

**‘Something for Nothing’
in the Discourses of
‘Sustainable Development’**

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1. Introduction: Commodification and the balance of forces

This past fortnight saw extensive commentary on matters of ‘sustainable development’, and hence allows us an opportunity to relate global discourses to local politics and reflect upon both. Is there a thread linking South Africa’s outstanding physical features and the stressed human condition, where the intertwining of environment, development and social protest can be theorised? Colonial-era geographical thinking certainly located social outcomes in an allegedly foreordained relationship of people to their land, even though people struggled mightily against geographical determinism because their freedom and often their very survival depended upon it. Today most intellectuals, aside from outliers like Jeffrey Sachs,¹ have also finally come to resist explanations of social processes by recourse mainly to inherited physical attributes such as land-lockedness or climatic conditions.

Yet fierce debates over utilisation of natural resources do offer us the opportunity to consider explicit linkages between human and environmental developments. What is different is that in the early twenty-first century, the interconnectedness appears strongest at the nexus of capital and state power, for the *commodification* of nature and society, together, has become the most profound experience of our time.

Likewise, struggles for *decommodification*--of water and electricity, anti-retroviral medicines, land, education and livelihoods through a Basic Income Grant--have come to play the most exciting role in the local backlash. It is here that we really, genuinely, do need *something for nothing*--so as to sustain society and nature by protecting both from the forces of the market. Internationally, the backlash is known as ‘anti-globalisation’ but we will better define it as the ‘movements for global justice’. There are, in my view, four other currents or tendencies of global politics that contest the discursive space of commodification. Three of these five tendencies, located in Washington, aim to bolster the architecture in the interests of the North. In contrast, two other tendencies are much more critical of the status quo, even though they differ about ‘fixing’ or ‘nixing’ the international financial, investment and trade system. The five positions, from left to right, can be labeled a) ‘Global Justice Movements’; b) ‘Third World Nationalism’; c) the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’; d) the ‘Washington Consensus’; and e) the ‘Resurgent Rightwing’ (Table 1).

Although the philosophical positions associated with the five currents appear ever more clearly delineated, the balance of these forces shifts constantly, with no durable alliances in sight. The unsatisfying status of crisis management, in relation to the trembling architecture of the international economy, was reflected in the inputs and outputs of the November 2001 WTO summit in Doha, Qatar; the March 2002 Financing for Development meeting in Monterrey; and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Notwithstanding the infamous collapse of the Seattle WTO summit in December 1999 due to a refusal to offer consensus by African countries led by Zimbabwe, the trend appears to be one of Third World nationalist conciliation. A key factor has been the *comprador* roles of South African government officials (especially president Thabo Mbeki, finance minister Trevor Manuel and trade minister Alec Erwin), who tend to line up in the middle three, depending upon circumstances.

Table 1 **five reactions to the global crisis**
an international snapshot (~2002) highlighting South African locations²

Tendency--> Issue:	Global Justice Movements	Third World Nationalism	Post-Wash. Consensus	Washington Consensus	Resurgent Rightwing
Main arguments	Against globalisation of <i>capital</i> (not <i>people</i>), and for fair (not free) trade, debt cancellation and a generous social wage	For more global integration: i.e., join (not change) the system, but on fairer terms (debt relief, more market access)	Reform the ‘imperfect markets’ and add ‘sustainable development’ to neoliberal framework	Slightly adjust the <i>status quo</i> (transparency, supervision & regulation) and establish bail-out mechanisms to improve stability	Restore US isolationism, punish banks’ mistakes, and reverse the globalisation of people
Key institutions	social/labour movements; environmental advocacy groups; radical activist networks; regional and national progressive coalitions; leftwing think-tanks; <i>Treatment Action Campaign, Jubilee South Africa, Social Movements Indaba, Cosatu?</i>	Self-selecting Third World governments: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, Haiti, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and <i>sometimes South Africa</i>	Most United Nations agencies; International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, governments of France, Japan and sometimes South Africa	US agencies (Treasury, Federal Reserve, USAID), World Bank, IMF, WTO, World Economic Forum, Council on Foreign Relations, centrist Washington think-tanks, British and German governments, and <i>sometimes South Africa</i>	populist & libertarian wings of Republican Party, American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute, Manhattan Institute, Heritage Foundation
Key proponents	<i>Achmat</i> , Amin, Bello, Bendana, Bove, <i>Brutus</i> , Chalmers, Chomsky, Danaher, <i>Dor</i> , Galeano, <i>Gabriel</i> , George, <i>Giyosi</i> , Kagarlitsky, Khor, Klein, Lula, Maathai, <i>Madisha</i> , Marcos, <i>Meer</i> , Nader, <i>Ndungane</i> , Negri, <i>Ngwane</i> , Njehi, <i>Nzimande</i> , Patkar, <i>Phoko</i> , Pilger, <i>Setshedi</i> , Shiva, <i>Vavi</i>	Aristide, Castro, Chavez, Gaddafi, Mahathir, <i>Mbeki?</i> , <i>Motlanthe</i> , <i>Netshitenzhe?</i> , Mugabe, Obasanjo, Putin	Annan, Jospin, <i>Erwin?</i> , Krugman, <i>Manuel?</i> , <i>Mbeki?</i> , <i>Mboweni?</i> , <i>Netshitenzhe?</i> , <i>Ramos?</i> , Sachs, Schroeder?, Soros, Stiglitz, Sweeney	<i>Abedian</i> , <i>Barrell</i> , <i>Bernstein</i> , Blair, Brown, <i>Bruce</i> , Bush?, <i>Erwin?</i> , Greenspan, Koehler, <i>Leon</i> , <i>Manuel?</i> , <i>Mbeki?</i> , <i>Mboweni?</i> , <i>Mills</i> , Moore, O’Neill?, <i>Ramos?</i> , <i>Roodt</i> , Wolfensohn	Buchanan, Bush?, DeLay, Haider, Helms, le Pen, Lott, <i>Parker</i>

This is merely a rough political mapping of the balance of forces. By mid 2002, the bloc of neoliberal international elite managers appeared to be holding the Washington Consensus line, notwithstanding the temptation of many on the far right--like George W. Bush--to apply proto-fascist formulae to both geopolitics and economics. The US economy had begun a recession well before the September 11 catastrophe, with potentially devastating consequences for those exporters which had grown dependent upon American hedonistic consumption norms.

Helping to bolster the sole superpower’s claim to economic predominance was ally Tony Blair and his chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown. The Federal Reserve Board’s chairperson, Alan Greenspan, lowered interest rates urgently, while US treasury secretary Paul O’Neill gave rich individuals and large corporations huge tax cuts to keep happy and keep spending. The imposition of tariffs on steel was one indicator of the US state’s hypocrisy in pushing ‘free’ trade rules on everyone else, but not itself. The leaders of the Bank, IMF and WTO--Wolfensohn, Koehler and Moore (soon to be replaced by the Thai economist Supachai)--maintained their devotion to corporate and banking power, and often specifically US economic interests. Neoliberal apologists appeared generally unmoved by the unfolding economic crisis.³

Genuine reform under the leadership of this crew appeared impossible. In the wake of the September 1999 firing of Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz, it is hard to take seriously any notion that the Bretton Woods Institutions can make fundamental changes from within. At that point, two years before he won the Nobel Prize in economics, Stiglitz had criticised IMF structural adjustment policies and crisis-management in East Asia and Russia. Bill Clinton’s treasury secretary, Lawrence Summers, immediately met with James Wolfensohn over the latter’s desire for a second five-year term, and soon thereafter Stiglitz was dismissed ‘with a fig leaf,’ in the words of Jagdish Bhagwati: ‘a sorry episode.’ Insiders say that Summers insisted that Stiglitz simply had to leave if the US was to support the Wolfensohn reappointment.⁴

The short-lived ‘post-Washington Consensus’ philosophy that Stiglitz introduced was not particularly radical, as it simply posed the need for state intervention in the event of market failure and for more attention to ‘sustainable development’ goals like equity and environmental protection. But the 2001 Nobel award he shared with two other US economists recognised Stiglitz’s ‘information-theoretic’ approach to markets, which does fundamentally undermine the neoliberal faith in self-correction, deregulation and growth.⁵ While not a movement-builder himself, Stiglitz won a following from other economists who pushed slightly heterodox viewpoints, but entirely from within the general framework of neoliberalism.⁶ And there were operational reformers aware of widescale market failure. Financier/philanthropist George Soros and UN secretary-general Kofi Annan suggested imposition of a ‘Tobin Tax’ on international financial transactions.⁷ The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was extremely active, pushed by US trade union leader John Sweeney, in pushing for labour-related reforms of the World Trade Organisation.⁸

