . . . Pagad represents the response of civil society who clearly feel alienated from the political process. Past structures campaigning for the political and civil rights of communities in the hegemonic battle against the apartheid regime disappeared with the onset of a democratic government. This vacuum and widespread disillusionment made fertile ground for militant mass struggles led by whoever is prepared to take up this popular cause' (Manjra 1996:38-39). Qibla did not need to form Pagad. Pagad was waiting to be born. If the ANC led government had anything to do with what Pagad was to become, it is in its reaction to the organisation. For the State Pagad became a 'terrorist' organisation and for the police just another gang.

Many of the members of Pagad could not sustain the mobilisation necessary to keep up the pressure on a number of fronts - gangsters, the State and the policing of internal boundaries. It tried to move beyond the Cape in order to broaden its base. But Pagad could not break out of the identity of 'Muslim organisation' and this militated against its ability to sustain any significant presence. In any case there was strong current to keep Pagad 'Islamic'. At the same time the State was able to hive off the MJC, as well as other 'moderate' voices in the Muslim community in the Cape, from Pagad, while using its repressive arsenal to curtail Pagad's operations, exhausting the energy and resources of the organisation.

In the case of Pagad, we see the truth of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's assertion that 'a combination of exhaustion, sectarianisation, and cooptation' is central in eroding the ability of a movement to continue mounting protest actions (2003:66).

Appendix A.
Methodology

> By means of observation
> Knowledge is generated; on the other hand knowledge is
> Needed
> For observation. (Brecht, 1979, 237)

In both cases (Pagad and gangs), I was following the tradition of qualitative or more particularly naturalistic inquiry. What Babbie and Mouton define as a 'commitment to study people in their natural life-worlds through immersed observation…the term "natural" also reflects a concern with the "normal course of events" and the qualitative researcher's desire to be as non-intrusive as possible…the aim of most qualitative researchers is to blend in and become 'participant' observers of the events they investigate…' (2004:270-271).

My initial contact with Pagad was made through my involvement in the anti-war movement (Iraq) in Durban. The organising committee consisted of a few former local Pagad members. In the first instance they facilitated contact with a very senior Cape Town Pagad member who had relocated to Durban. These same contacts gave me the necessary introductions to Pagad in Cape Town.

This, though, did not dispel suspicion. Pagad had faced a tremendous amount of repression, and there was also a general feeling that state agents had infiltrated the organisation. Given this context, I slowed my research process, gaining entry by stages. All the time, I was trying to build a reciprocal relationship of trust between myself as fieldworker and my hosts, a method highlighted by Rosalie Wax, who wrote of the process of involvement being circular and cumulative: 'The less anxious a fieldworker is, the better he works, and, as he becomes aware that he is doing good work, he becomes less anxious. Usually the essential factor in this transformation is the assistance and support-the reciprocal response-given him by some of his hosts' (Wax 1971:20).

I began to rely on field notes. But my constant writing fuelled suspicion. I then started to write down memory cues and in the evenings make fuller notes. In writing up the field notes, I followed John Lofland's general advice of the five components of field notes: running description; previously forgotten happenings that are now recalled; analytical ideas and inferences; personal impressions and feelings; notes for further information. (Lofland 1971:104-106).

What worried me was that, except for one person, all the Pagad members I met were male. I then enlisted a Muslim woman journalist to help with contacts. This was a successful move. Suddenly, a new world of Pagad opened up. I was able to talk to women who went on the marches and women whose husbands were imprisoned, some for life. It gave me considerable insight into why Pagad had become such a popular organisation and why it found it difficult to sustain its mass momentum.

All the time I was on the Cape Flats I was aware of the gangs. They seemed to be on every corner. I realised that to tell the story of Pagad was to tell the story of gangs. Here, too, some initial contacts in Durban helped. I was an organiser for a union that

was involved in a massive strike at the Engen plant in Wentworth. One of the central figures in the strike had spent many years in prison and had 'picked up' a high number in one of the prison gangs. He gave me a contact for a member of the Americans gang who had just been released from prison after a lengthy incarceration. A friendship emerged when the guy came to Durban to 'cool off' and spent time with people I also knew. The 'American' was staying with a person who had once sponsored a soccer team I had played for. The club was called K&B and came to be locally referred to as 'Kachies and Buttons' and later as 'Knives and Bushknives' Football Club. K&B actually referred to two guys from Overport who were murdered and the club was formed to remember them by. All this 'history' really helped my ability to earn the trust of some of the leading members of the Cape Flats 'underworld'.

I was really interested though in the 'foot-soldiers'. While the research into Pagad was overt, the research into the gangs was somewhat covert. Many of the gang members knew I was writing something but I tried to be as un-obtrusive as possible and took to blending in. What anthropologists have called 'deep hanging out'. This approach Leslie Banks has cogently summarised as 'simply circulating in the research area, speaking to people informally and gathering information on an *ad hoc* basis' (Banks, 2002, 162). In fact, Banks' article was very instructive because she reflects on three anthropological studies of Duncan Village in East London and finds huge gaps in explicating obvious social and cultural dynamics in all the studies, that incidentally were written by some of the doyens in the field. Part of the answer for these omissions, she convincingly argues, was because they limited their research to the household and its immediate surrounds, often relying on assistants to administer questionnaire schedules. What they missed out on was 'the changing cultural dynamics of the streets, dance-halls and other public spaces' (Banks 2002:163).

Generally, my approach to interviewing was reminiscent of what Kvale has called the traveller. In this approach the interviewer 'wanders through the landscape and enters into conversations with the people encountered . . . The interviewer wanders along with the local inhabitants asks questions that lead the subjects to tell their own stories of their lived world' (Quoted in Babbie and Mouton 2004:289). With some of the Pagad members, unlike the gang members, I did opt for in-depth interviewing (the study of Pagad was the research brief) so as to try and establish how 'opinion came into being' instead of just establishing what their opinions were (Babbie and Mouton, 2004, 291).

While I was able to gain increasing insights into social processes on the Cape Flats, time and resource constraints meant that the study falls short of Clifford Geertz's (1973) 'thick description', although this was the ideal I was aiming for.

An exhaustive reading of documentary material on Pagad and the gangs of the Cape Flats complemented the fieldwork. However, a rich vein of material exists in court records. This was only given cursory attention. This shortcoming must be seen in the context of the time period and resources.

Interviews

Between the end of 2003 and July 2004 9 members of Pagad (4 were lapsed members but still supporters of the organisation) were interviewed. In addition 2 members of the

Americans and 1 member of the Hard Livings gang were interviewed between April and June 2004. These interviews were supplemented with numerous informal 'conversations' with Pagad and gang members.

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