The Far Right is absent, for all practical purposes, in South Africa. But in Washington, the resurgent conservatives had gained great momentum when the Supreme Court selected Bush as US president in December 2000. The five justices who outvoted the citizens of Florida and the majority of US voters in that election were all chosen by the new president’s father a decade earlier. Bush had a right-wing flank of his own to worry about, led by commentator and perpetual candidate Patrick Buchanan, and a powerful reactionary Republican bloc in the US Congress centred around Tom DeLay, Jesse Helms and Trent Lott--who all mainly saw the World Bank and IMF as agencies behind a socialist plot to promote cheeky Third World leaders like Robert Mugabe. Internationally, Jorg Haider in Austria and Jean-Marie le Pen in France mirrored this bizarre, reactionary tendency. By 2001, the Far Right was dangerously resurgent, along with the military-industrial complex, thanks to the lunatic-fundamentalist Islamic group Al-Qaeda which hijacked four airplanes on September 11. While on the surface it first appeared as a blow to official US morale, the terrorist attacks soon

provided justification for establishing something akin to a police state, which Bush and his big business allies began to hastily construct.⁹

Aside from Mbeki, what were Third World rulers up to at this stage? As Table 1 suggests, there were a few nationalist leaders--Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez in the Caribbean corner of Haiti, Cuba and Venezuela, respectively--who regularly spoke from the Left. Most notably, perhaps, Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad--an anti-Semitic authoritarian--showed in 1998 that capital controls could be implemented in a major emerging market without the threat of US military intervention. Moammar Gaddafi was critical of Mbeki's Africa Union gambit for a partnership with the West, but from an obviously self-interested standpoint, like that of Robert Mugabe. Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo made some anti-systemic sounds as head of the Group of 77 developing nations and Vladimir Putin appeared anxious to break from the lock-step of Russian neoliberalism.¹⁰

But after adding up a variety of small-scale nationalist projects, the sum is not yet sufficiently impressive at the global scale to merit much attention. The hope that India would lead a Third World revolt against the World Trade Organisation--following Zimbabwe's lead in Seattle--was dashed in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.¹¹ As Washington's economic crisis-management evolved into a broader geopolitical 'coalition against terrorism,' nothing the nationalists tried in the run-up to Doha appeared to work, as we see below. Their most important spokespeople were led, by late 2001, to merely concede the logic and power of Washington's dictates.

Who, then, can catalyse substantial social change in an era of disempowered states, extreme international economic chaos and additional military-induced suffering? Little hope appeared from those immediately to the left of Washington: the existing set of national rulers and nationalist leaders, conscientious establishment intellectuals and philanthropists, or international agencies. Instead, the column in Table 1 of greatest interest is further left: the 'global justice movements.'

The social forces which argue for an entirely different approach to international political-economy are sometimes termed 'anti-globalisation'--though that term is slightly absurd--but better described as 'movements for global justice'. Table 1 lists notable individuals associated with these movements, although the main point is that as an 'NGO-swarm'--to cite the Rand Corporation's frightened description--these networks don't have formal leaders who tell followers 'the line' or 'the strategy.' Any such personality list is merely indicative, given the lack of hierarchy in the best segments of the movements, but includes names of internationally-renowned activists, scholars, commentators and politicians like Samir Amin (based in Senegal), Maude Barlow (Canada), Walden Bello (Thailand), Alejandro Bendana (Nicaragua), Jose Bove (France), Alex Callinicos (Britain), Camille Chalmers (Haiti), Noam Chomsky (US), Kevin Danaher (US), Eduardo Galeano (Uruguay), Susan George (France), Boris Kagarlitsky (Russia), Marin Khor (Malaysia), Naomi Klein (Canada), Lula Ignacio da Silva (Brazil), Wangari Maathai (Kenya), Subcommandante Marcos (Mexico), George Monbiot (Britain), Ralph Nader (US), Antonio Negri (Italy), Njoki Njehu (Kenya), Medha Patkar (India), John Pilger (Britain), and Vandana Shiva (India). Amongst many South African public figures who are highly regarded in the same circuits are Treatment Action Campaign leader Zackie Achmat, anti-apartheid poet and solidarity activist Dennis Brutus, Jubilee South Africa president MP Giyosi and secretary George Dor, Durban social movement leader Professor Fatima Meer, Archbishop of Cape Town Ngongonkulu Ndungane, Soweto civic leader Trevor Ngwane and Virginia Setshedi, SA Communist Party secretary Blade Nzimande, trade analyst Mohau Pheko, liberation-theologian Neville Gabriel of the SA Council of Churches, and--depending upon the circumstances--Cosatu president Willie Madisha and secretary Zwelinzima Vavi.

In general, the diverse movements have this in common: *they promote the globalisation of people and halt or at minimum radically modify the globalisation of capital.* Their demands, campaigns and programmes reflect the work of organisations with decades of experience. Their activists were

schooled in social, community, women’s, labour, democracy, disarmament, human rights, consumer, public-health, political, progressive-religious, environmental, and youth traditions, spanning an enormous variety of issues, organisational forms, and styles. In the Third World, high-profile justice movements at the turn of the 21st century included Mexico’s Zapatistas, Brazil’s Movement of the Landless, India’s National Alliance of People’s Movements, Thailand’s Forum of the Poor and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions.

The most dynamic forces within the movements have arrived at this formula not only because of high-profile battles between protesters and the police protecting elites in London and Seattle (1999); Washington, Melbourne, Prague and Nice (2000); Quebec City, Genoa and Brussels (2001); and New York, Barcelona, Calgary and Johannesburg (2002). In addition, conditions remain that gave rise to ‘IMF Riots’ and massive anti-neoliberal protests across virtually the entire Third World over the past two decades. For many Southern social and labour movements, Seattle was a catalyst to transcend the IMF Riot as knee-jerk protest against neoliberalism. Instead, mass-democratic activist responses have characterised the subsequent protests, which have featured anti-neoliberal programmatic demands. In some instances, particularly in Latin America (Bolivia and Ecuador), the activism reached a near-insurgent stage; in other sites (South Africa, Nigeria and India), many millions of workers became involved in mass strikes against neoliberalism; in yet other protests (South Korea, Argentina, Turkey), tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets in waves of militancy.¹²

In contrast to these non-violent movements whose ambition is social justice, the most important reactionary Third World force that emerged at the same time was an ultra-fundamentalist, violent streak within Islam, associated with the Al-Qaeda network. Although there was absolutely nothing in common between the justice movements and Al-Qaeda’s analysis, vision, objectives, strategies and tactics, there did emerge in the minds of some commentators a kind of ‘competition’ to make an impact--of a very different kind--on the global elite. For example, James Harding, writing in the *Financial Times* under the provocative title ‘Clamour against capitalism stilled,’ anticipated that in the wake of the September 11 terrorist incidents, global justice movements would be ‘derailed.’¹³ A spurious reason was ‘the absence of both leadership and a cogent philosophy to inspire fellowship.’ One counterpoint was obvious: hierarchical leadership is not necessarily a positive attribute for the kind of broad-based opposition to neoliberalism that is required, and that is bubbling up from all corners of Africa and the world. Still, the death-knell of the ‘movement’ (really many movements) for global justice was sounded by Harding:

It is riddled with egotism and petty politics. Its actions are sometimes misinformed, sometimes misjudged. It has an inflated sense of its own importance. Its targets keep changing and growing. And it has been robbed of its momentum. Counter-capitalism was not just a movement, it was a mood. Its main platform--the street--is not as open as it was. Its message, always complicated, is now much more loaded. Its audience--politicians, the press and the public--are seriously distracted. And its funding base, already tiny, threatens to shrivel as charitable foundations and philanthropists see their fortunes shrink with the stock market.

All these charges have a grain of truth. But if global justice activists were slightly intimidated by the Resurgent Right’s incitement in late 2001, subsequent months and years would see their revitalisation, as the problems they identified only became more serious.

How, then, do we anticipate the application of discursive strategies associated with these currents, to sustainable development? The five categories can be boiled down, at this stage, to three core discourses.

2. Discourses of sustainable development

In South Africa, the past century’s experience of industrialisation, urbanisation and rural dispossession did enormous damage to society’s ecological inheritance. In some cases, core components of the eco-system, such as urban water and rural land in some overpopulated settings, were affected so badly that the limits to human habitation became evident. Not just a social construct, the problem of physical scarcity presented itself, for example, by way of fast-rising prices for Johannesburg water, which had to be pumped hundreds of kilometres across mountains.

Restoring the eco-socio-economic balance was one of the most challenging of all the enormous responsibilities the first democratic South African government faced in 1994, just as the painful exercise of identifying capitalism’s environmental self-destructiveness occupied global elites in Stockholm in 1972 and Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Locally and globally, however, elites were not up to the challenge of adopting potential solutions. With the exception of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), virtually all the earth’s environmental problems worsened.

In a concise summary of these problems, the German Green party’s Heinrich Boell Stiftung issued *The Jo’burg-Memo*, edited by Wolfgang Sachs:

The Rio process has launched a number of successful institutional processes, without, however, producing tangible global results. In particular, economic globalisation has largely washed away gains made on the micro level, spreading an exploitative economy across the globe and exposing natural resources in the South and in Russia to the pull of the world market ...

In global aggregate terms, the only good news (at least for the environment, while not necessarily for people) is that the global surface area under environmental protection has increased, that CFC production has declined, and that the global carbon emissions have stagnated at 1998 levels. Apart from these cases, however, the excessive strain placed by human beings on nature’s sources, sites, and sinks has continued to rise. The extinction of species and habitats has increased, the destruction of ancient forests continues unabated, the degradation of fertile soil has worsened, over-fishing of oceans has continued, and the new threat of genetically engineered disruption has emerged. Of course, global aggregate figures conceal successes in particular places, just as they hide breakdowns in others. As life is planetary in scale, what matters however in the end, is the integrity and resilience of those webs of life, which form the Biosphere. Even if the surgery at Rio was a success, the patient’s overall health has definitely not improved.¹⁴

As a result of the conflict thereby generated, there have emerged at least three distinctive environmental-developmental discourses that seem to apply equally well, though with different implications, in industrialised and Third World countries: neoliberalism, sustainable development and environmental justice.¹⁵

As a semi-industrialised country, South Africa’s capital accumulation process originated in agriculture but came to be largely reliant upon diamonds and gold during the late nineteenth century and upon these and other minerals, energy and associated manufactures during the twentieth century.¹⁶ Subsequently, South Africa has mainly suffered the *dis*accumulation of capital: its flight to London; its wastage through parasitical investments and conspicuous consumption; its false starts in overhyped ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ deals gone sour; its periodic devaluation during currency crashes; and its overaccumulation in sectors where profit rates remain low.¹⁷

Not unrelated, South Africa also suffers extremely high levels of poverty. Inequality is also worsening, as the proportion of black Africans under the poverty line rose dramatically during the

period 1993-2001, from 50% to 62%.¹⁸ It is therefore logical that the three discourses stand out particularly well against the socio-economic crises facing this middle-income country today.

Neoliberalism

The first discourse, consistent with the Washington Consensus current identified above, is a ‘neoliberal’--free-market--concern with maximising Gross Domestic Product (GDP), showing only passing attention to associated environmental problems. The neoliberal approach is expressed well, if in caricature, in a 1991 memo signed by the World Bank’s chief economist, Lawrence Summers: ‘I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that’.¹⁹ Rather than ‘internalise the externalities’ associated with pollution or ecological damage, the ready solution is attempting simply to displace these to somewhere political power is negligible and the immediate environmental implications are less visible, in the name of overall economic growth. After all, Summers continued, inhabitants of low-income countries typically die before the age at which they would begin suffering prostate cancer associated with toxic dumping. And in any event, using ‘marginal productivity’ as a measure, low-income Africans are not worth very much anyhow. Nor are African’s aesthetic concerns with air pollution likely to be as substantive as they are for wealthy northerners.²⁰

Neoliberal discourses emerged in South Africa just as they achieved hegemony in international environmental management. To illustrate, the United Nations Panel on Water declared in 1998 that ‘water should be paid for as a commodity rather than be treated as an essential staple to be provided free of cost’.²¹ The same principle was applied in South Africa in 1994, when the minimum price of water was set at ‘marginal cost’--i.e., the operating and maintenance expenses associated with covering the next unit of water’s production cost.

Providing water as an essential staple *free of cost* for at least a lifeline amount to all residents would have required a nation-wide water pricing policy with higher unit amounts for higher-volume water consumers, especially large firms, mines and (white) farmers. This was not an impossible task, but the first post-apartheid water minister, Kader Asmal, refused to grasp the nettle. His rejoinder to the demand that he respect the ANC’s RDP promise of a 50 litre per day lifeline supply of water was telling:

The positions I put forward are not positions of a sell-out, but of positions that uphold the policy of the South African government and the ANC ... The RDP makes no reference to free water to the citizens of South Africa. The provision of such free water has financial implications for local government that I as a national minister must be extremely careful enforcing on local government.²²

It took a neoliberal leap of logic to redefine the word ‘lifeline’ to mean, not free, but instead the equivalent of the operating and maintenance costs (i.e., full marginal-cost recovery, namely the break-even cost of supplying an additional unit of the water to the customer). Under the influence of his own neoliberal bureaucrats and the World Bank, Asmal’s slippery semantic solution was applied with increasing ruthlessness during the late 1990s.

The main neoliberal criticism of a free lifeline and rising block tariff offered by Bank water official John Roome, the taskmanager of the controversial Lesotho Highlands Water Project, was that municipal privatisation contracts ‘would be much harder to establish’ if poor consumers had the expectation of getting something for nothing. If consumers didn’t pay, Roome continued, Asmal needed a ‘credible threat of cutting service’.²³ This was part of Roome’s advice that the Bank’s 1999 *Country Assistance Strategy* for South Africa termed ‘instrumental’. Finally in 2000, when cholera

exploded in KwaZulu-Natal and social protest rose to new heights, Asmal’s replacement, Ronnie Kasrils, admitted that ‘lifeline’ should really mean ‘free’. But a rapid neoliberal reaction by the Department of Trade and Industry prevented the government from paying for the cross-subsidy by charging corporations more.

Neoliberal hostility to subsidies was a general phenomenon within the post-apartheid state. In 1996, Dr Chippy Olver, then deputy director-general of the Department of Constitutional Development and subsequently the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism director-general (and main manager of the WSSD) told the *Mail & Guardian* newspaper that low-income people should *not* receive lower-priced electricity than large firms. (They pay, on average, four times more.) He remarked offhandedly, ‘If we increase the price of electricity to users like Alusaf [so as to cross-subsidise low-income consumers], their products will become uncompetitive and that will affect our balance of payments’.²⁴

One of the most powerful critiques of the neoliberal version of ‘environmental economics’ is John Bellamy Foster’s essay on ‘The Ecological Tyranny of the Bottom Line’. Foster cites three fatal contradictions:

- the radical break with all previous human history necessitated by the reduction of the human relation to nature to a set of market-based utilities, rooted in the egoistic preferences of individuals;
- the radical displacement of the very idea of value or worth, resulting from the domination of market values over everything else ... it is this widespread humanistic sense of systems of intrinsic value that are not reducible to mere market values and cannot be included within a cost-benefit analysis that so often frustrates the attempts of economists to carry out contingent value analyses among the general public;²⁵ and
- [market-based environmental economic] solutions, while sometimes attenuating the problems in the short term, only accentuate the contradictions overall, undermining both the conditions of life and the conditions of production. The reason for this is the sheer dynamism of the capitalist commodity economy, which by its very nature accepts no barriers outside of itself, and seeks constantly to increase its sphere of influence without regard to the effects of this on our biosphere.²⁶

Sustainable development

A second discourse offers a longer-term, more comprehensive accounting of environmental processes within society, namely the argument on behalf of ‘sustainable development’ which, drawing from Brundtland Commission ideology and endorsed by high-profile politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Al Gore, has also been termed ‘ecological modernisation’.

Occasionally, as we will see in the field of ‘ecological economics’, this strand of thinking does actually grapple with capitalism’s ability to consume and accumulate beyond the limits of the biosphere. Yet the main point behind the sustainable development thesis is a technical and reformist one, namely that environmental externalities such as pollution should, in the classical example, be brought into the marketplace. By doing so through taxes or the trading of pollution rights, for example, regulators assure that these costs are adequately accounted for in ‘polluter-pays’ profit-loss calculations. However, many argue, prevention is preferable.

The idea of ‘sustainability’ was redefined in lowest-common-denominator intergenerational terms by Gro Harlem Brundtland’s World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987: ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. But other thinking about sustainability, especially by

environmental economist Herman Daly, takes the argument further.²⁷ Daly’s normative view was that ‘We should strive for sufficient per capita wealth--efficiently maintained and allocated, and equitably distributed--for the maximum number of people that can be sustained over time under these conditions’.

Trying to make this philosophy operational, Daly grew frustrated and quit his backroom job at the World Bank in 1995, because ‘Although the World Bank was on record as officially favouring sustainable development, the near vacuity of the phrase made this a meaningless affirmation ... The party line [from Larry Summers] was that sustainable development was like pornography--we’ll know it when we see it, but it’s too difficult to define’.

Daly offered a tougher definition than Brundtland in order to highlight the difference between ‘growth’ and ‘development’ in a context in which the earth’s capacity to act as a ‘sink’ is a physical ecosystem limit to the absolute size of the global economy. Daly’s definition of sustainable development is ‘development without growth beyond environmental carrying capacity, where development means qualitative improvement and growth means quantitative increase’. Using this definition around the World Bank, Daly found, ‘just confirmed the orthodox economists’ worst fears about the subversive nature of the idea, and reinforced their resolve to keep it vague’.

Daly proposed at least four operative policy recommendations for both the Bank and governments:

- stop counting natural capital as income;
- tax labour and income less, and tax resource throughput more;
- maximise the productivity of natural capital in the short run, and invest in increasing its supply in the long run; and
- move away from the ideology of global economic integration by free trade, free capital mobility, and export-led growth--and toward a more nationalist orientation that seeks to develop domestic production for internal markets as the first option, having recourse to international trade only when clearly much more efficient.

The last recommendation is a radical break from the sustainability discourses of ecological modernisation, of course. The Coega port and smelter is a prime example of what’s wrong with global economic integration. But all four are sufficiently radical that they have been rejected, in practice, not only by the World Bank but also by the South African government. If, for example, Pretoria’s GDP figures were adjusted to exclude the non-renewable resources that mining houses strip from the ground, South Africa would have a long-standing net negative GDP. In turn, that might compel the ruling elites and bureaucrats to begin scrambling for a means of accumulating capital that is not so explicitly unsustainable.

Nevertheless, in myriad ways, the less radical sustainable development arguments are used in official South African discourses. Some of these are potentially progressive, for instance when the 1998 National Water Pricing policy insists that water users be taxed first because of scarcity--often a social construct but in the case of water in Southern Africa, also a physical constraint--and second because their consumption patterns are terribly inefficient and wasteful. But as we will see, the crucial tests of whether development practices become genuinely sustainable are tests of power and need. In virtually all the highest-profile examples since 1994, expediency prevailed, corporations got their way because of power, and the needs of the environment and society were denigrated.

Environmental justice

The third discourse we can label ‘environmental justice’, for it sites ecological problems and

possibilities within a socio-political context first and foremost, and poses firm moral and distributional questions about that context. Sometimes invoking the notion of justice requires resort to cultural defences and symbolic critique, which brings its own dangers. But mainly, the use of the rights-based arguments by social, labour, women's and environmental movements in post-apartheid South Africa has been rational, progressive and capable of the nuance required to transcend 'Not In My Back Yard', the 'Nimby' defence, with 'Not in Anyone's Back Yard!'

Indeed, the environmental justice discourse is grounded in values so well recognised that they were included in the South African Constitution's Bill of Rights in 1996: 'everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being ... everyone has the right to have access to healthcare services, including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and social security ...'²⁸

Tellingly, however, that Constitution also provided a caveat in mandating 'reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation, promote conservation, and secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources *while promoting justifiable economic and social development*' (emphasis added), quite consistent with international sustainable-development rhetoric.²⁹ And, underlining the central precept in neoliberal economics, it went on immediately to specify that 'No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property'.³⁰

Hence democratic South Africa is, even in its founding document, beset by conflicting discourses, the ramifications of which will be tested in the Constitutional Court for decades to come. Overall, the sense of liberal capitalist democracy prevails, augmented by 'second-generation' socio-economic rights beyond simply freedom of speech, association and the like. But if, in this discursive contest, even many environmental-justice advocates stop just short of questioning the roots of ecological damage within the capitalist mode of production, nevertheless this paper attempts to do so.

The objective in outlining these discourses is to unveil what is extreme capitalist (in Summers' image), what is reformist (following Brundtland) and what is potentially revolutionary about environmental and developmental projects, policies and politics in South Africa. This requires that we understand neoliberal economic accounting, attempt to radicalise sustainable-development conceptions, draw upon the moral and political strengths of the environmental-justice movement, and posit an eco-socialist conception of environmental management appropriate to South African conditions. (These are, indeed, the objectives of my new book, *Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest*.³¹)

Green business versus critical ecology

In the same spirit, one comradely critic of the green movement, Andrew Jamison, has recently devoted attention to unveiling the incoherence bound up in contemporary environmentalism.³² For Jamison, there is a distinct division emerging. One mode of thinking and practice, 'green business', has co-opted environmentalism into the nexus of capital accumulation, using concepts of sustainable development. The interaction of academic and industrial research has generated a politics devoted to flexible or soft regulation regimes. The philosophical basis includes faith in science and technology, a methodology based upon instrumental rationality, and an ideological commitment to market democracy. This is the 'economising' of ecology.

In contrast, what Jamison calls 'critical ecology movements' have practised resistance to green business drawing upon concepts of environmental justice. Their repertoire includes critical research, demands for stronger legal enforcement, and active campaigns against corporate enemies of the environment. They remain sceptical of science and technology at a deeper philosophical level,

they promote a communicative rationality, and they are committed to deliberative democracy. This ‘politicising’ of ecology runs counter to green business in virtually all issues and processes.

To dig deeper using Jamison’s typology, green business relies upon arguments such as eco-efficiency, natural capitalism and ecological modernisation. The premier green business networks are the Business Council on Sustainable Development, Greening of Industry, Cleaner Production Roundtable, and Natural Step. New technology practices in this spirit include cleaner production, green products and environmental management systems. While diverse, the green business perspective *is* coherent and, to the extent that there is any genuine effort to address environmental issues by global elites, the green business strategy is dominant in settings like the WSSD.

Synthesising red-green discourses?

In contrast, critical ecology movements have suffered a fragmentation of what Jamison terms ‘cognitive praxis’, resulting in four broad and often competing types of environmentalism, ‘knowledge forms’ and ‘knowledge interests’.

First, ‘civic’ environmentalism includes local campaigns and social ecology. Its knowledge is based on both factual and traditional forms, and its core objective is empowerment. Second, ‘professional’ environmentalism flows from mainstream organisations and an ethos of green expertise, grounded in scientific and legal knowledge, aiming at enlightenment. Third, a ‘militant’ environmentalism is based upon radical splinters, especially direct action groups, whose knowledge is often rhetorical and symbolic, and which grounds and expands its knowledge through political protest. Fourth, a ‘personal’ environmentalism is growing, based upon new age practitioners and green consumers, fostering spiritual and emotive knowledge, and seeking authenticity.

After considering evidence mainly from the first two of these four categories, we consider Jamison’s ideas for a synthesis in the critical ecology movements and transcendence towards a durable eco-socialism. To do so with confidence requires that we first review praxis-oriented campaigning against the dominant green business logic in South Africa, and that we test local environmentalisms for fragmentation and incoherence. It means that we not shy away from the logical implications of red-green politics, even when these are disarmingly radical.

Ultimately, this is no mere academic exercise in discourse analysis. Our aim is to establish some of the ways in which these divergent arguments have competed to win public policy favour within South Africa’s first democratic government, led by the ANC. We consider alliances and conflicts between different pressure groups in several distinct cases. Furthermore, we contextualise and set out an agenda for deepening the policy, legislative, enforcement and especially *political* character of future struggles over the environment and development.

To do so, it should be clear by now, requires consideration of debates that reach far beyond the scope of the present state, civil society and business. In South Africa, of all settings, it is crucial to avoid simplistic society-nature dualism, and to assert the extremely uneven nature of political practices around the idea of sustainable development.

3. The uneven politics of environment and development

The practitioners of neoliberalism, especially the framers of global-scale corporate environmentalism, did not count on one crucial post-Rio phenomenon: namely, where there is collusion by governments, multilateral agencies and corporations to plunder the environment and hijack humanity, the radical forces of civil society are never too far behind. In search of a synthesis, we conclude by looking at social protest with sympathy, but as critically as possible from both

theoretical and practical standpoints.

Decommodification, life and liberation

Consider some examples of the socio-environmental justice agenda. The demand for lifeline supplies of water and electricity is being made from the urban ghettos like Soweto where disconnections remain a problem, to the many rural areas which have still not received piped water. The need for free access to antiretroviral medicines, for five million HIV-positive South Africans, is acute. A campaign for a Basic Income Grant has also been taken up by churches and trade unions. The Landless People’s Movement objects to the failure of a commodified land reform policy designed by the World Bank, and insists upon access to land as a human right. A campaign has begun to rid South Africa of user fees for public education. Such demands, based upon the political principle of decommodification, are central to campaigns ranging from basic survival through access to health/educational services, to resistance against municipal services privatisation.

The verb decommodify has become popular amongst progressive strategists in part through studies of social policy conducted by Gosta Esping-Andersen, a Swedish academic. In his book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen points out that during the first half of the twentieth century, the Scandinavian welfare state grew because of urban-rural, worker-farmer, red-green alliances which made universalist demands on the ruling elites.

Those demands typically aimed to give the working class and small farmers social protection from the vagaries of employment, especially during periodic recessions. They therefore allowed people to escape the prison of wage labour, by weaving a thick, state-supplied safety net as a fall-back position. To decommodify their constituents’ labour in this manner required, in short, that the alliance defend a level of social protection adequate to meet basic needs. Over a period of decades, this took the form of generous pensions, healthcare, education, and other free state services which, like childcare and eldercare, disproportionately support and liberate women.³³

The electoral weight and grassroots political power of the red-green alliance was sufficient to win these demands, which were paid for through taxing wealthy households and large corporations at high rates. They were defended until recently, when corporate power and the ideology of competitiveness have forced some cutbacks across Scandinavia. A similar although much less far-reaching construction of welfare-state policies occurred elsewhere across the world, in the context of a Cold War that required western capitalism to put on a more humane face against the East Bloc and to maintain state spending, in the spirit of John Maynard Keynes, so as to boost macroeconomic growth.

In the post-war US, in contrast, corporations lobbied more effectively against state entitlements such as healthcare and pensions, preferring to hold control over workers through company health and pension plans which would then deter workers from going on strike. (The failure to decommodify labour-power helps explain the durability of the US trade union movement’s pro-corporate--and often pro-imperialist--position, until it began shifting leftward in the mid-1990s.)

As the 1950s-60s virtuous cycle of economic growth and expanding social policy came to an end, it was replaced not by a strengthened socialist struggle as the limits of such reforms were reached, but rather by an era of neoliberalism, which began during the late 1970s. Because the balance of forces has been inauspicious, for a variety of reasons, this recent period of class war by ruling elites continues to be characterised by austerity-oriented economic policies, shrinkage of social programmes, privatisation, trade and financial liberalisation, corporate deregulation, and what is often termed ‘the commodification of everything’.

In a setting as unequal as South Africa--with 45% unemployment and, alongside Brazil and Guatemala, the world’s highest income disparities--the neoliberal policies adopted during the 1990s

pushed even essential state services such as water and electricity beyond most households’ ability to pay. Some of these policies were adopted before political liberation from apartheid in 1994, but many were the result of influence on Nelson Mandela’s ANC by the World Bank, US AID and other global and local neoliberals during the late 1990s.

Various problems are associated with the neoliberal approach to basic services. They often relate to the dismissive regard with which positive eco-social externalities associated with water/sanitation, energy and other services are understood by neoliberals, for whom ‘the economic logic of dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable’, Lawrence Summers informed us. The failure to fully incorporate social and environmental benefits of state services is typical of commodification, because when state services undergo commercialisation, the state fragments itself as water, electricity, health and other agencies adopt arm’s-length, non-integrated relationships that reduce them to mere ‘profit-centres’. Service disconnections follow logically.

The first stage of resistance to the commodification of water and electricity often takes the form of a popular demand for a short-term, inexpensive flat rate applicable to all consumers. In Durban, community groups are, at the time of writing, mobilising for a R10 monthly fee for all municipal services, alongside an insistence that no one’s supply be cut off.

More compellingly, for medium-range policy a redistributive demand for decommodification is advanced by groups like the SA Municipal Workers Union, Rural Development Services Network, Johannesburg Anti-Privatisation Forum and Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee: a specific minimal daily amount of water (50 litres) and electricity (1 kiloWatt hour) to be supplied to each person *free*. The free services should be financed not only by subsidies from central government, but also by a rising block tariff in which the water and electricity bills for high-volume consumers and corporations rise at a more rapid rate when their usage soars to hedonistic levels.

When charged at ever-higher rates, the consumption of services by hedonistic users should decline, which would be welcome. South Africa is a water-scarce country, especially in the Johannesburg area which depends upon socio-ecologically destructive Lesotho dams. The WSSD host is also the world’s worst site of greenhouse gas emissions, when corrected for population and relative income. Hence conservation through higher rates for large consumers makes eco-socio-economic sense on merely technical grounds.

These demands, grounded in decades of social struggles to make basic services a human right were originally given political credibility with the promise of lifeline services and rising block tariffs in the Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994, the ANC’s campaign platform in the first democratic election. They were partially incorporated in the 1996 Constitution, which guarantees that ‘everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being ... everyone has the right to have access to healthcare services, including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and social security’.

The World Bank immediately became the most effective opponent of this philosophical principle and political strategy, arguing (incorrectly) that South Africa does not have sufficient resources to make good on the RDP or Constitution. Beginning by drafting infrastructure investment policy in late 1994, Bank staff then played a self-described ‘instrumental’ role in ‘facilitating a radical revision in South Africa’s approach to bulk water management’ in 1995, when the water minister, Kader Asmal, accepted advice not to supply South Africans with free water.

To reiterate a key point, the main criticism of a free lifeline and rising block tariff offered by Bank water official John Roome was that water privatisation contracts ‘would be much harder to establish’ if poor consumers had the expectation of getting something for nothing. If consumers didn’t pay, Roome continued, Asmal needed a ‘credible threat of cutting service’.³⁴ In short, a private supplier logically objects to serving low-income people with even a small lifeline consumption

amount. Hence the demand for such a rising block tariff is indeed, as Roome pointed out, a serious deterrent to privatisation.

Demands to reverse the government’s full cost-recovery policy by labour and social movements were made during the late 1990s, and Asmal’s mid-1999 replacement, Kasrils, began hinting at a policy change in February 2000 after rural water projects broke down at a dramatic rate--mainly because impoverished residents could not keep the vital service maintained by themselves without a subsidy, as Asmal had demanded. When cholera broke out in August 2000, less than four months before nation-wide municipal elections, the ANC government reacted by promising a free services lifeline. It was progress, although for poor households the promise was half the amount needed, and for electricity was undefined but in practice amounted to only a tenth of essential needs.

As might have been predicted, Roome and his colleagues saw Kasrils’ and the ANC’s free-services promise as potentially dangerous. In March 2000, the Bank’s Orwellian-inspired *Sourcebook on Community Driven Development in the Africa Region* laid out the policy on pricing water: ‘Work is still needed with political leaders in some national governments to move away from the concept of free water for all ... Promote increased capital cost recovery from users. An upfront cash contribution based on their willingness-to-pay is required from users to demonstrate demand and develop community capacity to administer funds and tariffs. Ensure 100% recovery of operation and maintenance costs’.³⁵

Social disasters from such rigid neoliberal policy were strewn across Africa, especially when low-income people simply could not afford any state services, or cut back on girls’ schooling or healthcare when cost recovery became burdensome. In October 2000, the Bank was instructed by the US Congress never to impose these user-fee provisions on education and healthcare, and in 2002 a campaign by progressive NGOs in the US expanded to decommodify water as well.

In South Africa, since free water came into effect in July 2001 as official policy--notwithstanding widespread sabotage by municipal and national bureaucrats responsible for administering the policy--there have been no new water privatisations, in large part due to the fear that cherry-picking and supply cuts will be deemed unconstitutional. Moreover, some of the major pilot cases have resulted in disaster.

For example, Saur had to renegotiate its Dolphin Coast contract in mid-2001 due to lack of profits, with research showing that it regularly denies services to poor people. For similar reasons, Saur also pulled out of its Maputo, Mozambique contract in late 2001. Having been thrown out of Fort Beaufort (also known as Nkonkobe), Suez’s subsidiary is responding with a lawsuit for millions of dollars in damages.

The Johannesburg Water Company, also managed by Suez, is controversially introducing pit latrines in spite of porous soil and the spread of the E.Coli bacteria, to prevent poor people flushing their toilets. If these are unacceptable, Johannesburg Water offers a low-flush ‘shallow sewage’ system to residents of ‘condominium’ (single-storey) houses arranged in rows, connected to each other by sanitation pipes much closer to the surface. Given the limited role of gravity in the gradient and the mere trickle of water that flows through, community residents are required to negotiate with each other, over who will physically unblock sewers every three months. With this sort of attitude, public health problems, including mass outbreaks of diarrhoea and even cholera, will continue to embarrass officials in the WSSD host city.

Electricity privatisation also remains an acute source of conflict. The SECC continues to hold protests against politicians who insist that the inclement privatisation of the state electricity utility, Eskom, requires cutoffs of power to those who can’t pay. At one point in 2001, when Eskom was cutting the supplies of 20,000 Soweto households each month, activists went door-to-door like Robin Hood, illegally reconnecting people for free. The SECC achieved folk-hero status as a result.

The other acute embarrassment for the South African government remains its fear of

alienating international pharmaceutical companies. Hence Mbeki maintains an Aids-denialist posture, claiming that antiretroviral medicines are either too toxic or that they don't work. But the same spirit of decommodification has emerged from the TAC and its international allies like the Aids Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), *Medicins sans Frontieres* and Oxfam. Like activists demanding free water and electricity, the Campaign has also hit the barrier of transnational (and local) corporate power.

The same conflicts were imported into the broader WSSD process, beginning at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Privatisation of basic services is moving ahead at great speed globally, under the rubric of Public-Private Partnerships. *Nepad* was drafted by a team under Mbeki's direction, and also calls for a massive dose of foreign investment in privatised infrastructure. If African leaders genuinely embrace the neoliberal plan, which would simply extend the economic policies that have ravaged the continent the past two decades, the most powerful water privatisers and Eskom would be the main beneficiaries. Mbeki won official endorsements of the plan at both the June 2002 summit of the G8 leaders in Alberta, Canada and the July launch of the Africa Union in Durban. Demonstrations by anti-capitalists from African and Canadian social movements embarrassed Mbeki at each event, leading him to brand the criticisms 'easy, routine, uninformed and cynical'.³⁶

Towards green socialism?

The green and red critiques reviewed above come together in Johannesburg. What the South African experience these last few years shows, is that full cost-recovery doesn't work and will be resisted, especially if combined with cutoffs of services. Those services create additional social welfare in the form of public/merit goods, but only if they are not privatised because solely the state--if it genuinely represents society--has an in-built incentive to use services like water and electricity to promote public health, gender equity, environmental protection and economic spin-offs.

Not only do privatisers ignore public goods, they are also inevitably opposed to free lifeline supplies and redistributive pricing. Hence, as so many South Africans have learned these last few years, the fight against privatisation is also a fight to decommodify the basic services we all need, simply to stay alive. And by winning that fight, there is a chance that the state can be won over to its logical role: serving the democratically determined needs and aspirations of that huge majority for whom the power of capital has become a profound threat to social and environmental well-being.

The socialist strategy has always entailed making profound demands--in some discourses, 'a transitional programme' and in others, 'non-reformist reforms'--upon the capitalist state. When invariably the *class power* of capital is challenged in the process, no matter how feasible the demands are in fiscal/administrative respects, the question of socialist revolution inexorably emerges. The demands for decommodification are popular, sane, logical and backed by solid democratic organisation.

On behalf of capital, the state must resist, and the South African state has typically done so by deploying the rhetoric of globalisation. Recall, for example, the quote by Chippy Olver, manager of the WSSD process for the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Previously, when he was the state's infrastructure policy director, Olver was confronted by the first round of demands that subsidies be used to help low-income people get free electricity, instead of helping megapolluters like the Alusaf smelter. Rejecting the request, Olver made clear the nature of the class struggle ahead: 'If we increase the price of electricity to users like Alusaf, their products will become uncompetitive and that will affect our balance of payments'.³⁷

Where does that leave those arguing for traditions of human rights, decommodification and socialism-from-below? In coming months and years, four sorts of tasks present themselves:

- link up the demands and campaigns for free services, medicines and universal-entitlement income grants;
- translate these from the spheres of consumption to production, beginning with creative renationalisation of privatised services, restructured municipal work, expansion of the nascent cooperative sector and establishment of state-driven local generic drug manufacturing;
- strengthen the basis for longer-term alliances between poor and working people, that are in the first instance rooted in civil society and that probably within the next decade will also be taken up by a mass workers’ party; and
- regionalise and internationalise these principles, strategies and tactics, just as Pretoria politicians and Johannesburg capital intensify their subimperialist ambitions across Africa, using concepts of deglobalisation and the formula of internationalism plus the nation-state.

One very hopeful sign of the last is the emergence of Anti-Privatisation Forums in the three largest South African cities and, in mid-2002, in Mbabane, Swaziland and Harare and Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. In each, mass-democratic activist groups are at the core, supported by explicitly socialist activists, as well as organised socialist revolutionaries. Third World debt repudiation and campaigns to kick out the World Bank and IMF, supported by the growing movement around the world to defund the Bank through the Bonds Boycott tactic, are common starting points.

Additionally, the more that South African subimperialism emerges as a key problem, the more unity these movements will find in common opponents. The Southern African People’s Solidarity Network is one of the main vehicles for ideological development. The African Social Forum will also continue expanding through debt, trade, environment and other sectoral networks.³⁸

The terrain is, therefore, being prepared for a deep-rooted challenge to capitalism. Aside from short-term splits over divided loyalties to exhausted political parties, which can be expected not only in South Africa but in many sites of African struggle, the prospects for unity between radical communities, labour, women, environmentalists and health activists have never been greater. The kinds of internationalist, anti-capitalist sentiments that rocked Europe during 2002 and scared so many globo-elites in their summits and conferences in prior years are becoming rooted in at least some Southern African soils. Through growing direct links to similar grassroots campaigns in places as diverse as Accra, Cochabamba, Narmada Valley and Porto Alegre, the struggle to decommodify life has enormous potential to grow from autonomous sites of struggle like Soweto into a full-fledged socialist movement. But that terrain also contains potholes which have to be recognised and filled in.

Uneven eco-socialist politics

In my book, I seek to document the great hope that has been sown through the seeds of some recent social justice struggles occurring at various scales:

- the living *body* of the HIV-positive individual--for example, one of millions of South African rape victims--facing a fatal disease, but through intense struggle against even president Mbeki, winning antiretroviral medicines to hold Aids at bay;
- the *household*, where the woman celebrates a preliminary victory in the campaign for free lifeline water and electricity;
- the Soweto *neighbourhood* that successfully resists service cuts through anti-disconnection activism;
- the *metropolitan-wide* campaigning that tentatively began, for example, in Nelson Mandela

- Metropole against the Coega port/smelter and that must deepen across South Africa, in favour of more progressive economic development, and against the Coegas of the world;
- policy debates that typically occur at the *nation-state* scale, which progressives can win not through technicist inputs but rather through mass mobilisation, direct action and humiliation of the neoliberal state;
 - *regional* African cross-border grassroots alliances, such as those prefigured by the growing resistance to Nepad, or through, for example, the Lesotho dam struggles that bring together peasants and workers to seek joint green and brown solutions; and
 - *global-scale* protests against an international elite that, faced with eco-social crises such as water scarcity and global warming, attempt to revitalise capitalism by making profits out of resource trading.

But it would be unfair to conclude without once again noting some of the philosophical and practical pitfalls of green-red consciousness. Some pitfalls fall away when we take the limits of the eco-social justice movement and consider their relevance to particular scales, instead of invoking full-fledged universalism. That strategy gets us beyond the constraints of localism and the utopianism of global-reformism.

Other divisions disappear when alliances form against the ‘green business’ approach. That philosophy was concisely articulated in 1989 by three authors associated with Anglo American Corporation, mixing neoliberal principles with sustainable development rhetoric:

We must make the free enterprise system market mechanism work for us and use it to guide research and development and technological innovation. The last thing one wants is to have these functions micro-managed by government. The taxpayer has traditionally borne the brunt of the costs of environmental damage. This burden could now become an opportunity for profit for the imaginative investor in new technologies.³⁹

Much of the counter-hegemonic challenge is to continue expanding our scientific knowledge so that glib opportunity for profit strategies--also known as ‘green imperialism’--are no longer so readily adopted by policy-makers. To do that requires, in part, that we establish dialectical-strategic directions which we began identifying above, so that the *conceptual* barriers that keep the critical ecology movements of various types apart, can in future be taken away.

Recall that Andrew Jamison posited four types of environmentalism: civic work on campaigns and social ecology; professional interventions based upon science and law; militant direct action; and personal environmentalism. We had little or no experience, in our studies, with the fourth. The first could be said to encompass the work of Mandela Metropole community activists fighting Coega, Basotho peasants and Alexandra campaigners who oppose Lesotho mega-dams for Johannesburg’s hedonistic water consumers, and the most forward-looking leaders from municipal unions and advocacy-oriented NGOs who argued for the human right to services.

The second category includes many of us here today: namely, academic supporters of eco-social change activism and NGO-based technical experts, who try to provide intellectual buttressing to the popular organisations. The third is exemplified by Soweto electricity activists, who, regrettably, are amongst the few genuinely victorious forces working the sustainable development terrain. Their reconnection campaign, though dangerous, at least put an end to electricity cut offs in late 2001. Militancy pays, it seems, because mild-mannered lobbying and project- or policy-wonk inputs by experts are, simply, incapable of raising the cost of business-as-usual.

That leads us, in Table 2, to Jamison’s typology of how the dichotomy between green

business and critical ecology, which we observed in many ways in the case studies above, can be transcended.

Table 2 Dialectics of environmentalisms and eco-socialism⁴⁰

terrain	green business	critical ecologies	eco-socialism
type of agency	TNCs, states and global agencies	environmentalists and green NGOs	hybrid red-green networks
forms of action	commercial, brokerage	popularisation, resistance	exemplary mobilisation
ideal of ‘science’	theoretical, expert	factual, lay	situated, contextual
knowledge sources	disciplines	traditions	experiences
competencies	professional	personal	synthetic

In the first row, Jamison concedes that green business can sometimes, perhaps often, co-opt environmentalism into the nexus of capital accumulation, using concepts of sustainable development. The critical ecology movements resist, drawing upon concepts of environmental justice. But the battle of environmentalists and green NGOs against TNCs, states and global agencies will not succeed without a dialectical advance to the next stage: hybrid red-green networks. Examples are found in South Africa, from Mandela Metropole to Lesotho-Alexandra to Soweto, though not without limitations.

As for emblematic forms of action, the commercial, brokerage functions of green business come into direct cultural conflict with the repertoire of resistance tactics utilised by the eco-social justice activists. The eco-socialist project, in contrast, has to advance to the stage of what Jamison terms ‘exemplary mobilisation’, in which the ideas that ‘Another World is Possible’ and ‘Socialism is the future, build it today’ become more than the slogans of Porto Alegre and the SACP, and take on real meaning.

Intellectual buttressing remains crucial, and hence the ideal articulation of ‘science’ is also worth dwelling upon briefly. We have, this morning, spent inordinate time considering discourses, ranging from the ‘theoretical, expert’ inputs--no matter how flawed in reality--of promoters working from a green business standpoint, to the factual and lay languages of activists. What we must seek, I want to argue, is to build upon the second by defying the first, and achieving a situated, contextual science. The knowledge sources that undergird such efforts are typically divided into the technical disciplines of green business, the political traditions of eco-social justice, and the transcendental experiences of the eco-socialist project. As for the terrain of competencies, the green-business suits claim professionalism; the critical ecologists invoke personal commitment; and eco-socialists strive for a synthetic understanding of personal, professional and, above all, political.

With a similar grasp of the dialectic challenge, one of the leading contemporary historical materialists, David Harvey, insists that eco-socialist programmes must be explicitly forward-looking, and hence must

deal in the material and institutional issues of how to organise production and distribution in general, how to confront the realities of global power politics and how to displace the hegemonic powers of capitalism not simply with dispersed, autonomous, localised, and essentially communitarian solutions (apologists for

which can be found on both right and left ends of the political spectrum), but with a rather more complex politics that recognises how environmental and social justice must be sought by a rational ordering of activities at different scales.⁴¹

What this requires is that we think more broadly about how society should manage its inherited environment. The rational ordering of South Africa’s space economy must be considered one of the fundamental starting points for future attacks on the irrational socio-ecological utilisation--really, despoliation--of natural resources more generally.

Settlement patterns in question

A good place to start such consideration is the South African city, of which Johannesburg is surely the worst offender. Harvey remarks,

If biocentric thinking is correct and the boundary between human activity and ecosystemic activities must be collapsed, then this means not only that ecological processes have to be incorporated into our understanding of social life: it also means that flows of money and of commodities and the transformative actions of human beings (in the building of urban systems, for example) have to be understood as fundamentally ecological processes.

The environmental justice movement, with its emphasis upon marginalised and impoverished populations exposed to hazardous ecological circumstances, freely acknowledges these connections. Many of the issues with which it is confronted are specifically urban in character. Consequently, the principles it has enunciated include the mandate to address environmental justice in the city by the cleaning up and rebuilding of urban environments.⁴²

This line of thinking takes us immediately to, but also far beyond, the questions raised above, over how cities are allocated their share of natural resources. Although it is vital not to assume any anti-urban sentiments (as do many ecological radicals), we have arrived at a position where it is only honest to address the ecological discourse established a century and a half ago in Marx and Engels’ *Communist Manifesto*. There we find the call for a ‘gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the populace over the country’.

Johannesburg was born, after all, merely because of the discovery in 1886 of gold, that centuries-old relic of faithlessness in the value of money. But is Johannesburg’s future golden or grim? There are now more industrial substitutes for gold. In the wake of dramatic financial market turbulence since the mid-1990s, the luxury consumption market for gold jewellery is unreliable. It is difficult to achieve profitable yields from ever-deeper mining operations. South African gold mining remains ecologically offensive, and particularly water-polluting. Add labour-related factors such as health, safety and migrancy, and there should be no geographical or locational grounds for Johannesburg continuing as South Africa’s economic heartland over coming decades and centuries. Agglomerations of industry, particularly the outdated overcapacity that characterises uncompetitive Gauteng manufacturing, offer little basis for economic strength in a more flexible era based increasingly on the South African government’s strategy, albeit a failure thus far, to promote export-oriented growth. It should be logical for Johannesburg gradually to decline, much like a Detroit or other rust belt towns.

If the response to Johannesburg’s decline is the construction of a more humane system of production, it will require more than transcending the potent Minerals-Energy Complex that

continues to prove so ecologically and economically self-destructive. At one point recently, South Africa promised a far greater degree of political capacity to shift production systems not only sectorally into more ‘sustainable’, redistributive systems (such as using relatively de-commodified, basic-needs infrastructure as the basis for kick-starting more balanced economic development), but also geographically.

As the ANC RDP mandated in 1994, ‘Macroeconomic policies must take into consideration their effect upon the geographic distribution of economic activity. Additional strategies must address the excessive growth of the largest urban centres, the skewed distribution of population within rural areas, the role of small and medium-sized towns, and the future of declining towns and regions, and the apartheid dumping grounds’.⁴³ Amongst many other RDP promises, this was immediately broken in government’s 1995 *Draft Urban Development Strategy*:

The country’s largest cities are not excessively large by international standards, and the rates of growth of the various tiers also appear to be normal. Hence there appears to be little reason to favour policies which may artificially induce or restrain growth in a particular centre, region or tier ... The growth rate is sufficiently normal to suggest that effective urban management is possible and there is, therefore, no justification for interventionist policies which attempt to prevent urbanisation.⁴⁴

Indeed, because ‘South Africa’s cities are more than ever strategic sites in a transnationalised production system’ the debate has to be joined by a wider questioning of South Africa’s insertion in the international division of labour.⁴⁵ The same challenge can be posed of many Southern African cities, according to Swatuk:

All of these patterns of settlement and attendant problems are exaggerated in the context of apartheid engineering, replicated to a large degree in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and to varying degrees in Botswana, Swaziland and Zambia: alienation of fertile land and the creation of plantation agriculture; forced removals of indigenous people and their relocation to arid ‘homelands’; the creation of ill- or non-serviced ‘locations’ which in the beginning were little more than dormitories for cheap labour.

Moreover, this ‘crush’ of people in barren environs was made all the worse in the post-colonial and post-apartheid periods as the movement of indigenous people was no longer restricted. Families from the rural areas joined husbands and fathers in the townships and ‘high-density suburbs’; many others made the trek to urban areas in search of work. At the same time, the early post-apartheid period saw a large influx of Africans from beyond the SADC region into the urban and peri-urban areas.

Changing global structures of production and South African state-makers’ attempts to find a neoliberal solution to them have also exacerbated settlement problems in the region. Countries which had long supplied labour to the mines and farms of South Africa in recent years have seen the return of tens of thousands of these citizens, retrenched as the South African mining industry continues to restructure. So, cities like Blantyre and Maseru are increasingly overrun with the newly unemployed and displaced.

Taken together, what these facts reveal is water security for the few and insecurity for the many. As stated at the outset of this paper, this is a ‘crisis’ that is socially constructed. Its roots are historical, the result of deliberate actions taken in the service of settler and colonial interests. Its contemporary manifestations result

from a combination of continuing elite privilege, shallow social and physical science, and the collective actions of millions of people responding ‘logically’ to abiding conditions of poverty and underdevelopment.⁴⁶

A revolution is surely required to right these eco-social wrongs. Harvey concludes his analysis of environmental justice discourses by noting that “There is a long and arduous road to travel to take the environmental justice movement beyond the phase of rhetorical flourishes, media successes, and symbolic politics, into a world of strong coherent political organising and practical revolutionary action”.⁴⁷

That too might be the key lesson to be learnt from the most conceptually advanced of the environmental justice struggles considered above. Alexandra residents protested against the neoliberal South African state’s prioritising of ‘development’, which in practical terms meant an awesome distributional bias towards big corporations and wealthy (mainly white) consumers. That imbalance was exacerbated by the state deploying merely token strategies to redirect water. In retrospect, the protest brought mainly a momentary conscientisation value to the water struggle.

Other approaches failed as well. Though necessary, reformist and technicist critiques of the LHWP, advanced by civic groups and technical experts via the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1998, were insufficient to foster real momentum for change, or to more decisively generate the alliances required for a broader--brown-green, urban-rural--critique of environmental injustice. The only alternatives left are practical but no less revolutionary: anti-capitalist analysis, demands and organising.

4. Conclusion

Since the early 1970s, the world has witnessed three broad discourses emerging around environmental management: neoliberalism, sustainable development and eco-social justice. The area between these is sometimes grey, and partisans often move fitfully--often largely rhetorically--between the camps. But the studies of existing environmental conditions in South Africa and of the emblematic policy and project case studies, give us a sense of how these discourses played out in a country characterised by a dramatic political power shift in 1994, but also by residual economic domination by corporate interests and a surprising degree of ideological adherence to the Washington Consensus world-view.

What underlies the discourses, however, is not only material interest but also political power to transform a particular discourse into a hegemonic discourse. What this means, concretely, is that South Africa is replete with radical intentions based on a highly politicised history and the obvious legacies of apartheid-capitalism on the one hand, with centrist bargaining fora and severely compromised legislative processes on the other; and in their most concrete manifestations, in actual cases of environmental management, extremely conservative policies and practices reflecting, above all, the dominance of major economic actors.

This is all widely understood, and does not go unchallenged. One expression of the implications of uneven political power relations for moral discourses about environmental management was provided by Constitutional Court judge Albie Sachs: ‘People who have washing machines have no right to condemn others who dirty streams with their laundry. Those who summon up energy with the click of a switch should hesitate before denouncing persons who denude forests in search of firewood. It is undeniably distasteful to spend huge sums on saving the white rhino when millions of black children are starving’.⁴⁸

And yet the privileges and prejudices of elites and of those companies which still wish

society to take the overall burden of externalised environmental costs remain in place. It is in this sense that to firmly address the generation of socio-ecological inequality and the failure of South Africa to even achieve a modicum of ‘sustainable development’ can be traced not just to existing power relations but further, to the capitalist mode of production. The *structural* relationship between the capitalist mode of production and environmental crisis, and the need to articulate such a relationship in policy, legislation and concrete practice, is explained by Paul Burkett:

Mainstream environmentalism bypasses the connections between capitalism’s social relations of production and the system’s tendency to devour, dispose of, and degrade nature to the point of threatening the basic conditions of human-material reproduction. Sustainable development, we are told, can be achieved via state policies (so-called ‘green’ tax/subsidy schemes and other technical fixes) and changes in individual behavior (recycling, marketing and consumption of more ecologically correct products, etc.) without changing the class relations between people and necessary conditions of their material reproduction. The assumption here is that eco-destruction is an inessential ‘externality’ of capitalism which does not fundamentally implicate the system’s essential relations of class-exploitation and competition.⁴⁹

Notwithstanding South Africa’s rights-based rhetoric and various attempts to tinker with environmental management problems through technical, market-oriented solutions, two factors are obvious: the imperatives of ecological exploitation and the impossibility of more fundamental reversals of environmental degradation. In contrast, an eco-socialist perspective starts with the very ingredient missing from virtually all post-apartheid government initiatives: popular mobilisation. In this sense, the issues associated with the survival of society’s oppressed communities can only be understood and tackled through an increasing convergence of green, brown, feminist, racial/ethnic justice, and class politics--or, militant particularisms, as Raymond Williams and David Harvey describes them.

That kind of serious environmentalism, Harvey insists, must claim the broadest appropriate terrain as its mandate, including cultural and spiritual features of ecological and social life, and seek to rationally reorder the space economy in a way that directly confronts capitalism’s neoliberal discourses:

The reinsertion of ‘rational ordering’ indicates that such a movement will have no option, as it broadens out from its militant particularist base, but to reclaim for itself a noncoopted and nonperverted version of the theses of ecological modernisation. On the one hand that means subsuming the highly geographically differentiated desire for cultural autonomy and dispersion, for the proliferation of tradition and difference within a more global politics, but on the other hand making the quest for environmental and social justice central rather than peripheral concerns.

For that to happen, the environmental justice movement has to radicalise the ecological modernisation discourse.⁵⁰

As neoliberal economic orthodoxy continues to prevail in so many areas of South African environment and development, and as sustainable-development discourses, policies and legislation fall far short of resolving the interlocking crises, it is to more radical confrontations with powerful forces that South Africa’s eco-social justice movements inexorably will be drawn. All of us hope to track these, because the South African movements have continued to successfully call forth local citizen activism and generous international solidarity with a simple appeal: ‘Another World is

‘Something for Nothing’ in ‘Sustainable Development’

Possible!!--but only if you join us!

Notes

1. Sachs, J. and D. Bloom (1998), ‘Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa’, presented at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington, September.
2. Adapted and updated from Bond, P. (2001), *Against Global Apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance*, Cape Town, UCT Press, pp. 94-95.
3. In South Africa, representatives of overlapping Washington-centric constituencies included not only the neoliberal ANC officials, but also political representatives of big business and white wealth (Tony Leon and Nigel Bruce), high-profile pro-liberalisation bank economists (Danie Roodt and Iraj Abedian), consultants (Reg Rumney), think-tank leaders (Greg Mills and Ann Bernstein), and convivial newspaper editorialists (Peter Bruce and Howard Barrell). Remarkably, although the invariably white male beneficiaries of apartheid were periodically accused of speaking to their own book, the 2000-01 currency crisis led many of them to call for yet more financial liberalisation, paid for by a new IMF loan that would allow yet more apartheid-era wealth to be liberated. *Business Day*’s Bruce was an especially avid proponent.
4. *Left Business Observer*, February 2000.
5. The main point is that ‘asymmetry’ between market players can lead to large-scale distortions--and hence Stiglitz-style policy prescriptions are generally limited to more transparency, more competition and a bit more government regulation to eliminate those distortions.
6. Economists Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Krugman stand out.
7. Occasionally, the main South African representatives--Mbeki, Manuel, Erwin, Finance director-general Maria Ramos and Reserve Bank governor Tito Mboweni--spoke out on the need for international reform.
8. In October 1998, Sweeney endorsed an \$18 billion US taxpayer bailout of the IMF which needed more funds to, in turn, bail out New York and London banks trapped during the 1997-99 ‘emerging markets crisis.’ A year later, he supported the explicitly imperialist US trade strategy organised by Bill Clinton just prior to Seattle, which fortunately tens of thousands of protesters and the African delegation scuppered. In Seattle, Sweeney marched at least 25,000 US workers *away from*--rather than towards--the convention centre confrontation.
9. Aida Parker and a network of right-wing conspiracy theorists in South Africa were traditionally comfortable amongst this crowd, as were many Afrikaner *verkerampies*.
10. In South Africa, Kgalema Motlanthe and Joel Netshitenzhe were important nationalists, as was Mbeki on occasion, such as Non-Aligned Movement, G-77 and similar gatherings.
11. At Seattle, the Organisation of African Unity caucus issued a statement withdrawing consensus: ‘There is no transparency in the proceedings and African countries are being marginalised.’ African trade expert Yash Tandon (1999:18) reported on Zimbabwe’s role immediately after the OAU revolt: ‘Now in panic, the US State Department sent its most skilled negotiators to pacify the Africans. They tried to co-opt Zimbabwe’s industry minister [Nathan Shamuyarira] (by now identified as the chief spokesperson for the Africa group) into the process by offering to consider a draft declaration that would satisfy the Africans. This was the first serious effort made by the US to bring in the Africans. However, the Zimbabwe minister was not persuaded, and he refused to join in the ‘Green Room’ consultations.’
12. <http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/DEBT/unrest.htm>.
13. *Financial Times*, 10 October 2001. For a more paternalist and uncomprehending version, see the open letter by Belgian prime minister and European Union president Guy Verhofstadt (2001).
14. Sachs, W. (Ed)(2002), *The Jo’burg Memorandum for the World Summit on Sustainable Development: Fairness in a Fragile World*, Berlin, <http://www.boell.de>
15. Discussions of these discourses which I find persuasive can be found in Harvey, D. (1996), *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, Chapter 13; and Jamison, A. (2001), *The Making of Green Knowledge: Environmental Politics and Cultural Transformation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
16. Fine, B. and Z. Rustomjee (1996), *The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to Industrialisation*, London, Christopher Hirst and Johannesburg, Wits University Press.
17. Bond, P. (2000), *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*, London, Pluto and Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, Chapter One.
18. Similar trends were observed for the two other black race groups: from 26% of ‘coloured’ people living in households under the bread line (R755/month) in 1993, the ratio rose to 29% in 2001 (due to inflation, the bread line was R1270/month); and Indian proportions were 8% in 1993 and 11% in 2001. Only 3% of white households were poor in 1993, and 4% in 2001 (*Focus* 26, Second quarter 2002).
19. Cited in *The Economist*, 8 February 1992; the memo is available at <http://www.whirledbank.org>.
20. Versions of the neoliberal economic discourse include the Wise Use movement and other arguments that place private property relations first and foremost in the ordering of society. Slight differences in the discourses mainly reflect debates over time periods and methods of valuation.
21. *New York Times*, 22 March 1998. An excellent discussion is provided in Ruiters, G. (2002), ‘The Economics and Mechanics of

Public Private Partnerships’, forthcoming Municipal Services Project *Occasional Paper*, drawn from Ruiters’ PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 2002.

22. Asmal, K. (1998), ‘Policy Directions of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry’, Letter to the author, Pretoria, 8 May, p. 1.

23. Roome, J. (1995), ‘Water Pricing and Management: World Bank Presentation to the SA Water Conservation Conference’, unpublished paper, South Africa, 2 October.

24. *Mail & Guardian*, 22 November 1996.

25. Such contingent valuation strategies often attempt to measure ‘willingness to pay’ in the absence of a functioning market. These studies, performed on human guinea pigs in South African during the late 1990s so as to determine how to price water, are exceptionally pernicious. They are one of the contributing factors to the callousness of the full cost-recovery ideology, especially the World Bank, that is explored in Chapters Three-Five.

26. Foster, J. (2002), *Ecology against Capitalism*, New York, Monthly Review Press, pp. 31-32.

27. Daly, author of the seminal *Steady State Economics* (1991, Washington, Island Press) worked with Robert Costanza to found the subdiscipline and journal *Ecological Economics*, and, with John Cobb coauthored, *For the Common Good* (1994, Boston, Beacon Press). The quotes below are drawn from Daly, H. (1996), *Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development*, Boston, Beacon Press, pp. 220,9,88-93.

28. Republic of South Africa (1996), *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, Act 108 of 1996, Cape Town, s.24.a, s.27.1).

29. RSA, *The Constitution*, s.24.b, emphasis added.

30. RSA, *The Constitution*, s.25.1.

31. Publishers are University of Natal Press (Pietermaritzburg), Merlin Press (London) and Africa World Press (Trenton).

32. Jamison, *The Making of Green Knowledge*, Chapter One.

33. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

34. Roome, J. (1995), ‘Water Pricing and Management: World Bank Presentation to the SA Water Conservation Conference’, unpublished paper, South Africa, 2 October.

35. World Bank (2000), *Sourcebook on Community Driven Development in the Africa Region: Community Action Programs*, Africa Region, Washington, DC, 17 March (signatories: Calisto Madavo, Jean-Louis Sarbib), Annex 2.

36. *Business Report*, 4 July 2002.

37. *Mail & Guardian*, 22-28 November 1996.

38. <http://www.aidc.org.za>

39. Huntley, B., R.Siegfried and C.Sunter (1989), *South African Environments into the Twenty-first Century*, Cape Town, Human and Rousseau Tafelburg, p. 35. For a similar techno-fix approach to environmental problems (in an otherwise extremely compelling period analysis), see Clarke, J. (1991), *Back to Earth: South Africa’s Environmental Challenges*, Johannesburg, Southern Book Publishers.

40. Adapted from Jamison, A. (2001), *The Making of Green Knowledge: Environmental Politics and Cultural Transformation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

41. Harvey, D. (1996), *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 400-401.

42. Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, p. 392.

43. ANC/Alliance (1994), *Reconstruction and Development Programme*, Johannesburg, Section 4.3.4.

44. Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (1995), *Draft Urban Development Strategy*, Pretoria, p. 9.

45. Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, *Draft Urban Development Strategy*, p. 41.

46. Swatuk, ‘The New Water Architecture in Southern Africa’.

47. Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, p. 402.

48. Sachs, A. (1990), *Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa*, Cape Town, Oxford University Press.

49. Burkett, P. (1995), ‘Capitalization Versus Socialization of Nature’, *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism*, 6, 4, p. 92.

50. Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, p. 401.